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BIENVENIDO Q. BAISAS, O.F.M.

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

Dear Readers! All past and forthcoming issues of *Landas*, the academic journal of Loyola School of Theology in the Philippines, will now be available for free to the public. Visit the LST Publications Office website at publications.lst.edu to download issues of *Landas*, Loyola Papers, and other publications.

While the COVID-19 pandemic likewise affected the publication of our journal, we look constructively to the future as Loyola School of Theology establishes its own Publications Office, which likewise manages *Landas* as an independent serial. In this context, the editorial board decided to publish articles in the sequence in which they are submitted, peer-reviewed, and accepted. As a result, the current issue of *Landas* picks up at Vol. 35 No. 1 (2023).

In the present volume, **Julius-Kei Kato** examines the validity of the Christian confession uttered in the name "Jesus Christ" through the lenses of Edward Schillebeeckx and Robert Funk. The author maintains that despite a seeming discontinuity between the name Jesus and the title of Christ, Schillebeeckx's view that there is an essential interrelatedness between them and the creedal Christ is "deeply rooted in the experience of salvation" (27) that people have experienced in Jesus.

Thomas Sherman, S.J. demonstrates that according to Martin Buber, "we can address and be addressed by God as our eternal *You* vis-à-vis each other in *willing* to encounter each other as *You*, in *believing* in our own individual reality as standing apart from each other within

the context of a religious destiny, and in being open to the *grace* of our mutual response" (29). Sherman contends that we can indeed conclude that for Buber, "in addressing and being addressed by God as the eternal *You* in our addressing and being addressed" as *You* by each other, "the reciprocity characteristic of all human *I-You* relations finds its completion in the *I-You* relation between human beings and God" (66).

Anatoly Angelo R. Aseneta expounds Joseph Cardinal Bernardin's Consistent Ethic of Life (CEL) as a "moral vision that can be used to uphold consistently the value and dignity of human life in all its stages and circumstances" (69). The author argues that "reframing Bernardin's CEL in the light of the crisis of our common home and with the help of integral ecology also means restructuring its rather anthropocentric foundations and principles" (92). For him, "instead of undermining the foundational principles of human dignity and the sanctity of human life, a reframed CEL enriches these by placing them in the larger context of our relationship with God, with one another, and with the rest of creation" (93).

James H. Kroeger, M.M. deepens our reading of Pope Francis's first major document *Evangelii Gaudium* as a "blueprint for the missionary renewal of the Church as it seeks to proclaim the Gospel in today's world" (110). Kroeger argues that the scope of *Evangelii Gaudium* is "remarkably comprehensive" and concludes that "any commentary on the original document pales in comparison to an actual meditative reading of its contents" (110).

Finally, **Bienvenido Q. Baisas, O.F.M.** poses a challenge to the Catholic Biblical Association of the Philippines to inculturate our Filipino faith in our local language—Tagalog. The author contends that Mitchell Dahood, S.J.'s *magnum opus* (*Psalms I-III* in the Anchor Bible series) "should serve us as a model in the mission of translating not only the Psalms but also the other poetic parts of the TaNaK" (113). Baisas exemplifies such an endeavor in the translation of Psalm 109 based on the Hebrew text "in accord with the principles of NWS poetry developed by Dahood" (113).

Our special thanks go to Josemaria Roberto V. Reyes. Due to his forward-looking vision and tireless work, Loyola School of Theology has established a Publications Office that manages the production and distribution of *Landas*, *Loyola Papers*, LST Monographs, and the LST Dissertation Series, among others.

Dr. theol. Markus Locker, Ph.D.
Editor-in-Chief

Landas 35:1 (2023) 1–27

"JESUS | CHRIST" OR "JESUS—CHRIST"?

Robert Funk vis-à-vis Edward Schillebeeckx on the Link Between the Historical "Jesus" and Faith in Him as the "Christ"

Julius-Kei Kato

Abstract. This article will examine the validity of the most succinct Christian affirmation of faith expressed in the name "Jesus Christ" (*Hesu-Kristo* in Filipino), which means that "Jesus," the teacher-healer from Nazareth, is trusted to be "the Christ," the chosen messiah of God. We will do this by exploring whether there is a flowing and smooth connection between "Jesus" and "Christ" (to be represented as "Jesus—Christ") or if we should admit to some points of disconnect between the two names (to be expressed as "Jesus | Christ"—with the two terms separated by a vertical bar or "pipe"). We will focus on the work of Edward Schillebeeckx who posits a necessary and logical link between "Jesus" and "Christ," then compare and contrast his approach with that of Robert Funk (founder of the Jesus Seminar) who represents a position that poses an almost insurmountable divide between "Jesus" and "Christ."

Keywords. Edward Schillebeeckx; Robert Funk; Christology; Historical Jesus; Catholic approach to Christology

On the occasion of the 500th anniversary of the coming of Christianity to the Philippines, this author thought that it would be profitable to review a fundamental affirmation found at the heart of the Christian faith, one expressed simply—at the superficial level—by the name every Filipino is very familiar with: *Hesu-Kristo*. That is the Filipino way of expressing what in English is "Jesus Christ" or *Iesous Christos* in the (*koiné*) Greek of the New Testament. Although every Filipino "on the street" may easily identify those two names as referring to the central being in Christianity, fewer would know that *Hesu-Kristo* is actually the most succinct Christian profession of faith found in the religious tradition brought to the Philippines by the Spanish *conquistadores* 500 years ago, namely, that *Hesus*, the historical person originally from Nazareth, is *the one* Christians believe to be *ang Kristo* (the Christ), the anointed messiah of God who is Lord, Savior, and the very embodiment of God. This *Hesu-Kristo*, it is believed, shares the same divine nature with God, the Father, together with God, the Holy Spirit.

This article will examine the validity of this central Christian affirmation and explore whether there is indeed a flowing and smooth connection between *Hesus* and *Kristo* which we shall symbolize as "Jesus—Christ" or whether we should admit to some—shall we say—"points of disconnect" between the two names, to be expressed as "Jesus | Christ" (with the two names separated by a vertical bar or "pipe").

Detailed Goals and Scope of the Study

There has been a tremendous amount of research done on the historical Jesus ever since the so-called "third search" for the historical Jesus began in the 1980s.[1] A good deal of it has been research that concerns itself more strictly with historical problems and balks at

[1]A good, succinct account could be found in G. Theissen & A. Merz, *The Historical Jesus: A Comprehensive Guide* (London: SCM, 1998), 10–12. A relatively recent, excellent, and exhaustive compendium of the historical search for Jesus

treading explicitly on theological ground. This has been good in a way because it significantly advanced the discipline of history concerning Jesus and minimized the practice of pretending to write history while in reality advancing one's theological agenda, something the nineteenth-century writers of "lives of Jesus" have been frequently accused of doing.[2]

However, for the Christian and the Christian theologian, it is, in the final analysis, only with difficulty that one can reflect, research, and write on Jesus while being completely detached from any theological concern for the simple reason that the historical Jesus himself was a profoundly "theological" person—his words and deeds, his identity and ministry, and, yes, his very person are all very theological. Everything about Jesus was radically oriented to the reality Israel and the Christian church call "God" (*theos* in Greek, where "theology" comes from).

Besides, Jesus is at the heart of the Christian-Catholic faith which many of us profess and strive to ground, in as much as it is possible, on reason (with the help of the academic disciplines, particularly historical criticism). Therefore, going from the theme of "Jesus" (taken in its strict historical sense [i.e., Jesus as an historical person]) and proceeding from there to the theme of "Christ" (taken here with its faith overtones [i.e., who Jesus is for believers or—in the words of theologian Edward Schillebeeckx—the "decisive salvation from God"])[3] is not only very

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is T. Holmén & S. Porter, eds., *Handbook for the Study of the Historical Jesus*, 4 vols. (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2010).

[2]See especially A. Schweitzer, "The 'Liberal' Lives of Jesus," in *The Quest of the Historical Jesus: A Critical Study of Its Progress from Reimarus to Wrede* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, [reprinted in] 1998), Chapter xiv.

[3]See E. Schillebeeckx, *Interim Report on the Books Jesus & Christ* (New York: Crossroad, 1982), 28, hereafter referred to as *IR*. See also E. Schillebeeckx, *Church: The Human Story of God* (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 104–105, hereafter referred to as *CHU*, and J. Crossan, *Who is Jesus?* (New York: Harper Paperbacks, 1996), 176. For a classic explanation of this distinction between "Jesus" and "Christ," consult M. Kähler, *The So-Called Historical Jesus and the Historic, Biblical Christ* (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1964). For a view from the renewed new quest, see

much in order but actually a necessary move in systematic theology. Allow this author, then, to state what this study aims to do in light of the reflections above.

This article aims to be, in a broad sense, an exposition of "a" (i.e., one among many) Catholic approach to the person of Jesus Christ in the context of an ongoing interest in our times in the so-called "historical Jesus." To be more specific, it aims to study why the theme "Christ" (that is, how Jesus of Nazareth is acclaimed as "messiah" and "Lord" by the early Christians) is a *sine qua non* (Latin for "without which," i.e., necessary) development of the theme of the historical Jesus in any exposition of a faith that calls itself "Christian and Catholic."

To aid in this quest, this author will focus here on the work of the great Dominican conciliar theologian Edward Schillebeeckx (henceforward ES) and, in particular, on his monumental tome called, in English, *Jesus: An Experiment in Christology* (henceforward *JEC*) because this author thinks that, even after all these years (since the work was originally published in Dutch in 1974), it still deserves to be reflected upon for the many solid contributions it has made and can still make to the field of Christology, particularly in terms of its theological approach and hermeneutical insights.[4] This author will also make constant reference to ES's *Church: The Human Story of God* (henceforward *CHU*) because this work, although it purports to be

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M. Borg, "Seeing Jesus: Sources, Lenses, and Method," in M. Borg & N. Wright, *The Meaning of Jesus: Two Visions* (San Francisco: Harper, 1999), 6–8.

[4]Schillebeeckx passed away in 2009. See also E. Schillebeeckx, *Jesus: An Experiment in Christology* (New York: Crossroad, 1979), hereafter referred to as *JEC*. Two important and relatively recent works that should also be consulted about Schillebeeckx's theology are D. Rochford, "The Theological Hermeneutics of Edward Schillebeeckx," *Theological Studies* 63 (2002): 251–267 and L. Boeve, F. Depoortere, & S. van Erp, eds., *Edward Schillebeeckx and Contemporary Theology* (London: T&T Clark, 2010). See also Australian theologian O. Rush's tribute to Schillebeeckx's Jesus book: O. Rush, "Schillebeeckx's Piercing Inquiry Brought Jesus Alive," *National Catholic Reporter* (December 19, 2016), available at https://www.ncronline.org/blogs/ncr-today/schillebeeckxs-piercing-inquiry-brought-jesus-alive (accessed November 3, 2021).

an ecclesiology, contains a more updated statement of ES's views on Jesus Christ.

Schillebeeckx, to be noted at the outset, is a systematic theologian and not a biblical exegete. As such, he attempts in the abovementioned works to ground the discipline of Christology as firmly as possible in historical research and the best European biblical scholarship that was available at the time, although he does not stop there. His real concern is to show how the faith, which calls this Jesus of Nazareth "the Christ," is reasonable and can be accepted even by people in the contemporary world. In fact, the biblical scholar B. Viviano suggests that the original stimulus for writing *JEC* was to "save faith in the divinity of Jesus among advanced theological circles in the Netherlands" because many younger theologians at the time of Schillebeeckx's writing were becoming more convinced that, with the advent of modern biblical and historical research, faith in Jesus's divinity was fast becoming intellectually untenable.[5] The situation has not changed at present; we can even say that it has become only more acute, especially in the West, Schillebeeckx's original context.

The order in which this author will proceed in this article will be as follows: Some main principles of a "Catholic approach" to the topic will be delineated. This will be followed by a presentation of an example of research on the topic of the interrelatedness of "Jesus" and "Christ" that is radically different from and diametrically opposed to that of ES. This author refers to the work of the late biblical scholar Robert Funk, who is still a major figure in contemporary historical Jesus studies.[6] The purpose of this is to have a dialogue partner who holds,

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[5]B. Viviano, "Schillebeeckx's *Jesus* and *Christ*—Contributions to Christian Life," *Spirituality Today* 34:2 (1982), available at http://www.domcentral.org/library/spir2day/823424viviano.html.

[6]This is how historical Jesus studies scholar N. Wright categorizes Funk: he was part of the renewed new quest for the historical Jesus as opposed to the "third" quest. The latter is characterized by its emphasis on the Jewishness of Jesus, whereas the former presents an image of Jesus apparently detached from the Jewish cultural matrix. For a fuller discussion, see N. Wright, "Chapter 2:

as it were, an antithesis to ES's position. This, in turn, will facilitate a comparison and contrast as well as an evaluation of two diametrically opposed approaches vis-à-vis some principles of a characteristically Catholic approach to the subject. This author has chosen Robert Funk because he represents a very common position among scholars and non-scholars alike who pose an almost insurmountable divide between "Jesus" and "Christ," one we can represent as "Jesus | Christ." After reviewing Funk's position, this author will go on to state the main contours of ES's treatment of the topic. The article will conclude with an evaluation of what has been covered and how it showcases key factors of a characteristically Catholic approach to Christology.

Catholic Principles to Note

What are some essential principles of Catholicism that may have a direct bearing on our theme of the interrelatedness of "Jesus" and "Christ"? Based on the opening chapter of R. McBrien's *Catholicism* appropriately entitled "What is Catholicism?," this author proposes the principles of "communion," "tradition," and "analogy."[7]

One characteristic trait of Catholicism is communion. According to this principle, "even when the divine-human encounter is most personal and individual, it is still communal, in that the encounter is

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Heavy Traffic on the Wredebahn" and "Chapter 3: Back to the Future: The 'Third Quest,'" in *Jesus and the Victory of God* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996). This author does not completely agree with Wright about his evaluation of Funk, though.

[7]R. McBrien, *Catholicism*, new ed. (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1994), 3–17. For another good and more extensive discussion of the traits of the Catholic Church, see H. Küng, "Part D: The Dimensions of the Church," in *The Church* (New York: Image Books, 1967), 341–461. See also Schillebeeckx's comments on this in *CHU*, 195–198. See as well Schillebeeckx's own take on theological criteria which could illuminate this theme further in "Chapter 4: Theological Criteria," in *The Understanding of Faith: Interpretation and Criticism* (New York: Crossroad, 1974).

made possible by the mediation of a community of faith."[8] Applying this to our topic, we can say that knowing Jesus and acquiring the faith that proclaims him as the Christ normally happens through the mediation of a community of believers.

Catholicism also puts much emphasis on "tradition," which hinges actually on the principle of communion mentioned above. Before there were any written texts (with some of these being canonized later on in time), the faith, especially its core of belief that Jesus is the Christ, was handed on (*tradere* in Latin) through proclamation, catechesis, worship, and the personal lives of the community of believers, foremost among whom were the closest collaborators and disciples of Jesus. Hence, tradition also has a lot to do with the concept of "apostolicity," that is, faith as being based on the faith of the "apostles" (in the wider sense).[9]

Another trait of Catholicism this author wants to mention here is "analogy." This concept has been developed extensively by the theologian D. Tracy.[10] According to this principle, Catholicism necessarily involves a way of thinking about God or the divine-human relationship in terms of "similarity-in-difference." In contrast to this, the more typically Protestant way of thinking is dialectical, that is, emphasizing the radical differences and dissimilarities that exist between God and humans. Applying this principle of analogy to Jesus, we can say that Jesus is the "primary analogue" in that we see in him what is divine and human brought significantly into fusion and hence not remaining radically different from us in his humanity.[11]

At this point, one may ask, "Why bother at all viewing the matter according to Catholic principles?" The so-called "Catholic principles"

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[8]McBrien, *Catholicism*, 12.

[9]See McBrien, *Catholicism*, 14.

[10]D. Tracy, *The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism* (New York: Crossroad, 1981).

[11]See McBrien, *Catholicism*, 15. A fuller discussion is found in Tracy, *The Analogical Imagination*, in Chapter 6, "The Event and Person of Jesus Christ" and Chapter 10, "A Christian Systematic and Analogical Imagination."

invoked above were traditionally discussed as part of the traditional "marks of the [true] church" (*notae ecclesiae*). They were invoked to identify the "true" church because these "marks" were believed to have stemmed from the earliest strata of the Christian tradition and distinguished the undivided church of the early centuries. In the words of theologian H. Küng, these "dimensions" (Küng's preferred word) are "demanded of the Church by the New Testament."[12] In the final analysis, then, this author's invoking of the Catholic principles is linked to the search for truth which believers still link with the corporate body known as the Catholic Church.

Having elaborated on that, we are now in a position to evaluate different opinions on the connection between "Jesus" and "Christ" to see, as it were, how "catholic" they are in their approach to the topic. We shall now briefly see a representative of contemporary Jesus studies who touches on the interrelatedness of "Jesus" and "Christ" but posits a radical divide between them.

Dialogue Partner 1: Robert Funk

Funk's Rallying Cry: "Give Jesus a Demotion!"

In addition to being a first-rate biblical scholar,[13] Robert Funk was also the founder of the famous (or notorious, depending on one's ideological bent) group known as "The Jesus Seminar." That fact makes him have an undeniable importance in contemporary historical Jesus studies because of the seminar's impact on the field.

[12]Küng, *The Church*, 461.

[13]Although Funk tends to be associated exclusively nowadays with the Jesus Seminar, he has more than enough scholarly and solid works on the Bible to deserve being considered "first rate"; an example is *Language, Hermeneutic, and Word of God: The Problem of Language in the New Testament and Contemporary Theology* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966).

Funk's personal contribution to historical Jesus studies is the book *Honest to Jesus: Jesus for a New Millennium* (henceforward *HTJ*).[14] The title harks back to the book *Honest to God* by John A. T. Robinson, in which the Anglican bishop calls for a radical questioning of the entire religious framework (in particular, Christian theism) in which Western religion had been offered. Funk seems to suggest by his title that his program in his book is similar to that of Robinson's; in other words, he also calls for a radical rethinking of the whole framework in which Jesus Christ has been hitherto presented. Hence, this work is not only a book on the historical Jesus in the strict sense but also a work with an unabashedly straightforward theological agenda. And one can glean even from a cursory reading of the book that Funk's theological agenda is to "give Jesus a demotion."[15] As a reason for this, he claims that a Jesus clothed with the sublime divinity, which "Nicaea" bestowed on him, is not the real founder of the Christian movement. By this, he refers to the process by which the lowly Galilean, Jesus, went on to be proclaimed as God the Son, co-eternal with the Father, at the council of Nicaea.[16] Rather, this divine figure is only a myth that is very much at odds with the original, flesh and blood Jesus of Nazareth, who was not at all an icon to be worshipped but an iconoclast vis-à-vis the religious institution in his first century Jewish society.[17]

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[14]This author adds "personal" here to distinguish this work from the many other contributions Funk has made to contemporary Jesus studies as head of a corporate body (i.e., the Jesus Seminar). See also R. Funk, *Honest to Jesus: Jesus for a New Millennium* (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1996), hereafter referred to as *HTJ*. See also a later work by R. Funk, *A Credible Jesus: Fragments of a Vision* (Santa Rosa, CA: Polebridge, 2002).

[15]J. Robinson, *Honest to God* (London: SCM Press, 1963). See also Funk, *HTJ*, 306.

[16]Remember, however, that what is often imprecisely called the "Nicene Creed" is the creed actually produced by the Council of Constantinople in 381 in which the original Nicene Creed was revised and affirmed.

[17]See, for example, Funk, *HTJ*, 21–23, 300–301.

The Priority of Sayings

Funk is convinced that one must give first importance to Jesus's genuine words or sayings above everything else if one is to find the historical figure lying hidden, as it were, in the dense brush of later Christian interpolations and divinization. The rationale for this fundamental principle is that Funk thinks that authentic sayings (put in traditional Catholic jargon, *ipsissima verba*, or "the very words") are more reliable if one would like to determine what Jesus himself thought about his mission. On the other hand, when scholars try to determine Jesus's authentic deeds, they can rely only on reports of eyewitnesses, who in turn can report only what they *thought they saw*. This makes the report basically unreliable according to this position. Thus, reconstructions of Jesus's deeds can be thought of as not being able to go back reliably to Jesus himself.[18]

For this reason, Funk is concerned in his methodology to tease out authentic sayings (in a special way, parables and aphorisms directly traceable for him to the historical Jesus) from the sea of later Christian additions to the gospels.[19] This prompts his critics to say, cynically, something to the effect that Funk's Jesus (in the words of New Testament scholar B. Witherington III) is "a talking head."[20]

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[18]For a further discussion, see L. McGaughy, "The Search for the Historical Jesus: Why Start with the Sayings?," in R. Hoover, ed., *Profiles of Jesus* (Santa Rosa, CA: Polebridge, 2002), 121.

[19]For a further discussion, see Funk, "Part Two: The Gospel of Jesus," in *HTJ*, esp. chapters 8–11. See also Funk, *A Credible Jesus*, 1–18; R. Funk, "Jesus: A Voice Print," in Hoover, ed., *Profiles of Jesus*, 9–13; and R. Funk, A. Dewey, & the Jesus Seminar, *The Gospel of Jesus according to the Jesus Seminar*, 2nd ed. (Salem, OR: Polebridge, 2015), 1–12.

[20]B. Witherington III, "Chapter 2: Jesus the Talking Head: The Jesus of the Jesus Seminar," in *The Jesus Quest: The Third Search for the Jew of Nazareth* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1995).

Funk's Jesus

The results of such a methodology and research make Funk conclude that Jesus was "a subversive sage."[21] Vis-à-vis the religious-political order of his time, Jesus "may be said to have been *irreligious, irreverent*, and *impious*."[22] Funk claims that Jesus was not really concerned with the formal practice of religion; that makes him a "secular sage." Instead, he even profaned the temple and the Sabbath; he breached purity laws deemed sacred at the time, and, "most of all, he spoke of the kingdom of God in profane terms—that is, nonreligiously."[23]

This author would make the following demurrer about this: Funk seems to be making an unwarranted and anachronistic distinction between the sacred and the secular unknown in Jesus's day. For this author, it was more a question of different interpretations, emphases, and styles of living on the part of Jesus, on the one hand, and of some (perhaps even the majority) of the more recognized religious authorities on the other, but always about a life lived through, with, and in God and in light of the covenant between God and Israel. It must be remembered firmly that there was no real "secular" sphere in the Israel of Jesus's day.

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[21]Funk, *HTJ*, 302.

[22]Emphasis in the original. See also Funk, *HTJ*, 302. Recall that religion and politics could never be separated in an ancient society such as the one of Jesus.

[23]About Jesus "breaching purity laws," one must temper this traditional Christian (and also common liberal scholarly) claim with more recent scholarly demurrers that see the matter of Jesus vis-à-vis the purity regulations not so much as a "breaching" but more as a different way of interpreting the meaning of purity in theory and practice while fundamentally accepting the importance of the value of purity itself. See, for example, A. Levine, *The Misunderstood Jew: The Church and the Scandal of the Jewish Jesus* (New York: HarperOne, 2006), 17–52 and M. Thiessen, *Jesus and the Forces of Death: The Gospels' Portrayal of Ritual Impurity within First-Century Judaism* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2020), 9–41. See also Funk, *HTJ*, 302.

Funk's Process "From 'Jesus' to 'Christ'"

Funk expresses the theme which concerns us here in terms of geographical and "iconic" categories: "From Nazareth to Nicaea: How the Iconoclast Became the Icon," which is actually the title of the second chapter of *HTJ*. So, at this point, we can ask: How does Funk conceive of the process by which the Galilean iconoclast from Nazareth was transformed into an icon at Nicaea?

As mentioned above, there is for Funk a radical divide between the historical "Jesus" and the church's "Christ." He comes to this conclusion by comparing the blatant contrast he sees between the "gospel" which the historical Jesus preached and the figure of the divine co-eternal Son of God, the second person of the Trinity found in the church's creeds. Funk thinks that the Nicene Christ is a product of a long historical process. In the final analysis, however, it "obscures, to some extent, who Jesus was and what he said."[24] Therefore, the main goals of historical Jesus scholarship are to disentangle Jesus from this "tangle of Christian overlay" in order to see Jesus as the "robust, real, larger-than-life figure in his own right" and to recover the religion *of* Jesus and distinguish it from the religion *about* Jesus (Christianity).[25]

In short, Christianity with its "Christ" as we know it (by this, he means presumably post-Nicene Christianity) did not originate with the historical Jesus. There lies the great divide! Instead, Funk traces the development of Christianity from the confessions of Peter and Paul in the first century to the creedal formulations of the fourth and later centuries, all the while emphasizing, as mentioned above, that it is basically an "obscuring" of the real man from Nazareth. Let us go to the fine print of Funk's efforts at tracing this historical development.

Funk begins with the rivalry between Peter and Paul in the early church. Philosopher and religious studies scholar T. Sheehan's hypothesis states that Christianity cannot be traced to the historical

[24]Funk, *HTJ*, 31.

[25]Funk, *HTJ*, 31, 300, and 31, respectively.

Jesus, only to Simon Peter's faith.[26] This reflects the Catholic tradition, so Funk adds the Protestant tradition and says that, in an analogous sense, Paul's faith (which reflects a more Protestant-like tradition) was the other major influence on the early church.[27] Whereas Peter's faith represents the link with the historical Jesus, Paul's, on the other hand, focuses more on a nonhistorical image of Jesus as Christ centered on the concept of resurrection as well as on a "downward and upward trajectory," that is, Jesus as Christ descending into the tomb but then ascending from the grave to the right-hand of the Father.[28] This trajectory is even extended later on to the birth of Jesus Christ, the savior, which in turn lays the foundation for what is reflected in the first chapter of John, that is, the eternal Logos descending to earth, living, dying ignominiously, but then rising and being exalted at God's right hand. Funk reminds us that this encompassing downward and upward trajectory forms, in fact, the basic content of the creed found at the heart of Christianity.[29]

While an image of a divine Christ was gaining prominence through the "gospel" of Paul and later of John, there were also the older traditions, which better reflected the historical Jesus circulating among Christians (e.g., the Q source, an account composed mainly of Jesus's sayings).[30] At a later stage, these two strands of tradition merged with the production of the narrative gospels that we know and that have found their way into the canon. By means of this, the tension between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith was somewhat alleviated in

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[26]T. Sheehan, *The First Coming: How the Kingdom of God Became Christianity* (New York: Crossroad, 1986), esp. "Part 2, Chapter 4: The Denial of Jesus."

[27]Funk, *HTJ*, 35–36.

[28]Funk, *HTJ*, 39.

[29]See Funk, *HTJ*, 36–40.

[30]Cf. M. Borg, M. Powelson, & R. Riegert, eds., *The Lost Gospel Q: The Original Sayings of Jesus* (Berkeley, CA: Seastone, 1999), 23–30.

that "the historical Jesus [had] been given a more encompassing role as the Christ of faith."[31]

However, the two figures who contributed most to Christianity's becoming dominant in the Mediterranean world were, in the final analysis, Paul and the emperor Constantine. The latter made Christianity licit in 313 CE. By this act of favoring Christianity, he paved the way for the edict of a later emperor (Theodosius) which made Christianity the official religion of the Roman empire in 381 CE. In this process, the Christ of faith "overpowered" the Jesus of history.[32] This is most clearly seen in the official creeds of the church in which there is an "empty center" in between Jesus Christ's being born of the Virgin Mary and his suffering under Pontius Pilate.[33] By this, Funk means that there is nothing stated in the creeds about what happened between the birth of Jesus and his death and resurrection, thus, the "empty center." In this way, one can say that if the structure of the creed is given supreme importance, the most important things that Christians should believe actually have nothing or little to do with the sayings and deeds of the flesh and blood man from Nazareth.

Funk concludes, from this review of the process from "Nazareth to Nicaea," that Nicaea is "a world away if we are thinking … of the relation of Jesus as Jewish teacher and sage [who lived in Israel] to the theological debates and political intrigue that took place at Nicaea" (concerning the Christ of faith).[34] Thus, it is important for biblical scholars and everyone interested in the Jesus of history to make an about-face, that is, retrace their steps from Nicaea back to Nazareth in order to understand and get a glimpse of the real, flesh and blood subversive sage which the Christ of Nicaea has made practically obscure.

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[31]Funk, *HTJ*, 42.

[32]Funk, *HTJ*, 43.

[33]Funk, *HTJ*, 43.

[34]Funk, *HTJ*, 45.

Evaluation of Funk's Position

Granted that it is not Funk's main intention to give a detailed portrayal of the development from the historical Jesus to the Christ of faith (hence, the very broad strokes he uses in painting this process), we can still say that the overall impression one gets, in reviewing his treatment of the theme, is that *there is a radical, almost unbridgeable divide between "Jesus" and "Christ"* (Jesus | Christ), so much so that one may even be tempted to conclude that Christianity is, essentially (perhaps even completely), inimical to Jesus![35] Funk is only a representative of many others—scholars and non-scholars alike—who present the relation of "Jesus" and "Christ" in this way, that is, in a negative, discontinuity-as-paradigm way. But is that all there is to "Jesus" and "Christ"? Are there no positive, continuity-as-paradigm ways of looking at the matter? We will see that Schillebeeckx's work is still very relevant today because he is a representative of a paradigm of continuity between "Jesus" and "Christ."

Of course, Funk never had in mind the use of a Catholic approach, although it would also be helpful to evaluate his position from the point of view of Catholic principles to see how he stands vis-à-vis an analysis from an explicitly Catholic-Christian perspective. We can deduce from the divide that Funk posits between the historical Jesus and the early Christians' faith in him as the Christ that the principles of communion, tradition, and analogy were not at play in the process. First, according to this depiction of the development from Jesus to the early church's Christological faith, the early communities were a corruptor of Jesus's vision. Second, the tradition got it wrong—somewhere along the way, key elements of the historical Jesus's vision were forgotten, misunderstood, or consciously changed in order to give priority to elements which were foreign to Jesus's program or even inimical to it.

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[35]Offensive as it may sound to traditional Christian ears, this author thinks that this statement is not completely false. There are indeed elements in Christianity which are inimical to Jesus. See, for example, the following works: J. Nelson-Pallmeyer, *Jesus Against Christianity: Reclaiming the Missing Jesus* (Harrisburg, PN: Trinity Press, 2001) and R. Hagenston, *Fabricating Faith: How Christianity Became a Religion Jesus would have Rejected* (Salem, OR: Polebridge, 2014).

Third, similarity between the historical Jesus and the early church is not only absent but vigorously rejected. In its place, Funk emphasizes the radical difference between the two visions.

This author does not mean to say that Funk's treatment of the matter is without value because of that; on the contrary, *there are a lot of valid insights in it*. We need to listen carefully to voices like Funk's in order to avoid a glib and uncritical stance which too readily claims a problem-free connection between "Jesus" and "Christ," most especially when we are dealing with how the vision of the historical Jesus is reflected in confessional and ecclesial Christianity's presentation of him. When one thinks of that, one cannot help but admit that there is indeed a great need to go back to the original vision of the prophet-rabbi from Nazareth. This author also thinks that there was significant corruption of Jesus's vision in the shift from the historical Jesus to the early church's Christological faith, most especially when the church was assimilated into the structure of the Roman empire.[36]

In the end, though, the nagging question remains: Is discontinuity all there is in the relation between "Jesus" and "Christ"? Let us now look for an alternative vision from Edward Schillebeeckx.

Dialogue Partner 2: Edward Schillebeeckx

Past, Present, and Future Dimensions

We start, as it were, by asking Schillebeeckx to give us insights on our topic of concern: How is the historical "Jesus" related to the "Christ" of the early Christians' faith? To this query, he would start, no doubt, by saying that no person can be understood

1. apart from the course of past events that have affected them and elicit their critical reaction (the "past" dimension);

[36]See, for example, A. Kee, *Constantine versus Christ: The Triumph of Ideology* (London: SCM Press, 1982).

2. apart from people who are in relationships with them (the relational and present dimension); [and]

3. apart from the effect that this person has had on subsequent history (the future dimension).[37]

Applying this to the theme of "Jesus—Christ," we perceive that if we seek to know the central element of the Christian faith (Jesus) in a fuller sense, it is not enough to do studies on Jesus exclusively as an historical figure—that would deal only with the past dimension. We also need to take stock carefully of how the people who were in relationships with him experienced, saw, and thought about him. We would also have to consider seriously the impact that Jesus had on his world's subsequent history, which, in the words of theologian M. Hellwig explaining ES's thinking on the matter, is that "long-term, far-flung, complex, and ever unfolding legacy" which Jesus left. Notice here that ES is making a caveat, right at the very start, about the illusion and dangers of doing a purely historical study.[38] He emphasizes that in discovering who Jesus was, the element of "tradition" (particularly how the early Christians experienced, saw, and thought about Jesus) is *as important* as the effort at recovering particular *ipsissima verba et facta* (the very words and facts related with the historical Jesus).

On the other hand, although he admits that there is some truth in German New Testament scholar R. Bultmann's positing of a not-so-

[37]Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 44. A more recent historical Jesus scholar who put particular value on the "impact of Jesus" as an important historical category was the late J. Dunn. See J. Dunn, "Remembering Jesus: How the Historical Jesus Quest Lost Its Way," in J. Beilby & P. Eddy, eds., *The Historical Jesus: Five Views* (Downer's Grove, IL: IVP, 2009), 203–207 (the whole chapter spans pp. 199–225). See also J. Dunn, *Jesus Remembered* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 881–884. This author thinks that Dunn's work on the historical Jesus is particularly important for comparative purposes because there are some striking resonances between it and Schillebeeckx's work on Jesus.

[38]M. Hellwig, "Historical Jesus Research: Its Relevance to Thoughtful Christians and to Systematic Theologians," in B. Le Beau, L. Greenspoon, & D. Hamm, eds., *The Historical Jesus through Catholic and Jewish Eyes* (Harrisburg, PN: Trinity Press, 2000), 91.

smooth continuity between "Jesus" and "Christ," ES basically rejects the typical Bultmannian view that the only thing we can recover from the New Testament is the *kerygma* (proclamation) of the early Christians and not the historical Jesus.[39] For ES, if anyone loses sight of how the historical Jesus actually lived—his person, message, way of life, and death—in trying to explain the mystery that is Jesus Christ, they will risk turning the *kerygma* into a pure myth without any historical grounding or true incarnational meaning.[40]

The best way for ES to proceed, therefore, is through "a historical and critical approach, set within an intention of faith."[41] This is an approach which does point to and find its uniting factor in the person of Jesus (i.e., his person, message, way of life, death, and resurrection). At the same time, it also takes into account how the different communities in the early church (the "impact of Jesus on subsequent history" dimension) experienced and expressed their relationship with him whom they believed to be risen and continuously present and saving them.[42]

Therefore, the first main point about the interrelatedness of "Jesus" and "Christ" is this: it is important to quest not only for *ipsissima verba et facta* (the authentic words and deeds of Jesus) but also for the impact of the historical Jesus on those around him and on subsequent history. And since these people later came to acclaim the eschatological prophet from Galilee as the "Christ" due to several factors we will discuss in more detail below, it is logical to deduce that "Christ" has an intimate link with the historical Jesus.

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[39]Schillebeeckx, *CHU*, 106. Cf. particularly R. Bultmann, *Jesus and the Word* (New York: Scribner's, 1958) and R. Bultmann, *Jesus Christ and Mythology* (New York: Scribner's, 1958).

[40]See Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 52.

[41]Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 56.

[42]Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 56–57. See also J. Bowden's enlightening summary and commentary on ES's thinking: J. Bowden, *Edward Schillebeeckx: In Search of the Kingdom of God* (New York: Crossroad, 1983), 60–61.

Roots of "Christ" in the Historical Jesus

Part Two of *JEC* (entitled "The Gospel of Jesus Christ") is the place where ES deals directly with the life of Jesus of Nazareth. It is good, therefore, to delve into this second part of *JEC* to look for some interrelatedness between "Jesus" and "Christ." Let us focus on three things which seem to have great import for the theme that concerns us here: 1) Jesus's summons to discipleship; 2) Jesus's *abba* experience; and 3) Jesus's unshaken assurance of salvation continuing in the face of death. This author wishes to see, above all, what these three aspects of the historical Jesus's life show about how Jesus saw himself vis-à-vis his main concern, "the kingdom of God," and how early Christ-followers appropriated and expressed that in their post-easter faith in Jesus.

At the very start of Part 2, ES states, along with the majority of scholars, that "the basic impulse behind the message and preaching of Jesus" was the kingdom of God, "with the emphasis at once on its coming and on its coming close."[43] ES defines the "Kingdom of God" as "the expression of God's being: unconditional and liberating sovereign love, in so far as this comes into being and reveals itself in the life of men and women who do God's will."[44]

What was Jesus's relation to this kingdom? Jesus basically did not proclaim himself. He was concerned not so much with himself but with the coming kingdom of God.[45] In his person and way of life, which was characterized by "persistent care for and attention to those about him," many experienced the salvation that the kingdom of God realizes, and thus came to understand Jesus as the messenger of God's kingdom.[46] In fact, "living contact with him (Jesus) was experienced as God-given salvation."[47]

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[43]Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 140.

[44]Schillebeeckx, *CHU*, 111.

[45]Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 307.

[46]Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 219.

[47]Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 545.

Jesus's Calls to Discipleship

It is also equally true that Jesus assembled around himself "a very intimate coterie of disciples, along with a wider circle."[48] For these companions, to associate with Jesus meant to be put unconditionally at the service of the kingdom of God, a kingdom that is characterized by its soteriological character, that is, the realizing of salvation. The fact of being associated with Jesus is, therefore, first and foremost, a soteriological fact. However, what concerns us more here is that, as ES remarks so insightfully, *it is a Christological fact as well*. How? It shows that "one's relation to the coming rule of God is *dependent or conditional upon a relationship to Jesus*."[49]

Another facet of Jesus's summons to discipleship is that the many stories of calling in the Gospels make it clear beyond any doubt that following Jesus is more important than the hitherto most serious obligation of fulfilling the Law in Jesus's world. The episode of the man who wants to bury his father is a case in point (Matt. 8:19, 21–22 and Luke 9:57–60). In response to the request to bury his dead father, Jesus answers him thus: "Follow me, and let the dead bury their own dead" (Matt. 8:22).[50] This statement has several decisive implications. Jesus's call is as it were "a matter of life or death." It deliberately overrides the claims of a sacred obligation stipulated by the Torah which Pharisaic interpretation even considered as providing exemption from any other duty.[51] In short, Jesus's summons took precedence over all other things. Expressed with reference to the all-important Jewish Law, Schillebeeckx thinks that such call stories make it clear that the fulfillment of the Law is no longer enough for salvation. What mediates salvation now above everything is one's relationship with Jesus.[52]

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[48]Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 219.

[49]Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 222 (emphasis added).

[50]All quotes from the Bible are from the NRSV.

[51]See Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 221.

[52]Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 226; also Schillebeeckx, *CHU*, 116–118.

As mentioned above, here we find not only a soteriological implication but also a Christological one. One, therefore, is prompted to ask: Who is this Jesus who can make such an authoritative, hitherto almost unknown powerful summons to discipleship?

Jesus's Relationship with His *Abba*

Jesus was someone who had a special relationship with the being he called *abba*. Titles like "Son of God" or "the Son" were expressions of the early Christians' identification of Jesus with the promised messiah, although the historical Jesus most probably never spoke of himself in those terms. However, in Jesus's calling the God of Israel *abba*, the disciples had a glimpse of how Jesus thought of himself with regard to Yahweh.[53] The action of addressing God as *abba* connotes an unconventional relationship characterized by love, familiarity, and an "unaffected and natural simplicity" not completely absent in the Judaism of Jesus's day but certainly rare.[54]

This *abba* filled Jesus completely. We know that because "he broached the subject of God in and through his message of the coming rule of God."[55] In the context of the "calamitous and pain-ridden history within which Jesus stood," we can see that in addressing God as *abba*, Jesus expressed that he was continuously in a deep relationship of trust and familiarity with a benevolent God who does not allow all the evil in the world to have the last word. This was what spurred Jesus to proclaim the "coming" but at the same time "already present" kingdom of God.[56]

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[53]See Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 258.

[54]Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 261 and 260, respectively; also Schillebeeckx, *CHU*, 121. Also cf. H. Taussig, *Jesus Before God: The Prayer Life of the Historical Jesus* (Santa Rosa, CA: Polebridge, 1999), 67–74.

[55]Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 266.

[56]See Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 267.

Continuing Trust in the Face of Death

This trust in his *abba* was shown concretely in how Jesus faced his death. In discussing Jesus's death, ES brings to the fore the event of the Last Supper and states that the service which characterized Jesus's whole life and ministry was firmly rooted in the tradition of the meal. That, in turn, is shown concretely in Jesus's action of gathering his disciples for a last supper.[57]

With regard to the Last Supper, ES puts special emphasis on the implications of two passages, Mark 14:25 and Luke 22:15–18, reproduced below in that order:

> Truly I tell you, I will never again drink of the fruit of the vine until that day when I drink it new in the kingdom of God.
>
> From now on I shall not drink of the fruit of the vine until the kingdom of God comes. (v. 18)

These verses show that during the Last Supper, there was an emphatic announcement by Jesus of his imminent death, a farewell to his disciples as it were. However, Jesus also stated clearly that that farewell is offered with the assurance of renewed fellowship in the coming kingdom of God.

For ES, these two passages are pregnant with meaning. They show us that in the face of impending death (which was a result of a rejection of Jesus's offer of salvation), Jesus was still trusting that salvation would come, and, in fact, through his very death. And this death was not to be the end of the fellowship he had with those who did accept the kingdom.[58] Finally, it is also important to note that in all of this, Jesus considered his disciples' fellowship with him as something that would not be completely shattered with his death but would continue until the kingdom of God comes in a fuller way.[59]

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[57]Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 305.

[58]See Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 308–310, which are among the most powerful and moving pages in the book.

[59]Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 310; also Schillebeeckx, *CHU*, 119–120.

This attitude also makes it clear that Jesus considered his death not a break from but a part, maybe even the culmination, of his life's program—that of loving service. Hence, ES is adamant in insisting not to separate Jesus's death from his ministry, declaring that "Jesus' whole life is the hermeneusis of his death."[60]

We are now in a position to express briefly a second point on the interrelatedness of "Jesus" and "Christ": The root of the early Christians' confession of Jesus as the Christ lies in the very person and ministry of the historical Jesus who exhibited a special authority grounded apparently in an intimate, one-of-a-kind, trusting relationship with God whom he called *abba*. This trust remained to the end, even when Jesus was faced with death. These factors, when recalled by the early Christians in the light of the Easter experience, led them to identify Jesus as "Christ."

The Kingdom of God Takes on the Appearance of Jesus Christ

Resurrection

The nature of Jesus's resurrection and how ES treats it is beyond the scope of this article. What concerns us is what the nature of the early church's resurrection faith was.[61] According to ES, in believing and proclaiming that God had raised Jesus from the dead, the early Christians were affirming one of the key beliefs that has since characterized Christianity: God did not forget Jesus. God remembered him and the result of this remembrance of Jesus on the part of God takes the forms of resurrection and *Christology*: "God identifies the kingdom of God with Jesus of Nazareth, the crucified One." The kingdom of God proclaimed did indeed come in Jesus who was

[60]Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 311; also Schillebeeckx, *CHU*, 120, 124.

[61]See Schillebeeckx, *CHU*, 127–132.

crucified and risen! Thus, the proclaimer who did not think of himself was turned into the proclaimed, the center of the Christian faith.[62]

Here we are dealing with what ES calls "first-order" and "second-order" assertions. The first-order assertion is "In Jesus God saves human beings" (the focus is on God through the mediating action of Jesus). The second-order assertion is "Jesus is the one in whom God's definitive saving action has become a reality" (the focus is on the person and identity of Jesus).

First-order assertions are naturally the starting point for all reflection on Jesus Christ since "God" (first of all, then secondly "as mediated by the historical Jesus") is the focus of such assertions. But through the experience of salvation, first in the historical Jesus and then through the faith born out of the resurrection and on to the subsequent identification of the kingdom of God with Jesus and the development of a strictly Christological faith, Christology—with its focus on "Christ"—was born. However, it should never be forgotten that there is a strict connection between the historical Jesus and the faith of the church supported by Christological dogmas.[63]

ES clearly states that Christological dogmas lie on the plane of second-order affirmations. The object of Christology is the identity of Jesus. This quest is found, in the first instance, in the New Testament where we can already see the identification of God's rule with the person of Jesus. Christology in the New Testament and its subsequent history in the life and teaching of the Christian church eventually gave birth to the Nicene dogma of Jesus as one in being with God the Father, to be balanced later on by Chalcedon's proclamation that Jesus is also truly human.[64]

Thus, we have been brought back to Nicaea not with a sense of a great divide between "Jesus" and "Christ" but with a clear idea of

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[62]Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 402, 531, 542–543. See also Schillebeeckx, *CHU*, 112.

[63]Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 548–549.

[64]Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 549–550.

the reason why Christians sought to know better the identity of Jesus and define it more precisely, the culminating point of which was the formulation of the Christological dogmas.

Note on Jesus's Deeds and Words

We saw in our discussion of Funk's position that he gives priority to Jesus's sayings over deeds. In contrast, Schillebeeckx's approach is decidedly characterized by an overwhelming emphasis on Jesus's deeds or, shall we say, Jesus's patterns of acting and lifestyle. Even a cursory survey of Part Two of *JEC*, where he deals with the historical Jesus's life, shows that the bulk of the material is devoted to Jesus's "manner of life" which made those who came in contact with him experience salvation in a concrete way.[65] In fact, one of the key expressions not only of *JEC* but of ES's whole theology is "the *praxis* of the Kingdom of God."[66]

The reason for ES's emphasis on deeds is, apparently, the weight he gives the Jewish ontology of being (which sheds more light on the milieu of Jesus) as opposed to the Greek one. The former maintains a unity between the being of a person and his or her deeds—or, to use another category, between the nature and the function of a person—while the latter tends to dichotomize the two aspects. ES also calls this Jewish ontology "salvation-history ontology." He considers a separation of function and being to be "outside New Testament categories" and thus unjustifiable. In the ultimate analysis, "Jesus' being *is* itself salvation from God."[67]

In fact, ES clearly states that "the kingdom of God has to be defined further in terms of the life of Jesus." As proof of this, he mentions the incident where disciples of John the Baptist ask Jesus

[65]See Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 179.

[66]Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 154; also Schillebeeckx, *CHU*, 116–118. Emphasis added.

[67]Schillebeeckx, *IR*, 23 (emphasis in original). See also Schillebeeckx, *IR*, 21–23.

whether he is the Messiah. Jesus's answer is simple: he merely mentions what he is doing to care for and help others (see Luke 7:22–23).[68]

Evaluation of Schillebeeckx's Treatment of "Jesus—Christ"

Alfred Loisy is famous for the pithy remark, "Jesus preached the kingdom of God, but out came the Church!"[69] This positing of a great divide between the kingdom of God and the church, or, to express that in a similar expression, between "Jesus" and "Christ," has never gone away. It continues to influence many, scholar and non-scholar alike. It comes back in every age, clothed in new attires, proposed by new names, yet at its core is the idea that there is a basic discontinuity between the historical Jesus who preached the kingdom and the church who deified this Jesus and made him into "Christ," corrupting him in the process into an icon more reminiscent of the imperial Byzantine courts than of the "subversive iconoclast" from Galilee who was against all imperial trappings. Latent in such a view is an admiration of "Jesus" but distrust of "Christ" as a mere machination of a power-addicted, dysfunctional ecclesiastical institution.

It is clear that Funk's book exemplifies that position. Recall, though, this author's earlier demurrer: it is also important to listen to—what this author would go so far as to call—"prophetic suggestions" that, in a way, are also contained therein. In fact, in speaking about Bultmann's position of denying a smooth continuity between the Jesus of history and the Christ of the church's faith, ES himself says, "Bultmann continues in a renewed way to fulfill a critical role in respect of the church's faith."[70] This author thinks that the paradigm of discontinuity between "Jesus" and "Christ" should also be balanced out with a

[68]See also Schillebeeckx, *CHU*, 112–113.

[69]Quoted in Schillebeeckx, *JEC*, 402.

[70]Schillebeeckx, *CHU*, 106.

paradigm such as that of Schillebeeckx that takes the continuity between "Jesus" and "Christ" seriously.

At the end of our examination of Funk's position, we asked: Is discontinuity all there is between "Jesus" and "Christ"? Schillebeeckx has given us a contrasting view of the matter that invites us to see that there might indeed be a firm continuity between "Jesus" and "Christ" which cannot be easily dismissed.

ES's approach shows in a salient way the Catholic principles enunciated at the beginning of this article. In insisting that we approach the person of Jesus with an eye both for the historical flesh and blood person from Nazareth and the people who followed him, lived with him, and were profoundly affected by him to the extent of proclaiming him as the "Christ," Schillebeeckx demonstrates the pivotal role that communion and tradition play in understanding who Jesus really was and continues to be for us today.

In painstakingly showing how the earthly Jesus can still be held as similar in a way to the creedal Christ and that there is an essential interrelatedness between them—that is, "Christ" is deeply rooted in the experience of salvation people had in "Jesus" (not "Jesus | Christ" but "Jesus—Christ")—ES shows the principle of analogy at work, which seeks to see similarity more than difference and otherness.

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ADDRESSING AND BEING ADDRESSED BY GOD AS OUR ETERNAL *YOU* IN MARTIN BUBER'S *I AND THOU*

Thomas Sherman, S.J.

Abstract. Martin Buber's main concern in *I and Thou* is how we can come to address and be addressed by the living God as our eternal *You*. According to Buber, we can address and be addressed by God as our eternal *You* vis-à-vis each other in *willing* to encounter each other as *You*, in *believing* in our own individual reality as standing apart from each other within the context of a religious destiny, and in being open to the *grace* of our mutual response. In *willing* to encounter each other as *You*, we ultimately will to encounter the eternal *You*; in *believing* in our own individual reality standing in relation to each other within a context of a religious destiny, we believe in the reality of the eternal *You* as our creator; and in being open to the *grace* of our mutual response, we are open to the divine response to us in revelation. In addressing and being addressed by God as our eternal *You* in addressing and being addressed by each other as *You*, the reciprocity characteristic of all *I-You* relations finds its perfect fulfillment.

Keywords. I; *You*; willing; belief; grace; address

According to Martin Buber in his influential work *I and Thou*,[1] there are two basic attitudes one can take with respect to the world and others in the world: an *I-You* or an *I-It* attitude.[2] These attitudes reflect how one habitually treats others in the way one addresses them. When addressing others by speaking the basic word pair "*I-You*", one respects them for who they are in themselves and, in so doing, comes to respect oneself in relation to them.[3] On the other hand, in addressing others from an *I-It* attitude by speaking the basic word pair "*I-It*" to them, one treats others as objects of one's particular interest; in doing so, one understands oneself as limited to that perspective. Throughout our lives, we relate to others and to ourselves in one of these two ways, by addressing others by one or other of these two word pairs, from taking up or relinquishing one or other of these two basic attitudes.[4]

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[1]M. Buber, *I and Thou* and *Afterword*, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Touchstone, 1996), 53. This will be the translation used throughout this article.

[2]According to Buber, "there is no world of appearance, there is only one world—which to be sure appears twofold according to our twofold attitude" (*I and Thou*, 125).

[3]Buber's analysis of this twofold attitude and especially his valorisation of the *I-You* attitude have been controversial; cf. M. Zank, "Martin Buber," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/buber/ and, most notably perhaps, W. Kaufmann, "Buber's Failures and Triumph," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 32:126 (1978): 1–24 and S. Katz, "A Critical Review of Martin Buber's Epistemology of I-Thou," 89–121 and F. Rosenzweig in B. Casper's "Franz Rosenzweig's Criticism of Buber's *I and Thou*," 90–120, both in H. Gordon & J. Bloch, eds., *Martin Buber: A Centenary Volume* (KTAV Publishing House, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, 1984). Katz also offers a sustained criticism of Buber in S. Katz, "Dialogue and Revelation in the Thought of Martin Buber," *Religious Studies* 14:1 (1978): 57–68.

[4]In a later work commenting on *I and Thou*, Buber makes this explicit:

> What I mean is that when a man presents himself to the "world" or in general to others, when he takes up an "attitude", when he "speaks a primal word", it is either the one or the other—and that he actualizes either the one or the other. But I do not mean at all that the life of man

Buber's main concern in *I and Thou* is how we can come to address and be addressed by the living God as our eternal *You*. For Buber, we do this in our human *I-You* relations when we speak the basic word "*You*" to each other from three basic dispositions: *will*, *belief*, and openness to *grace*. The subject of this article is *how* we address and are addressed by God as our eternal *You* in addressing and being addressed by each other from *will*, *belief*, and openness to *grace*.

I and Thou as the Fruit of an Experience of Faith

Later in his life, Buber acknowledged that his writing *I and Thou* was the result of a number of experiences which grew into "one great experience of faith" and that it is this experience of faith to which "I owe the independence of my thought."[5] Buber was willing to concede that *I and Thou* is a work of religious thinking[6] as long as that thinking is not understood to arise from the standpoint of any

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or even only his "inner life" represents a continuity of such attitudes, such "speakings", such actualizations. In the one moment he is over against another as such, sees him as present and relates to him thus. In the other moment he sees everything else collected around him and from time to time singles out, observes, explores, applies, uses. Both the moments are included in the dynamic of a lived life. (M. Buber, "Replies to My Critics," in P. Schilpp & M. Friedman, eds., *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*, Library of Living Philosophers [New York: Open Court Press, 1967], 699)

[5]Buber, "Replies to My Critics," 689–690. And "the existence of mutuality between God and [the human being] cannot be proved any more than the existence of God" (Buber, *Afterword*, 182). Buber recognizes no convincing proof for the existence of God and if there were one he fears "the risk of faith would no longer exist" (cf. M. Friedman, "Interrogation of Martin Buber," in S. Rome & B. Rome, eds., *Philosophical Interrogations* [New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964], 84).

[6]This is W. Kaufmann's characterization of Buber's mature thought—a characterization which Buber himself accepts—with important reservations; cf. Buber, "Replies to My Critics," 689, 691, 741–744.

particular religion,[7] nor as a theology or a particular teaching *about* God.[8] *I and Thou* can be understood more properly as a philosophical anthropology concerned not with God but with how human beings can relate *to* each other and *to* God.[9] This anthropology requires rational reflection on one's experience to understand and communicate this with others—as long as one is aware of the limits of what can be logically described according to the ordinary law of contradiction, and that one's experience of an *I-You* encounter (whether with another human being or with God) transcends logical limitations.[10] *I and Thou*, then, might be best understood as a secular religious philosophical anthropology inspired by Buber's own experience of faith.

Buber in *I and Thou* is concerned primarily with human and divine *I-You* relations.[11] He recognizes other spheres of *I-You* relations in the world, including such relations to nature and to the forms which inspire great art,[12] but he believes that *I-You* relations in human communication especially lead us into an *I-You* relation with the divine, for

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[7]Buber, "Replies to My Critics," 689, 691, 741–744.

[8]Buber, "Replies to My Critics," 689, 691.

[9]Buber writes: "When I seek to explain the fact of [the human being], I cannot leave out of consideration that [the human being] lives over and against God. I know of no theological anthropology … only a philosophical one" (Buber, "Replies to My Critics," 690). With respect to our *I-You* relation to God and with each other, Buber writes in his *Afterword:* "The question is not about God but only about relation to [God] … we shall speak only of what God is in [God's] relationship to a human being" (180).

[10]Cf. Buber, "Replies to My Critics," 690. Buber admitted as well that this use of reasoning and concepts in communicating the experience of the *I-You* encounter can treat the singular experience of *You* as an *It* (Buber, "Replies to My Critics," 689, 691, 693).

[11]In his *Afterword*, written a year after *I and Thou*, Buber states that his "most essential concern" in the work was the central significance of the close association of the relation to God with the relation to one's fellow human being (*Afterword*, 169).

[12]Buber, *I and Thou*, 60–61.

> only here does the word, formed in language, encounter its reply. Only here does the basic word go back and forth in the same shape; that of address and reply are alive on the same tongue … here that which confronts us has developed the full actuality of the You … this is the main portal into which the two side portals lead.[13]

This is such that "the relation to the human being is the proper metaphor for the relation to God—as genuine address is here accorded a genuine answer."[14]

Given the initial importance of human *I-You* relations in *I-You* relations with God, the first part of this article, corresponding to the First Part of *I and Thou*, will be devoted to an examination of the basic characteristics of human *I-You* relations in our addressing and being addressed by each other. In doing this, we hope to appreciate how human *I-You* relations from the basic dispositions of *will*, *belief*, and an openness to *grace* are for Buber the basis for our addressing and being addressed by God as our eternal *You*, which is the content of the Third Part of *I and Thou* and the subject of the second part of this essay. Finally, in the third part of this article, we will combine what we have learned in the first two parts to give us a final overview of how for Buber we can address and be addressed by God as our eternal *You* in our addressing and being addressed by each other as *You*.

I. The Basic Characteristics of Human *I-You* Relations

In the First Part of *I and Thou*, Buber describes how we address and are addressed by each other as *You* in human *I-You* relations. There are

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[13]Buber, *I and Thou*, 151.

[14]Buber, *I and Thou*, 151. In addition to being the proper metaphor for the relation to God, Buber later added that our human relations with each other are essentially similar to our relations with God in that both relations involve a turning to the other as a *You* and both find their fulfillment in actual reciprocity; cf. Buber, "Replies to My Critics," 694.

a number of basic characteristics of human *I-You* relations by which we do this.

The first basic characteristic of our addressing and being addressed by each other in human *I-You* relations is that the basic word "*You*," spoken from an *I-You* attitude, is spoken with our *whole* being whereas the basic word "*It*" spoken from an *I-It* attitude is not.[15] This difference determines the character of the *I* that speaks these two words. The *I* spoken with my whole being is the *I* of a person (*Person*) conscious of entering into relations with other persons whereas the *I* of the spoken word *It* is my ego (*eingewesen*) as setting myself apart from other egos.[16]

Second, in speaking the basic word *You* from an *I-You* attitude, we do not *have* anything but rather we stand in *relation* to the other whom we address.[17] To have something is to experience (*Gebrauchen*) or to use (*erfahren*) that thing and to know it to the extent of merely going over its surface.[18] Experiencing the world is experiencing others in the world as *He*, *She*, or *It*. This is not to participate (*anteil*) in the world by entering into the lives of those we meet, for experience is in the subject *I* and not between (*zwischen*) the *I* and *You*.[19] The world as experience

[15]Buber, *I and Thou*, 54, 89.

[16]Buber, *I and Thou*, 112–115.

[17]Buber, *I and Thou*, 55.

[18]"Experience" (*erfahrung*) founds the world of *It*. Buber plays on the etymological root of the term in *fahren*, "to travel." To travel is to experience only the surface of life, whereas real intimacy is possible only through prolonged dwelling with the other. Buber uses the term *erlebnis*, from *leben*, "to live" (*I and Thou*, 70), to express the *I-You* relation signifying authentic human living (*I and Thou*, 59–60; cf. R. Wood, *Martin Buber's Ontology*, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy [Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1969], 40).

[19]Buber, *I and Thou*, 56. The between (*zwischen*) actualized in relation is central to Buber's thought in *I and Thou*. The notion of the between includes two significant elements. It points to the self-transcendence of the act in which one relates to the *You* and to the real otherness of the *You*. Cf. Wood, *Martin Buber's Ontology*, 41.

belongs to the basic word *I-It* whereas the basic word *I-You* establishes the world of relation (*Beziehung*).[20]

A third characteristic of our human *I-You* relations is that this relation involves mutual interaction in which our awareness of each other whom we address as *You* is *immediate* or *unmediated* (*unmittelbare*).[21] There is no concept, no prior knowledge nor imagination, no goal or purpose, no anticipation that intervenes between *I* and *You*.[22]

A fourth characteristic of our *I-You* relations in addressing and being addressed by each other is that we are *present* (*gegenwart*) to each other in our speaking the basic word *You*;[23] this is in contrast to treating each other from an *I-It* attitude as objects with a past but no present.[24]

A fifth characteristic of human *I-You* relations is that in our addressing one another as *You*, our awareness of each other cannot be reduced to that of an object in space and time and as something subject to causal necessity.[25]

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[20]Buber, *I and Thou*, 56.

[21]Buber, *I and Thou*, 65–67.

[22]Buber, *I and Thou*, 62–63.

[23]Buber, *I and Thou*, 63; cf. 58. This difference between presence (*Präesenz*) and object especially marks the real boundary between *You* and *It* (Buber, *I and Thou*, 63–64).

[24]The *I* of the basic word *I-You* directly confronts (*gegenüber*) the *You*; the *I* of *I-It* does not but rather surrounds itself with a multitude of contents (*Inhalten*) with a past but no present. Objectification reduces the present to the past in the sense that the uniqueness we meet is considered only in terms of what it has in common with other things encountered in the past; the other becomes object of experience and future anticipation of the other is based on past experience of the other as object. Cf. Wood, *Martin Buber's Ontology*, 54.

[25]The *It*-world hangs together in space and time. The *You*-world does not hang together in space and time (Buber, *I and Thou*, 84). In the *It*-world, causality holds unlimited sway (Buber, *I and Thou*, 100).

A sixth characteristic of human *I-You* relations is that in addressing each other as *You* we experience an *exclusiveness* (*Ausschließlichkeit*) which (paradoxically) *includes* an appreciation of *everything* about each other.[26] Buber gives an example of this exclusivity when he describes the act of contemplating a natural being like a tree. If I am drawn into an *I-You* relation with the tree, I am seized by "the power of exclusiveness" as the tree becomes for me a unique whole which nevertheless includes what I once viewed simply as my object from a limited point of view or a scientific concern.[27]

In the sphere of human *I-You* relations, when we address each other as *You* we are aware of an exclusiveness in loving and taking responsibility for each other as whole human beings,[28] perceiving each other as "filling the firmament" of our awareness so that we perceive everything else in relation to each other.[29] Buber puts it thus: "as prayer is not in time but time in prayer and as the sacrifice [is] not in space but space in the sacrifice," so in addressing each other as *You* we no longer find ourselves in time or space but rather we experience time and space in our awareness of each other. This same reversal and sublimation occurs in the experience of causal necessity in our relationship.[30]

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[26]Buber, *I and Thou*, 126.

[27]Buber, *I and Thou*, 57–59.

[28]Cf. Buber, *I and Thou*, 66–67.

[29]Buber, *I and Thou*, 59, 126. Though, as we shall see, this exclusivity is limited by the duration of the presence of the *You* (Buber, *I and Thou*, 126–127) and by the introduction of another *You* (cf. Buber, *I and Thou*, 148).

[30]Even causal necessity finds its place within the firmament of my *You*, or as Buber puts it, "as long as the firmament of the *You* is spread over me, the tempest of causality cowers at my heels" (*I and Thou*, 59), and

> the unlimited sway of causality in the *It*-world, which is of fundamental importance for the scientific ordering of nature, is not felt to be oppressive by [him or her] who is not confined to the *It*-world but free to step out again and again into the world of relation. (*I and Thou*, 100)

It is only when we step out of the *I-You* relation altogether and enter into an *I-It* attitude that what we once appreciated as an *aspect* of each other as our *You* is now experienced as an *object* whose spatial, temporal, and causal dimensions are located in a system of coordinates based on a limited focus of concern.[31]

The seventh characteristic of human *I-You* relations is that of the reciprocity (*Gegenseitigheit*) of the relation. Our relation with each other is reciprocal when in our addressing each other *You* act on me as *I* act on *You*.[32] This reciprocal interaction requires the mutual *will* (*Willen*) to encounter, *belief* (*Glauben*) in the actuality of our association as individuals within the context of destiny, and reliance on the *grace*

As this author interprets Buber, while the *I-You* relationship is in itself free and not subject to causal necessity, the *I* of the *I-You* attitude is nevertheless aware of the objective dimension of the *You* in the relationship as physical (and behavioral)—a dimension which involves casual necessity, for "[the human being] knows that [his or her] mortal life is by its very nature an oscillation between *You* and *It*, and [he or she] senses the meaning of this" (Buber, *I and Thou*, 101). Taking an *I-You* attitude towards *You* includes an awareness of the possibility of taking an *I-It* attitude towards *You* as one's object. Buber even maintains that *You* appears *in* space only in the exclusive confrontation in which everything else is background and not boundary and measure (*I and Thou*, 81).

[31]Buber, *I and Thou*, 60, 81. Katz ("Dialogue and Revelation in the Thought of Martin Buber," 58–67) criticizes Buber for completely separating *I-Thou* relations and *I-It*. However, while Buber does separate the two as *attitudes*, with respect specifically to *I-You* human relations, his understanding of the *I-You* attitude in human relations can, *pace* Katz, *include* an awareness of the objective dimension to the human *You*—though not as *separate* from the *You*. Cf. Buber, "Replies to My Critics," 711. This *I-You* inclusion of the objective can be seen in Buber's description of community life in which the drive to experience and use is objectifying only when one's relations with others in the community are no longer *I-You* relations. The economic will to profit and the political will to power can be natural and legitimate when tied to the will to human relations (*Beziehungswillen*) and carried by it (Buber, *I and Thou*, 97). Indeed, community life in the spirit requires the *It* world—but only as properly ordered to the Spirit; cf. Buber, *I and Thou*, 99–100.

[32]Buber, *I and Thou*, 67, 84.

(*Gnaden*) of each other responding.[33] This encounter (*Begegnung*) consists at once of mutual election and electing, passivity and activity.[34]

The eighth characteristic of human *I-You* relations, which flows from our reciprocal interaction, is the *spirit* (*Geist*) between us. Spirit is the word mutually spoken as *between I* and *You*.[35] We live in the spirit in speaking the word *You* to each other. This mutually spoken word, however, cannot be simply identified as something merely verbal, for the word underlies physical speech and is likened by Buber to a silence which allows each other to respond freely to the address.[36]

The ninth characteristic of our human *I-You* relations with each other is that the word *You* we speak to each other emerges from our innate longing for relation, which Buber describes as an *innate You* as the *a priori* of all relation.[37] This innate *You* as the fundamental

[33]Cf. Buber, *I and Thou*, 58, 62, 108–109.

[34]Buber, *I and Thou*, 62; cf. 124–125.

[35]In a later work, Buber describes "the between" in a genuine dialogue as that reality shared by the partners which is nevertheless neither their physical presence in speaking and gesturing nor the psychic phenomena they experience within themselves; cf. Buber, "Replies to My Critics," 706–707.

[36]Buber, *I and Thou*, 89.

[37]Buber, *I and Thou*, 78–79. Buber believes that the development of the child's soul in its prenatal life in the womb is connected to this longing for the *You* as an innate drive for contact with another being, which appears originally in tactile contact followed by optical contact from which the drive for reciprocity and tenderness appears. While his description of an innate *You* as an *a priori* of all relation realized in the *You* we encounter (cf. *I and Thou*, 79) makes use of recognizably Kantian terminology, what Buber means by this description need not be construed as referring to anything more than the natural human desire for personal relations with others, a desire that is rooted in human rationality and so present as a natural *potential* in the human infant—a potential which is subsequently actualized in his or her relations with others throughout his or her life. However, for another interpretation and critical evaluation of Buber's philosophical dependence on Kant's epistemology in *I and Thou*, cf. Katz, "A Critical Review of Martin Buber's Epistemology of I-Thou," 89–99 and S. Katz,

natural human longing for relation is actualized in each finite *You* we encounter;[38] however, it impels us beyond the finite *You* towards the *eternal You*[39] in which that desire is perfectly realized in an immediate relationship to that *You* that cannot be an *It*.[40]

The tenth characteristic of human *I-You* relations is the transience or evanescence (*vergänglichkeit*) of awareness of each other as *You*.[41] Every actual relationship in the world alternates between actuality and latency (*Latenz*)[42] as every *You* in the world is compelled by its nature to become a thing for us—or at least to enter again and again into thinghood.[43] Yet this loss of the actuality of presence among us is not irreversible, for the individual *It* can again become *You* by re-entering the event of relation.[44]

"Lawrence Perlman's 'Buber's Anti-Kantianism': A Reply," *Association for Jewish Studies Review* 15:1/Spring (1990): 109–117.

[38]Buber, *I and Thou*, 78.

[39]Buber, *I and Thou*, 128.

[40]Buber, *I and Thou*, 123.

[41]Buber, *I and Thou*, 146–147.

[42]Buber, *I and Thou*, 68–69, 84–85, 147. By "*Latenz*" as opposed to actuality, Buber might be understood as referring to a state of soul akin to an Aristotelian habit or fixed disposition formed as a result of repeated action; cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II.1.

[43]Buber, *I and Thou*, 68–69, 147. Genuine contemplation, for example, never lasts long; the natural being that only now revealed itself in the mystery of reciprocity has again become describable, analyzable, classifiable (Buber, *I and Thou*, 68). The inherent limitation of the *You* in the world seems to be reciprocal in Buber's understanding as based on the physical dimension of beings in the world. *I* am limited and so *I* cannot sustain my *I-You* attitude to you and you yourself as limited are susceptible to my reducing *You* to an *It* for me.

[44]Buber, *I and Thou*, 84.

Interpretive Summary of Human *I-You* Relations

For Buber, our addressing and being addressed by each other as *You* in human *I-You* relations presupposes three basic dispositions: a mutual *will*, *belief*, and reliance on the *grace* of the other's response.

> Free is the man that wills without caprice. He believes in the actual, which is to say: he believes in the real association of the real duality, I and You. He believes in destiny and also that it needs him. He must proceed toward it without knowing where it waits for him. He must go forth with his whole being: that he knows.… He must sacrifice his little will … to his great will that moves away from being determined to find destiny.… He listens to that which grows, to the way of Being in the world, not in order to be carried along by it but rather in order to actualize it in the manner in which it, needing him, wants to be actualized by him.… He believes, I said, but this implies: he encounters.[45]

In human *I-You* relations, *I* and *You* confront each other freely,[46] and this freedom consists in willing (*willen*) without caprice (*ohne wollende*), a willing which depends on a belief (*glauben*) in the duality of *I* and *You* and in what Buber calls "destiny" (*die Bestimmung*). Let us consider these two aspects of belief.

Belief in the real duality of *I* and *You* is a recognition that we as partners in dialogue are two substantially existing individuals standing over and against each other.[47] Though existentially *distinct*, we are *united* in the *I-You* relation in our will to encounter each other as *You* by our mutual address in speaking and hearing the basic word "*You*." However,

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[45]Buber, *I and Thou*, 108.

[46]Buber, *I and Thou*, 100.

[47]What Buber understood as *belief* in *I and Thou* becomes, in his later work "Distance and Relation," an awareness of a primal setting at a distance, the first of a twofold principle of human life of which *will* is the second; cf. "Distance and Relation," in M. Buber, *The Knowledge of Man: A Philosophy of the Interhuman*, trans. & ed. with an introduction by M. Friedman (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), 59–71; "Appendix II: A Tentative Answer," in M. Buber, "Autobiographical Fragments," in Schilpp & Friedman, eds., *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*, 35; and Buber, "Replies to My Critics," 691.

in our addressing each other, the basic word "*You*" is not a description of each other; rather, it is the means by which we mean (*meinen*) or intend who we are as unique individuals who cannot be described in conceptual terms or linguistic categories.[48] This use of the basic word "*You*" in addressing each other is not unlike the metaphorical finger pointing at the moon. The finger is not the moon but by use of the finger we orient ourselves to the moon as the reality we intend. Similarly, our speaking the basic word "*You*" in addressing each other orients us to the reality of who we are.[49] While it may be possible to give a phenomenological description of our *attitude* in speaking the basic word "*You*" to each other, there can be no such description of the *reality* intended, for that reality (who we are in ourselves) can only be encountered and cannot be described in words, images, or concepts.[50] In this sense, the other as the unique individual person intended in speaking the basic word *You* transcends phenomenology or any type of intentional idealism.[51]

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[48]As Buber explains, the term *You* points to the reality intended, or "to something in reality that had not or had too little been seen" (cf. Buber, "Replies to My Critics," 693).

[49]This, incidentally, is true in its own way when I speak the basic word "*It*" to the other from an *I-It* attitude as from a limited but legitimate interest, e.g., psychological or natural (chemical, biological, etc.). My speaking *It* to the other in this way orients me not to the other as a whole substantial reality but rather to an aspect of that reality according to my limited interest. Thus, both the basic words "*You*" and "*It*", spoken from their respective attitudes, are important in orienting us *to* the reality of the other we intend.

[50]Buber distinguishes the reality intended from the word "*You*" of address, as is apparent in "Replies to My Critics," where he contrasts *being* with the *relation to* being (cf. 693), and in his reply to Emmanuel Levinas, where he states that "only in the relation is [the other] my Thou; outside the relation between us this Thou does not exist" (697; cf. also *Afterword*, 180, where Buber distinguishes God *in God's self* from our *relationship* to God [italics added]).

[51]This author takes Buber's presentation of speaking the basic word "*You*" as an act intentionally directed to the *You* as the real unique individual before oneself; cf. M. Theunissen, *The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger,*

However, the freedom of willing without caprice is based on the belief not only in the *real duality* of *I* and *You* as substantially existing individuals but also in what Buber calls *destiny*. While he leaves the word "destiny" undefined, his use of the term seems to refer to a personal, religious reality—one "*believes* in destiny" and that "destiny *needs* [him or her]," and that in proceeding towards destiny "one *sacrifices* one's little will to a great will" but in such a way that one actualizes destiny "as destiny *wants* to be actualized by [him or her]," and by so "believing in destiny one *encounters*."[52] Without actually identifying this destiny with God, the use of the term seems to refer to something quite like God or at least as connected to God (the will of God?) as a personal invitation to cooperate in a providence. Willing without caprice in accordance with this belief in destiny allows one to *encounter* the other in the *I-You* relation. This is in contrast to the capricious person who wills without this belief by living in an *I-It* world devoid of sacrifice and grace but shot through with mere ends and means.[53]

In speaking the basic word "*You*" to each other, we *will* to encounter each other *believing* in the duality of the relationship between really distinct individuals and in destiny. Moreover, along with this twofold *belief*, our *will* to encounter each other as *You* appears to be the result of the dynamism of an innate *You* as our naturally innate human desire for *I-You* relations. This innate *You* is actualized in addressing each other as *You* but is *fully* actualized only in addressing the eternal *You*.[54] And,

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Sartre, and Buber (Boston, MA: MIT Press, 1986), chapter 8, "The Destruction of the Transcendental Model of Intentionality" (291–307).

[52]Buber, *I and Thou*, 108–109.

[53]Buber, *I and Thou*, 110.

[54]In "Distance and Relation," Buber understands the principle of human life as a twofold movement, the first a primal setting at a distance and the second an entering into relation, and that the second movement, which involves the *will* to relation, presupposes the first; cf. "Distance and Relation," 59–71. This first movement as the act of setting at a distance seems to be understood as a basic characteristic of human rationality similar to what Buber understood as *belief* in *I and Thou* (108), while the second movement as the act of the will is rational human desire for the good of entering into relation with the other. Buber's

along with this mutual *will* and *belief*, addressing and being addressed in human *I-You* relations also depends on a mutual reliance on the *grace* of the other's response.

In addressing and being addressed, we are *immediately* and *exclusively present* to each other. However, this immediacy and exclusivity includes an awareness of our own unique physical nature, particularly our bodies in their temporal, spatial, and causal dimensions.[55] This makes our mutual presence to one another ineradicably physical or *bodily* so that the basic word *You* we share as the *spirit between* us must also be in some way physical. While Buber describes but does not explain either the nature of spirit or the transience of the actuality of our *I-You* relations, we may infer that the human spirit rooted in the mutability of the physical, bodily dimension of our human being is the basis of the transience of our *I-You* attitude. That is, as physical beings we simply cannot sustain an *I-You* attitude in addressing and being addressed by each other and in lapsing into an *I-It* attitude we can no longer address and be addressed as *You*. And what we once perceived as the whole of who we are (which really included our physical dimensions as parts of that whole) now becomes perceived as an *It*—the object of a particular concern we may take of each other. However, as we are more than simply physical—for we are capable of living in the spirit as the between—our awareness of who we are in ourselves can be regained once we recover our *I-You* attitude towards each other.

In summary, then, Buber's religious philosophical anthropology under the inspiration of his "one great experience of faith" can be described as concerned with human *I-You* relations based

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recognition of "[the human being's] great desire to enter into personal relation with things" in "Distance and Relation" (66) is in effect the realization of the natural innate *You* he recognized in *I and Thou*.

[55]For Buber, I am bodily confronted by a *You* (*I and Thou*, 63, 65). The human being I bodily encounter as my *You* is one being (*I and Thou*, 83), a human person in relation to me as a human person (*I and Thou*, 112), an individual (*I and Thou*, 148). It is as an individual person whom I confront bodily that the *You* steps forth to confront me in its uniqueness (cf. *I and Thou*, 126), an independent individual relativized by other independent individuals (cf. Buber, *Afterword*, 181).

a) on a reciprocal *willing* to encounter the *You* that stems from an innate desire for *You* (and ultimately for the eternal *You*) in

b) the *belief* of the separate individual reality of each other as *I and You* within the context of destiny and

c) on a mutual reliance on the *grace* of each other's response.

The final characteristic of human *I-You* relations in the First Part of *I and Thou* is that in addressing and being addressed as *You*, there is some intimation of an eternal *You*.

> In every sphere, through everything that becomes present to us, we gaze toward the train of the eternal You; in each we perceive a breath of it; in every You we address the eternal You.…[56]

In the next and second part of this essay, we will examine the Third Part of *I and Thou* to explore how for Buber we come to have this intimation. This second part will be divided into two sections, the first dealing with how we address God as the eternal *You* in our human *I-You* relations and, in the second, how God addresses us in those relations.

II. Addressing and Being Addressed by God as Our Eternal *You* in *I-You* Relations

1. Addressing God as our Eternal *You* in the *I-You* Relation

As we have seen, our addressing and being addressed as *You* in human *I-You* relations involves mutual will, belief, and grace. In this second part of this article, we will examine the Third Part of Buber's *I and Thou* to understand how we can address God as our eternal *You* according to *will* and *belief* and how by *grace* we can be addressed by the revelation of the divine presence.

[56]Buber, *I and Thou*, 57, 84.

At the beginning of the Third Part of *I and Thou*, Buber presents us with a startling image to express how every single *You* can be an intimation of the eternal *You:*

> Extended, the lines of relationships intersect in the eternal You. Every single You is a glimpse of that.[57]

Y. Amir has suggested that the image Buber presents here is that of a straight line of three points: A, B, and an extended end point C, with A standing for the *I* in the *I-You* relation, B the finite *You* in that relation within the world, and C that of God as the eternal *You*.[58] According to this image, as the three points lie on one and the same line, so our access to the eternal *You* is through that of the finite *You* in the world.

However, we read further on in the Third Part that

> the demanding silence of forms, the loving speech of human beings, the eloquent muteness of creatures—all of these are gateways into the presence of the word. But when the perfect encounter is to occur, the gates are unified into the one gate of actual life, and you no longer know through which one you have entered.[59]

Here, in this image of gates leading to one gate, when "the gates are unified into the one gate of actual life," the eternal *You* is no longer described as merely glimpsed in any single *You* but is now immediately present. However, the immediacy of this presence seems to imply that the presence of any single *You* that provided a glimpse of that divine presence has now lost its own immediacy, or, as Amir puts it, "you know that the earthly encounters have led up to this gate but everything that encounters you has now become One."[60]

However, does the finite *You* lose its presence in the immediate presence of the eternal *You*?

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[57]Buber, *I and Thou*, 123.

[58]Y. Amir, "The Finite Thou and the Eternal Thou in the Work of Martin Buber," in Gordon & Bloch, eds., *Martin Buber: A Centenary Volume*, 83.

[59]Buber, *I and Thou*, 150.

[60]Amir, "The Finite Thou and the Eternal Thou in the Work of Martin Buber," 84.

Following his image of the extended lines leading to the eternal *You*, Buber writes of the *mediatorship* of the finite *You* in addressing the eternal *You*:

> Through (*Durch*) every single You the basic word addresses the eternal You. The mediatorship (*Mittlertum*) of the You of all beings accounts for the fullness of our relationships to them—and for the lack of fulfillment. The innate You is actualized each time without ever being perfected. It attains its perfection solely in the immediate relationship to the You that in accordance with its nature cannot become an It.[61]

Here, too, we might wonder whether the *You* of finite beings as *mediating* the eternal *You* loses its presence once the immediate presence of the eternal *You* is realized.

Now, if the eternal and the finite *You* were of the very same nature, the immediate presence of one would necessitate the loss of presence of the other, for, as Buber maintains, the *exclusiveness* of any actual relationship in the world is limited to the duration of its presence and from any other relationship from breaking in to avenge its exclusiveness.[62]

However, the eternal *You* is not of the same nature as the finite *You*, and so the immediate presence of the eternal *You* does not necessarily prevent an awareness of the presence of the finite *You* that led up to or mediated the immediate presence of the former. Indeed, for Buber, the nature of the eternal *You* clearly transcends the finite *You* in a number of ways. First, the eternal *You*, unlike any finite *You* in the world, is by nature a *You* that *cannot* be an *It*. One manifestation of the nature of this unique *You* is in the uniqueness of its *exclusivity*. The exclusivity of the finite *You* in human *I-You* relations, even while filling the firmament of our awareness so that we see everything else in *his* or *her* light, cannot allow an awareness of *another You* without breaking this exclusivity.[63]

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[61]Buber, *I and Thou*, 126.

[62]Buber, *I and Thou*, 126–127, 148.

[63]Buber, *I and Thou*, 126–127, 148.

However, in relation to God, "unconditional exclusiveness and unconditional inclusiveness are one … for entering into the pure relationship does not involve ignoring everything but seeing everything in the You."[64]

In the presence of the eternal *You*, unconditional exclusiveness *is* unconditional inclusiveness so that an awareness of the eternal *You* includes in its light not only everything but also every other finite *You* as well, for

> entering into the pure relationship does not involve ignoring everything but seeing everything in the You, not renouncing the world but placing it upon its proper ground … whoever beholds the world in him stands in his presence … but leaving out nothing, leaving nothing behind, to comprehend all—all the world—in comprehending the You … to have nothing besides God but to grasp everything in him, that is the perfect relationship.[65]

Another manifestation of the unique nature of the eternal *You* is that in an actual relationship this *You* is not subject to the *transience* of a finite *You* in *I-You* relations. As the eternal *You* is by nature a *You* that cannot be an *It*, there is no transience or alteration between actuality and latency in the divine presence. The eternal *You* is always, actually, and immediately present to us, though for our part who by nature are *You* that *can* become an *It*, we cannot be always, actually, and immediately present to our eternal *You*.[66]

However, if the nature of the eternal *You* as a *You* that cannot be an *It* is crucial in appreciating the possibility of remaining aware of a finite *You* in the immediate presence of the eternal *You*, the foundation of this difference between the eternal and the finite *You* is the creative act by which the eternal *You* as *creator* gives us being and relates to us as creatures of the eternal *You*.[67] However, this fundamental relation

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[64]Buber, *I and Thou*, 127, 148.

[65]Buber, *I and Thou*, 127, 148.

[66]Buber, *I and Thou*, 148.

[67]In a later work, Buber admits that the fundamental importance of creation and all its implications are established by his faith; cf. Buber, "Replies to My

between creator and creature in an *I-You* dialogue can only be expressed paradoxically and in antinomies:[68]

> Creation—happens to us … we participate in it, we encounter the creator, offer ourselves to [the creator], helpers and companions…[69]

> Yes, in the pure relationship you felt altogether dependent—and yet also free as never and nowhere else; created—and creative … you felt both at once.[70]

> I need God for my being but God needs me for that which is the meaning of my life.[71]

> In prayer and sacrifice we step before the countenance of the eternal You and pour ourselves out to God, acting on God without exacting anything from God … praying "let your will be done"—through me whom you need.[72]

> God embraces but is not the world and God embraces but is not myself. On account of this which cannot be spoken *about*, I can say in my language, as all can say in theirs: You.[73]

> In the pure relationship … God and man are consubstantial: actually and forever two partners of the primal relationship that from God to man is called mission and commandment; from man to God, seeing and hearing; between both, knowledge and love.[74]

Critics," 702. However, he is anxious to understand the act of creation in such a way as not to threaten his belief in the *mutuality* of an *I-You* relationship with God: "I believe not merely in the creative act in the beginning but also in the creation at all times, in which [the human being] has a share as God's comrade in the work of creation" (Buber, "Replies to My Critics," 714).

[68]Cf. Buber, *I and Thou*, 144.

[69]Buber, *I and Thou*, 130.

[70]Buber, *I and Thou*, 130.

[71]Buber, *I and Thou*, 130.

[72]Buber, *I and Thou*, 130–131.

[73]Buber, *I and Thou*, 143.

[74]Buber, *I and Thou*, 133.

The relation between the eternal *You* and the finite *You* as between creator and creature is the foundation for appreciating not only how the immediate presence of the eternal *You* can include the finite and mediating presence of the finite *You* but also, and even more importantly, the very nature of the *I-You* dialogue between the human and the divine partners as a duality in unity. This duality is not only in the radical difference between creator and creature and the utter dependence of being of the latter on the former but also in the radical unity of the partners in the relation as the one creates the other as a living partner who, by *will*, can accept (or reject) freely the creator's invitation to enter into dialogue. This is the ultimate paradox in *I-You* relations with the eternal *You* that cannot be *explained* but rather *lived*.

However, the *will* to enter freely into an *I-You* dialogue with the eternal *You* depends on the *belief* that this is possible—that the eternal *You* as creator is radically other than the human partner and yet radically interested in the dialogue. And this *will* to encounter the eternal *You* is, fundamentally, the dynamic of an innate *You*, that *You*-sense that cannot be satiated until it finds the infinite *You*, that which impels the human *I* towards its fulfillment in the perfect relationship with the eternal *You*.

> The You-sense of [the human being] who in [his or her] relationships to all individual Yous experiences the disappointment of the change into It, aspires beyond all of them.… Every encounter is a way station that grants [him or her] a view of fulfillment … but once [he or she] has found … [he or she] now encounters everything in the one … for this finding is not an end of the way but only its eternal center. It is a finding without seeking, a discovery which is most original and the origin. The You-sense that cannot be satiated until it finds the infinite You sensed its presence from the beginning; this presence merely had to become wholly actual for it out of the actuality of the consecrated life of the world.[75]

[75]Buber, *I and Thou*, 128. It is worth noting that the image of the relation between the finite and the eternal *You* in this particular passage is not that of extended lines intersecting at the line's ultimate point but rather that of a circular line drawn around a center where the many instances on that circular line point to their common center.

Indeed, this *innate You* impels the human being to address the eternal *You* even in solitude—that is, even *apart* from any mediating encounter with a human *You*. Such a *direct* address in solitude is also a legitimate portal to the eternal *You* as long as this desire for the eternal *You* does not involve a rejection of *I-You* relationships with others or a desire to possess the eternal *You* within.[76]

This dynamic of the innate *You* as described by Buber is not unlike what Saint Augustine describes in his prayer to God in the beginning of his *Confessions:* "You have made us for yourself and our hearts are restless until they rest in you."[77] As the eternal *You* for Buber is the creator, the innate *You*, that fundamental desire for encountering the *You* in each other and ultimately in that eternal *You*, is already the creative action of God in our dialogue with God. Our desire for God as our eternal *You* can be understood as a manifestation of the creator's desire for a relationship with us. This desire for an encounter with the eternal *You* will be in accord with our belief in God who as our creator enables us to be partners with God in dialogue. This can be understood as our belief in destiny (*die Bestimmung*) as providence.

In summary, then, from what we have learned so far in the Third Part of *I and Thou*, we can address God as our eternal *You* by our *will* to encounter the eternal *You* and our *belief* in this as a possibility since this eternal *You* is our creator.

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[76]Buber, *I and Thou*, 152; cf. 155. In his later works, Buber fully acknowledges the actuality of a direct relation to God, insisting only that this essential relation to God find its complement in the essential relation to the human person; cf. Buber, "Replies to My Critics," 710.

[77]Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. H Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford World's Classics, 1998), i (1).

2. Being Addressed by the Eternal *You* in *I-You* Relations: Revelation of Presence

All *I-You* relations as reciprocal involve not only *addressing* but also *being addressed* as *You*. We can address each other by *will* and *belief* but we must rely on the *grace* of each other's free response. In this human *I-You* relationship, we can address the eternal *You* by our will for such a relation and our belief in its possibility, although we must also rely on the *grace* of the response of the eternal *You*. The grace we rely on in being addressed by the eternal *You* in an *I-You* relationship is what Buber calls *revelation* (*Offenbarung*).

Buber considers revelation in the final section of the Third Part of *I and Thou* when he asks,

> What is it that is eternal: the primal phenomenon, present in the here and now, of what we call revelation? … it is [the human being's] emerging from the moment of the supreme encounter, being no longer the same as [he or she] was when entering into it.[78]

In this revelation,

> [the human being] receives and what [he or she] receives is not a content but a presence, a presence as strength. This presence and strength includes three elements … first, the whole abundance of actual reciprocity … second, the inexpressible confirmation of meaning … third, the meaning not of "another life" but of this our life … of this our world.[79]

In fact, the eternal revelation appears identical to the divine presence itself:

> I neither know of nor believe in any revelation that is not the same as its primal phenomenon. I do not believe in God's naming [God's self] or in God's defining [God's self] before [human beings]. The word of revelation is: I am there as whoever I am there … the eternal voice sounds, nothing more.[80]

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[78]Buber, *I and Thou*, 157.

[79]Buber, *I and Thou*, 158–159.

[80]Buber, *I and Thou*, 159.

This is such that

> only the acceptance of the presence is required … as we have nothing but a You on our lips when we enter the encounter, it is with this on our lips when we are released from it into the world.[81]

This revelation is an

> encounter with God [which] does not come to [human beings] in order that [they] may henceforth attend to God but in order that [they] may prove its meaning in action in the world. All revelation is a calling and a mission.[82]

Buber's understanding of revelation is controversial. S. Katz, for one, has called its intelligibility into question. First, Katz notes that for us, recognition of each other as *You* requires *beliefs* about each other, beliefs we have acquired through objectivity conditions in observable human behavior and spatio-temporal conditions.[83] In the case of a husband and wife, for example, the couple can recognize each other as their *You* and can continue to do so across time and space because they can recognize (and remember) each other's physical traits and characteristic behavior. Yet while the couple's awareness of each other as their *You* is certainly more than their recognition of these objective conditions, a human recognition of a *You* would be impossible without those conditions. However, in *I-You* relations with the eternal *You*—that *You* Buber claims cannot be an *It*—no such objectivity conditions are available.[84] Without such conditions, how can we know whether we are in an *I-You* relation with the eternal *You* and are being addressed by that *You*?[85]

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[81]Buber, *I and Thou*, 159.

[82]Buber, *I and Thou*, 164.

[83]Katz, "Dialogue and Revelation in the Thought of Martin Buber," 58–68.

[84]Katz, "Dialogue and Revelation in the Thought of Martin Buber," esp. 61–68.

[85]For some of the philosophical issues involved here, see S. Katz, "Language, Epistemology and Mystical Pluralism," in S. Katz, ed., *Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 22–74. In a later work,

In addition to this basic problem of recognition, Katz also queries the intelligibility of Buber's claim that revelation does not name or otherwise define God.[86] Can one reveal a bare presence without any otherwise identifiable content? For Katz, the answer is no. And, in point of fact, Buber himself relies on his own interpretation of the Exodus account of Moses's encounter with God in his claim that the word of revelation has no more content than "I am there as whoever I am there." Buber, in fact, is describing not some direct existential experience of the divine presence but an experience *interpreted* by his own experience of faith.[87]

Buber goes so far as to deny that *any* knowledge *about* God is necessary in order to believe in God, "since many believers know how to talk *to* God but not *about* [God]" (M. Buber, *Eclipse of God* [New York: Humanity Books, 1998], 28), to which Katz responds by asking how one could go out to meet God if one knew nothing about God.

[86]According to Katz, even the intelligibility of Buber's statement about the "unknowable Thou" assumes at least *four* objective metaphysical propositions: a) God exists (otherwise it would be absurd to recommend that one believe in God), b) God is the sort of being who is capable of being addressed, c) God is the sort of being whom one can address, and d) not only does God exist and not only is God the type of being capable and worthy of being addressed but also that God enters into relation with human beings (Katz, "Dialogue and Revelation in the Thought of Martin Buber," 68).

[87]Indeed, for Katz, Buber's "teaching" that formed the core of the dialogical philosophy in *I and Thou*, which included God as the *eternal Thou* that can never be an *It* and that God searches for the human being to enter into a mutual dialogue with them, was influenced by a lifelong involvement with Hasidism and the direct, transforming address of God at the center of biblical revelation; cf. S. Katz, "Martin Buber in Retrospect," in M. Zank, ed., *New Perspectives on Martin Buber*, Religion in Philosophy and Theology 22 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 255–266. And, as other biblical scholars have pointed out, even Buber's interpretation of biblical revelation itself was influenced by his reading of the prophets whom he understood as concerned not with the temple and sacrifice but for the people and for social justice as signs of God's presence. This prophetic concern, as Buber understood it, led Buber to downplay any developmental history of faith that might include apocalyptic books and their imagination of the Beyond. Cf. L. Wachinger, "Buber's Concept of Faith as a Criticism of

However, E. Fackenheim has endeavored to defend Buber's views on revelation as *philosophically* defensible.[88] In his defense of Buber's understanding of revelation, Fackenheim begins by pointing out that while Buber recognizes knowledge by rational inquiry as *I-It* knowledge, Buber also believes that *I-You* relations can provide us with a cognitive access to a reality which is otherwise inaccessible from the *I-It* perspective.[89]

Fackenheim thinks Buber's reasoning can be understood along the following lines: Since all genuine religion is an *I-Thou* relation with God, religion must involve some form of revelation[90] in the form of an address of a *You* who is present *in* what this *You* gives rather than in revelation as translated into human statements, such as in dogma or a law (though it can issue in a commandment).[91] However, in revelation the divine *You*—as giver who is present in what the divine *You* gives—is

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Christianity," in Gordon & Bloch, eds., *Martin Buber: A Centenary Volume*, 444. Cf. also M. Buber, *The Kingship of God* (New York: Humanity Books, 1990); M. Buber, *The Prophetic Faith* (New York: Harper and Row, 1960); M. Friedman, "Martin Buber's View of Biblical Faith," *Journal of Bible and Religion* 22:1 (1954): 3–13; and B. Offenheimer, "Buber and Modern Biblical Scholarship," in Gordon & Bloch, eds., *Martin Buber: A Centenary Volume*, 163–166.

[88]E. Fackenheim, "Martin Buber's Concept of Revelation," in Schilpp & Friedman, eds., *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*, 273–296.

[89]According to Fackenheim, this means that for Buber we are capable of knowledge in one or the other or both of these fundamental attitudes without special doctrinal provisions for the reconciliation of the category of revelation with the principle of rational inquiry (Fackenheim, "Martin Buber's Concept of Revelation," 282–283). However, Buber himself appears to deny that any doctrine of *I* and *You* can be classified without qualification as *I-You* knowledge when he writes: "that which discloses itself to me from time to time in the I-Thou relationship can only become such a knowledge through transmission into the I-It sphere" (Buber, "Replies to My Critics," 692).

[90]Buber, *I and Thou*, 161.

[91]Fackenheim, "Martin Buber's Concept of Revelation," 265. Here Fackenheim cites Buber:

not a timeless presence but the God of dialogue who, like any *You* in any dialogue, speaks to a unique partner in a unique situation, disclosing God's self according to the unique exigencies of each situation. If we name the speaker God, then, it is always the God of a moment, a moment God, and if God has a name at all it is "I shall be who I shall be" since God cannot be comprehended as God may be in God's timeless essence; God can only be encountered here and now as God may show God's self in each, here and now.[92]

Now revelation, Fackenheim argues, must be distinguished from being addressed in any other *I-You* relation, the divine *You* from any other *You*, otherwise the very words "religious," "divine," and "revelation" would be meaningless to those not—or not yet—actually participating in such a human-divine dialogue.[93] But how is revelation to be distinguished from being addressed in any other *I-You* relation? God, as Buber asserts in *I and Thou*, is the *You* that cannot become an *It*.[94] The nature of God as this *unique You* distinguishes the religious relationship from every other *I-You* relation. However, how in this relationship is God *recognized* as this unique *You* that cannot be an *It*?

In attempting to answer for Buber, Fackenheim cites a comment Buber makes in a later work with respect to a biblical *miracle:*

> The real miracle means that in the astonishing experience of the event the current system of cause and effect becomes, as it were, transparent

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> There is no revelation without commandment. Even when He who addresses us talks to us about himself, he is really talking about us. What he says about himself does not refer to his own being, but gives the reasons for and elucidation of his demands on us. (M. Buber, *Israel and the World* [Syracuse University Press, 1997], 209)

[92]Fackenheim, "Martin Buber's Concept of Revelation," 285. Fackenheim here quotes Buber in M. Buber, *Between Man and Man* (Mansfield Centre, CT: Martino Publ., 2014), 15.

[93]Fackenheim, "Martin Buber's Concept of Revelation," 286.

[94]Buber, *I and Thou*, 75, 112.

> and permits a glimpse of the sphere in which the sole power, not restricted by any other, is at work.[95]

As in the singular experience of the miracle event when the *I-It* relation between cause and effect becomes transparent so as to permit a glimpse of the power of God, so too, Fackenheim argues,

> in the moment of the revelation no *It* retains its independence. In that moment every *It* becomes either a symbol through which God speaks, or the partner to whom [God] speaks. In making transparent every *It* in the moment of [God's] presence, God discloses that no *It* can remain opaque to [God's] presence.[96]

Hence, God can be known as *infinite* in the moment of encounter because in that moment, no *It* can limit God, and as *eternal* because in that moment, one knows God cannot be an *It* at any moment.[97]

In the moment of revelation, the infinite and eternal divine *You* speaks into the temporal situation of the finite human *I* who can respond only out of that situation. What the divine *You* says to the human *I* in the situation transcends all conceptual anticipation and the appropriate human response to the divine address is tied to a particular situation. So just as every act of revelation reveals the divine *You*, so each and every human response must be to that *You*, and what distinguishes each response is the situation in which that response is made.[98]

Yet even after this attempted defense, Fackenheim admits that for Buber, the relation between the divine address and human response remains an antinomy for, if in speaking to me the infinite *You makes* me its listening *I*, there can be no *I-You* relation unless I *freely allow*

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[95]M. Buber, *Moses: The Revelation and the Covenant* (Victoria, BC: Must Have Books, 2012), 77; citing also Buber, *The Prophetic Faith*, 46 and M. Buber, *Israel and Palestine* (London: East and West Library, 1952), 26: "wherever the action of nature as well as spirit is perceived as gift, revelation takes place."

[96]Fackenheim, "Martin Buber's Concept of Revelation," 287.

[97]Fackenheim, "Martin Buber's Concept of Revelation," 287.

[98]Fackenheim, "Martin Buber's Concept of Revelation," 288.

myself to be its listening *I*. This real antinomy between divine causal determinism and human freedom cannot be resolved by thought; rather, it must be lived.

And Fackenheim seems forced, in the end, to admit a final antinomy in Buber's understanding of revelation. For while the core of revelation is the event of God's presence, this revelation requires a content, for an address calls for a response. But any *content* to such a revelation can only be recognized by the individual in the moment of receiving the revelation, and such content cannot be determined by philosophy as *I-It* knowledge.[99] Thus, Fackenheim's attempt to give a philosophical defense of Buber's understanding of revelation itself ends in antinomy as the reality of *I-You* knowledge transcends philosophy in so far as philosophy is limited to *I-It* knowledge.[100]

Like Katz's criticisms, Fackenheim's failed attempt to give a philosophical defense for Buber's understanding of revelation leads us to conclude that Buber's understanding of revelation as presence must, like the content of *I and Thou* in general, be the fruit of an experience of *faith* rather than of philosophical reflection.[101]

However, this still leaves us with the question as to why Buber is so intent on maintaining that in revelation "[the human being] receives and what [he or she] receives is not a content but a presence."[102] Buber appears to minimize the importance of content in revelation because of his worry over how revelation is received. In *I and Thou*, Buber laments the human "desire to have God continually in space and time"[103] in

[99]Fackenheim, "Martin Buber's Concept of Revelation," 290. Here Fackenheim quotes Buber: "I experience what God desires of me for this hour … not earlier than this hour. But even then it is not given me to experience it except by answering before God for this hour as my hour" (Buber, *Between Man and Man*, 68).

[100]Buber, *Eclipse of God*, 45.

[101]Buber, "Replies to My Critics," 689.

[102]Buber, *I and Thou*, 157–158.

[103]Buber, *I and Thou*, 161.

an attempt to *possess* God, thereby transforming divine presence into an *object* of *faith* which then becomes a *substitute* for that presence.[104]

> Thus God becomes an object of faith. Originally, faith fills the temporal gaps between these acts of relation; gradually, it becomes a substitute for these acts. The trust-in-spite-of-it-all of the fighter who knows the remoteness and nearness of God is transformed ever more completely into the profiteer's assurance that nothing can happen to him because he has the faith that there is One who would not permit anything to happen to him.[105]

For as an "object" of faith, God becomes a cult object:

> The cult, too, originally supplements the acts of relation, by fitting the living prayer, the immediate You saying into spatial context of great plastic power and connecting it with the life of the senses. And the cult too gradually becomes a substitute as the personal prayer is no longer supported but pushed aside by communal prayer; and as the essential deed simply does not permit any rules, it is supplanted by devotions that follow rules.[106]

Despite this,

> God is near his forms as long as man does not remove them from him. In true prayer, cult and faith are unified and purified in living relation. That true prayer lives in religions testifies to their true life; as long as it lives in them, they live. Degeneration of religions mean[s] the degeneration of prayer in them: the relational power in them is buried more and more by objecthood, they find it ever more difficult to say You with their whole undivided being.[107]

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[104]For Buber's understanding of faith, cf. Friedman, "Martin Buber's View of Biblical Faith," 3–13; for his development in that understanding, cf. Wachinger, "Buber's Concept of Faith as a Criticism of Christianity," 437–455.

[105]Buber, *I and Thou*, 162.

[106]Buber, *I and Thou*, 162. For Buber on religion in *I and Thou* and in his thought in general, cf. I. Kajon, "*Religio* Today: The Concept of Religion in Martin Buber's Thought," in P. Mendes-Flohr, ed., *Dialogue as a Trans-Disciplinary Concept* (Berlin: CPI Books, 2015), 101–111.

[107]Buber, *I and Thou*, 167.

Buber's distinction between faith as trust-in-spite-of-it-all and confident assurance in a dogmatic content is the basis for the distinction he later draws between two types of faith: the *emuna* of early Israel and the *pistis* of Pauline Christianity.[108] The former type of faith, he thinks, allows for a revelation of presence as divine mystery while the latter too easily lends itself to dogmatic theological formulations.[109]

Years later, in his *Replies to My Critics*, Buber admitted that content *is* necessary in revelation.[110] However, he finds the binding nature of such content problematic:

> I have many times pointed out that I cannot understand the events of divine revelation in which I believe as a divine content that pours into an empty vessel … I know no other revelation than that of the meeting of the divine and the human in which the human takes part just as well as the divine … anything that proceeds directly or indirectly (i.e., through the oral or written tradition) out of the actual revelation, be it word or custom or institution, I cannot, therefore, understand simply, in the form in which we possess it, as spoken by God or instituted by God. In other words, I possess no security against the necessity to live in fear and trembling: I have nothing but the certainty that we share in the revelation.[111]

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[108]M. Buber, *Two Types of Faith* (New York: Macmillan, 1986), 7–12, 170–174.

[109]In his *The Prophetic Faith*, which preceded *Two Types of Faith*, Buber, interestingly enough, recognized a distinction between *spirit* and *logos*, *ruah* and *dabhar*, as stimulus received and a content, but that in the experience of the prophet (*nabi*) these two are *not* divided; cf. Buber, *The Prophetic Faith*, 64.

[110]In Buber, "Replies to My Critics," 696–697. Buber affirms that dialogue in human *I-You* relations includes content and that as spirit seeks the body in speaking the basic word, the content of dialogue is more important the more concrete it is. However, in this dialogue the given and received contents are "so manifold that [one] who treats the nature of dialogue as a basic relation of human existence cannot keep them in mind" ("Replies to My Critics," 697). While the content of the dialogue does allow for binding propositions that can be transmitted, dialogue as the basic relation of human existence is lost when this content is codified and separated from the dialogue. Of the dialogue of God with the human being, however, it must be said that even the most universal commands attain unforeseen interpretations as the situation furnishes the interpretation.

[111]Buber, "Replies to My Critics," 698–699.

> Revelation, historical revelation, can bind us because the divine has a share in it. But what does this binding signify? An unhampered believer in revelation may trustfully follow, without reservation, a traditional codex that appeals to God's word, because the share of heaven and earth are not objectively to be measured. But another [person] believes in revelation yet is tormented by the all-too-human character of the human share in it, and resists obeying human prescriptions as divine commands. Such a [person] may find no other way than holding [his or her] own soul open to the whole traditional shall and shall not, in order, in the absence of objective criteria, to examine honestly in [his or her] own subjectivity what [he or she] can acknowledge as bidden and forbidden by God and what not. That is the lot of the "beggar."[112]

Historical revelation, as Buber understands this, allows for the mystery of the divine—a mystery that cannot be intellectually comprehended—and at the same time allows for the mystery of a free human response. In his case in particular, Buber concludes:

> Therefore I have not been able to accept either the Bible or Hasidism as a whole; in one and the other I had to and I have to distinguish between that which had become evident to me in this manner. Many of my readers, both of the "right" and of the "left," will protest against such a "subjectivism." Those with whom I am in dialogue and whose experience conforms [with] mine know otherwise.[113]

So, while Buber admits that revelation is a mutual sharing of personal presence which *also* involves content of what is being shared, he wants to maintain the primacy of presence in revelation and he fears that undue attention to content might distract from the fundamental importance of mutual presence between *I* and *You*.[114] What Buber does recognize is a legitimate content in revelation which allows for

[112]Buber, "Replies to My Critics," 699–700.

[113]Buber, "Replies to My Critics," 744.

[114]One possible critical response to Buber here might be to appeal to the human experience of communication as shared self-revelation in which the content of that revelation expresses the personal truth of who the dialogic partners understand themselves to be, so much so that appreciating the content of that revelation could arguably *enhance* the partners' appreciation of their mutual presence.

a subjective reception and interpretation according to the particular circumstances of the revelation.

From this analysis, we might return to the thesis of this essay and conclude that Buber's understanding of revelation as a sharing of the divine presence can be understood as how the eternal *You* addresses us in our addressing and being addressed by each other. That is, by the grace of our response to each other we are thereby open to the grace of the divine response as the revelation of God's presence among us.

At this point, we are in a position to combine what we have learned about human and divine *I-You* relations in the First and Third Parts of *I and Thou* to appreciate how for Buber we can address and be addressed by God as our eternal *You* in our addressing and being addressed by each other as *You*.

III. Basic Characteristics of Human and Divine *I-You* Relations

As we have seen, the human being for Buber is the proper metaphor for the relation to God.[115] Nevertheless, because of the radical difference between the divine and human partners as between creator and creature, the *I-You* relation we have with God as our eternal *You* cannot be exactly like the relation we have with one another. Indeed, any description of this relation is going to be "contradictory" or "paradoxical"—a relation that we are called on to live rather than define.[116]

To appreciate the paradoxical description of an *I-You* relation with God as our eternal *You*, we will re-examine the basic characteristics of human *I-You* relations in the light of the nature of God as our eternal *You*.

It will be recalled that the first basic characteristic of human *I-You* relations, in the First Part of *I and Thou*, is that the basic word "*You*" is

[115]Buber, *I and Thou*, 151.

[116]Cf. Buber, *I and Thou*, 144 and *Afterword*, 180.

spoken with one's whole being. Without giving myself completely in addressing *You*, I cannot encounter *You*. This first basic characteristic of human *I-You* relations is also fundamental if we want to encounter God as our eternal *You*. Buber describes this in an arresting way: "When [one] addresses with [one's] whole devoted being the You of [one's] life that cannot be restricted by any other, [one] addresses God."[117]

God, the living God, that *You* of our lives that cannot be restricted by any other, cannot be addressed except by doing so with our whole devoted being. To this extent, human and divine *I-You* relations are the same—they both require our whole-hearted commitment. What appears to distinguish the two *I-You* relations is that in the divine *I-You* relation, we address the *You* that we believe cannot be restricted by any other. *Belief* in this unique nature of the eternal *You*—ultimately as *creator*—enables us to address each other as *You* in addressing God as *You* and enables us to address God as our unrestricted *You* in addressing each other as *You*.[118]

Addressing the eternal *You* with the whole of our devoted being, that is, with a *will* to encounter the eternal *You*, we will to address each other as a finite *You*. This the completion and fulfillment of our addressing others as *You*.

The second characteristic of human *I-You* relations is that in addressing each other we do not *experience* each other as *things* but stand in relation to each other as the *You* whom we address. Since the eternal *You* cannot by nature be an *It*, God, of course, cannot be possessed or experienced as a physical thing, for "God [as] the eternal presence, cannot be had … [and] as surely as God embraces us and dwells in us, we never have [God] within."[119]

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[117]Buber, *I and Thou*, 124.

[118]In the perfect relationship, we see everything *in* God's presence (Buber, *I and Thou*, 127), everything is comprehended *in* God (Buber, *I and Thou*, 148). While he recognizes that God embraces us and dwells in us, Buber does not describe an experience of seeing God *in* everything, *in* each other, or of having God *within* ourselves as something to be possessed; cf. Buber, *I and Thou*, 155, 152.

[119]Buber, *I and Thou*, 152, 155.

Now, as we have seen, the *will* to encounter the eternal *You* (as the *ultimate* intention of our innate *You*) is in accord with a *belief* in the reality and otherness of that *You* in the *I-You* relation and our openness to the *grace* of the response of the eternal *You* in revelation.

However, this belief in the reality and otherness of God cannot be the same as our belief in the reality and otherness of each other in so far as God, as a *You* that cannot be an *It*, is not physical and so cannot be physically perceived. As such, our belief in the existence of God as our eternal *You* must be in accord with a belief more explicitly *religious* than the belief we can have in the existence and otherness of each other as *You*.[120] In Buber's case, that religious belief is based ultimately on his own experience of faith.

A third characteristic of human *I-You* relations is that our presence in addressing each other is immediate, that is, unmediated. Again, since we cannot perceive God physically as we can with each other, we can only address God as our eternal *You* by our will to encounter that *You* according to a religiously inspired belief in the existence and otherness of that *You*. When we are able to do this, we become immediately present to that *You* without intermediary reasoning, concepts, or images.

> It is not as if God can be inferred from anything … this is what confronts us immediately and first and always and legitimately[;] it can only be addressed, not asserted.[121]

A fourth characteristic of human *I-You* relations is that in our addressing each other as *You* we are *present* to each other. This human presence, of course, includes an awareness of each other's physical dimension. Now, even though the eternal *You* has no physical dimensions, if we are open to the *grace* of a divine response, then,

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[120]It is the relation of the human being to their Creator that grounds the revelation of God as other. Cf. M. Buber, "Das Unbewusste," in *Nachlese* (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1965), 151; M. Buber, "The Faith of Judaism" and "The Power of Spirit," in *Israel and the World*, 27, 180; Wood, *Martin Buber's Ontology*, 64.

[121]Buber, *I and Thou*, 129.

"emerging from the moment of supreme encounter … [the human being] receives … a presence, a presence as strength."[122]

A fifth characteristic of human *I-You* relations is that the *You* we address in each other is not *limited* to categories of space, time, or causality. However, while our awareness of each other as a finite human *You* is not limited to space, time, and causal dimensions, it certainly includes them such that our awareness of each other as *You* includes our perception of these conditions. God, however, is not a physical reality at all, and so our addressing God as our *eternal You* cannot rely on *any* physical dimension of reality. Without any possible perceptual experience of God as *You*, our belief in the existence of God as our partner in an *I-You* relation, our belief in the existence and otherness of the eternal *You*, must be akin to a type of religious faith.

A sixth characteristic of human *I-You* relations is that in addressing each other as *You* we experience an *exclusiveness* (*Ausschließlichkeit*) of our *You* which can include all else except another *You* in the relationship.[123] In *I-You* relations with God, however, "unconditional exclusiveness and unconditional inclusiveness are one … everything is included in the relationship … in comprehending all the world in comprehending the You … [having] nothing besides God but to grasp everything in [God]."[124]

A seventh characteristic of human *I-You* relations is the mutuality or reciprocity of the encounter. We act on each other in speaking and listening to the mutual word "*You*." As such, there is a paradoxical reciprocity in *I-You* relations with a partner who creates us as their partner such that

> in the pure relationship you felt altogether dependent and yet altogether free; created and creative … creation—we participate in it, we encounter the creator, offer ourselves to [the creator], helpers and companions … in prayer [the human being] pours [himself or herself] out … knowing

[122]Buber, *I and Thou*, 157–158.

[123]Buber, *I and Thou*, 126, 148.

[124]Buber, *I and Thou*, 127, 157.

> that incomprehensibly [he or she] acts on God albeit without exacting anything from God.[125]

The eighth characteristic of human *I-You* relations, which flows from the reciprocity of interaction in mutually speaking the word *You*, is *spirit* as the reality *between I* and *You*. In addressing each other, we interact in the spirit, in the between of who we are as different substantially existing finite individuals. In the divine *I-You* relation with God as our eternal *You*, however,

> God embraces but is not the universe just [as] God embraces but is not my self. On account of this, which cannot be spoken about, I can say in my language, as all can say in theirs: You. For the sake of this there are I and You, there is dialogue, there is language, and spirit whose primal deed language is, there is eternality, the word.[126]

The ninth characteristic of human *I-You* relations is that the word *You* is spoken freely out of a will to encounter a *You* that is impelled by an innate *You* which finds its actualization in our addressing each other. However, this innate *You* is finally fulfilled in becoming wholly actualized in an *I-You* relation with the *eternal You*.

> Every encounter is a way station that grants [the human being] a view of fulfillment: … the You sense that cannot be satiated until it finds the infinite You sensed its presence from the beginning; this presence merely had to become wholly actual for it out of the actuality of the consecrated life of the world.[127]

The tenth characteristic of human *I-You* relations is their evanescence. However, this is not true of our *I-You* relation with God as our eternal *You*, for

> every actual relationship in the world alternates between actuality and latency … in the pure relationship, however, latency is merely actuality drawing a deep breath during which the *You* remains present. The eternal

[125]Buber, *I and Thou*, 130–131.

[126]Buber, *I and Thou*, 143.

[127]Buber, *I and Thou*, 128.

> You is You by its very nature[;] only *our* nature forces us to draw it into the It-world and It-speech.[128]

According to Buber, then, in *I and Thou*, we can address and be addressed by God as our eternal *You* in addressing and being addressed by each other as *You*. This happens when we address and are addressed by each other while *willing* to encounter each other as *You*, *believing* in our own individual reality as standing apart from each other within the context of destiny, and open to the *grace* of our mutual response. Moreover, by the dynamic of the innate *You* in willing to encounter each other as *You*, we ultimately will to encounter the eternal *You*, and in believing in our own individual reality standing in relation to each other within a context of destiny, we believe in the reality of the eternal *You* as our creator, and in being open to the grace of our mutual response, we are thereby open to the divine response in revelation. Thus, we can conclude that for Buber, in addressing and being addressed by God as the eternal *You* in our addressing and being addressed by each other as *You*, the reciprocity characteristic of all human *I-You* relations finds its completion in the *I-You* relation between human beings and God.

Katz, in his own way, sums up this conclusion of ours in a summary comment on Buber's *I and Thou:*

> Consistent with the hasidic, and more generally Jewish notion that God searches for [the human being] as [the human being] searched for God, Buber agreed with the provocative and wonderful assertion that God needs friends and cares about the world. This teaching of Divine Love, which makes possible human love, is at the heart of Buber's teaching of dialogue.[129]

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[128]Buber, *I and Thou*, 148.

[129]Katz, "Martin Buber in Retrospect," 263.

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FOUNDATIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF A REFRAMED CONSISTENT ETHIC OF LIFE

Anatoly Angelo R. Aseneta

Abstract. Joseph Cardinal Bernardin's Consistent Ethic of Life (CEL) is a moral vision that can be used to uphold consistently the value and dignity of human life in all its stages and circumstances. However, it must be reframed to acknowledge the new ways in which life is threatened today; these include the modern ecological crisis of our common home. This essay seeks to paint a more concrete picture of a reframed CEL. The first part rebuilds the original foundations of Bernardin's moral vision in light of the crisis of our common home. The second part identifies and reframes principles from Catholic social teaching that can guide us in living out this ethic. The essay concludes by pointing out how this reframing does not undermine the original CEL. Rather, such a reframing enhances its foundations, principles, and substance.

Keywords. Consistent Ethic of Life; *Laudato Si'*; Joseph Cardinal Bernardin; ecological ethics; pro-life

As the United States presidential elections drew near, some members of the U.S. Church raised once again the matter of single-issue voting. In focusing on abortion as a preeminent, nay, decisive issue for many U.S. Catholics, the full range of issues that affect human life and dignity, especially of the poor and the vulnerable, is not given significant attention; among these are systemic racism, genocide, the coronavirus pandemic, and the crisis of our common home.[1]

This scenario brings to mind Joseph Cardinal Bernardin's moral vision of a consistent ethic of life (CEL). More than thirty years ago, Bernardin gave his Gannon Lecture at Fordham University entitled "A Consistent Ethic of Life: An American Catholic Dialogue." In it, he sought to link together different issues about human life, particularly the right to life and quality of life. More specifically, the Cardinal sought to rule out contradictory moral positions concerning the unique value of human life, "from the womb to the tomb."[2] Bernardin's moral vision from more than three years ago still remains to be significant today.

According to two articles written by Bishop Mark J. Seitz of El Paso, Texas and William O'Neill, S.J. of the Jesuit School of Theology of Santa Clara University, the exploitation of the environment is one issue that has been sacrificed in favor of single-issue voting strategy to end abortion.[3] O'Neill contends that the modern ecological crisis—alongside endemic poverty and neglect of those gravely affected by

[1]M. Seitz, "Bishop Seitz: Single-issue voting has corrupted Christian political witness," *America* (September 30, 2020); W. O'Neill, "What vote will best protect the sanctity of life? Prudence must decide," *America* (September 30, 2020).

[2]J. Bernardin, "A Consistent Ethic of Life: An American Catholic Dialogue" (Gannon Lecture, Fordham University, December 6, 1983), in T. Nairn, ed., *The Seamless Garment: Writings on the Consistent Ethic of Life* (New York: Orbis Books, 2008), 10–13. Hereafter referred to as *SG* with appropriate page numbers. The title of the specific address given by Bernardin, together with its nature, occasion, and place and date it was given, will be provided, if available, the first time it is cited.

[3]Seitz, "Bishop Seitz: Single-issue voting has corrupted Christian political witness"; O'Neill, "What vote will best protect the sanctity of life?"

the coronavirus pandemic—is gravely wrong. To say that abortion is an "intrinsic evil" and, therefore, must be "preeminent" should not stop the conversation.[4]

Elsewhere, it has been argued that Bernardin's CEL must be reframed and expanded in the light of the crisis of our common home and with the help of integral ecology. The destructive effects of this crisis on the integrity of both human and non-human life and its profoundly moral dimensions in terms of justice and equality are just some of the reasons identified as to why the CEL should pay attention to the modern ecological crisis.[5] After humanity has survived the pandemic and returned to "normal," is it also back to "normal" for how we treat our common home? Having survived the pandemic, can future generations survive on this "sick planet"?[6] An ecologically-sensitive CEL can serve as a moral compass to help us consistently live out our duty to protect and promote life in light of this destructive crisis. A reframed CEL can provide the moral vision and framework for articulating in a coherent manner the linkages between different ethical issues concerning the defense and promotion of human life in all its stages as well as of our common home on which life itself depends.[7]

While the reasons for having an ecologically-sensitive CEL have been determined together with its contributions, what it would look like, particularly in terms of its foundations and principles, has not yet been laid down. This essay, therefore, seeks to paint a more concrete picture of such a reframed ethic. The first part of this essay rebuilds

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[4]O'Neill, "What vote will best protect the sanctity of life?" Regarding the controversial concept of "intrinsic evil," see N. Polgar & J. Selling, eds., *The Concept of Intrinsic Evil and Catholic Theological Ethics* (Lexington Books/Fortress Academics, 2019).

[5]A. Aseneta, "The Consistent Ethic of Life of Joseph Cardinal Bernardin and the Crisis of Our Common Home," *Landas* 33:1 (2019): 43–54.

[6]The thought behind putting humans on a sick planet comes from B. Swimme & T. Berry, *The Universe Story* (San Francisco, CA: Harper San Francisco, 1992), 257.

[7]Aseneta, "The Consistent Ethic of Life of Joseph Cardinal Bernardin and the Crisis of Our Common Home," 60–62.

the original foundations of Bernardin's moral vision in light of an ecologically-sensitive CEL. The second part identifies and reframes principles from Catholic social teaching that can guide us in living out this ethic. The essay concludes by pointing out how this reframing does not undermine the original CEL. Rather, such a reframing enhances its foundations, principles, and substance.

Foundations

Bernardin grounds the CEL on the unique value and dignity of the human person and the systemic defense of human life in all stages and in all circumstances. Similarly, a reframed CEL must remain built on the same foundation.[8] However, human dignity and the value of human life as well as the unique place of the human person must be understood in a larger context. As Francis pointed out in his call for an integral ecology, human beings are not the only inhabitants of our common home. The theological anthropology behind integral ecology maintains that human life is grounded in three fundamental and closely entwined relationships: with God, with our neighbor, and with the rest of creation.[9] Thus, while it is clear that human beings occupy a special place in our common home, it is also equally clear that there is no room either for a "tyrannical anthropocentrism" that is nonchalant of other creatures or for an indifference towards one's neighbors (LS no. 68).[10] Human dignity—a central tenet of Catholic moral theology and social ethics—is not necessarily a stumbling block

[8]See J. Bernardin, "The Church's Witness to Life" (Seattle University, March 2, 1986), in SG, 103 and J. Bernardin, "The Death Penalty: An International Human Rights Issue" (General Annual Meeting of Amnesty International, Loyola University Chicago, June 23, 1984), in SG, 27.

[9]Francis, *Laudato Si'* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2015), no. 66. Hereafter referred to as LS.

[10]Francis, "Homily at the Island of Lampedusa" (March 19, 2013), in G. Vigini, ed., *Care for Creation* (New York: Orbis Books, 2016), 53–54.

to the care for our common home.[11] While it can be observed that the Catholic tradition's overemphasis on human dignity has obscured the connection between that dignity and the integrity of non-human creation,[12] an ecologically-sensitive human dignity can serve as a fruitful norm in caring for God's creation.[13] The same can be said about anthropocentrism. Even in his call for an integral ecology, Francis does not totally reject anthropocentrism; instead, what he rejects is an excessive, misguided, and tyrannical one (LS nos. 68, 116, and 118–119). Indeed, an appreciation of our unique place in our common home is necessary if we are to take care of it. Occupying such a special place entails a serious duty to carry out a responsible stewardship over our common home, to care for it, and to cultivate it.[14]

Given the fundamental place of human dignity in the Catholic tradition as well as the CEL, a reframed consistent ethic must affirm this foundation. However, human dignity must be reinterpreted in the light of our complex relationships and responsibilities in our common home. In seeking to reinterpret human dignity in this manner, the kinship model of creation is an important resource. In *Ecology at the Heart of Faith*, Denis Edwards writes about how scientific data

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[11]In his work, D. Cowdin considers the problematic relationship between contemporary moral theology's emphasis on human dignity and sound ecological ethics. For more details, see D. Cowdin, "Toward an Environmental Ethic," in K. Irwin & E. Pellegrino, eds., *Preserving the Creation: Environmental Theology and Ethics* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1994), 112–147.

[12]R. Raluto, *Poverty and Ecology at the Crossroads: Towards an Ecological Theology of Liberation in the Philippine Context* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2015), 107–108.

[13]In *The Common Good and Christian Ethics* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002), D. Hollenbach, S.J. proposes an ecologically sensitive anthropocentrism and Christian humanism. For a summary, see D. Cowdin, "Environmental Ethics," *Theological Studies* 69:1 (February 2008): 166–168.

[14]Benedict XVI, "If You Want to Cultivate Peace, Protect Creation" (2010 Message for the Celebration of the World Day of Peace) (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2015), nos. 2, 6, and 7.

reveals that human beings are born from the Big Bang, are made from stardust, and are part of an evolutionary history of life. Human beings share a common history of life with all of Earth's creatures. Indeed, we are emergent creatures who share the same hydrogen atoms that materialized in the early life of the universe 14 billion years ago.[15]

From this scientific perspective which theology cannot ignore, we can glimpse a close interrelationship between human beings and the universe, including its galaxies, stars, and non-human creation. In short, human beings are in kinship with all other creatures. The kinship model "sees [the] human being and the earth with all its creatures intrinsically related as companions in a community of life."[16]

This is not to deny the special place of human beings as being created in the image and likeness of God. Edwards argues that being made in God's image and likeness means that human beings are made for interpersonal love in the midst of and in relation to the rest of God's creation. Our precise vocation is to relate to other creatures as God does—not in sentimental, anthropomorphic, and instrumental ways but in ways that respect the specificity, distinctiveness, integrity, and proper autonomy of each creature as they are. More to the point, human beings are called to act responsibly before God within creation, to "cultivate and care for" what God has created.[17]

The strength of this kinship model of creation is that it helps us transcend the separation and hierarchy that tend to obscure the relationship between humans and the rest of creation. This model helps us break away radically from the more rigidly-demarcated distinctions

[15]D. Edwards, *Ecology at the Heart of Faith* (New York: Orbis Books, 2006), 8–14.

[16]E. Johnson, *Women, Earth, and Creator Spirit* (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1993), 30. M. Himes and K. Himes advance a *companionship* model that corresponds with this kinship model. For more details, see their *Fullness of Faith: The Public Significance of Theology* (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1993), 109–112.

[17]Edwards, *Ecology at the Heart of Faith*, 14–18.

between human and non-human creatures.[18] In the words of one of the model's proponents, E. Johnson, "this kinship attitude does not measure differences on a scale of higher or lower ontological dignity but appreciates them as integral elements in the robust thriving of the whole."[19]

A serious engagement with ecological realities—in particular, an attentiveness to the connectedness of everything, our kinship with the entire cosmos that runs in our very bodies, and a painful awareness of the crisis of our common home—will not just supplement but also reconfigure our very understanding of human dignity. In the words of C. Hinze: "Regarded through an ecologically attentive lens, theological anthropology, pertaining as it does to [the] religious understanding of our human creaturehood, confirms the profundity of the commerce of humans with nature, whose impact reaches down into our very embodiedness [sic]."[20]

Such an expanded notion of human dignity is implicit in Bernardin's CEL and other works.[21] D. Nothwehr indicates that the Cardinal shows a relational ontology that opens up the CEL to ecological questions.[22] Created in God's image and likeness, human life is both sacred and social. Our relationship is not only with God but also

[18]D. Horan, "*Haecceitas*, Theological Aesthetics, and the Kinship of Creation: John Duns Scotus as a Resource for Environmental Ethics," *Heythrop Journal* 59:6 (November 2018): 1068.

[19]Johnson, *Women, Earth, and Creator Spirit*, 30.

[20]C. Hinze, "Catholic Social Teaching and Ecological Ethics," in D. Christiansen & W. Grazer, eds., *And God Saw that It Was Good: Catholic Theology and the Environment* (Washington, DC: United States Catholic Conference, 1996), 170. The whole paragraph has its source from pp. 168–171 of the same work.

[21]See J. Bernardin, "Theology on Tap," in *Selected Works of Joseph Cardinal Bernardin* Vol. 1: *Homilies and Teaching Documents* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2000), 590–592 and "Religion Enrichment Day," 422–425.

[22]D. Nothwehr, "From Ontology, Ecology, and Normativity to Mutuality: The Attitude and Principle Grounding the Consistent Ethic of Life," in T. Nairn, ed.,

with our neighbors. In turn, our relationship with other humans of inviolable dignity means that we must protect and nurture each other both personally and socially through the structures we create. Different morally significant issues that affect life, which include care for our common home, arise precisely within this highly complex and interconnected life.

Finally, it is possible not only to broaden our notion of human dignity but also to develop our notion of the sanctity of human life which is another principal tenet of the CEL and the Catholic tradition. In his investigation of the principle of the sanctity of human life, Keenan points out that "sanctity of life" is a rather new expression as it has not appeared in Catholic encyclopedias and dictionaries. At its inception, "sanctity of life" is a euphemism for God's dominion. Life is sacred not necessarily because it has intrinsic value but more so because it is a divine possession. However, John Paul II, particularly in his moral argumentation in *Evangelium Vitae*, breathes new life into this principle. God's dominion is put in the context of creation (the human person as being created in God's image and likeness) and leaves us to consider the human person as "having *in se* the dignity to claim inviolability." There is thus a development of the understanding of the sanctity of human life from the human person and life as simply objects which God owns to being subjects that bear the divine imprint.[23] Taking into account this development of the principle of the sanctity of human life, it is arguably feasible to broaden it further in light of integral ecology's theological anthropology. Such an expansion of the understanding of human dignity and the sanctity of human life has far-reaching consequences. One of these is that a reframed CEL will not only rely on a single principle to advance the connection between life issues, which now include protecting God's creation. Rather, it has

The Consistent Ethic of Life: Assessing Its Reception and Relevance (New York: Orbis Books, 2008), 132–135.

[23]J. Keenan, "The Moral Argumentation of *Evangelium Vitae*," in K. Wildes & A. Mitchell, eds., *Choosing Life: A Dialogue on Evangelium Vitae* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1997), 48–55.

to rely on the convergence of several principles to identify and advance the connection between life issues.

Principles

F. van Beeck, S.J. asserts that the CEL should not rely on the "massive fixity of explicit principle." Instead, what the ethic seeks to do can be achieved by conveying convergence. This is best done not by insisting on one absolute principle but through the use of several convergent formulae or principles. Precisely because of their convergence, such formulae can point to a total commitment that lies at the heart of the CEL without expressing it in one standard formula.[24]

Apart from human dignity and the sanctity of human life which remain to be paramount, several principles—drawn from Catholic social teaching—stand out as significant for a CEL that is attuned to the crisis of our common home and informed by an integral ecology. These are: stewardship and care for creation, the preferential option for the poor and the vulnerable, a "thicker" notion of solidarity, the common good, and equality. After briefly defining these principles and pinpointing their key characteristics, we will proceed to identify why they are important for a reframed CEL.

Stewardship and care for creation

If human life is fundamentally grounded in its relationship with the earth itself, then one of the obvious principles for a reframed CEL is stewardship and care for creation. While it is a latecomer, it remains to be a key principle or major lesson of the Church's social teaching[25] as demonstrated by a review of Catholic social teaching

[24]J. Van Beeck, "Response: Weaknesses in the Consistent Ethic of Life? Some Systematic-Theological Observations," in T. Fuechtmann, ed., *Consistent Ethic of Life* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1988), 130.

[25]E. DeBerri & J. Hug, with P. Henriot & M. Schultheis, *Catholic Social Teaching: Our Best Kept Secret*, 4th rev. and exp. ed. (New York: Orbis Books, 2003), 33–34.

on the environment.[26] The Church has a well-documented tradition of stewardship and care for creation even if it has not always been primarily because of creation's intrinsic value. With *Laudato Si'* and Francis's call for an integral ecology, it becomes apparent that being a steward of God's creation means caring for and cultivating creation not just for human ends but because it has value in itself.

Becoming increasingly and painfully aware of how the modern ecological crisis affects both our common home and human life, we are called to become more responsible and consistent stewards of God. To care for our common home means caring for our neighbor, especially the most vulnerable ones; it is not simply tending the garden of the world (cf. Genesis 2:15). Similarly, to care for our neighbor, we must also look after our common home—indeed, our only home. While stewardship and care for creation helps a reframed CEL see that we have a serious responsibility for our common home, this reframed ethic expands this principle by including concern for our neighbor as an indispensable component. Consistency means we cannot have it both ways.

An ecologically-attuned common good

The common good "embraces the sum total of those conditions of social living, whereby [women and men] are enabled more fully and more readily to achieve their own perfection."[27] In the words of the U.S. bishops, it refers to the "social conditions that allow people to reach their full human potential and to realize their human dignity."[28] Included

[26]See, for instance, Raluto, *Poverty and Ecology at the Crossroads*, 92–100 and 107–109. See also D. Dorr, *Option for the Poor: A Hundred Years of Catholic Social Teaching*, rev. and exp. ed. (New York: Orbis Books, 1992), 369.

[27]John XXIII, *Mater et Magistra* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1961), no. 65.

[28]W. Byron, "Ten Building Blocks of Catholic Social Teaching," in P. Giordano, ed., *Readings for Theology 141: A Theology of the Catholic Social Vision* (Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Loyola Schools Office of Research and

in these social conditions are respect for the human person, the social well-being and development of the community, and maintenance of peace and security by the authorities.[29] However, what exactly comprises the common good is always to be a subject for discussion.[30] Even the *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church* acknowledges the time-specific character of the common good: "the demands of the common good are dependent on the social conditions of each historical period.…"[31]

Even though the exact contents of the common good depend on different historical social conditions, it is "strictly connected to respect for and integral promotion of the person and [his or her] fundamental rights" (CSDC no. 166). Thus, it includes human rights which should always be in the context of the promotion of the common good.[32]

Everyone has a right and duty to participate, according to one's capacity, in the promotion, development, attainment, and enjoyment of the common good (CSDC no. 167). The common good is not simply the sum total of individual goods; it belongs to everyone and is indivisible, hence it is called "common" (CSDC no. 167). This stands in contrast to and serves as a challenge against individualistic attitudes as the Church stresses everyone's participation in the common good.[33]

The common good, then, is not merely a social concern but is fundamentally about the very dignity and lives of persons. This is why the Church insists that everyone should have access to the common

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Publications, 2007), 242, citing the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, *Summary Report of the Task Force on Catholic Social Teaching and Catholic Education*, 25.

[29]Byron, "Ten Building Blocks of Catholic Social Teaching," 242.

[30]Byron, "Ten Building Blocks of Catholic Social Teaching," 243.

[31]Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2006), no. 166. Henceforth CSDC.

[32]DeBerri et. al., *Catholic Social Teaching*, 23.

[33]DeBerri et. al., *Catholic Social Teaching*, 23.

good; without access to it, persons are deprived of something essential for dignified living and for reaching their full human potential. Given the close connection between human health and the health of our common home, we are becoming increasingly aware that the common good includes the environment in which we live in. It is clearly one of those conditions of social living that are necessary for us to reach our full potential and to realize our dignity. M. Himes and K. Himes make the same point when they sought to expand the common good to include the protection of the relationship between human and non-human creation in the context of companionship. Tracing how Catholic social thought elaborated the components of the common good through the language of human rights, Himes and Himes note how the "right to a safe environment" has developed to be part of the common good. It is one of those essential needs, basic freedoms, and relationships that serve human dignity.[34] As B. Swimme and T. Berry point out: "We cannot have well humans on a sick planet."[35]

The health of our common home is not only indispensable for human dignity and potential; it is also necessary for the social well-being and development of the community as well as for the attainment of a just social order. As we have seen, the crisis of our common home disproportionately and unjustly affects the poor and the vulnerable more. This is why Francis maintains that solidarity and the preferential option for the poorest are imperative for the attainment of the common good (LS no. 158). Protecting the poorest and preventing irreversible damage to our common home includes protecting the so-called "global commons" of the planet, namely, the atmosphere, the forests, the global water cycle, and the oceans, among others.[36] The Pope in particular states that "the climate is a common good, belonging to all and meant

[34]Himes & Himes, *Fullness of Faith*, 116–117.

[35]Swimme & Berry, *The Universe Story*, 257.

[36]O. Edenhofer & C. Flachsland, "*Laudato Si'*: Concern for Our Global Commons," in V. Miller, ed., *The Theological and Ecological Vision of* Laudato Si': *Everything is Connected* (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 177 and 180–181. See also O. Edenhofer, C. Flachsland, and B. Knopf, "Science and Religion in Dialogue Over the Global Commons," *Nature Climate Change* 5 (2015): 907–909.

for all" (LS no. 23). Taking into consideration integral ecology's central vision that everything is connected and reading that statement in the context of the whole encyclical, it can be surmised that it is not just the climate that belongs to all and is meant for all but also the entirety of our common home.

The CEL calls us to expand our moral concern to include the protection and enhancement of the dignity of human life in society. The ethic calls us to a so-called "justice challenge" that confronts us with questions on how to build a society that provides the essential moral and material support for every human being to realize his or her dignity. This justice challenge is thus intimately related to access to and participation in the common good. Bernardin identified racism, homelessness, unemployment, poverty, and access to health care as some pressing justice challenges.[37]

On account of these, two things must be noted. First, the CEL is already evidently aware of the importance of the common good. While the abovementioned issues remain to be important justice challenges, a CEL that is informed by both the crisis of our common home and integral ecology must also recognize that pursuing the common good includes protecting our common home. The modern ecological crisis is not just an environmental crisis but is also a justice challenge because it is closely related to the protection and enhancement of human dignity, especially of the poorest.

Second, as the principle of the common good underscores everyone's access to and responsibility in attaining social conditions for dignified living, it must be given significant emphasis if we are to create a societal climate of consistent respect for human life at every stage and in every circumstance. While the principles of human dignity

[37]J. Bernardin, "The Consistent Ethic of Life and Public Policy" (U.S. Catholic Conference Social Action Directors' Conference, Washington, DC, February 10, 1988), in SG, 148–149. For poverty, see J. Bernardin, "The Fact of Poverty Today" (Catholic University of America, January 17, 1985), in SG, 60–69. For the consistent ethic of life and health care, see J. Bernardin, "The Consistent Ethic of Life and Health Care Systems" (Foster McGaw Triennial Conference), in SG, 82–83.

and sanctity of human life signify the sacred character of human life, the principle of the common good stands for its sociality.

Preferential option for the poor and the vulnerable

The Latin American bishops have a particular role in the emergence of the principle of the preferential option for the poor and the vulnerable. Though the term itself was not yet used in the Medellín Conference of 1968, the concept was already present when the Latin American bishops committed themselves to be in solidarity with the poor and give preference to the poorest and most needy sectors of society. This concept was affirmed in the 1979 Puebla Conference and the term was used in one chapter of the Final Document of Puebla. The chapter was entitled "A Preferential Option for the Poor."[38]

The preferential option for the poor constitutes a form of partiality[39] which instructs us to put the needs of the poor and the vulnerable first.[40] It is a commitment to being in solidarity with the poor. Such an option means giving special care for people or groups who are marginalized.[41] Instead of being morally pernicious, this partiality is morally justified and even required.[42] The common good requires the good of the whole of society. If the good of all is to prevail, then

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[38]D. Dorr, "Poor, Preferential Option For," in J. Dwyer, ed., *The New Dictionary of Catholic Social Thought* (Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1994), 756.

[39]S. Pope, "Proper and Improper Partiality and the Preferential Option for the Poor," *Theological Studies* 54:2 (1993): 242.

[40]United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, *Sharing Catholic Social Teaching: Challenges and Directions—Reflections of the U.S. Catholic Bishops* (June 19, 1998), available at http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-believe/catholic-social-teaching/sharing-catholic-social-teaching-challenges-and-directions.cfm (accessed October 12, 2020).

[41]D. Dorr, *Option for the Poor and for the Earth: Catholic Social Teaching* (Quezon City, Philippines: Claretian Publications, 2013), 8–13.

[42]Pope, "Proper and Improper Partiality," 242.

preferential protection must be given to those who are negatively affected by their lack of power and the presence of deprivation.[43] The poor have a special place with God not because they belong to a specific class nor because of their virtue or moral merit but because of their need.[44]

Poverty is complex and multifaceted; the poor include not only those who are economically deprived but also those politically, culturally, ecologically, and religiously deprived. Furthermore, it includes those who are discriminated against because of their gender, race, or other grounds.[45] The Biblical understanding of the "poor" includes not only those who are in financial poverty but also all those who are marginalized and despised. The poor, then, are people who are not considered and respected as persons: they are the "insignificant ones," the "non-persons" who are not recognized in their full human dignity.[46] Thus, we say preferential option for the poor and the *vulnerable*.

The link between poverty and human life can be seen through the negation of the latter, namely, death. G. Gutiérrez holds that "poverty means death, both physical death that is early and unjust, due to lack of the most basic necessities for life, and cultural death, as expressed in oppression and discrimination for reasons of race, culture, or gender."[47] Moreover, theologically speaking, poverty means the negation of creation's significance for it is against the will of God the Creator of life. To speak theologically of poverty is not to deny its economic and social aspects but to grasp its "cruel and deep meaning:

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[43]Byron, "Ten Building Blocks of Catholic Social Teaching," 241.

[44]C. Astorga, *Catholic Moral Theology and Social Ethics: A New Method* (Quezon City, Philippines: Claretian Publications, 2014), 163.

[45]Dorr, "Poor, Preferential Option For," 757.

[46]G. Gutiérrez, "Memory and Prophecy," in D. Groody, ed., *The Option for the Poor in Christian Theology* (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 26.

[47]Gutiérrez, "Memory and Prophecy," 27.

its radical rejection of life, the gift of God, as this life is manifested in the narrative of creation."[48]

The preferential option for the poor and the vulnerable is indispensable for an integral ecology. If the CEL is to be truly informed by integral ecology and is to be truly attentive to the crisis of our common home, it has to pay attention to this option. Innocent or not, the poor and the vulnerable not only bear the greater burden of the effects of the crisis of our common home; they are also more susceptible when it comes to threats against life. Where poverty kills, the principle of the preferential option for the poor and the vulnerable serves as a more apparent principle that connects life issues.

Of course, this does not mean that we should care about the life of the poor and the marginalized only. The option for the poor is a preferential and not an exclusive one. Consistency means defending human life where it is threatened, regardless of whether it is the life of the poor or the rich, the innocent or not.[49] However, the principle of the preferential option for the poor and the vulnerable can, arguably, help us go beyond the innocent versus non-innocent human life distinction that the principle prohibiting the direct taking of innocent

[48]Gutiérrez, "Memory and Prophecy," 28.

[49]To give an example, euthanasia appears to be a problem that primarily affects the wealthy who have access to costly medical and pharmaceutical resources or who have the wherewithal to travel to countries such as Switzerland where euthanasia is legal. For more details about the connection between euthanasia and the wealthy, see the following: T. Bancroft-Hinchey, "Euthanasia—Luxury for the Wealthy," *PravdaReport* (August 18, 2012), available at http://www.pravdareport.com/society/121910-euthanasia_rich/ (accessed October 12, 2020); C. Fotinopoulos, "Dignity in Death Shouldn't Just Be for the Rich," *ABC News* (July 9, 2014), available at https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-09/fotinopoulis-dignity-in-death-shouldnt-just-be-for-the-rich/5582238 (accessed October 12, 2020); and J. Mudditt, "Voluntary Euthanasia May Only Be for the Wealthy, Canadian Expert Warns," *The New Daily* (November 14, 2017), available at https://thenewdaily.com.au/life/wellbeing/2017/11/14/euthanasia-taxpayer-subsidised/ (accessed October 12, 2020). The authors provide statistical data as well as the costs of euthanasia.

human life invites.[50] It can do so by focusing our attention on how poverty threatens life more often than do categories of innocence or non-innocence.

Finally, this option does not mean absolving the poor and the marginalized from their responsibilities, particularly towards our common home. It must not be forgotten that the poor also contribute to our common home's degradation, even if not to the same extent as the well-off.[51] Moreover, even while the poor still use crude methods in their everyday lives (e.g., traditional biomass, fuelwood, charcoal, cow dung, and kerosene for heating and cooking) that harm them and our common home, they are often left without a choice if they are to survive.[52]

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[50]One of the foundational principles of the CEL is the prohibition on the direct taking of innocent human life (see Bernardin, "A Consistent Ethic of Life: An American Catholic Dialogue," 12). Some theologians found the CEL's insistence on this principle being foundational and preeminent to be problematic. For a detailed critique, see R. McCormick, "The Consistent Ethic of Life: Is There an Historical Soft Underbelly?," in Fuechtmann, ed., *Consistent Ethic of Life*, 109–119. See also C. Kaveny, "An Ethic of 'Life,' Not 'Purity,'" *Commonweal* (November 24, 2013) and Van Beeck, "Response: Weaknesses in the Consistent Ethic of Life? Some Systematic-Theological Observations," 123–139.

[51]Perhaps an exception would be actions by the poor that massively damage our common home. An example would be informal settlers or "squatters" dumping wastes into lakes, rivers, and other bodies of water as in the case of Manila Bay and Laguna de Bay in the Philippines. For details about the effects of informal settlers disposing of wastes into waterways, particularly in the Philippines, see the following: J. Arranza, "What Happened to the Anti-Squatting Laws?," *Philippine Institute for Development Studies* (June 22, 2017), available at https://pids.gov.ph/pids-in-the-news/2007 (accessed October 12, 2020); United Nations Environment Programme, "Battling pollution in the Philippines' largest lake," available at https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/story/battling-pollution-philippines-largest-lake (accessed October 12, 2020); and M. Cinco, "Pollution, squatting, industries hasten death of Laguna de Bay," *Philippine Daily Inquirer* (January 5, 2017), available at https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/859365/pollution-squatting-industries-hasten-death-of-laguna-de-bay (accessed October 12, 2020).

[52]United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2011* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 51; United Nations Environment

Thus, even Francis recognizes that there must be "common but differentiated responsibilities" for our common home (LS nos. 52 and 160).[53]

A "THICKER" NOTION OF SOLIDARITY

Closely linked with the principle of the preferential option for the poor and the vulnerable is the principle of solidarity. It is possible to have a preferential option for the poor and the vulnerable because of our solidarity with them. This solidarity comes from an experience of significant sharing, to an extent, in the life of the poor and the vulnerable.[54] Solidarity involves a *moral empathy of each person towards everyone*, particularly of the advantaged and privileged ones towards the disadvantaged and underprivileged ones.[55]

Solidarity is both a moral principle and a social virtue. As a moral principle, it determines the order of institutions in which "structures of sin" must be purified and transformed through the creation or proper

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Programme, *Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication* (Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP, 2011), 12; and Worldwatch Institute, "The State of Consumption" (October 24, 2016), available at http://www.worldwatch.org/node/810 (accessed October 12, 2020).

[53]J. Kureethadam provides a useful discussion of historical and personal responsibilities concerning the crisis of our common home, particularly climate change. Such a discussion is helpful in identifying common but differentiated responsibilities, especially in terms of adaptation and mitigation. He concludes that the rich and developed countries that benefited from heavy industrialization have a greater responsibility. Moreover, they owe poorer nations a debt since the latter have been deprived of the carbon space they need for development. For more details, see *Creation in Crisis: Science, Ethics, Theology* (New York: Orbis Books, 2014), 266–272.

[54]Dorr, "Poor, Preferential Option For," 757.

[55]D. Finn, "Commentary on *Centesimus Annus* (On the Hundredth Anniversary of *Rerum Novarum*)," in K. Himes, L. Cahill, C. Curran, D. Hollenbach, & T. Shannon, eds., *Modern Catholic Social Teaching: Commentaries and Interpretations* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 449.

modification of laws, market regulations, and structures. It rises to the level of a social virtue because it places itself in the realm of justice. It is a virtue "directed *par excellence* to the *common good*" since it finds itself in a commitment to the good of one's neighbor with the preparedness to "lose oneself" for others instead of exploiting them, and to serve others instead of oppressing them (CSDC no. 193).

More than just an attitude and "a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes of so many people, both near and far," solidarity is action-oriented. It involves "a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good; that is to say to the good of all and of each individual, because we are all really responsible for all."[56]

Solidarity is indispensable for a reframed CEL because its absence is an obstacle to living out this ethic. A lack of solidarity may be in the form of indifference or in the form of overvaluing independence.[57] Without solidarity, we will not be able to receive and accept freely other people and concerns in our lives. Instead, we will be confined to our own circles of people and affairs.

For a CEL that is ecologically attuned and informed by an integral ecology, solidarity cannot be limited to the present generation and to human beings. It must adopt a "thicker" notion of solidarity which is present in Francis's call for an integral ecology. Authors like A. Annett,[58] K. Clarke,[59] V. Miller,[60]

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[56]John Paul II, *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1987), no. 38.

[57]McCormick, "The Consistent Ethic of Life: Is There an Historical Soft Underbelly?," 106–107.

[58]A. Annett, "The Next Step: How *Laudato Si'* Extends Catholic Social Teaching," *Commonweal* (November 7, 2018).

[59]K. Clarke, "Pope Francis explores key Catholic Social Teaching themes in 'Laudato Si'," *America* (June 18, 2015).

[60]V. Miller, "Integral Ecology: Francis's Spiritual and Moral Vision of Interconnectedness," in Miller, ed., *The Theological and Ecological Vision of* Laudato Si', 19.

and K. Irwin[61] note that in *Laudato Si'*, Francis calls for a broader idea of solidarity that extends to future generations (intergenerational solidarity) and to the rest of creation. For instance, at the beginning of the encyclical, Francis insists that "we require a new and universal solidarity" in light of the crisis of our common home (LS no. 14). Elsewhere in the document, Francis talks about a "sense of solidarity which is at the same time aware that we live in a common home which God has entrusted to us" (LS no. 232). The interconnectedness of everything also invites us "to develop a spirituality of that global solidarity which flows from the mystery of the Trinity" (LS no. 240). Finally, calling for a "universal communion," Francis maintains that if our hearts are truly open to such a communion, this sense of fraternity will exclude nothing and no one. The way we treat God's creation is deeply connected to the way we treat our fellow human beings (LS no. 92).

Thus, apart from extending solidarity to future generations, Francis also extends the principle to promote a planetary solidarity with the earth, its inhabitants, and the whole of creation. From a mere social interdependence with other human beings, we are called to move towards an acknowledgement of human interdependence with the rest of creation.[62] If a reframed CEL is to be authentically seamless in its recognition of connections, particularly between caring for our common home and protecting human life, it must also have a broader sense of solidarity. However, this solidarity would also mean that we should care for God's creation because of its intrinsic goodness and not just because of its instrumental value for humans.

While a reframed CEL is called to a thicker notion of solidarity, this does not mean putting human beings and creation on the same level. It must be clarified that the way we should show solidarity with our neighbors must be different from the way we extend such solidarity

[61]K. Irwin, *A Commentary on* Laudato Si': *Examining the Background, Contributions, Implementation, and Future of Pope Francis's Encyclical* (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 2016), 152–153.

[62]Miller, "Integral Ecology," 19.

to other creatures and the rest of creation. Even Francis is clear that we should not fall into a biocentrism that prescinds from humanity. Yielding to biocentrism will only add another imbalance which will not solve present problems while adding new ones (LS no. 118).

Equality

Since every human person is created in God's image and likeness, everyone possesses the same dignity and is fundamentally equal with each other, regardless of race, gender, nationality, origin, culture, or class (CSDC no. 144). While differences in talents are a part of the divine design, discrimination in fundamental rights is not compatible with God's plan.[63] Safeguarding and promoting this equality is a communal responsibility through the mutual actions of individuals and peoples genuinely concerned for the good of all. Finally, to stimulate the common and personal growth of everyone, it is necessary to help the least, thereby "effectively ensuring conditions of equal opportunity for men and women and guaranteeing an objective equality between the different social classes before the law" (CSDC no. 145).

Taking into account the glaring ecological divide between the poor and the rich brought about by poverty and the modern ecological crisis,[64] the principle of equality is vital for a reframed CEL. Similar to the previously mentioned principles, equality also serves to unite different but related life and justice challenges because these issues urge us to look at how inequality threatens life in various stages and circumstances. Whether it is the life of the unborn in the womb, the inmates who cannot get good legal services, the sick and the elderly swayed towards assisted suicide, and the poor who cannot fully access and participate in the common good in different ways, they are all not treated as having dignity and worth equal to those who are affluent or

[63]Byron, "Ten Building Blocks of Catholic Social Teaching," 242, citing the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, *Summary Report of the Task Force on Catholic Social Teaching and Catholic Education*, 23–24.

[64]For a discussion of this ecological divide in terms of the carbon footprint produced by the rich and the poor, see Kureethadam, *Creation in Crisis*, 261–266.

able. An ecologically-sensitive CEL informed by an integral ecology is compelled to foster personal and social attitudes and actions that guarantee conditions of equal opportunity, especially for the poorest.

Conclusion

Reframing Bernardin's CEL also means reexamining the foundations and principles behind it. The Catholic moral and social tradition's emphasis on human dignity and the sanctity of human life is not and should not be a stumbling block to our vocation as protectors of God's creation. For that to happen, however, these two principles—which also serve as foundational for Bernardin's CEL—must be understood in the context of our relationship not only with each other and with God but also with the rest of our common home. A result of expanding our understanding of human dignity and of the sanctity of human life is that a reframed CEL will no longer rely on these two principles as its foundation. Instead, an ecologically-sensitive CEL will have to rely on a network of several principles to identify and advance the connection between life issues which now include the modern ecological crisis.

In addition to the principles of human dignity and the sanctity of human life, the five principles or major themes of the Church's social teachings mentioned in the second section stand as some of the more significant principles for a CEL informed by the crisis of our common home and integral ecology. Aside from the individual significance of each principle, their congruence as well as the broader vision of integral ecology function to underscore better the systematic and analogical character of Catholic moral theology that Bernardin claims to be at the theological foundation or the substance of the CEL.[65] A brief word about these two characteristics and how they are better reflected by the congruence of these principles serves as an apt conclusion to this essay.

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[65]Bernardin, "The Church's Witness to Life," in SG, 103. See also J. Bernardin, "Address to the Consistent Ethic of Life Conference" (Portland, Oregon, October 4, 1986), in SG, 120.

The systematic nature of Catholic moral theology means that it is rooted in an array of foundational principles and then formulated in such a way that draws out the meaning of each principle and the connections among them at the same time. Since it is systematic in nature, Catholic moral theology refuses to take up moral issues in an ad hoc manner; there is a constant process of testing the utility of a principle in one case by its use in very different cases. Bernardin points out that the CEL only seeks to show how this testing takes place in dealing with issues involving the taking of life and the enhancement of life. However, he did not elaborate what this means precisely.

Being analogical in reasoning, Catholic moral theology identifies unifying elements that link together different issues while concurrently recognizing their distinctiveness. Consequently, issues should not be reduced to a single problem despite their similarities. The analogical character of Catholic moral theology addresses a host of issues that are dissimilar but have shared features. For example, the element of protection of human life unifies a spectrum of life issues from abortion to war to euthanasia. At the same time, there are other elements that radically differentiate these issues from one another. The CEL seeks to stress that amid these distinctions stands a common moral challenge: the protection of human life.

The systematic and analogical character of the CEL is alternatively expressed by Bernardin in terms of its scope and structure. With regards to its scope, the CEL, like the systematic character of Catholic moral theology, is broad enough to embrace different moral issues concerning human life. Concerning its structure, the CEL, following the analogical character of Catholic moral theology, bases its broad moral concern on a solid moral analysis that recognizes both the correspondences and divergences among distinct cases. Moreover, it admits that at some point a higher priority may be given to one issue over others.[66]

[66]J. Bernardin, "An Update on the Consistent Ethic of Life" (North American College, Rome, January 23, 1991), in SG, 202.

By relying on the convergence of these principles instead of depending on only one, the CEL reflects to a greater degree the systematic nature of Catholic moral theology which is founded on an array of principles. Furthermore, while each of these principles has their own meaning, we have seen that they are also connected at the same time. The convergence of these principles also prevents the ethic from treating issues in an ad hoc fashion because they show that apart from the principles of human dignity and the sanctity of human life, these different life and justice challenges are intimately connected in various ways.

The coherence of these principles also underlines the analogical reasoning claimed by the CEL. While human dignity and the sanctity of human life unify a spectrum of life and justice issues, these principles not only do the same but also highlight the distinctive character of each challenge. The preferential option for the poor and the vulnerable, for instance, can highlight significant aspects of some threats against life that go beyond categories of innocence, as in the cases mentioned earlier (that is, abortion, capital punishment, and the modern ecological crisis).

Reframing Bernardin's CEL in the light of the crisis of our common home and with the help of integral ecology also means restructuring its rather anthropocentric foundations and principles. Contrary to a "logic of the line" approach that pits the needs of humans and non-human creation against each other, these reframed foundations and principles help us achieve a "moral and spiritual wholeness"[67] that

[67]A "logic of the line" approach sees a long line of concerns starting with human needs and with care for the environment towards the end of the line. Human needs should be met first before turning to our physical environment. Additionally, attending to the needs and the interests of the latter is argued to lessen the attention that is due to humans. R. Wennberg finds this approach to be illogical since if one were to follow this reasoning, we would never be able to give attention to the welfare of our physical environment due to the sheer magnitude of human needs to be fulfilled. For him, caring for our environment does not (and should not) necessarily mean lessening attention to humans. Instead of having this flawed perspective, Wennberg points out that we must

"excludes nothing and no one" (LS no. 92). Instead of undermining the foundational principles of human dignity and the sanctity of human life, a reframed CEL enriches these by placing them in the larger context of our relationship with God, with one another, and with the rest of creation. In addition, these foundational principles are further augmented by the convergence of other principles from Catholic social teaching: stewardship and care for creation, a preferential option for the poor and the vulnerable, a "thicker" notion of solidarity, the common good, and equality.

Through the coherence of these principles, the systematic and analogical character of Catholic theology that Bernardin claims to be the theological foundation or substance of the CEL is better reflected. Finally, a reframed CEL, remaining true to Bernardin's vision that the distinctive characteristics of each moral challenge must be recognized, must see through this coherence that caring for God's creation is done not only for protecting and promoting conditions for dignified living. Rather, it is done also because God's creation possesses an intrinsic value.

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have "moral and spiritual wholeness" that embraces concern for humans and the environment. For more details, see R. Wennberg, *God, Humans, and Animals: An Invitation to Enlarge our Moral Universe* (Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2003), 11–14, also 201–203.

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REKINDLING THE CHURCH'S MISSIONARY FIRE

Pivotal Insights from Francis's *Evangelii Gaudium*

James H. Kroeger, M.M.

Abstract. Evangelii Gaudium (The Joy of the Gospel), Pope Francis's first major document, was written in the same year he was elected Pope (2013). It sets forth his vision for a renewed Church which is "permanently in a state of mission" (25) and seeks to "put all things in a missionary key" (34). This article of modest length seeks to digest the rich content of this lengthy apostolic exhortation (51,000 words) by identifying ten major themes that emerge from a reflective reading of Francis's work.

Undoubtedly, one of Francis's key emphases throughout this inspiring document is to renew the "fire for missionary evangelization" throughout the entire Church. He repeatedly summons all of us to become "missionary disciples" (120) and be an evangelizing community where "missionary disciples accompany missionary disciples" (173). Each of the ten themes in this presentation contributes to a comprehensive appreciation of Francis's profound and inspiring agenda for the Church which is truly *alive in mission*.

Keywords. Pope Francis; mission; evangelization; Second Vatican Council; Church social teaching; popular piety

The Joy of the Gospel (*Evangelii Gaudium*),[1] the first apostolic exhortation issued by Pope Francis, appeared only a few months after his election as pope on March 13, 2013. It is a lengthy document (51,000 words) and unfolds in five chapters across 288 numbered sections; its subtitle focuses on the "Proclamation of the Gospel in Today's World." Truly an extraordinary document, it sets forth Francis's vision for the Church that is "permanently in a state of mission" (25).

Francis notes that the 2012 XIII General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops in Rome sought to renew the Church and to be attentive to "the promptings of the Holy Spirit who helps us together to read the signs of the times" (14). For Francis, this task of examining current realities in the light of Christian faith and mission is "a grave responsibility" (51). He proposes using "an evangelical discernment" which is "the approach of a missionary disciple" who is guided by "the light and strength of the Holy Spirit" (50). Holistic, integral evangelization demands that all the baptized must continually "read the signs of the times" (108) as they live out their Christian evangelical vocation in today's complex and challenging world.

This modest presentation attempts a synthetic examination of *Evangelii Gaudium*, identifying ten pivotal insights which this author believes will contribute to renewing the missionary fervor of the Church. These ten themes seek to reflect a comprehensive integration of the numerous profound—and often very personal—insights of the Church's 266th pope; they draw heavily on Pope Francis's very own words in *The Joy of the Gospel.*

I. Missionaries: God-centered Prayerful Persons. Early in his exhortation, Francis boldly states:

> I invite all Christians, everywhere, at this very moment, to a renewed personal encounter with Jesus Christ; … I ask all of you to do this unfailingly each day. (3) … I never tire of repeating those words of Benedict XVI which take us to the very heart of the Gospel: "Being a

[1]Francis, *Evangelii Gaudium* (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2013). Hereafter referenced inline as section numbers.

> Christian is not the result of an ethical choice or a lofty idea, but the encounter with an event, a person, which gives life a new horizon and a decisive direction." (7)

Mission demands a "personal encounter with the saving love of Jesus" (264). Francis believes that

> the primary reason for evangelizing is the love of Jesus which we have received, the experience of salvation which urges us to ever greater love of him. What kind of love would not feel the need to speak of the beloved, to point him out, to make him known? If we do not feel an intense desire to share this love, we need to pray insistently that he will once more touch our hearts. (264)

Undoubtedly, mission originates and overflows from an encounter with the very person of God, the Trinity, which is *fontalis amor*, a fountain of overflowing love. As missioners personally encounter the fount-like love of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, they become "the pilgrim Church which is missionary by her very nature" (*Ad Gentes* 2).[2]

Francis asserts:

> Spirit-filled evangelizers are evangelizers who pray and work. Mystical notions without a solid social and missionary outreach are of no help to evangelization, nor are dissertations or social or pastoral practices which lack a spirituality which can change hearts. (262) … Without prolonged moments of adoration, of prayerful encounter with the word, of sincere conversation with the Lord, our work easily becomes meaningless; we lose energy as a result of our weariness and difficulties, and our fervor dies out. (262)

We may end up seeking "a purely spiritual Christ, without flesh and without the cross" (88).

An entire section of *Evangelii Gaudium* deals with "the challenge of a missionary spirituality" (78-80). Here Francis identifies various realities that may "end up stifling the joy of mission" (79). He encourages "evangelizers fearlessly open to the workings of the Holy Spirit" (259). Indeed, "Jesus wants evangelizers who proclaim the good news not only with words, but above all by a life transfigured by God's presence" (259).

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[2]Second Vatican Council, *Ad Gentes* (1965).

Missioners need "the fire of the Holy Spirit [that] burns in our hearts" (261); they will frequently turn to Mary, "Mother of Evangelization" (284-288). Poignantly stated: "Mission is at once a passion for Jesus and a passion for his people" (268).

II. Joy: Pivotal Sign of Missionary Disciples. The obvious focus on joy in *Evangelii Gaudium* is seen in the sheer number of times that words such as joy, joyful, and joyfully are repeated (nearly 100 times). Pope Francis has mined the treasures found in the two interrelated apostolic exhortations written by Paul VI in 1975: *Evangelii Nuntiandi* (Evangelization in the Modern World) and *Gaudete in Domino* (On Christian Joy). *Both popes* constantly assert that if the Gospel is not heard from "joyful evangelizers," it will not be heard at all by contemporary humanity. The lack of joy and hope is an obstacle to effective evangelization. In the introduction of *Evangelii Gaudium* (10), Francis quotes extensively the sentiments of Paul VI who believed that joy would enable the world of our time "to receive the Good News not from evangelizers who are dejected, discouraged, impatient or anxious, but from ministers of the Gospel whose lives glow with fervor, who have first received the joy of Christ" (*Evangelii Nuntiandi* 80).[3]

Pope Francis employs several catchy phrases to emphasize the centrality of joy in missionary evangelization. He notes that "an evangelizer must never look like someone who has just come back from a funeral" (10). Missionaries must not be "Christians whose lives seem like Lent without Easter" (6). Mission challenges and difficulties must not turn evangelizers into "querulous and disillusioned pessimists, 'sourpusses'" (85); yes, Francis uses the very word "sourpusses"! People today "prefer to listen to witnesses" who "speak of a God whom they themselves know and are familiar with, as if they were seeing him" (150). "A committed missionary knows the joy of being a spring which spills over and refreshes others" (272).

The success of evangelization undoubtedly requires renewed, joyful evangelizers. Jesuit Pierre Teilhard de Chardin once wrote: "Joy is the

[3]Paul VI, *Evangelii Nuntiandi* (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1975). Hereafter referenced inline as EN.

most infallible sign of the presence of God." Joy is convincing; joy evangelizes. All the daunting challenges and the complex dimensions of mission will not overwhelm those whose lives have been transformed by a joyful encounter with the Risen Lord. With heartfelt emotion, Pope Francis writes: "I wish to encourage the Christian faithful to embark upon a new chapter of evangelization marked by this joy" (1). He believes that missionary disciples must listen frequently to the admonition of Saint Paul: "Rejoice in the Lord always. I shall say it again: rejoice! Your kindness should be known to all. The Lord is near" (Phil 4:4; cf. *Evangelii Gaudium* 18). Certainly, Francis would speak these encouraging words to each of us: Be transformed by joy! Surrender to the "Lord of Joy"! Respond to my invitation: Become a joyful herald of the new evangelization! Live joyfully as a dynamic missionary-disciple!

III. Integrating Vatican II Perspectives. Francis is the first pope in many decades who was not actually present at the deliberations of Vatican II. Remarkably, five popes did take an active role in the Council: John XXIII, Paul VI, John Paul I, John Paul II, and Benedict XVI. Yet, as manifested in his *Evangelii Gaudium*, Francis is clearly imbued with Council perspectives. He has canonized three popes of Vatican II (John XXIII, Paul VI, and John Paul II) and beatified John Paul I; in effect, he has thus "canonized" Vatican II! Francis frequently quotes from several Council documents, generously employing copious references to both *Lumen Gentium* and *Gaudium et Spes*. He asserts that "it is important to draw out the pastoral consequences of the Council's teaching" (38) in fulfilling the Church's mission of evangelization in the world today.

In two places (41, 84), Francis directly quotes the words of John XXIII's opening address to the Council, recalling at length the latter's clear disagreement with the "prophets of doom" (84). Francis also notes that "fifty years after the Second Vatican Council," the Church does not adopt a "naïve optimism," although this "must not mean that we are any less trusting in the Spirit or less generous" (84).

Francis frequently uses texts from Pope Paul VI who served as pope from 1963-1978. He twice quotes *Ecclesiam Suam*, Paul VI's first encyclical, written in 1964 during the Council (26, 51). One finds over a dozen quotes from *Evangelii Nuntiandi* (e.g., 10, 12, 146 [2x], 150,

151, 154 [3x], 156, 158, 176, 181). In the first two quotes of *Evangelii Gaudium*, Francis directly cites Paul VI's 1975 apostolic exhortation *Gaudete in Domino*, a document that obviously influenced the writing of *Evangelii Gaudium*. Furthermore, one recognizes that Francis, even without presenting a full documentation of the writings of John Paul II and Benedict XVI, is remarkably conversant with the popes, documents, and theological themes of Vatican II.

Pope Francis is clearly aware of "today's vast and rapid cultural changes that demand we constantly seek ways of expressing unchanging truths in a language which brings out their abiding newness" (41). And here, once again, he quotes John XXIII's opening speech to the Second Vatican Council: "The deposit of faith is one thing … the way it is expressed is another" (41). Francis goes on to assert that in "her ongoing discernment" of current signs and trends, the Church will realize that some customs and practices "may be beautiful, but [that] they no longer serve as means of communicating the Gospel. We should not be afraid to re-examine them" (43). In doing so, the Church is being faithful to the *aggiornamento* spirit of the Council.

IV. Missionary Evangelization is Central to the Church. Pope Francis constantly promotes an active missionary Church, a community that always reaches out to people; he asserts that "missionary outreach is *paradigmatic for all the Church's activity*" (15; emphasis in original). Indeed,

> today missionary activity still represents the greatest challenge for the Church … the missionary task must remain foremost. (15) … All of us are called to take part in this new missionary "going forth." (20) … Every Christian is a missionary to the extent that he or she has encountered the love of God in Jesus Christ; we no longer say that we are "disciples" and "missionaries," but rather that we are always "missionary disciples." (120; cf. 40, 119-121)

In the Church, "missionary disciples accompany missionary disciples" (173).

Jesus is "the first and greatest evangelizer" (12); he was sent into our world to bring us the Good News of the Kingdom of God. When he began his public ministry, Jesus noted that he was sent "to bring Good News to the poor, to proclaim liberty to captives and to

the blind new sight, to set the downtrodden free, to proclaim a year acceptable to the Lord" (Lk 4:18-19). In turn, he called and sent his own disciples on mission, to become "fishers of [women and men]" (Mt 4:19). In imitating Jesus, Francis asserts: "If the whole Church takes up this missionary impulse, she has to go forth to everyone without exception" (48).

Francis has a vision, a dream, for the Church:

> I dream of a "missionary option," that is, a missionary impulse capable of transforming everything, so that the Church's customs, ways of doing things, times and schedules, language and structures can be suitably channeled for the evangelization of today's world rather than for her self-preservation. (27)

Concretely, this means that each local Church is invited "to make this missionary impulse ever more focused, generous and fruitful" through "a resolute process of discernment, purification and reform" (30).

In *Evangelii Gaudium*, one repeatedly finds a holistic and comprehensive vision of mission, often expressed today using the words "integral evangelization"; thus, the Church employs an "authentic and integral meaning of the mission of evangelization" (176). Francis directly quotes Paul VI: "any partial or fragmentary definition which attempts to render the reality of evangelization in all its richness, complexity and dynamism does so only at the risk of impoverishing it and even of distorting it" (176; EN 17). Again, "evangelization would not be complete if it did not take account of the unceasing interplay of the Gospel and of [the human person's] concrete life, both personal and social" (181; EN 29). Francis is emphatic, asserting that the entire Church must attempt "to put all things in a missionary key" (34)!

V. Becoming a Dynamic, Outgoing Church. In calling for a "mission-centered" Church, Francis offers various descriptions of such a renewed Christian community. His summons is filled with vibrant expressions and challenges. "I prefer a Church which is bruised, hurting and dirty because it has been out on the streets, rather than a Church which is unhealthy from being confined and from clinging to its own security" (49); indeed, the Church must avoid "remaining shut up within structures which give us a false sense of security" (49).

Francis continues: "A Church which 'goes forth' is a Church whose doors are open" and seeks "to reach the fringes of humanity" (46). Such a Church "realizes that it has to grow in its own understanding of the Gospel and in discerning the paths of the Spirit" so that "it always does what good it can, even if in the process, its shoes get soiled by the mud of the street" (45). As Church, "all of us are asked to obey his call to go forth from our own comfort zone in order to reach all the 'peripheries' in need of the light of the Gospel" (20).

How can this transformation be accomplished? One clear essential, alluded to earlier, is to engage in prayer and experience its "missionary power" (281).

> When evangelizers rise from prayer, their hearts are more open; freed of self-absorption, they are desirous of doing good and sharing their lives with others. (282) … Keeping our missionary fervor alive calls for trust in the Holy Spirit, for it is he who "helps us in our weakness" (Rom 8:26). (280)

Pope Francis singles out the roles of the laity and the youth in renewing missionary dynamism. He asserts that emphasis is needed on "the identity and mission of the laity in the Church" (102). In addition, Francis believes that "the rise and growth of associations and movements mostly made up of young people can be seen as the work of the Holy Spirit" (105). These directions, as noted earlier, are pivotal in seeking "to put all things in a missionary key" (34).

VI. Centrality of Mercy in Missionary Evangelization. Quoting Saint Thomas Aquinas, Pope Francis has said that

> mercy is the greatest of all the virtues: "In itself mercy is the greatest of the virtues, since all the others revolve around it and, more than this, it makes up for their deficiencies. This is particular to the superior virtue, and as such it is proper to God to have mercy, through which his omnipotence is manifested to the greatest degree." (37)

Consequently, "the Church must be a place of mercy freely given, where everyone can feel welcomed, loved, forgiven and encouraged to live the good life of the Gospel" (114).

Francis, inaugurating the Year of Mercy (2015-2016), noted in *Misericordiae Vultus* (24) that Jesus is "mercy-made-flesh"; God's mercy is incarnate in the person of Jesus. He went around the towns and villages of Israel, "teaching in their synagogues, proclaiming the Good News of the Kingdom, and curing all kinds of diseases and sickness" (Mt 9:35). He "felt deep compassion" for the crowds (Mt 9:36), sensitively paying attention to everyone, especially the "little people," like the woman who donated her two small coins to the temple (Mk 12:41-44), the poor widow of Nain (Lk 7:11-17), or the Gerasene demoniac (Mt 5:1-20). Jesus truly served the "little, lost, least, lonely, and last." Merciful service of the needy was the hallmark of his ministry.

Jesus's mercy overflowed when he invited Matthew the tax collector to follow him; he looked at Matthew with merciful love and chose him (Mt 9:9). Recall that Francis's own episcopal motto reflecting this scripture passage is *miserando atque eligendo*. Simply translated, it means "chosen through mercy"; this captures Francis's own vocational calling. In addition, Francis deeply appreciates Jesus's many parables devoted to mercy: the lost sheep, the lost coin, and the father with two sons (Lk 15:4-7, 8-10, 11-32). He frequently notes (for example, in his general audience on April 6, 2016) that "Jesus … is God's mercy made flesh."

Arising from his insights into God's mercy and its role in the Church's missionary evangelization, Francis summons everyone to a "revolution of tenderness" (88). Following Jesus, we are "to touch human misery, to touch the suffering flesh of others…, [and] enter into the reality of other people's lives and know the power of tenderness" (270). Jesus himself becomes the model of evangelization by which we touch the very hearts of people (cf. 269). Because "by her very nature the Church is missionary; she abounds in effective charity and a compassion which understands, assists, and promotes" (179). In a word, mission means making God's compassionate mercy visible, tangible, and perceptible through one's daily Christ-like deeds.

VII. Social Realities: Integral to Evangelization. Francis straightforwardly admits that "the Church does not have solutions for every particular issue" (241) that humanity faces. In response to the many and diverse challenges that arise in today's world, the Church

> supports those programs which best respond to the dignity of each person and the common good. In doing this, she proposes in a clear way the fundamental values of human life and convictions which can then find expression in political activity. (241)

It is noteworthy that the entire chapter four of *Evangelii Gaudium* is devoted to "The Social Dimension of Evangelization" (176-258). Certainly, this social engagement includes the discerning of the signs of the times as mentioned in the introduction of this presentation.

While retaining a broad concern for all important social challenges, Francis states:

> I intend to concentrate on two great issues which strike me as fundamental at this time in history. I will treat them more fully because I believe that they will shape the future of humanity. These issues are first, the inclusion of the poor in society, and second, peace and social dialogue. (185)

One may seek to know the foundation of Church social engagement. Francis is clear: "Our faith in Christ, who became poor … is the basis of our concern for the integral development of society's most neglected members" (186). Concretely, this demands that "each individual Christian and every community is called to be an instrument of God for the liberation and promotion of the poor, and for enabling them to be fully part of society" (187). In addition, this means "working to eliminate the structural causes of poverty and to promote the integral development of the poor, as well as small daily acts of solidarity in meeting the real needs which we encounter" (188).

Francis constantly enunciates lofty Christian ideals and concretely links them with specific tasks to be undertaken. He believes that "we need to grow in a solidarity which 'would allow all peoples to become the artisans of their destiny,' since 'every person is called to self-fulfillment'" (190). Concretely, this demands that "in all places and circumstances, Christians, with the help of their pastors, are called to hear the cry of the poor" (191). In diverse places, Francis highlights issues such as education, healthcare, employment, just wages, injustices, consumption, etc.; the list of issues is undoubtedly varied and lengthy.

These many factors lead Francis to assert:

> I want a Church which is poor and for the poor. They have much to teach us. Not only do they share in the *sensus fidei*, but in their difficulties they know the suffering Christ. We need to let ourselves be evangelized by them. (198) … None of us can think we are exempt from concern for the poor and social justice. (201)

Together in the Church, we must address "the new idolatry of money" (55), the "throw-away culture" (53), the "globalization of indifference" (54), "inordinate consumption" (60), "an economy of exclusion and inequality" (53), as well as multiple other unjust social realities.

Undoubtedly, Francis's words are often very strong and direct on social issues; some may be taken aback to hear the pope speak in such a direct manner. He explains:

> If anyone feels offended by my words, I would respond that I speak them with affection and with the best of intentions, quite apart from any personal interest or political ideology. My words are not those of a foe or an opponent. (208)

Francis says that he is only interested in promoting "a way of living and thinking which is more humane, noble, and fruitful, and which will bring dignity to [people's] presence on this earth" (208).

Succinctly stated, Francis is deeply interested in "generating processes of people-building" (224). He concludes:

> Starting from certain social issues of great importance for the future of humanity, I have tried to make explicit once again the inescapable social dimension of the Gospel message and to encourage all Christians to demonstrate it by their words, attitudes and deeds. (258)

VIII. Popular Piety, a Vehicle of Evangelization. Francis devotes an entire section of his apostolic exhortation to "the evangelizing power of popular piety" (122-126). He builds upon the insights of recent popes, his own pastoral experience, and the 2007 *Aparecida Document* of the Latin American and Caribbean Bishops. Bishop Jorge Bergoglio, the future Pope Francis, served as the main writer of the *Aparecida Document* and he quotes it directly five times in *Evangelii Gaudium*. His insights also reflect the thought of the *Directory on Popular Piety and the*

Liturgy: Principles and Guidelines issued in 2001 by the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments.

While Francis speaks of popular piety in various places in *Evangelii Gaudium* (69-70, 90), his focused profound insights appear in the section directly linking popular piety with evangelization (122-126). One can do no better than listening directly to Francis's words! He points out the culture-faith linkage:

> Once the Gospel has been inculturated in a people, in their process of transmitting their culture, they also transmit the faith in ever new forms.… One can say that "a people continuously evangelizes itself." Herein lies the importance of popular piety. (122)

> Popular piety enables us to see how the faith, once received, becomes embodied in a culture and is constantly passed on. Often looked down upon, popular piety came to be appreciated once more in the decades following the Council. In the exhortation *Evangelii Nuntiandi*, Pope Paul VI gave a decisive impulse in this area. There he stated that popular piety "manifests a thirst for God which only the poor and the simple can know" and that "it makes people capable of generosity and sacrifice even to the point of heroism." (123)

Francis also quotes what Pope Benedict XVI said about Latin America, pointing out that "popular piety is 'a treasure of the Catholic Church,' in which 'we see the soul of the Latin American peoples'" (123).

Quoting the *Aparecida Document*, Francis notes that popular piety is referred to by the bishops in various terms: "popular spirituality," "the people's mysticism," and "a spirituality incarnated in the culture of the lowly" (124). They also assert that

> it is a legitimate way of living the faith, a way of feeling part of the Church and a manner of being missionaries; it brings with itself the grace of being a missionary.… Let us not stifle or presume to control this missionary power! (124)

Thus, "to understand this reality we need to approach it with the gaze of the Good Shepherd, who seeks not to judge but to love" (125).

Francis concludes his reflections (which most probably arise from his own direct personal experience of this living form of faith) by

noting that the Church must not underestimate the value of popular piety, for

> to do so would be to fail to recognize the work of the Holy Spirit.… Expressions of popular piety have much to teach us; for those who are capable of reading them, they are a *locus theologicus* which demands our attention, especially at a time when we are looking to the new evangelization. (126)

Parenthetically, this author, whose faith was nourished by popular devotions and who has spent over five decades as a missionary in the Philippines and Bangladesh, deeply appreciates the valid, profound, and enriching insights of Pope Francis on popular piety and its contribution to missionary evangelization! This is the living faith-experience of millions of Catholic Christians!

IX. Two Crucial Dialogues in Evangelization Today. Within a larger section devoted to various forms of dialogue, Francis treats both ecumenical dialogue (244-249) and interreligious dialogue (250-254). Brief highlights of these two tasks of the Church are presented here.

In discussing ecumenism, Francis notes that

> the credibility of the Christian message would be much greater if Christians could overcome their divisions.… We must never forget that we are pilgrims journeying alongside one another. This means that we must have sincere trust in our fellow pilgrims, putting aside all suspicion or mistrust, and turn our gaze to what we are all seeking: the radiant peace of God's face. (244) … Given the seriousness of the counter witness of division among Christians, particularly in Asia and Africa, the search for paths to unity becomes all the more urgent. (246)

Francis notes that

> the immense numbers of people who have not received the Gospel of Jesus Christ cannot leave us indifferent. Consequently, commitment to a unity which helps them to accept Jesus Christ can no longer be a matter of mere diplomacy or forced compliance, but rather an indispensable path to evangelization. (246)

Through ecumenical relations, which Francis sees as "an exchange of gifts, the Spirit can lead us ever more fully into truth and goodness" (246).

Recall the fact that in October 2016, Pope Francis travelled to Sweden for ecumenical gatherings in the cities of Lund and Malmo, joining the Catholic-Lutheran commemoration of the Reformation. He said: "We, too, must look with love and honesty at our past, recognizing error and seeking forgiveness." Simply stated, this very public action by Pope Francis manifested his commitment to ecumenism.

On the topic of interreligious or interfaith dialogue, Francis has given us some unique insights.

> Interreligious dialogue is a necessary condition for peace in the world, and so it is a duty for Christians as well as other religious communities. (250) … True openness involves remaining steadfast in one's deepest convictions, clear and joyful in one's own identity, while at the same time being "open to understanding those of another party" and "knowing that dialogue can enrich each side." … Evangelization and interreligious dialogue, far from being opposed, mutually support and nourish one another. (253)

We also remember that Pope Francis has personally met with major Islamic leaders. In May 2016, he travelled to Egypt and met with Egyptian Grand Imam of al-Azhar Mosque Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed al-Tayeb. In his four-day visit to Iraq in March 2021, the first ever by a pope, Francis met with the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in the holy city of Najaf. Such actions manifest the Church's public commitment to fostering interfaith dialogue.

X. A World-wide Vision of Evangelization. In surveying the content of *Evangelii Gaudium*, one comes to appreciate Pope Francis's broadly based vision of evangelization and his collegial approach. He directly quotes nine episcopal conferences (Latin America and Caribbean, USA, France, Congo, Philippines, India, Europe, Brazil, and Oceania); all the continents appear in his citations. For example, his lengthy quote from the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) focuses on the current topic of ecology which was the subject of the 1988 CBCP pastoral letter *What is Happening to Our Beautiful Land?* Francis introduces the quote with these words: "Here I would make my own the touching and prophetic lament voiced some years ago by the bishops of the Philippines" (215).

An additional observation notes that there are many "Asian echoes" in *Evangelii Gaudium*. This author, an "Asian missioner" for over five decades, can affirm that Francis's exhortation has found wide acceptance and resonance in the Asian context. In addition to his very personal style of writing and his heartfelt appeal for a joyful, enthusiastic commitment to evangelization, Francis has recognized the dedicated work and insights of the local Churches of Asia.

Pope Francis quotes *Ecclesia in Asia* six times (see footnotes 58, 77, 78, 95, 99, and 134 of *Evangelii Gaudium*). In these places, he speaks about these themes: "the stability of the family" (62), "the explicit proclamation of Jesus as Lord" (110), "joyful, patient and progressive preaching" (110), "faith cannot be constricted to the limits of understanding and expression of any one culture" (118), "the Holy Spirit is the principal agent [of evangelization]" (122), and "a pedagogy which will introduce people step by step to the full appropriation of the mystery" (171). One naturally comes to the conclusion that Francis is truly a universal pastor with a vision of evangelization for the entire Catholic Church!

Within Francis's global mission vision, one finds a very creative response to contemporary mission challenges. To assist Christians in addressing profound challenges facing evangelizers today, Francis presents an innovative list of eight "no" statements and seven "yes" exhortations. First, employing a kind of *via negativa*, Francis alerts us to factors that could diminish the Church's effectivity in the world today. He bluntly says:

> No to an economy of exclusion (53-54)
> No to the new idolatry of money (55-56)
> No to a financial system which rules rather than serves (57-58)
> No to the inequality which spawns violence (59-60)
> No to selfishness and spiritual sloth (81-83)
> No to sterile pessimism (84-86)
> No to spiritual worldliness (93-97), [and]
> No to warring among ourselves (98-101).

Francis also exhorts evangelizers to be vigilant and not to let themselves be "robbed" of pivotal dimensions of Christian life and mission:

> Let us not allow ourselves to be robbed of missionary enthusiasm! (80)
> Let us not allow ourselves to be robbed of the joy of evangelization! (83)
> Let us not allow ourselves to be robbed of hope! (86)
> Let us not allow ourselves to be robbed of community! (92)
> Let us not allow ourselves to be robbed of the Gospel! (97)
> Let us not allow ourselves to be robbed of the ideal of fraternal love! (101), [and]
> Let us not allow ourselves to be robbed of missionary vigor! (109).

These "no" statements and "yes" exhortations clearly show that Pope Francis is neither naïve nor unrealistic in his efforts to promote evangelization within the Church. He is simply reflecting the realism needed to read contemporary "signs" for a more effective missionary evangelization. He affirms that

> in spite of everything, Saint Paul's exhortation is directed to each of us: "Do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good" (Rom 12:21). And again: "Let us not grow weary in doing what is right" (Gal 6:9). (101)

Conclusion. Undoubtedly, *Evangelii Gaudium* is Pope Francis's blueprint for the missionary renewal of the Church as it seeks to proclaim the Gospel in today's world. Its scope is remarkably comprehensive; its coverage of pivotal topics is broad and extensive; its pastoral vision is sensitive and practical; its evangelical insights have lasting value; its appeal reaches the hearts and minds of Catholics today. Therefore, any commentary on the original document pales in comparison to an actual meditative reading of its contents. One may employ a simple comparison: while Scripture commentaries provide helpful insights into the meaning of the text, there is no substitute for reading the original Word of God itself!

The words addressed to Saint Augustine echo the sentiments of this writer: *Tolle, lege!* Take and read! This author can definitely assure that the reader will be personally enriched by the depths of unique insights found in *Evangelii Gaudium. Tolle, lege!*

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ISANG BAGONG SALIN SA TAGALOG NG MGA SALMO AT MABISANG PAGBABALIK-BUKAL SA KALINANGANG HILAGANG-KANLURANING SEMITIKO

Isang Paglalahad, Pagsasanay, at Pagganyak sa Pamamagitan ng Slm 109

Bienvenido Q. Baisas, O.F.M.

Abstract. After 500 years since the arrival of Christianity in these islands now called the Philippines, we are still being summoned to inculturate our faith. This dialogue between faith and culture takes place more effectively if done in our local language—Tagalog. This challenge is posed concretely to the Catholic Biblical Association of the Philippines in the form of a translation project, with enough Filipino and Filipina biblicists, of the entire Sacred Scriptures, which shall serve theological studies and reflection rooted in the context of our people and society. The belated and posthumous appreciation of Mitchell Dahood, SJ's *magnum opus* (*Psalms I-III* in the Anchor Bible series) should serve us as a model in the mission of translating not only the Psalms but also the other poetic parts of the TaNaK, hence this biblico-theological exercise on Psalm 109, a marginalized psalm. Biblical insights in dialogue with our Philippine context have been reached through a study of the Hebrew text in accord with the principles of NWS poetry developed by Dahood.

Keywords. Hebrew consonantal text; Northwest Semitic poetry; inculturation; faithful translation; CBAP priority; marginalized Psalm

1. Paunang Salita

1.1. Hamon ng Ikalimang Dantaon

Napapanahon na sa ating pagdiriwang ng ikalimang dantaon ng pagsapit ng pananampalatayang Kristiyano sa mga kapuluang ito na bakahin ang hamon ng pag-ugat nito sa ating katutubong kalinangang Pilipino sa pamamagitan ng ating sariling wikang Tagalog. Marapat na masdan at suriin ang ating kalalagayan ngayon bilang mga mananampalatayang Pilipino sa tanglaw ng mga Banal na Kasulatan, na siyang pinakapangulong pinagkukunan natin ng mabathalang pananaw. Tulad ng malimit sabihin sa akin ni Jose de Mesa, isa sa mga unang laykong teologong Pilipino, nang nabubuhay pa siya (kapuri-puri ang kanyang alaala!), kailangan natin ng isang mahusay na salin sa Tagalog na malapit na malapit sa mga orihinal na wika ng Banal na Kasulatan. Nais ko nang páunang sabihin na isang hamon ito para sa Catholic Biblical Association of the Philippines (CBAP)—na magbunsod ng isang proyektong sama-sama't organisadong mahusay na pagsasalin ng ating mga pinagkukunang bibliko na makakatulad sa serye ng *The Anchor Bible*—upang maibunsod pang higit ang pagteteolohiyang Pilipino sa mga parating na panahon, at di manayâ lamang sa Inglés na mananatiling banyaga, lalung-lalo na sa karamihan ng ating mga kapanalig at kamamamayan sa bansang ito.

1.2. Proyekto ng Biblia ng Sambayanang Pilipino

Sumapit nang kongkreto ang hamong ito para sa kasalukuyang manunulat, may higit nang anim na taon na ang nakararaan, nang nakadestino pa siya sa Nazaret, Israel at lapitan siya ni Desiderio Ching, CMF, ang Patnugot ng Biblia ng Sambayanang Pilipino.[1] Ninais niyang makibahagi ang manunulat na ito sa hangarin ng mga Claretiano—na maghandog ng isang bagong edisyon ng BSP sa ating sambayanang Pilipino sa pagkakataon ng nasabing Ikalimang Dantaon—sa pamamagitan ng isang bagong salin ng 150 mga Salmo

[1]Tutukuyin bilang BSP sa mga susunod na gamit.

mula sa orihinal na Hebreo. Naging bantulót itong manunulat sa simula kasi alam niyang isa sa mga pinakamahirap isalin na bahagi ng Hebreong Biblia ang mga Salmo dahil mga tula ito. Sa katapusan nama'y tinanggap niya ang hamon sa kondisyong magiging batayán niya ng salin ang Hebreong tekstong mga katinig[2] na sinuri't pinag-aralan ni Mitchell Dahood, SJ sa sali't komentaryong pilolohiko niya sa *Psalms I-III* sa serye ng *The Anchor Bible*. Pinasimulan niya ang gawain sa mga malaya niyang panahon gayong may iba siyang pangulong mga gawaing iniatang sa kanya ng mga namumuno sa Ordeng Franciscano sa Israel. Sa paglipas ng panahon, unti-unting nabuo ang pasyang gumawa rin ng isang aklat-aralin tungkol sa mga Salmo para sa gamit ng mga mag-aaral sa mga seminaryo. Kayâ nangahulugan ito ng pagsasalin ng halos buong nasabing tatlong tomo ni Dahood. Patuloy na sinisikap ni Alberto Rossa, CMF, ang Direktor ng Pastoral Bible Foundation ng mga Claretiano sa Hong Kong, na makuha ang pahintulot ng mga kinauukulang awtoridad sa Yale University Press, na siya ngayong tagalimbag ng bagong taguring *Anchor Yale Bible Series*, na gamitin ang nasabing tatlong tomo ng *Psalms I-III*[3] para sa nasabing

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[2]Ang *Biblia Hebraica*, ed. R. Kittel, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart: 1937), na tutukuyin bilang BH(3) sa susunod na gamit, at ang *Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia*, eds. K. Elliger & W. Rudolph (Stuttgart: 1968), na tutukuyin bilang BHS sa susunod na gamit, ang naging mga batayan ni Dahood. Ang naging batayan naman ng kasalukuyang manunulat ay ang *Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia*, eds. K. Elliger & W. Rudolph, 5th amended ed. (Stuttgart: 1997), na tutukuyin bilang BHS(5) sa susunod na gamit.

[3]Sa kaalamang abót ng kasalukuyang manunulat, walang nangahas na magrebisa ng *magnum opus* ni Mitchell Dahood na *Psalms I-III* sa orihinal na *The Anchor Bible*, gen. eds. W. F. Albright and D. N. Freedman, Vols. 16–17A (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1965/1966, 1968, 1970), gayong namatay siya noong 1982 at kinilala ang kawastuhan ng kanyang metodolohiya sa pag-aaral ng mga Salmo sa dakong katapusan lamang ng nakaraang dantaon at higit sa pasimula ng kasalukuyang dantaon. Bagama't napalipat sa ibang tagalimbag at nagkaroon na ng huling edisyon ang nasabing gawa ni M. Dahood, *Psalms I-III*, Anchor Yale Bible Series (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), gayumpaman, ang ginamit na edisyon ng kasalukuyang manunulat ay ang orihinal na M. Dahood, *Psalms III*, Vol. 17A, The Anchor Bible (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1970), na sa mga susunod na gamit ay tutukuyin bilang Dahood, *Psalms III*. Tutukuyin naman ang M. Dahood, *Psalms II*, Vol. 17, The

proyekto. Mayroon ding bagong *General Editor* ang bagong seryeng ito, si John J. Collins.

1.3. Si M. Dahood at ang Kaugnayan ng Hebreo sa HKS[4]

Mahigit na kalahating dantaon ang nakalipas mula nang maluwalhating maisagawa ni Dahood ang kanyang komentaryong pilolohiko sa mga Salmo (1965–1970)[5] bilang bahagi ng serye ng *The Anchor Bible*.[6] Walang alinlangang nabulabog noon ang maraming mga mananaliksik ng Banal na Kasulatan,[7]

Anchor Bible (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1968) bilang Dahood, *Psalms II* sa mga susunod na gamit.

[4]Hilagang-Kanluraning Semitiko.

[5]Sa katunayan, inabot ng sampung taon ang pagsulat ni Dahood ng *Psalms I-III* sa Anchor Bible, gaya ng kanyang ipinahiwatig sa Prepasyo ng huling tomo:

> Ten years have passed since that August afternoon of 1959 when my tranquil study in the library of the Biblical Institute in Jerusalem was interrupted.… Today, a decade and one hundred and fifty psalms later, I thank Professor D. N. Freedman both for his intrusion and for his subsequent help and counsel.… (Dahood, *Psalms III*, v)

[6]Tutukuyin bilang AB sa mga susunod na gamit.

[7]Narito ang dalawang halimbawa ng mga punang maiigting na kabilang sa mga sinipi mismo ni Dahood:

> Two rather persistent questions about *Psalms I* can be couched roughly in these terms: How can one be sure that this translation of Psalms, which departs so radically not only from the venerable traditions of the MT and the ancient versions, but also from contemporary translations and Psalms scholarship, is sound and reliable? How can one scientifically control these new proposals? Reviewing *Psalms I* in the *Journal of Biblical Literature* [Vol. 85 (1966), p. 484], David A. Robertson expresses his deep concern about the potential harm that may accrue from the book.… [He says:] "In short, most of what this commentary contains should be for scholarly consumption only, and should be transmitted

lalo na ng TaPaK;[8] mismong si Dahood ang nag-ulat nito at nagbigay ng karampatang kasagutan sa ikalawa't ikatlong mga tomo ng nasabing komentaryo.[9] Sa katunayan, naging daan ito upang higit niyang mapayaman lalo na ang ikatlong tomo[10] at mabigyan ng mas matibay

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to the public only after intensive evaluation by those best qualified to do so." (Dahood, *Psalms II*, xxii–xxiii)

Ang isa pang puna ay nakatutok naman sa kaugnayan ng Ugaritiko at ng Hebreo sa isa't isa:

> In his review of *Psalms I*, F. I. Andersen [*Anglican Theological Review* 49 (1967)] remarked that many Old Testament scholars may not be prepared to accept the general presuppositions underlying many of these results. These volumes assume that Israelite poetry continues the poetic tradition of the Canaanites, borrowing Canaanite poetic techniques, parallelism, vocabulary, imagery, etc. The psalms are translated with an eye more to the meaning given to the words in an earlier period than in the sense attributed them by post-Exilic Jewish culture or by Christian interpretation. In this approach the ancient versions play a very minor role. Andersen correctly sensed the mood of some scholars, to judge from Samuel Terrien's review of *Psalms II*.… (Dahood, *Psalms III*, xxii)

[8]TaPaK ang pagsasa-Tagalog ng akronimo sa Hebreong Biblia na *TaNaK* (*Tōrāh* = Turo + *Nᵉbi'im* = Propeta + *Kᵉtūbim* = Kasulatan).

[9]Paganito pinasimulan ni Dahood ang Paunang Salita ng Ikatlong Tomo ng kanyang komentaryo:

> The lively critical reaction to *Psalms I, 1–50* and *Psalms II, 51–100* (AB, vols. 16 and 17) belies the apologetic dictum of Saint Jerome that of all the gifts or graces bestowed by Heaven, that of the translator ranks lowest in the scale of importance. Modern scholars know better; they realize that the soundness of biblical theology and anthropology depends upon the soundness of the translation on which these disciplines are based. Try as we will, we cannot escape words, in themselves, or the subtle grammatical structures that build up sentences and paragraphs.… Thus scholars are obliged to cast a critical eye upon a new translation of Psalms which upends current assumptions and urges a basic reorientation. (Dahood, *Psalms III*, xvii)

[10]Palatandaan ng katapatan at kababaang-loob na pangkatalinuhan ni Dahood, sa palagay ng manunulat na ito, ay ang kanyang isinulat sa Panimulang Salita ng *Psalms III* (p. xvii):

na patutunguhan sa pag-ugat ng Hebreong mga tula sa minana nito bilang kabahagi ng kalinangang Hilagang-Kanluraning Semitiko. Sa tingin naman ng kasalukuyang manunulat, ang mahigit na animnapung taon, makaraan ang mainit na pagtatalo tungkol sa kawastuhan ng mga simulaing sinundan ni Dahood sa kanyang *magnum opus* kaugnay sa mga Salmo ng TaPaK, ay sapat na magpahupa roon para mas panatag at payapa nating makilatis ang ginintuang gawa ng Gurong ito.

Sa sandaling ito, makatuturan bago magpatuloy na malaman ang pagsulong ng mga pag-aaral tungkol sa Ugaritiko at Hebreo. Malaking tulong na makita ang pangkalahatang kalalagayan ngayon ng Ugaritolohiya at ng pagpapaliwanag sa TaPaK, lalo na ng mga Salmo. Isang sanaysay ni A. Gianto, ang "Ugaritology and Biblical Interpretation,"[11] ang malinaw na naglahad ng mga pagsulong na ito. Itinuring niyang ang mga isinagawa ni Dahood na pagsasalin ng *Psalms I-III* ay kabahagi ng ikatlong kapanahunan ng Ugaritolohiya (1970–1985) nang matibay na tumatag ang impluho ng mga pag-aaral ng Ugaritiko sa mga pag-aaral sa Biblia. Nakakapagpalakas ng loob na malamang sa

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> This volume trusts to have profited from the comments of critical reviewers; their questions have helped shape the following paragraphs. The Prophet announced that if two texts of the Koran appeared inconsistent, the later one was to be taken as authoritative. And I should wish the reader to apply the same principle when judging these volumes that were ten years a-borning. Some revisions presented below are necessitated by the author's faulty judgment in the past, and some arise from his failure to have adhered consistently to the enunciated canons of Northwest Semitic grammar.

Pinagtibay ang pahayag na ito ni Dahood sa pag-aaral na ginawa ni R. Althann noong 1997 sa kanyang *Studies in Northwest Semitic* (Rome: Editrice Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 1997), p. 157, sa pagsasabing,

> The contribution of Mitchell Dahood to the clarification of the meaning of the biblical text lies especially in the attention to points of detail. Even where his suggestions must be rejected—and he himself frequently changed his opinion on a passage in the light of later evidence—he offers a stimulus.

[11]A. Gianto, "Ugaritology and Biblical Interpretation," in S. McKenzie, ed., *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Biblical Interpretation* (Oxford University Press, 2013), 429–436.

ikaapat na kapanahunan (1985–1999), kaalinsabay ng higit na ganang pabutihin pa ng mga mananaliksik ang teoria't mga kasangkapan sa pag-aaral ng Ugaritiko mismo, ay ang pagbabalik sa mga nagawang mga pag-aaral sa nakaraan.[12] Naghihintay pa ng panibagong pagtatasa ang mga pangyayari ng nakaraang unang dekada ng kasalukuyang dantaon. Subali't higit na pampasigla ang naging katapusan ng unang bahagi ng nasabing sanaysay ni Gianto tungkol sa pagkakahati ng pangkat na pangwika ng HKS sa pagitan ng Aramaiko at Kananeo, at kung saan kabilang ang Hebreo sa ikalawang grupo nito.[13]

2. Ang Sanaysay tungkol sa Slm 109

Pinili ng kasalukuyang manunulat ang salmong ito para mailahad nang sapat ang ilang mga katangian ng tulang Hebreo gayong pinatunayan ng salmista ang kanyang pagiging batikang makata sa paggamit ng iba't ibang mga pamamaraang pantula. Ibinadyang napausbong at napaunlad niya ang kaloob ng pagiging isang makata sa paglipas ng mahaba ring panahon, hanggang sa kanyang katandaan.[14]

Gayundin, malinaw na matatambad sa mga paglalahad na gagawin ang malaking paggalang ni Dahood sa banal na tekstong nakaabot sa atin sa mga kumpol ng mga katinig. May sinunod siyang disiplina sa mga pagkakataong kinailangang isaayos ang Hebreong teksto o/at

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[12]Kabilang na rito ang mga isinulat ni Dahood sa iba't ibang mga peryodikong bibliko na pinag-aralan ni Althann, gaya ng nabanggit sa talâ 10 sa itaás. Idinugtong pa ni Gianto: "*A generally positive and sobering assessment of Dahood's contributions in Hebrew studies was published by Althann (1997)*" ("Ugaritology and Biblical Interpretation," 430 [diin ng kasalukuyang manunulat]).

[13]"The Northwestern Semitic language group eventually split into the Aramaic and Canaanite languages during the first millennium B.C.E. Belonging to the latter are Phoenician, Hebrew, and some lesser-attested Transjordanian dialects, like Moabite, Edomite, and the dialect found in [the] Deir Alla inscription. This situation represents a dialect continuum from the earlier period down to the latter period and gives ground for the use of Ugaritic in Hebrew studies" (Gianto, "Ugaritology and Biblical Interpretation," 430).

[14]Tgn. mga bss 23 at 30.

patinigang panibago para mapalitaw ang higit na katuturang nilalayon ng banal na makata. Sa katunayan, ito nga ang habol ng isang tapat na tagasalin para maabot/maiabot ang ipinahihiwatig ng Diwang Banal.

Sa kahulihan, gayong isang panaghoy na isahan ang tulang ito, mayroong mga sangkap na kaugnay na kaugnay sa kinasasadlakan ngayon ng ating pamayanan. Humahamon ito sa ating bakahin ang ating situwasyon nang may kagitingan, tapang, at tiwala sa hangad na pag-iral ng tama't angkop na asal at kalakaran ng buhay nang ayon sa katuwira't katarungan ng Kataas-taasang Diyos.

2.1. Ang Tekstong Hebreong Isinalatíng-Titik ng Slm 109

Ngayon pa man, masasabing buo ang mga katinig na umabot sa atin sa salmong ito! Para sa isang tama't angkop na salin, napakahalagang malinaw para sa tagasalin ang orihinal na tekstong Hebreo. Ito ang unang-unang dapat na tiyakin—ang malaking paggalang sa mga katinig na nakaabot sa atin sa paggulong ng matagal na mga dantaon. Marapat namang unawain ang paggalang na ito ayon sa mga simulaing inilahad ni Dahood, na sinikap sundin ng kasalukuyang manunulat sa ginawa niyang salin sa Tagalog.[15] Malaki ang paggalang ni Dahood sa mga Masoreta at sa kanilang malaking gawaing pagpapatinig sa mga iyon.[16] Malaki rin ang paggalang niya sa mga sinaunang tagasalin

[15]Inilahad ni Dahood sa *Psalms II* ang kanyang itinuturing na apat na mga simulain ng pagsusuri sa teksto: 1) pagpapanatili ng tekstong katinig; 2) kahulugan: Isinasantabi lamang ang simulain ng *lectio difficilior*, "ang mas mahirap na pagbasa," kung walang lumalabas na katuturan ang tekstong katinig; 3) balarila: Maraming mga balarila noon ng Hebreo'y nangangailangan ng rebisyon ayon sa mga natuklasan sa HKS; 4) panunula: Kasama rito ang mga paksa gaya ng paralelismo, sukat ng bersikulo, bilang ng mga pantig, paglansag sa mga pinaghalong pamagat na mabathala, at mga pariralang parisán, kiasmo, pagkakasintunog, pagkakasintitik, at paglangkap. Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms II*, xvii–xxii.

[16]Tgn., hal., ang kanyang isinulat sa Panimulang Salita sa *Psalms III*:

> From these random examples [i.a. mula sa pp. xxv–xxviii] the textual method pursued in these volumes becomes evident. First and foremost

ng Banal na Kasulatan, tulad ng sa LXX, Siriako, at *Vulgata*, pati na ang sa *Juxta Hebraeos*. Gayumpaman, hindi ito naging balakid upang magbulag-bulagan siya sa mga limitasyon ng kanilang kaalaman[17] dahil sa ang mga natuklasang tatanglaw na HKS ay natagpuan at

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is respect for the consonantal text. No more than *eight consonantal changes* are encountered in the *Notes* to the one hundred and fifty psalms [ang pagdidiin ay mula sa kasalukuyang tagasalin]. But at once to maintain consonantal integrity and to elicit sense from the text, one must often cut free from the Masoretic vowels, most of which were inserted more than a millennium after the completion of the Psalter. The notion that consonantal freedom exists inside the text is rather novel and difficult for many scholars, who would prefer the same consonants to mean the same thing everywhere. They are unwilling to concede that Hebrew, like all other languages and perhaps more than most, teems with ambiguities due partly to the nature of the language and partly to the several methods of transcription employed during the long formation of the Hebrew text. Though the Masoretic points should not be dismissed out of hand, one must, for example, be duly suspicious of innumerable instances of prepositions such as *'el*, "to," *'al* and *ʿalē*, "upon." As prepositions they often contribute little or nothing to the sense, being thus at odds with a fundamental quality of biblical (and Canaanite) poetry: concise intensity. When, however, these purported prepositions are revocalized, they are freighted with meaning; cf. the list of composite divine names given below, many of which have been recovered from purported prepositions [Makikita natin sa Slm 109 ang ilang mga halimbawa!].… (Dahood, *Psalms III*, xxviii)

[17]Isinulat din ni Dahood ang mga sumusunod:

If progress in Northwest Semitic grammar and prosody entails some devaluation of the Masoretic vocalization, it considerably weakens the authority of the ancient versions at least in the poetic books of the Bible. Ugaritic, for instance, illustrates various senses of the preposition *l*, "to," "from," which are not normally appreciated by the versions of antiquity, and numerous cases of vocative and emphatic *lamedh*, "surely," go unrecognized. Emphatic *kī* finds no response in the versions; their grasp of the functions of the *yqtl* verb form is unsteady. The significance of the precative and energic modes was generally lost on them, and dative suffixes proved [to be] a constant source of embarrassment.… (Dahood, *Psalms III*, xxviii–xxix)

napag-aralan lamang noong pasimula ng nakaraang milenyo't huling dantaon nito. Isa ito sa naging sanhi ng pagtatalo niya noon sa kanyang mga kritiko.

2.1.1. Ang Gawain ng Pagsasalin. Kayâ ang unang ginawa ng kasalukuyang manunulat ay ang pagsulat-kamay sa Latíng titik ng tekstong Hebreong nakalimbag sa BHS[5] ayon sa inilahad ni Dahood sa kanyang *Psalms I-III* at pagkopya nito pagkatapos sa *computer* para maging *file*[1] at batayán ng unang borador ng salin ng salmo sa sulat-kamay. Matapos maisagawa ang salin ng buong salmo sa tulong higit sa lahat ng BDB[18] sa mga pagkakataong kailangang matukoy ang iba't ibang pakahulugan ng ilang mga salitang Hebreo, at sa tulong din ng *English-Tagalog Dictionary* ni L. English, C.Ss.R. o ng *Google Translate*, ipinasok naman ito sa computer na siyang *file*[2] para sa payak na saling sinikap na katugmang-katugma ng Hebreo. Gumawa rin pagkatapos ang kasalukuyang manunulat ng isa pang kopya ng *file*[2] na nilagyan naman ng mga talábabâ bilang tulong sa pag-unawa sa karampatang salmo; ito ang naging *file*[3]. Matapos ang ganitong proseso, gumawa muli ang kasalukuyang manunulat ng isa pang kopya nitong *file*[3] na may mga talábabâ para naman magsilbi bilang *file*[4] na daragdagan ng lahat ng mga paliwanag na pilolohiko't tekniko bilang pagmamatuwid sa isinagawang salin. Kayâ habang isinasagawa ang paglalagay ng mga nasabing talâ sa katapusang-katapusan ng salmo sa *file*[4], nakabukas ang apat na mga *files* at pabalik-balik ang kasalukuyang manunulat sa kanilang lahat habang nararepasong muli ang nagawang salin, at kung may kailangan pang iwasto ay naisasagawa bago salungguhitan ang salita o mga salitang katugma sa Hebreo sa *file*[2] na may payak na salin.[19]

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[18]F. Brown, S. Driver, & C. Briggs, *The Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 2010).

[19]Isang malaking kakulangan kung nag-iisa ang tagasalin at hindi siya kasali sa isang sama-samang gawain ay ang walang masasangguni agad-agad kung may anumang dapat linawin sa salitang mas angkop na gamitin. Mayroong pinakiusapang mga maging tagabasa para matingnan kung tama ang pagbubuo ng pangungusap ayon sa balarila at nauunawaan ang mga paliwanag na isinalin o idinagdag sa mga puna ni Dahood.

2.1.2. Anyo ng Aklat-aralin sa mga Salmong Binubuo. Sa aklat-araling binubuo, ang unang bubungad sa bawa't 150 salmo ay ang Hebreong tekstong isinalating-titik sa pahinang katapat, o sa likuran nito ay ang simpleng salin sa Tagalog na mayroong magkakaibang salungguhit ang salita o mga salita upang maipakita ang katugma nitong salita o parirala sa Hebreong teksto. Kapag maiksi ang salmo, matutunghayan ang isinilatíng titik na tekstong Hebreo sa iisang pahina kasama ang salin sa Tagalog. Sa gabay ng isang guro o may kaalaman sa wikang Hebreo, binabayaan ang mag-aaral na magbasa kahit hindi pa maalam sa nasabing banal na wika. Sa ganitong paraan, higit na mauunawaan niya ang ilang mga pantulang kasangkapang ginamit ng makata tulad ng pagrima, paglalaro ng mga salita sa pamamagitan ng tinatawag na pagkakasintunog,[20] o pagkakasingtitik sa simula ng mga salita.[21] Isang pamamaraan itong magganyak, pagdating ng takdang panahon, ang mag-aaral na matuto ng banal na wikang Hebreo. Hindi ako nagtataka kung bakit noon pa man sa Latíng orihinal na *Analisis philologica Novi Testamenti* ni M. Zerwick ay kanyang isinulat ang hangarin ni Santa Teresita ng Lisieux tungkol sa pag-aaral ng mga banal na wika sa bahagi ng mga nagpapari.[22]

Gumamit itong kasalukuyang manunulat ng mga *nakahilig* na panandâ[23] o titik para maipahiwatig ang mga pagsasaayos o panibagong pagpapatinig na ipinanukala ni Dahood. Malinaw na karamihang

[20] *Assonance* sa Inglés.

[21] *Alliteration* sa Inglés.

[22] Maging sa nirebisa't isinalin sa Inglés ngayong M. Zerwick & M. Grosvenor, *A Grammatical Analysis of the Greek New Testament* (Rome: Gregorian & Biblical Press, 2010), hindi kinaligtaang isulat ang nasabing hangarin sa pahina v ng Prepasyo: "Kung naging pari ako, disin sana'y pinag-aralan kong masusi ang Hebreo't ang Griyego upang maunawaan ang niloloob ng Diyos sang-ayon sa kanyang pagmamarapat na paghahayag noon sa ating wika bilang tao" (sariling salin ng kasalukuyang manunulat).

[23] Mga kahulugan ng panandang ginamit dito: [= ihiniwalay sa sinundang salita o kolon; [ ] = may titik na nawala, lalo na kung doble; […]} = buong kolon o salita o titik ay kasama ng kasunod; …] [… = pinaghiwalay; {[…] = buong kolon

dalawahang kolon ang Slm 109 na may tigtatatlong kumpás ang bawa't bersikulo.

Slm 109

1 *lam^{e}naṣṣē^{a}ḥl^{e}dāwid mizmōr*
'^{e}lōh$\bar{a}$*y* t^{e}hillātī 'al teḥ^{e}raš
2 kī pī rāšā‘ ūpī mirmāh ‘ālay p*ū*tāḥū
*/*dibb^{e}rū *'ō/*tī l^{e}šōn šāqer*/}* 3 w^{e}dibrē śin'āh s^{e}bābūnī*/*
*/*wayyillāḥ^{a}mūnī ḥinnām*/}* 4 taḥat 'ah^{a}bātī*/* */*yiśṭ^{e}nūnī *{/*wa'*ā*nī*/*
*/*t^{e}pillāh*/}* 5 wayyāśīmū ‘āl*ā*y*/* */*rā‘āh taḥat ṭōbāh
w^{e}śin'āh taḥat 'ah^{a}bātī
6 hapkēd ‘ālāyw rāšāh w^{e}śāṭān ya‘^{a}mōd ‘al y^{e}mīnō
7 b^{e}hiššopṭō yēṣē rāša‘ ūt^{e}pillātī tihyeh laḥ^{a}ṭā'āh
8 yihyū yāmāyw m^{e}‘aṭṭīm piqudātō yiqqaḥ 'aḥēr
9 yihyū bānāyw y^{e}tōmīm w^{e}'ištō 'almānāh
10 w^{e}nō‘^{a} yānū‘ū bānāyw w^{e}šī‘ēlū w^{e}d*ū*r^{e}šū m*ø*ḥ*ē*r*/* */*bōtēhem
11 y^{e}naqqēš nōšeh l^{e}k*ø*l ^{a}šer lō w^{e}yābozzū zārīm y^{e}gī‘ō
12 'al y^{e}hī lō mōšēk ḥāsed w^{e}'al y^{e}hī ḥōnēn y^{e}tōmāyw
13 y^{e}hī 'aḥ^{a}rītō l^{e}hakrīt b^{e}dōr 'aḥēr yimmaḥ š*ē*m-m
14 yizzākēr ‘^{a}wōn ^{a}bōtāyw
--'*ē*l yhwh--
w^{e}ḥaṭṭa't 'immō 'al timmāḥ
15 yihyū neged yhwh tāmīd w^{e}yakrēt mē'ereṣ zikr*ō*-m
16 ya‘an ^{a}šer lō' zākar ‘^{a}śōt ḥāsed wayyirdōp 'īš ‘ānī w^{e}'ebyōn
w^{e}nik'ēh lēbab l^{e}mōtēt
17 wayye'^{e}hab q^{e}lālāh*/* */*watt^{e}bō'ēhū
w^{e}lō' ḥāpēṣ bibrākāh w^{e}tirḥaq mimmennū
18 wayyibbaš q^{e}lālāh k^{e}maddō wattābō kammayim b^{e}qirbō
w^{e}kaššemen b^{e}‘aṣmōtāyw

---

o salita o titik ay kasama ng sinundan; -- … -- = lunduang salita o parirala ay may dobleng-gamit, na tumuturing sa sinundang kolon at sa kasunod na kolon.

19 t^{e}hī lō k^{e}beged ya‘ṭeh {[ū]
20 zō’t p^{e}‘ulat śōṭ^{e}nay
—m*i*’*ē*t*ā* yhwh—
w^{e}haddōb^{e}rīm rā‘ ‘al napšī
21 we^{u}[/]t*ē*h yhwh ^{a}dōnāy
[l^{e}ma‘an š*i*m^{e}kā {[kī ṭōb]
[ḥasd^{e}kā haṣṣīlēnī]}
w^{e}libbī ḥ*u*lal b^{e}qirbī
23 k^{e}ṣēl k*ī*] [n*ā*ṭ*a*wtī]
nin‘artī k*ī* ’*e*rbeh
24 birkay kāš^{e}lū miṣṣōm
25 w^{e}’*ō*n*a*y hayyītī ḥerpāh lāhem
26 ‘ozrēnī yhwh ’^{e}lōhāy
27 w^{e}yēd^{e}‘ū kī yād^{e}kā zō’t
28 y^{e}qāl^{e}lū hēmmāh]
qāmū wayyēbōšū]
29 yilb^{e}šū śōṭ^{e}nay k^{e}limmāh
30 ’ōdeh yhwh m*a*’*ē*d b^{e}pī
31 kī ya‘^{a}mōd līmīn ’ebyōn

[l^{e}mēzaḥ tāmīd yaḥg^{e}rehā
^{a}śēh ’*ō*[/]tī]
22 kī ‘ānī w^{e}’ebyōn ’ānōkī
[w*i*]}nh*e*laktī]
ūb^{e}śārī kāḥāš mi[/]š[/]m*ā*n
yir^{e}’ūnī y^{e}nī‘ūm rō’šām
hōšī‘ēnī k^{e}ḥasdekā
’attāh yhwh ^{a}śītāh
[w^{e}’attāh t^{e}bārēk
[w^{e}‘abd^{e}kā yiśmaḥ
w^{e}ya‘ṭ ū kam^{e}‘īl boštām
ūb^{e}tōk rabbīm ^{a}hal^{e}lennū
l^{e}hōšī‘^{a} miššōp^{e}ṭ *ī* napšō

2.2. Ang Balangkas ng Tula’t mga Nilagom na mga Kagamitan ng Panunulâ ng Makatà ng Slm 109

Mahirap sa ísahang panaghoy na ito, ayon kay Dahood, na matukóy nang tiyak ang mga taong gumaganap sa drama[24] at ang pagkakasunud-sunod ng kilos gayong nakalílitó ang Hebreong teksto nito. Maaari namang maaninag ang pagkakasunud-sunod na ito mula sa panukalang salin dito:

> *Bs 1:* Ang kinagawiang panawagan sa ngalang mabathala.
>
> *Bss 2–5:* Ang mga kilos ng kanyang mga walang-hiyang kaaway, na nagparatang sa kanya ng isang krimeng

[24] *Dramatis personae.*

napakabigat na di-tukoy na posibleng hatulan ng kamatayan (tgn. mga bss 16 at 31) at nagsakdal sa kanya.

Bss 6–19: Págpapatamà ng salmista ng isang serye ng mga kakila-kilabot na panunumpa laban sa págpasuhol na hukom (tgn. bs 31), na sa halip na magbasura sa sumbóng bilang isang kabaliwán ay umayong makinig sa kaso. Waring kinatha ng salmista ang napakasidhing panaghoy na ito samantalang naghihintay sa paglilitis sa isang húkumang punô ng mga sinungaling at pinamúmunuan ng hukom na nápasusuhol.

Bs 20: Maikling sumpa sa mga máninirà.

Bss 21–27: Panalangin ng salmista na máligtás at masáklolohan.

Bs 28: Ang kinálabasán ng panalangin.

Bs 29: Ang muling panunumpa laban sa mga máninirà.

Bss 30–31: Pangmadlang pagpapahayag ng salmista ng saklolong tiyak niyang ipadadala ng POON.[25]

Isang batikang makata ang salmista na mayroong kátandaan na. Pinatutunayan ang kanyang mga kaloob bilang isang gayóng makatà sa pamamagitan ng mga gamit niya ng mga sumusunod:[26]

A. Mga Pangunahing Pantulang Kagamitan:

1) Kiasmo (bss 2d–3a, 14, 16b–16k, 30)

2) Panturing na may dobleng gamit (bss 14, 20)

3) Pagkakátugma-tugmâ ng mga metáporá (bss 2–3a, 13–14)

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[25]Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 99.

[26]Sa Teolohikong Pagmumuni-muni, ipakikita ng kasalukuyang manunulat kung paano nagsilbi ang mga kagamitang pantulang ito sa paghahatid ng kalatas na mabathala ng Salmo.

4) Paglangkap (bss 1 at 30, 2 at 30, 7 at 31, 21 at 26, 22 at 31, 26 at 31)

5) Masinop na bilang ng mga pantig sa mga kola (bss 2, 2d–3a, 3b–4b, *tᵉpillāh* + 5, 19, 21, 23, 26, 28–29)

6) Pagkakátimbáng sa pagitan ng mga pangngalang abstrakto at kongkreto (bs 2)

7) Pinaghalong ngalang mabathala (bss 14, 21, 26, 30)

B. Iba pang mga Pantulang Kagamitan:

1) Iba pang mga dobleng gamit (hulapi [bs 5, 2x], pandiwa at tuwirang nilalayon [bs 27], engklitikong *mem* [bss 13, 15])

2) Mga pandiín (pandiíng *kī* [bss 21, 23], pandiíng *lamed* [bss 11, 16], pandiíng *waw* [bs 5])

3) *Casus pendens* (bs 25)

4) Paglalaro sa mga ugat ng mga salita (bs 29)

5) Perpektong pahilíng at paatás (bs 28)

6) Kaukulang datibo (bss 17, 21)

7) Nakaugaliang gawi sa HKS (bss 9, 10, 12, 13a, 13b, 18, 30)

8) *Hendiadys* (bs 10)

9) Sinaunang hulaping isaha't panlalaki sa *-y* (bs 31)

10) Pandiwang isiningit sa isang kadenang binanghay (bs 18)

11) *Qal* na balintiyak (2k, 10b, 22b)

Bukod pa rito, ipinahíhiwatig ng mágkakapantáy na katangiang pantulang napakahusay ang pagiging-isá ng may-akda at ng pagkatha sa tula ayon kay Dahood; gayón, di katanggap-tanggap ang paglalarawan ni C. Briggs sa kanyang komentaryo, na ang mga bss 6–15 ay isang salmong Makabeong isiningit na naglalaman ng bahagyang tunay na

panunulâ. Malamáng na kinatha ang salmo sa maagang kapanahunan bago mangyari ang Pagkatapon sa Babilonia.[27]

2.3. Ang Bagong Salin

Sa ginagawang aklat-aralin sa mga Salmo, hangad na isunod muli sa binanggit sa itaas na tekstong Hebreong isinalatíng-titik, kasama ang karampatáng simpleng salin nito sa wikang Tagalog, ang buong salmo na nilagyan naman ng dalawang uri ng talâ o nota—a) Tálababà at b) Mga Pilolohiko at Teknikong Paliwanag—sa katapusang-katapusan ng salmo.[28] Nangangahulugan itong halos lahat ng mga talâ ni Dahood sa kanyang komentaryong pilolohiko sa *Psalms I-III* ay isinalin sa gawang ito. Ang mga taláng ito ang pinagbatayan ng halos buong sanaysay na ito. Sa magiging aklat-aralin, malinaw na ipahihiwatig kung mayroong anumang idinagdag na puna ang kasalukuyang manunulat sa mga isinaling komentaryo ni Dahood.

Narito ang bagong saling sinikap ng kasalukuyang manunulat na maging lubos na tapat sa orihinal na Hebreo sa tanglaw ng Hilagang-Kanluraning Semitiko upang higit na maabot ang ipinaaabot ng Diwang Banal sa pamamagitan ng banal na wika't kalinangang ito.[29]

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[27]Dahood, *Psalms III*, 99.

[28]Tgn. 2.1.2. sa itaás.

[29]Para sa mismong pagsasalin, sinundan din ng kasalukuyang manunulat ang tinalakay ni Dahood tungkol sa mga teoriya ng pagsasalin at ang pamamaraang kanyang ginamit. Sapat na sipiin dito ang kanyang isinulat sa *Psalms III* tungkol dito:

> Though the translation presented here differs from traditional versions, it adheres, paradoxically, to the method of formal equivalence. In Dryden's terminology it might be called a metaphrase. Yet the differences result less from the theory of translation adopted than *from different conceptions of Hebrew grammar and style*. Since the grammar of Hebrew poetry is being rewritten in the light of emerging Northwest Semitic grammar, it was deemed wise to propose a formally equivalent version, one that would permit the reader who understands some Hebrew to follow word by word this new translation which so frequently, and often radically, diverges from the well-known versions. (xviii–xix, diin ng kasalukuyang manunulat; tgn. ang buong pagtalakay ni Dahood dito sa xvii–xxv)

Tulad ng nabanggit na sa itaas, ang mga salungguhit[30] ay tumatayong katugma sa mga salitang Hebreo sa tula.

Slm 109

Sa direktor. Isang salmo ni David.
Diyos ko, sa awit kong papuri,
huwag kang magíng bingí!
Dahil ang bibig ng tampalasan,
at ang bibig ng mapanlinlang
laban sa akin nangákangangá.
Inuusig nila ako sa pamamagitan ng dilang bulaan,
at sa pamamagitan ng mga salitang may-muhì pinaliligiran nila ako.
Kinákaaway nila akong walang kadahí-dahilán:
kapalit ng pagmamahal ko
sinisiraan nila ako, patí na ako!
Dalangin ko kanilang ikinákargang tunay sa aking utang,
ang kasamaan kapalit ng aking kabaitan,
ang pagkamuhì kapalit ng aking pagmamahal.
Mágtalagá ka laban sa kanya niyong Masamâ,
at si Satanas bayaang tumayo sa kanang kamay niya!
Sa paglilitis sa kanya, bayaang lumabas siyang may-sala,
at ang kanyang pagsamo nawa'y maging kasalanan!
Maging kakaunti nawa ang mga araw niya,
ang katungkulan niya bayaang may kumuhang iba!
Nawa mga anak niya mangaulila sa ama,
at asawa naman niya, isang biyuda!
Bayaan ngang mágpagalá-galà kanyang mga anak sa págpapalimós!
Nawa'y siyasatin ng tagatasa ang pamamahay nila!
Nawa'y samsamín ng tagapagpautang ang lahat-lahat ng mayroon siya,
at dambungin ng mga dayuhan ang pinagpaguran niya!
Huwag bayaang sa kanya'y may maggawad ng gandang-loob,
ni magdalang-habag sa kanyang mga naulila sa ama!

[30] _ = unang salitang Hebreo; _ = ikalawang salitang Hebreo; ... = ikatlong salitang Hebreo; _ _ _ _ = ikapat na salitang Hebreo; ~~~ = ikalimang salitang Hebreo (kapag mayroon); ▬ = ikanim na salitang Hebreo (kapag mayroon).

13 Mangyari nawang kinabukasan niya'y maputol,
mula sa buhay sa kabilâ mapahì nawa ngalan niya!
14 Italâ nawa kabuktutan ng ama niya
—ni El na POON—
Kasalanan naman ng ina niya'y huwag bayaang mapahì!
15 Nawa ang mga iyon sa harap ng POON mamalagì,
habang pinuputol niya mula sa lupa kanyang alaala!
16 Palibhasa di siya nakákaalaalang magmagandang-loob,
manapâ inuusig niya taong dukha't dahop,
at ang nasiraan ng loob kanya pang tinangkang pakáutasín.
17 Gayong mahilig siya sa panunumpa,
dumáratíng at dumáratíng ito sa kanya.
Gayong di siya nasisiyahan sa págpapalà,
lumalayo't lumalayo ito mula sa kanya.
18 Nagdamit siya ng panunumpa na parang balabal niya,
at tumiím itong parang tubig sa kanyang lamang-loob,
at parang langis sa kanyang mga butó.
19 Bayaang para sa kanya iyon ay maging parang barong nakabalot sa kanya,
at parang sintás, palaging bayaang ipambigkis niya.
20 Kahihiyan bilang pabuyà ng mga mánininírà sa akin
—paramihin mo nawang mákasandaán, O POON—
At kahihiyan bilang pabuya ng mga nangungusap ng masama laban sa akin!
21 Kaya ngâ, halika, POON, Panginoon ko!
Paghimalaán mo ako,
pakundangan sa 'yong Ngalang káybaít!
Sa pamamagitan ng gandang-loob mo, sagipin mo ako!
22 dahil dukha't dahop ako,
at puso ko'y sinibát sa loob ko.
23 Gaya ng anino talagang napípipís ako,
at pumapanaw ako;
nalipasan ako ng págkabatà, talagang tumanda ako!
24 Mga tuhod ko'y nangángatóg sa pag-aayuno,
at ang katawan kong matipunò'y naging patpatin.
25 Yaong mga sumasalubong sa akin, naging pagdusta ako sa kanila.
Nakikita nila ako, iníilíng nila kanilang ulo.
26 Saklolohan mo ako, POONg Diyos ko!
Iligtas mo ako ayon sa gandang-loob mo!

27 Upang matalastás nila, na sa pamamagitan ng ‘yong kamay ginawa mo ito,
na ikaw, POON, siyang gumawa nito!
28 Bayaang manumpâ sila,
basta’t ikaw mágpapalà!
Magsibangon nawa sila para lang mápahiyâ,
samantalang lingkod mo nama’y matútuwâ!
29 Magsuot nawâ mga máninirà ko ng kanilang kawalang-dangal,
at mabihisan nawa sila ng kahihiyán nila na parang balabal!
30 Pasasalamatan ko ang POON Siyang-Dakila sa pamamagitan ng bibig ko,
at sa gitna ng mga matatandâ pupurihin ko siya.
31 Dahil tátayô siya sa kanang kamay ng daḥóp,
upang magligtas mula sa kanyang hukom sa buhay niya.

2.4. Isang Teolohikong Pagmumuni-muni sa Slm 109

Malamáng na higit sa dalawang milenyo’t pitong dantaon ang nakalipas mula ng kathain ng isang tumanda nang makatang nasanay sa panunula, na nakaugat hindi lamang sa kanyang Kalinangang HKS kundi higit sa lahat sa kanyang pananalig sa POONg Diyos ng Tipan, na kanyang pinaglilingkuran at nais na sandigan bilang kanyang Dakilang Hukom at Tagapagligtas,[31] ang Slm 109. Ang paglalarawang ipinakita niya tungkol sa kanyang di-makatarunga’t di-makatuwirang kinasasadlakan ay isang pangyayari hindi lamang ng matagal nang kahapon kundi maging hanggang ngayon, hindi lamang sa may kalayuang Gitnang Silangan kundi mismo rito sa ating mga Kapuluan. Batay sa inayos na tekstong Hebreo, pati na sa mga paliwanag na kadahilanan nito alinsunod sa mga isinulat ni

[31]Sa tingin ng kasalukuyang manunulat, may mahigpit na kaugnayan ang pagsasaayos ng tekstong orihinal sa mga pangunahing katangiang ginamit ng makata sa banal na tulang ito. Isa siyang dalubhasang makatang mainam na gumamit ng iba’t ibang mga kagamitang pampanitikan ng kanyang kalinangan. Hindi na kailangan pang ipagdiinang ang tinatawag na *parallellismus membrorum* (ang pagkakabalalay ng mga sangkap ng Hebreong tula, at gayundin naman ng Ugaritiko) ang pinakamahalaga at pinakapangulo sa mga kasangkapang pampanitikang ginamit ng salmista sa pagkatha ng kanyang tula. Malinaw ito sa mga ilalahad na mga puna at higit sa lahat sa naabot na bagong salin sa Tagalog ng may-akda ng sanaysay na ito.

Dahood na simulaing panunula sa Hebreo't Ugaritiko, at sa kaugnay na salin niyon sa wikang Tagalog, nais ng kasalukuyang manunulat na pagnilayan natin ang marahil iniiwasang awit na ito dahilan sa lipos ng mga panunumpang kinaáalawasán marahil ng karamihan sa atin bilang mga Kristiyanong mananampalataya.

2.4.1. Ang Panawagan (bs 1). May karapatan ang tumandang salmista na managhoy at manumpang maski tayo ngayon ay nakapangingilabot na pakinggan. Subali't sa gitna ng mga ito, hindi siya nawalan ng loob dahil talos niyang lubos kung kanino siya sasandig, kagaya ng kanyang mga ninunong nanaghoy rin sa mga panahon ng kagipitan. Susundan niya ang kanilang halimbawang tahasang manawagan sa POONg Diyos ng Tipang pinanánaligan. Gayón, sa simula't simula ng salmo, ipinahayag niya ang kanyang matibay na pananalig: "Diyos ko,[32] sa aking papuri huwag ka ngang maging bingi!" Mananaghoy siyang walang hiyá-hiyâ. Ito ang tulak ng kanyang bibig ngunit papuri talaga ang kabig ng dibdib! Papuri sa POON Siyang-Dakila ang masidhi niyang ibig, gayong iyon nga ang gagawin niya sa katapusan ng panunulang nananalig.[33]

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[32]Isang panaghoy ang salmo; kung gayon, katugma ng iba pang mga salmong panaghoy na isahan (hal., mga Slm 51,2; 55,2; 64,2; 69,2; 70,2; 77,2; 88,2; 102,2; 120,2; 130,1; 140,2; 141,1; at 143,1), nagsisimula ang salmista sa pananawagan nang tahasan sa Diyos sa pamamagitan ng pantawag sa kanya ng *ʾelōhīm* o *yhwh*, atbp. Kaya tama ang mungkahi ni Dahood na sa halip ng katatayuang binanghay na *ʾelōhēy*, pinapatinig ang panibagong *ʾelōhay*, "Diyos ko." Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 99.

[33]Sagana ang mga paglangkap na ginamit ng makata sa tulang ito; sa pamamagitan ng pantulang gamit na ito, naipakikita ang pagkakáma-kamâ o pagkakaugnay-ugnay ng buong tula o ng isang bahagi ng tula sa ibang bahagi nito. Mayroong anim at ang una'y sa pagitan ng bs 1 at bs 30. Nasabi na ngang isang panaghoy ang ating salmo; gayumpaman, ninais ng salmistang páunáng ihayag ang kanyang matibay na tiwala sa POON sa pagtawag sa tula na isang *tᵉhillāh*, "awit na papuri." Ipinamalas niya ang paglangkap sa gamit ng ugat na *hll* sa bs 1 (*tᵉhillātī*, "awit kong papuri") at sa bs 30 (*ʾᵃhalᵉlennū*, "pupurihin ko siya"). Pahiwatig ito ng kabuuan ng salmo mula sa iisang makata. Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 100.

2.4.2. Ang Kalalagayan ng Salmista (bss 2–5).[34] Bibig[35] niya'y tumatanaw ng utang-na-loob di-tulad noong sa kanyang mga máninirà na pawang kabulaana't panlilinlang[36] ang ibinubulalas sa kanilang paghahabol sa kanya't pagpaparatang ng isang mabigat na krimeng maaaring parusahan ng kamatayan. Para silang mga lobong nanunugis sa kanilang másisilà, at ngayong nasukól ang biktima at nakapagsampa sila ng sakdal sa bulok na hukuman ay nakapaligid at sa kanya'y umuungol,[37]

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[34]Tingnang mabuti ang ginawang pagsasaayos ng mga bersikulong ito sa Hebreong teksto (p. 124): ang bs 2a+2b+2k ang bumubuo ng unang linya; ang 2d+3a ang ikalawa; ang 3b+4a+4b ang ikatlo; ang *tᵉpillāh* 5a+5b+5k ang ikapat. Kayâ, tatluhang kola, dalawahang kola, at dalawang dalawahang kola.

[35]Sa ikalawang paglangkap na ginamit ng makata, susi ang bibig (bs 2 [*pī*; 2 ulit] at bs 30 [*bᵉpī*]). Pasalungat din gaya ng unang-unang paglangkap sa bs 1 at bs 30 sa pamamagitan ng ugat na *hll*. Inihahambing ng salmista ang bibig ng mga tampalasang mapanira doon sa kanyang sariling bibig, na sa katapusan ng salmo'y tahasang magpapasalamat sa Dakilang POON at kasama ng kanyang kinabibilangang matatanda'y magpupuri sa kanya. Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 100.

[36]Gumamit ang salmista sa mga bss 2a+b ng pagkakatimbang ng mga pangngalang abstrakto't kongkreto; sa pagtambal ng kongkretong *rāšaʿ* sa abstraktong *mirmāh*, "panlilinlang", ipinamalas ng makata ang ganitong gawing pantulang Hebreo-Ugaritiko, na matatagpuan din, hal., sa Slm 107,42. Kung gayón, hindi na kailangan ang panibagong pagpapatinig noon para gawing abstrakto ang *rešaʿ*, gaya ng ipinanunukala ng aparato ng BH(3) at ng BHS(5). Tgn. din ang Kas 14,25 kung saan ang kongkretong *ʿēd ʾᵉmet*, "isang saksing makatotohanan," ay katimbang ng abstraktong *mirmāh*, "panlilinlang," subali't salamat sa paralelismo, mayroong pakahulugan itong "ang mánlilínlang." Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 100.

[37]Laman ng bss 2d–3a ang isang kiasmo:

dibbᵉrū ʾōtī (A) + *lᵉšōn šāqer* (B) //

wᵉdibrē šinʾāh (B') + *sᵉbābūnī* (A')

Natatangi rin ang linyang ito sa pagkakaroon ng timbang ng palaugnayan (pandiwa + tuwirang nilalayon - akusatibo ng pamamaraan // akusatibo ng pamamaraan - pandiwa + hulapi) at ng bilang ng mga pantig (9:9). Sa pamamagitan ng kiasmo at ng timbang ng palaugnayan, napalilitaw nang husto ng makata ang maigting na kagipitang kanyang kinalalagyan. Waring sa magkabi-kabilang

nakanganga,[38] at naglalaway para lapain ng kanilang mga hinabing sakdal at maling mga paratang upang siya'y maipapatay![39] Mga walang-hiyang walang utang-na-loob sa lahat ng gandang-loob na ipinamalas niya sa kanila. Ganito pa ang kanilang isusukli! Kailanma'y hindi nalimutan ng inabáng matuwid na kung hindi man niya masilayan sa mundong ibabaw ang katuwira't katarungan, sa paghuhukom pagkamatay[40] ay tiyak niya itong makakamtan. Ganito nga ang karaniwang pananalig ng isang tao o grupong nanaghoy sa mga Salmo.

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dako'y nakaumang sa kanya ang makamandag na paninirang lipos ng pagkamuhi. Mismong ang masinop na bilang ng mga pantig na 9:9 dito at gayundin sa mga kalapit na bss 2 (4:4:5), 3b–4b (8:6:7), at 4b–5 (9:6:9) ay nagkakatlig ng masinop na binalak na sabwatan.

Laman din nito ang kaibang pakahulugan sa *dibbᵉrū* at ang pinatinigang panibagong *'ōtī* (tanda ng akusatibong may hulapi) sa halip ng TM na *'ittī*, "kasama ko." Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 100.

[38]Mas angkop na basahing *pūtāḥū* ang pandiwa, na balintiyak na qal sa halip ng tahasang tinig ng TM na *pātāḥū*, gayong karaniwang mayroong palipát na kahulugan ang anyong tahasan nito. Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 100.

[39]Isa sa mga kasanayan ng panunula ng makata ay ang pagkakabagay-bagay ng gamit ng mga metapora. Inilalarawan niya na ang bibig ng tampalasa't ng manlilinlang ay nakanganga gaya ng sa mababangis na halimaw na nagháhaból ng kanilang másisilà. Ihambing sa Pan 3,46–47—"Lahat ng aming mga kalaba'y nagngangá ng kanilang mga bibig laban sa amin; isang pangkat at isang bitag ang naghihintay sa amin"—at Slm 22,14—"Ngináng angahán nila ako, parang leong nanlalapa't umaatungal." Marahil ang kilalang-kilalang paghahambing sa Biblia sa dila ng isang halimaw na mabangis ay ang sinulat ni Jaime sa 3,7: "Dahil bawat uri ng hayop at ibon, reptilya't mga nilalang ng dagat, ay mapaáamò, at napaamò ng tao, subali't walang taong makapágpaamò sa dilà." Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 100.

Tingnan din ang metapora ng pagligid sa kanya ng kanyang mga kaaway, gaya ng sa mga Slm 22,17, kung saan inilalarawan ng *sᵉbābūnī* ang kilos ng mga asong pumapalibot sa kanilang biktima, at 35,16: "Ang mga nakapalibot na mánlilibák sa akin nagngalit sa akin ng kanilang mga ngipin." Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 100.

[40]Maging hanggang sa kasalukuyang panahon, binabaka pa rin ang ganitong suliranin tungkol sa patuloy na pag-iral ng kawalang-katarungan sa mundong ito, lalo na noong nakaraang dantaon at maging hanggang sa bagong milenyo't dalawang dekada na ang nakalipas. Ang inaral ni G. Lohfink, isang Alemang

Totoong walang anumang magagawa ang ganitong uri ng mga tao kung marangal at makatotohanan ang sistemang pinaiiral sa pamahalaan at lipunan. Nguni't sa abá ng pamayanan, naglipana ang mga hukom na bulok na nagpapadulas ng mga kamay sa suhol sa mga may bulok ding puso't isipang kumakasangkapan sa kanilang impluho, salapi't kapangyarihan sa una pa mang pagsisiyasat kung mayroong ebidensiya nga ba sa habláng isinampa upang mahukuman o kaya'y simpleng ibasura ang inimbentong kaso na isang kabaliwa't walang kakuwenta-kuwenta. "O Dakilang Hukom, huwag kang magbulag-bulagan sa debotong sa iyo'y pumopoon"—ganito nga rin ang maaaring sambitin ng kahabag-habag nating makata.

Matapos na mailarawan ng salmista ang naganap na mga kilos ng mga walang-utang-na-loob na kumaaway sa kanya't nagsakdal sa isang bulok na hukuman, nakiníkitá-kitá niya ang posibleng mangyayari sa kanya: lilitisin siya sa isang paraang parang komedya hanggang sa mahatulan siya ng kamatayang mayroong napakabigat at napakalaking kahihinatnan sa kanyang posibleng maiiwanang mga mahal sa buhay at pati na sa kanyang mga ari-arian.[41] Kung ganito ang natalastas niyang

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teologong bibliko, tungkol sa mga paksa ng huling panahon (eskatolohiya) sa kanyang aklat na *Is This All There Is?* ay lubhang makabuluhan:

> Human courts are helpless in [the] face of the immeasurable potential for injustice in the world; indeed, they are themselves involved in that injustice. Ultimately they are unable either to establish adequate justice or to uncover the depths of worldwide injustice, which is the result of human freedom for good or evil. Only God can reveal human history in all its dimensions. And only God can really, universally, and above all finally create justice … and therefore there must be a divine judgment. A world that is not judged would be a world without hope, without purpose; it would be worthless. Every religion that has considered the fate of the human after death has proposed that there will be a judgment.… (G. Lohfink, *Is This All There Is?* [Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press Academic, 2020], 147–148)

[41]Kaugnay sa situwasyong ito ay ang nakalílitóng págpapalít-palit ng bilang sa tekstong Hebreo mula sa maramihan hanggang bs 5 tungo sa isahan sa mga bss 6–19. Balikan ang balangkas na ipinanukala ni Dahood sa 2.2 sa itaás. Paganito, walang nagiging suliraning pambalarilang kailangang bakahin. Ito ang

magiging kalagayan niya at ng may pitak sa kanyang puso, nasaan ang katarungan ng POON? Talagang sa harap ng hukuman sa lupa ng kanyang kapanahunan ay wala siyang kalaban-laban. Dukha siya't dahop at gayon nga ang ihahayag na tingin niya sa sarili sa harap ng POONg kanyang Diyos. Tanging sa kanya lamang makakatagpo ng paglaya't kaligtasan!

2.4.3. Ang mga Panunumpa ng Salmista sa Bulok na Hukom sa Diwa ng Lex Talionis *(bss 6–19).* Gayumpaman, nais niyang mailapat ang *lex talionis*, ang katarungan ng makatwirang pagganti.[42] Hindi siya nag-iisa sa ganitong panimdim. Mismong ang isa pang makata ay nagtaguri sa POON na *'ēl nᵉqāmōt*, "Diyos ng paggantí."[43] Sa pagsagip niya sa mga sinisiil at sa pagparusa niya sa mga masasama, ipinagmatuwid ng POONg Diyos ang kanyang Batas; dahilan dito, pasasalamat ang nauukol sa kanyang nagbigay sa hiling ng salmista sa Slm 94.[44] Hindi

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dahilan kung bakit hindi niya matanggap ang kuru-kuro ni A. Weiser sa kanyang komentaryo sa mga Salmo:

> Ang pagbabago mula sa maramihan sa mga bss 1–5 at 20ss tungo sa isahan sa mga bss 6–19 ay maipaliliwanag lamang nang kasiya-siya kung ang mga bss 6–19 ay ipaliliwanag bilang pagsipi ng mga panunumpang ipinatatama laban sa salmista. (A. Weiser, *The Psalms: A Commentary*, Old Testament Library [London/Philadelphia: 1962], 691; salin ng kasalukuyang manunulat)

Sa ibang salita, inilalagay ni Weiser ang mga bss 6–19 sa loob ng mga panipi. Kung wasto ang kanyang paglutás sa suliranin ng nasabing pagbabago, ang suliranin ng mga tagapagtanggol ng pananampalatayang Judio at Kristiyano, na dapat magpaliwanag ng mga kakila-kilabot na panunumpang ito sa loob ng balangkas ng pagbubunyag, ay lubhang mapagágaán. Sa kasamaang-palad, nanánatilì ang suliranin (tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 102).

[42]Marahil isa ring dahilan ito na nagtulak kay Weiser, gaya ng nabanggit sa sinundang talâ 40 sa itaás tungkol sa suliraning pambalarila, ang suliranin ng panunumpa sa loob ng balangkas ng pagbubunyag na mabathala.

[43]Slm 94,1.

[44]Basahin ang buong salmong ito, at upang maliwanagan din ang tamang pagtingin sa Slm 109.

nga pinamagatan kailanman ng ating kasalukuyang makata ang Diyos na tagaganti; gayumpaman, yoon ang nasa kanyang puso. Ang habol niya ay lumantad ang tunay na katarungan ng Diyos! Masasabi rin natin dito ang kawangis na nabanggit sa itaas: panunumpa ng masasama ang kanyang bukambibig subalit pasasalamat ang kabig ng kanyang dibdib na ihahayag ng Diyos ang kanyang katarungan at katuwiran, gaya nga ng pasimulang pahayag ng ating salmista: "Diyos ko, sa awit kong papuri, huwag kang magíng bingí!" Kung gayón, ang kiníkitá-kitá niyang magiging kalalagayan niya sa kamay ng kanyang mga malisyosong máninirà ay iyon nga rin ang kanyang hihilingin sa mga nakakakilabot na mga samo sa mga bss 6–19, na higit sa lahat ay nauukol sa bulok na hukom. Ang pangingilabot kayang ito sa mga panunumpang nasa mga nasabing bersikulo ang nagbunsod sa mga liturhista ng Simbahang Romano na isantabi't hindi isama ang Slm 109 sa dasalang opisyal ng Simbahan, sa Liturhiya ng mga Oras? Isa itong malaking katanungang dapat nating bakahin, gayong ang mga karanasang kawalang-katarunga't katuwiran ng ating makata ay mga karanasang sinasagupa maging hanggang ngayon sa iba't ibang dako ng mundong ibabaw na ito. Hindi ito maisasantabi kung di natin ibig na bumagsak sa tinatawag na globalisasyon ng pagwawalang-bahala sa halip ng pagmamalasakit!

Sa karanasan ng kawalan ng katarunga't katuwiran at sa pagkasukol sa kagipitan, nadadala ang puso't isip ng tao sa huling panahon.[45] Pagsapit ng takdang oras, haharap ang bulok na hukom sa mismong mabathalang hukuman at mismong si Satanas na ubod ng samá't

[45]Sa pamamagitan ng isang paglangkap sa pagitan ng mga bss 7 (*lᵊhiššopṭō*) at 31 (*miššōpᵉṭī* [TM *miššōpᵉṭē*]), sa paggamit ng salitang ugat na *špṭ*, ipinakitang muling pasalungát ng makata ang paghahambing ng kasasadlakan ng bulok na hukom sa harap ng hukumang mabathala pagkamatay niya at sa lubos na pagtutuwid sa salmista, na kanyang inaasahan sa napipintong paglilitis sa hukumang bulok. Samantala, dalangin niya para sa bulok na hukom ay tumayo si Satanas sa kanang kamay nito hindi bilang tagapagtanggol kundi bilang tagapagsakdal. Sa katapusan nama'y tiwalang-tiwala ang ating makata na mismong POON ang siyang tatayo sa kanang kamay niya upang magtanggol at magligtas sa kanya mula sa bulok na hukom. Isa na namang pahiwatig itong ang kabuuan ng tula ay mula sa iisang makata. Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 102.

Ama ng lahat ng mga Kasinungalingan ang siya nawang itatakdang tumayong tagapagsakdal. Tiyak na ihahayag na siya ang maysala't tatanggap ng parusa.

Subali't hangad at dalangin ng banal na makata na ang katarungan ng Diyos ay masasaksihan hindi lamang ng mga inapi't siniil kundi rin naman niyong napatangay sa simbuyo ng kasamaa't kabulukang pinagtatakpan ng balatkayong "maayos" daw na palakad at pamamahala. Kung ang ninasa para sa salmista ng kanyang mga karumal-dumal na mapanirang mga kaaway ay parusa tungo sa tiyak na kamatayan, bagama't walang tunay na kadahi-dahilan, magbalik nawa sa bulok na hukom ang pagnanasang ito na para bang isang tadhanang karma. Desperado nga ang salmista sa mga masidhing hiling na sumpa't mura. Pakinggang muli ang masidhing panunumpa ng ating makatang sukól na sukól.[46] Napakatindi talaga ang mga panunumpang itong umabot sa kabaligtarang hangarin ng unang-unang utos na kaugnay sa kapuwa sa "Sampung Utos" ng Tipán.[47] Kayâ sa dakong katapusan ng seryeng ito, gumamit ang salmista sa bs 14 hindi lamang ng isang kiasmo kundi rin naman ng lunduang parirala, ang bukod-tanging dobleng gamit na panturing na tumutukoy kay El na POON.[48] Ang magkasalungat na

[46]Basahing muli ang bss 8–15!

[47]Kung kaakibat ng ikapat na utos na *kabbēd 'et 'ābīkā wᵉ'et 'immekā* ang pangakong *lᵉmaʿan yaʾᵃrīkūn yāmekā 'al hāʾᵃdāmāh* (Ex 20,12), naunahan pa ang hiling na ito ng samong *yihyū yāmāyw mᵉʿaṭṭīm* sa bs 8a.

[48]Narito ang balangkas ng nasabing kiasmo at panturing na may dobleng gamit na parang lunduang salita o parirala sa bs 14:

yizzākēr (A) + *ʾᵃwōn ʾᵃbōtāyw* (B)

(K)—*'ēl yhwh*—(K')

wᵉḥaṭṭa't 'immō (B') + *'al timmāḥ* (A')

Natatangi ang ganitong balangkas sa tulang Hebreo't Ugaritiko, na ang sangkap na K at K' ay magkaparehong kaugnay at tumuturing sa una't ikatlong kolon; sa palaugnayan ang *'ēl yhwh* ay ang akusatibo ng tagakilos ng pandiwang balintiyak na A at ng pandiwang paatás na pinahíhindiáng A'. Mangyari pa, sa ganitong pagsusuri ng sukat at balarila ng bs 14, pinatinigang panibago ang TM na *'el*

pandiwang *yizzākēr* at ang pinahindiáng *timmāḥ*, na nasa magkabilang-dulo ng una't ikatlong kola ng bs 14, ay magkaparehong nagpapahiwatig kung gaano kabigat ang mga kasalanan ng kanyang mga magulang, at ang nakakakilabot pa nito: mismong si El na POON ang magtatalâ o di buburá[49] sa kanilang mga sala, maging ng ama o maging ng ina ng bulok na hukom! At ganap na mangyayari ito ayon naman sa pahiwatig

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yhwh at ginawang *'el yhwh*; kung gayon, dapat isantabi ang panukala ni H. Gunkel (*Die Psalmen*, Handkommentar zum Alten Testament [Göttingen: 1926]), ayon kay Dahood, na kaltasín ang mga salitang ito batay sa saling Siriako. Dapat ding bigyang-pansin bagama't máramihan ang panlalaking *'ᵃbōṯāyw*, na malinaw mula sa kabalalay nitong *'immō* na dapat unawai't isalin itong ísahan. Iyon ay nasa maramihang pangkamáhalan gayong tumutukoy "ang ama niya" sa isang taong may mataas na katungkulan (bs 8). Itong-ito ngâ ang gamit na nasa Is 14,21: *hākīnū lᵉbānāyw maṭbēᵃḥ baʿᵃwōn 'ᵃbōtām*, "Ihanda ninyo para sa mga anak niya ang pagpatay dahil sa kabuktutan ng kanilang ama," kung saan ang maramihang pangkamáhalang *'ᵃbōtām* ay tumutukoy sa hari ng Babilonia. Kapansin-pansing 8:3:8 ang bilang ng mga pantig ng bersikulong ito. Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 104–105.

[49]Kinakitaan din ni Dahood sa bs 14 at pati sa sinundang bs 13 ang pagkakatugma ng metaporang ginamit ng makata tungkol sa aklat ng buhay. Kaugnay sa mga Slm 37,37 at 73,17, ang pakahulugan dito ng *'aḥᵃrītō* ay "kabiláng buhay." Makikita rin ang ganitong kahulugan sa Aramaikong Inskripsiyon ng Agbar, mga linya 9–10: *wʾḥrt tʾbd*, "At kinabukasan niyang buhay nawa'y mapawi." Kahawig ang ganitong panimdim na Aramaiko sa panunumpa ng Biblia. Sa pagkilala ng ganitong kahulugan, nabibigyan ng katuturan ang Blg 23,10b: *tāmōt napšī mōt yᵉšārī-m* (TM na *yᵉšārīm*) *ūtᵉhī 'aḥᵃrītī kāmōhū*, "Nawa mamatay buhay niya [ang kay Jacob] ng kamatayan ng isang matuwid, at nawa kinabukasan niya [ang kay Israel] ay maging katulad ng kanya." Kasingkahulugan ang *dōr 'aḥēr* sa *'aḥᵃrītō*, "kinabukasan niya" ng unang kolon. Sa ibang salita, kaugnay na kaugnay ang bersikulong ito sa Slm 69,29: "Burahin nawa sila mula sa balumbon ng buhay, / at kasama ng mga matuwid di nawa sila mápatalâ!"

Napananatili ang pagkakátugma-tugmâ ng metápora ng mabathalang tagatalâ kapag bibigyan ng pakahulugan ang *yizzākēr*, na karaniwang isinasaling "alalahanin nawa," ng "italâ nawâ," na tinalakay sa Slm 79,8: "Huwag mong italâ laban sa amin mga sala ng aming mga ninuno!" Ipinagpapatuloy naman ng patangging hangaring *'al timmāḥ* ang metápora ng *bookkeeping*, na pinasimulán sa unang salitang Hebreo ng bs 14, ang *yizzākēr*. Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 103–104.

ng ganap na bilang ng mga pantig (8:3:8) ng pampanitikang balangkas na nabanggit.

Bayaang itambad ng POONg Diyos ang kanyang katarungan, at ipagmatuwid niya ang kanyang mga deboto maging sa daigdig na ito! Katarungan ng Diyos ay mangulo sa langit, subalit gayundin naman dito sa lupang ibabaw! Hindi ba pamamathala niya'y hindi lamang sa kabilambuhay kundi sa daigdig din na atin pang ginagalawan—sa madaling salita, saanman, ngayon, at magpakailanman?![50]

Kahit bulok na hukom ang nakaupo sa kasalukuyang pinag-uusapan, iginalang pa rin ng banal na makata ang katungkulan ng paghuhukom at ang mismong hukuman.[51] Kung gayon, dasal niya'y pumanaw nawa ang bulok na hukom at mapalitan ng isang may simulain at tapat sa Banal na Tipan, gayong ang dinadalanginan ng makata ay mayroong pamagat na si El na POON[52] o ang POONg Diyos. Kung anong posibleng mangyayari sa salmista mapatawan siya ng kamatayang parusa, gayon nga ang siyang maganap nawa sa hukom na walang konsiyensiya. Magiging kaawa-awa talaga ang kanyang mga anak na mangangaulila at asawa niyang magiging biyuda.[53] Madali

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[50]Tgn. ang samo sa Panalangin ng Panginoon: "Sumapit nawang lubós ang paghahari mo!" (tgn. Mt 6,10). Bigyang-pansing nakatumbok ang panalangin ng Panginoon ayon kay Mateo sa kaganapan ng huling panahon sa paggamit niya sa mga hiling ng kapanahunang aoristo sa Griyego.

[51]Sa tingin ng kasalukuyang manunulat, ipinahiwatig ang ganitong panimdim ng makata sa paggamit niya ng maramihang pangkamahalan sa halip ng isahan lamang na *'ābiw*; tgn. talâ 47 sa itaás.

[52]Tgn. din ang talâ 47 tungkol sa panibagong pagpapatinig sa TM na *'el yhwh*.

[53]Ang nakaugaliang pares ng mga salitang magkabalalay na *bānāyw // 'išto*, "mga anak niya // asawa niya," ay natatagpuan din, ayon kay Dahood (*Psalms III*, p. 102), sa C. Gordon, *Ugaritic Textbook*, 4th ed. (Rome: 1965), 2068:19 (na tutukuyin bilang UT sa susunod na gamit)—*'bdn watth wbnh*, "si Abdanu at ang asawa niya at mga anak niya." Sabi ni Dahood, kabilang ito sa umabot nang 290 mga pares ng mga salitang magkakabalalay sa Ugaritiko at sa Hebreo; tgn. ang talâ xlviii ng Slm 102,20. Matatagpuan din ang kaparehong paralelismo sa Slm 128,3. Ang magkabalalay ding *ytm // almnt* ay matatagpuan din sa Ugaritiko; tgn. ang talâ 7

silang magiging biktima ng pang-aapi't pagsasamantala! Sa abá nila, alam natin maging hanggang ngayon ang madalas na kabagsakan ng mga dukhang biyuda't mga ulilang pagala-gala sa pagpapalimos para maitaguyod ang buhay na mahalaga,[54] kapit-sa-patalim na nabíbiktimá ng kálakalan ng mga tao sa trabaho raw o maging sa prostitusyon, ang kalakalan ng laman ng tao lalo na ng mga kabataa't kababaihan.

Ang habol talaga ng bulok at ganid na hukom ay ang suhol na malamáng na gárapalan na at walang kahiya-hiyang tinatanggap o tahasa't sápilitang hinihingi dahil ang talagang pinakanánasà ay makamit ang pamamahay at lupang kinatitirikan niyong makatang isinakdal[55]—at hindi lamang ito kundi lahat-lahat[56] ng maituturing na pag-aari nito

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sa Slm 68,6 na tumutukoy sa tekstong Ugaritikong naglalaman ng magkabalalay na *ytm*, "ulila sa ama," at *almnt*, "biyuda." Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 102–103.

[54]Sa tingin ng kasalukuyang manunulat, ipinahiwatig ang ganitong napakaselang na katatayuan ng mga naulilang anak ng bulok na hukom sa paggamit ng salmista ng isang *hendiadys* sa bs 10a: Iisa lamang galaw ang tinutumbok ng parang dalawang kilos na paggalà at pagpapalimos—ang mabuhay na parang "isang kahig—isang tukâ." Walang ibang pakay ang paggalà kundi mamalimos at di naman makapagpapalimos kung hindi gagalà.

[55]Napalitáw na magkabalalay din ang *bānāyw // bōtēhem*. Napalilitaw ang katuturan mula sa kumpol ng mga katinig na *dršw mḫrbwtyhm* sa pagbasa ng *dūr^{e}šū* bilang balintiyak na qal, na sinusundan ng akusatibo ng tagakilos na *mōḫēr* (tgn. bs 14), ang pandiwari ng **māḫar*, ang ugat ng *m^{e}ḫīr*, "halaga, upa," na matatagpuan sa Slm 44,13. Hindi mapipintasan ang kinalabasang paralelismo sa pagitan ng *mōḫēr* at ng *nōšeh*, "tagapagpautang" ng bs 11. Sinasalamin ng mga huling katinig na *bwtyhm*, na dapat patinigang *bōtēhem*, ang anyong maramihang *bwtm*, "mga bahay," sa Ugaritiko. Mahalaga ito sa tamang pagpapaliwanag ng Hebreong *bottīm*, at hindi ang anyong *bāttīm*, tulad ng ipinagdiinan ni C. Gordon sa UT, Glossary, No. 463. Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, p. 103.

[56]Gayong sa ibang sipi kumukuha ang pandiwang *y^{e}naqqēš* ng isang tuwirang nilalayon, maipanunukalang mainam dito sa bs 11 na suriin ang *l^{e}kōl* bilang *lamed* na pandiin at ang *kōl* bilang akusatibong nilalayon. Matatagpuan ang isa pang halimbawa ng pandiing *lamed* sa bs 16 at sa *l^{e}kōl* sa Slm 135,11 at 145,16. Tgn. din ang 1 S 22,7: *l^{e}kull^{e}kem yāśīm śārē '^{a}lāpīm w^{e}śārē mē'ōt*, "Bawa't isa sa inyo ay gagawin niyang mga pinuno ng líbuhan at mga pinuno ng dáanan" (sa kagandahang-loob ni W. Kuhnigk, ayon kay Dahood [*Psalms III*, 103]); tgn. Ecles 10,3; atbp.

para mapaghatian ng mga buhong na mga kasapakat na maninirang nagsampa ng kaso. At kung mayroong ano pa mang matira, maski mga dayuha't di-kaanu-ano, ay sisimot ng anumang kanyang pinagpaguran at naging kita. Talagang masinop maglimás ng hindi kanila, masahol pa sa mga buwitre! Kahindik-hindik na kawalan ng katuwirang babayaang ganoon na lamang? Tunay na pagpapamaralita ng isang taong may dangal! Ang sigaw ng propeta'y kailangang muling umalingawngaw:

> Kaawa-awa ang nagpápalít sa hatol at nagtatapon ng katarungan sa Lupa! Kinamumuhian ninyo ang nagsasakdal sa hukuman at hinahamon ang nagsasabi ng katotohanan.… Sapagkat alam kong napakarami ng inyong mga kasamaan at napakabigat ng inyong mga kasalanan: pang-aapi sa matuwid, panghihingi ng lagáy, pandaraya sa mga dukha sa hukuman. Kaya walang imik ang matalino sa panahong ito, sapagkat panahon ito ng kasamaan.…[57]

Kung naging gayon kabulok ang isang lipunan, at lalong higit ang mga namumuno rito, nagiging manhid sila sa mga pagdurusa ng kapwa, o nagmamaang-maangan na mga iyon ay nariyan. Kayâ nagiging mga taong walang-awa, walang kaluluwa, walang bahala sa nangyayari sa iba! Ang inaatupag sa loob ng 24 oras ay sarili, sarili, sarili, maging isahan man o maramihan! Nagiging hungkag ang loob; kung gayón, mismong ito nga ang malimit na angal o panaghoy ni Papa Francisco sa ating kapanahunan.[58] At kailanman di dapat limuting ang Anak ng Diyos, na naging-tao tulad natin sa katauhan ni Yeshu'a na taga-Nazaret, ay di-naging manhid sa kalalagayan ng tao't ng buong santinakpan dahil naging kabahagi siya nito, pati na sa kanyang katatayuan ngayong niluwalhati na. Kailanma'y hindi niya itatatuwa ang kanyang pagiging tao! Ilang ulit nating mababasang nagdalang-habag siya (*'esplagxnísthe*) sa dusa't sakit ng mga taong nakapaligid sa kanya? Paganito nga siya naging ating Dakilang Pari.[59]

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[57]Am 5,7–10.12–13.

[58]Hal., sa kanyang Apostolikong Pangaral na *Evangelii Gaudium* 52–60.

[59]Tgn. Heb 2,16–18.

Nababuhay tayo hindi lamang para sa kasalukuyan. Bulag at tanga ang taong may hangad lamang ng ligaya't tuwang panandalian! Gayon ang dalangin ng isa pang banal at marunong na makata: "Magbiláng ng aming mga araw turuan mo ngâ kami, / upang makamit namin ang ubod ng karunungan!"[60] Nakagigimbal para sa isang may pananalig sa tunay na Diyos na sumpain siyang buhay niya sa kinabukasan ay maputol at ngalan niya'y burahin mula sa aklat ng buhay.[61] Nakakagulat nga ang pangangahas ni Moshe na igiit sa POONg Diyos na ngalan niya'y pahiin mula sa aklat ng buhay kung hindi ito magpapatawad sa

[60]Slm 90,12.

[61]Ang sumpang ito sa bs 13 ay mayroong dalawang pananalitang Hebreong kaugnay sa panitikang HKS. Katumbas ang *'aḥ^{a}rīt* sa Ugaritikong *uḫryt*. Kaugnay sa mga Slm 37,37 at 73,17, ang pakahulugan dito ng *'aḥ^{a}rītō* ay "kabiláng buhay." Makikita rin ang ganitong kahulugan sa Aramaikong Inskripsiyon ng Agbar, mga linya 9–10, *w'ḥrt t'bd*, "At kinabukasan niyang buhay nawa'y mapawi." Kahawig ang ganitong panimdim na Aramaiko sa panunumpa ng Biblia. Sa pagkilala ng ganitong kahulugan, nabibigyan ng katuturan ang Blg 23,10b: *tāmōt napšī mōt y^{e}šarī-m* (TM na *y^{e}šārīm*) *ūt^{e}hī 'aḥ^{a}rītī kāmōhū*, "Nawa mamatay buhay niya [ang kay Jacob] ng kamatayan ng isang matuwid, at nawa kinabukasan niya [ang kay Israel] ay maging katulad ng kanya." Sa kanyang artikulong "The Death of the Upright and the World to Come" (*Journal of Jewish Studies* 16 [1965]: 183–186), sinipi ni S. Loewenstamm ang kuru-kuro ng komentador na Judiong medyebal na si Nahmanides na nakakita sa *'aḥ^{a}rīt* ng buhay sa mundong parating. Hindi niya tinanggap ang ganitong paliwanag dahil "ang mundong parating" ay isang kaisipang lubos na banyaga raw sa kapanahunan ni Balaam. Subali't ang kanyang pag-ayaw na ito ay isang maginhawang pagwawalang-bahala sa Ugaritikong *uḫryt*, "kinabukasang buhay," at sa mga tekstong naglalarawan ng buhay magpakailanman. Matatagpuan naman ang pananalitang *māḥāh b^{e}*, "pahiin mula sa," ng bs 13b sa Penisyong Inskripsiyon ni Azitawaddu; ihambing sa Slm 69,29.

Kaisa ng gawing Ugaritiko, gumamit din dito ang salmista ng tinatawag na englitikong *mem*. Malamáng na sa mga katinig na *šmm* ay matatagpuan natin ang pangngalang *šēm* na sinusundan ng englitikong *mem*, na nagsisilbi rito bilang panghaliling ma-estilo sa hulapi. Kung magkagayón, nakikibahagi ang *šēm* sa isahang hulapi ng katambal nitong *'aḥ^{a}rītō*; tinalakay ang ganitong estilo sa taláng kaugnay sa Slm 10,17. Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 104. Gayon, hindi kailangang sundin ang mungkahi ng BHS$^{(5)}$ na palitan ang huling *mem* ng *šmm* at gawing *šmw*.

kanyang bayan.[62] Paganito, nakakamangha rin namang makita ang di-masayod na pag-ibig ni Moshe sa kanyang mga kamámamayáng muling patutunayan ni Sha'ul, na ngayo'y kilala nating Pablo, makaraan ang higit sa labindalawang dantaon, sa isang kawangis na pahayag sa sulat nitong hulí sa mga taga-Roma.[63]

Sa kabaligtaran, manhid ngang tunay ang taong walang pandama sa kasasadlakan ng kanyang mga magulang, na ang kanilang mga sala't kasamaang nagawa ay laging nasa harap ni El na POON. At ang masaklap pa, mismong alaala ng bulok na hukom, na naghangad ng mga panandaliang tagumpay at katanyagan sa buhay na ito sa pamamagitan ng mga gawing bulok at makasalanan, ay lilimutin at isasantabi, na, sa katunayan, ay isang bagay na masakit mismo sa kapanahunang pananaw noon.

Bakit ganito kakila-kilabot ang mga hiling na masidhi't maigting ng makata para sa bulok na hukom? Mismong isiniwalat ng salmista ang kadahilanan. Unang-una, nalimutan niya kung sino nga ba siya, kung sino nga ba ang Diyos na kanyang sinasamba, kung kaninong pamayanan ang kanyang kinabibilangan! Mismong POON ang pumuputol ng kanyang alaala; pagkamatay niya, limót na limót siya.[64] Ito ay dahil nalimutan niyang maggawad ng gandang-loob! Sa halip, para ba siyang isang mabangis na hayop na tumutugis sa dukha't dahop,[65]

[62]Tgn. Ex 32,32. Tanda ito ng kanyang di-masayod na malasakit at pagsinta sa kanyang bayan.

[63]Tgn. Rom 9,1–3. Gayon nga rin ang inihayag ni Sha'ul gaya ng kanyang ninunong si Moshe.

[64]Sa bs 15 ay binabasa ang *zikrō-m*, "kanyang alaala" (na may *mem* na engklitiko), sa halip ng TM na *zikrām*, "kanilang alaala," gayong tumutukoy ito gaya ng *šem-m* sa bs 13 sa bulok na hukom. Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 105.

[65]Ganito ang pagkakilala ng salmista sa kanyang sarili, at táhasang ihahayag niya ito sa bs 22.

at ang pusong bigo'y kanya pang pinagtatangkaang utasin[66] sa pusakal na paglilitis at paghukom.[67]

Bukod pa, napakahilig niyang manumpa't magmura nang buong yabang—isang bagay na kanyang kinagigiliwan, na waring isang bisitang kahit di muna kumatok at magtao-po ay malugod na pinatutuloy.[68] Dahilan dito, ang magpalà para sa kanya ay isang gawaing banyagang-banyaga. Naging parang panlabas na kasuotan ang panunumpa't pagmumura para sa bulok na hukom. Ngunit di lamang gayon! Nilalagok niya ang mga iyon, na parang tubig, at ang

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[66]Kinagawiang binabago ang TM na *l*^{e}*mōtēt* at ginagawang *l*^{e}*māwet*, katugma sa Siriako. Ngunit madaling suriin ang TM na *l*^{e}*mōtēt* bilang pandiing *lamed* na nagpapaigting sa pandiwang polel na *mōtēt*, na napasama sa tálakayan tungkol sa ápatang titik na pandiwa sa Slm 88,17. Bagama't nasa anyong polel dahil galing ito mula sa isang ugat ng tinatawag na *mediae waw*, may batbat na kahulugan ang *mōtēt* na likás sa banghay na po'el, na maayos na nagpapahayag ng pakay o pagsisikap na kumilos lalo nang may tagláy na palabáng pakay; tgn. W. Gesenius, *Hebräische Grammatik*, ed. E. Kautzsch, 25th rev. ed. (Leipzig: 1909), §55k. Tungkol sa paglalagay ng pandiwa sa huli kapag may pandiing *lamed*, tingnan ang kaugnay na talâ sa Slm 25,14 at sa Slm 119,128. Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 105–106.

[67]Gumamit na naman ang makata sa bs 16b–16k ng isang kiasmo:

wayyirdōp (A) + *'iš 'anī w*^{e}*'ebyōn* (B)

w^{e}*nik'ēh lēbab* (B') + *l*^{e}*mōtēt* (A')

Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 105–106.

Paganito napabibigat ang dating ng pagkakasala ng bulok na hukom sa di-pag-alaalang magmagandang-loob at kundi sa halip ay kabaligtaran pa ang inaasal. Ginipit niya nang husto ang dapat niyang ipagtanggol at kaylupit niyang maghangad pang pakautasin ang nasiraan ng loob.

[68]Kilala pa ng matandang makata ang gamit ng datibo. Kaya kinikilala ang hulaping panghalip ng *watt*^{e}*bō'ēhū* sa bs 17b bilang datibo. Ihambing ang kahalintulad na gamit nito doon sa Job 22,21: *bāhem t*^{e}*bō'āt*^{e}*kā ṭōbāh*, "Gayon Siyang-Mabait ay magtutungo sa iyo," kung saan ang *ṭōbāh* ay isang pamagat na mabathalang tinalakay sa Slm 86,17. Para sa iba pang mga halimbawa ng mga hulaping datibo kasama ang *bō'*, "pumarito, magtungo," tgn. ang kaugnay na talâ sa Slm 35,8. Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 106.

kakatwang kataka-taka'y parang pinagágalíng at pinagíginhawa siya ng mga iyon, na para bang panlunas na langis.[69] Waring panunumpa't pagmumurá ang pagkákakilanlán sa kanya, parang kanyang DNA! Nakahíhindík talaga! Palatandaan ito ng isang taong nagmanhid sa sarili. At ang nakagígimbal pa ay ang pagkagiliw rin dito ng kanyang mga kasamahan sa kabulukang ipinaiiral sa lipuna't pamayanan. Dahil sa kamanhirang ito sa sariling sáloobin, kinakitaan ng ating salmista ang bulok na hukom na hindi na malulunasan. Nawalan na ang makata ng pag-asang makararanas ng pagbabago sa kanya, liban na lamang sa isang posibleng milagro ng pagmumulagà at pagmamalay na siya'y pasakit hindi lamang sa sarili kundi sa lahat din ng kanyang pinanunungkulan. Talagang ganyan na lamang siya! Nakalulunos at nakalulungkot na naging parang balabal at pamigkis[70] na pang-araw-araw ang pagmumura't panunumpa, maging sa mataas na katungkulang kanyang ginagampanan na mismong siya ang unang-unang dapat na gagalang sa marangal at matuwid na pamamalakad at pamamahala.

Bagama't ganyan ang naging karanasan ng makata at ng iba pang mga nauna sa kanyang humarap sa paglilitis ng bulok na hukom, napanatili pa rin niya ang karampatang paggalang sa hawak niyang katungkulan. Ipinahiwatig niya ito sa paggamit ng maramihang pangkamahalang *'ᵃbōtāyw*, literal na "kanyang mga ama," bilang may kahulugan talaga na "kanyang ama" sa halip ng simpleng ísahang

[69]Sa bs 18 ang mga pangngalang *mayim* at *šemen* ay matatagpuan ding magkasama sa UT, IV:86–87: *tḫspn mh wtrḫṣ ṯl šmm wšmn arṣ*, "Sumalok siya ng kanyang tubig upang makapaghugas sa pamamagitan ng hamog ng langit at ng langis ng lupa." Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 106. Isa na namang patunay ito ng mahigpit na kaugnayan ng panunulang Hebreo sa Ugaritiko.

[70]Ayon kay Dahood, marahil isang sagisag ang pamigkis ng katungkulang hukom. Sa pamamagitan ng panibagong pagbasa niya ng bs 19 na *ya'ṭehū lᵉmēzaḥ* sa halip ng TM na *ya'ṭeh ulᵉmēzaḥ*, nagkaroon ng magkatimbang na bilang ng mga pantig na 9:9 ang dalawahang kola (tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 106). Gayon, sa tingin ng kasalukuyang manunulat, inangkop nang ganap ng bulok na hukom ang kanyang hilig na manumpa't magmura sa kanyang mataas na katungkulan.

ʾabīw, "kanyang ama."[71] Gayundin, ang pamigkis[72] na gamit niya'y bahagi ng karamtan ng may awtoridad na kanyang tangan, na sa kasamaang-palad ay di niya maayos at matuwid na ginagampanan. Hindi nga kataka-takang makadaloy ang napakahabang panahon na magwiwika muli si Yeshu'a na taga-Nazaret, na kanyang kalahi, sa kanyang mga kapwa Judiong magpitagan sa mga guro ng Batas at sa mga Pariseong nangagsisiupo sa likmuan ni Moshe, na sumunod at gumanap sa kanilang wastong aral ngunit huwag kumilos gaya ng kanilang pagkilos.[73]

Ang haba nga at ang tindí ng panunumpang isinagawa ng makata para sa bulok na hukom, gayong alam niyang gayon nga ang hangad ng mga kaaway para sa kanya. Inilapat lamang niya ang "batas ng pagganti" (*lex talionis*).

2.4.4. Maikling Sumpâ sa mga Máninirà (bs 20). Hindi nalimutan ng salmista ang mga nagsampa ng dinoktor na kasong di naman ibinasura ng napasuhol o humingi ng suhol mula sa kanila para mapadulas ang proseso; magkasapakat sila sa krimen at kasalanan! Mas malaki ang pananagutan ng nanunungkulan. Hindi iiral ang kabulukan kung sa simula't-sapol ay hindi binigyang-pansin ang mga malisyosong máninirà at hindi na nagpadulas sa suhol. Kung gayon, ang panghihiya't[74] pambubusabos na kanilang ginawa sa makata ay babaling sa kanila.

Maikli man ang hiling ng salmista sa POON sa bs 20 para sa kanila, malakas din naman ang paratíng ng makata sa paggamit ng balangkas ng lunduang parirala at ng kiasmo, bagama't di-ganap ang huling kagamitan ni ganap ang bilang ng mga pantig (7:5:9), gaya ng

[71]Tgn. talâ 48 sa itaás kung saan tinalakay ang maramihang pangkamahalan.

[72]Tgn. talâ 70 sa itaás.

[73]Tgn. Mt 23,2–3.

[74]Tgn. ang kasunod na talâ 75 tungkol sa pakahulugang "kahihiyan" para sa Hebreong *ẓoʾt*.

sa bs 14.[75] Kung binigyang-diin ng salmista sa bs 14 na mismong si El na POON ang magtátalâ ng kabuktutan ng kanyang ama at di-papahi ng sala ng kanyang ina, sa lunduang parirala rito sa bs 20 ay binigyang-diin naman niya, sa madaling sabi, na ulit-uliting makasandaan (!)[76] ang maging tadhanang kapahamaka't kahihiyan ng mga kampon ng Ama ng Kabulaanan. Kapansin-pansing ginamit ng makata ang balangkas ng lunduang parirala sa kanyang panunumpa sa magkasabuwat na bulok na hukom (bs 14) at sa kanyang mga naging kaaway (bs 20). Tiyak na mapupuna ang tindi ng sumpa sa ganitong pampanitikang gamit.[77]

2.4.5. Dalanging Taimtim ng Salmista (bss 21–27). Kung sinapantaha ng makatang tanging himala lamang ang makapagbabago sa palámurá't palásumpáng hukom, tiyak na tiyak naman niya ngayong tanging isa ring himala ang makapagpapalaya't makapagliligtas sa kanya mula sa

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[75]Narito ang kiasmo't lunduang parirala ng bs 20:

zō't pᵉ'ullat (A) + *śōṭᵉnay* (B)

(K)—*mi'ētā yhwh*—(K')

wᵉhaddōbᵉrim rā' 'al napšī (B')

Katulad din ng nasa bs 14 (tgn. talâ 48 sa itaás) ang kasalukuyang bersikulo, bagama't hindi ganáp, gayong gumamit dito ang makata ng elipsis, isang kasangkapang malimit sa mga tulang Hebreo't Ugaritiko. Gumamit din ang makata ng di-karaniwang kahulugang "kahihiyan" para sa Hebreong *zō't* na may ganito ring pakahulugan sa Slm 7,4 at pinagtabi naman sa Job 2,11 kasama ang *hārā'āh*; kung gayon, naging mapanuya ang hiling dito ng salmista sa Diyos para sa mga naninira sa kanya. Katulad ng nakabiting panturing sa bs 14, malimit na kinakaltas ang pariralang *m't yhwh* (tgn., hal., ang aparato ng BHS[5]) dahil sa palagay na walang gaanong silbi ito sa bersikulo. Subalit kung papatinigang *mi'ētā yhwh* at susuriin ang *mi'ētā* bilang perpektong pahilíng na mayroong kapos na pagbaybay at ang *yhwh* bilang pantawag, nalílipós ito ng kahulugan. Ang nagmula sa pangngalang pandiwang *mi'āh*, na pinag-aralan sa Slm 22,26, ay matatagpuan din sa Slm 66,20. Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 107.

[76]Masdan sa talâ 78 kung paano nailigtas mula sa pagkaltas ng ilang mga kritiko ang pariralang katinig na *m't yhwh*.

[77]Sa tingin ng kasalukuyang manunulat, ipinahihiwatig din naman ang pagkakatugma ng estilo at ng panimdim.

magiging hatol na kamatayan kung matutuloy ang paglilitis sa isang hukumang puspos ng kabulukan sa lahat ng dako. Kayâ hiling niya sa POON: "Halika! Ikaw na aking Panginoon at paghimalaan mo ako!"[78] Hindi alang-alang sa anumang kanyang karapatan o dahilan kundi pakundangan sa Ngalan ng kanyang POON at Panginoon na kanyang naranasan, at gayundin ng kanyang mga ninunong matuwid, na Siya'y kaybait[79] at kumilos tungo sa kanilang kaligtasan. Alang-alang sa

[78]Tingnan ang isinaayos na teksto ng mga bss 21–22 sa p. 124 ng sanaysay na ito. Panibagong pinapatinigan ang TM na *'attāh*, "ikaw," para maging *'ᵃtēh*, ang pautós ng *'ātāh*, "pumarito." Ayon kay Dahood, ang pagpapatinig ng TM ay kumákatig sa talâ ng aparatong kritiko ng BH⁽³⁾ na nagpapanukalang kaltasin ang buong unang kolong *wᵉ'attāh yhwh 'ᵃdōnāy*, "Ngunit ikaw, POON, Panginoon ko!," subalit pinahihintulutan tayong umayaw sa pagkaltás na ito sa pagmungkahing panibagong pagpapatinig at pagsasaayos ng linya: ihinihiwalay ang *ᵃśēh 'ōtī* para bumuo ng ikalawang kolon samantalang idinurugtong naman sa naiwang *lᵉma'an šimᵉkā* ang dalawang unang mga salita ng ikatlong kolong *kī ṭōb* para bumuo ng bagong ikatlong kolon; kung gayón, nasusuri ang linya bilang tatluhang kolong may 8:4:8 na bilang ng mga pantig.

Bukod pa, dapat ding bigyang-pansing gumamit na naman ang makata sa bs 34 ng datibo sa hulapi ng panibagong binasang *'ōt*, "palatandaan, himala." Sa halip ng TM na *'ittī*, "kasama ko," pinapatinigang panibagong *'ōtī*, na mayroong hulaping henitibo, na nangangahulugan namang datibo (tgn. talâ lx sa Slm 104,27). Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 107. Pinuna sa talâ 37 sa itaas na nagkamali sa pagpapatinig ang TM sa *'ittī*, "kasama ko," para sa *'ōtī*, na isang *nota accusativi* naman doon. Isinatagalog ang *ᵃśēh 'ōtī* sa pamamagitan ng paggamit ng unlaping "pag-" at ng hulaping "-an" sa ugat na "himala" para mabuo ang pandiwa.

[79]Pinagágaáng lubos ng kaparehong-kapareho at sinusuri ang *kī* bilang isang pandiín gaya ng nasa pariralang *šimᵉkā kī ṭōb* sa Slm 52,11 at 54,8 ang paghahati nang ayon sa sukat ng mga huling salita ng bs 21. Para maikabit ang *kī ṭōb* sa *lᵉma'an šimᵉkā* para mabuo ang bagong ikatlong kolon ng bersikulo, inaayos din ang naunang dalawang kola sa panibagong pagpapatinig na binanggit sa sinundang talâ sa itaás, at gayundin naman ng *'ōtī* bilang *nota accusativi*, na mayroong hulaping henitibo, na nangangahulugang datibo, tulad ng sa Slm 104,27 at sa bs 2. Kung gayon, nagkakaroon ang tatluhang kolong ito ng 8:4:8 na bilang ng mga pantig. Bilang kinalabasan ng pag-aayos na ito, nagiging unang kolon ang natirang dalawang huling salita ng bs 21 at isinasama ito sa bs 22 upang bumuo ng bagong linyang may tatluhang kolon din na may 7:9:8 na bilang ng mga pantig; sinusuri ang *ḥasdᵉkā* bilang isang akusatibo ng pamamaraang náuuná sa pawatás, kagaya

gandang-loob ng POON at hindi sa ano pa man ang samo ng makatang palayain siya't sagipin.[80] Talos na talos niyang wala siyang ligtas sa kanyang mga tampalasang mga máninirà at sa kanilang kasabuwat na bulok na hukom. Siya ang aba't dahop at sirang-sirâ ang loob na binanggit sa nakaraang bs 16b+k,[81] gayon sa pamamagitan ng isa pa ring paglangkap sa gamit ng *'ānī w^{e}'ebyōn*, na ngayo'y malinaw niyang inilalapat sa kanyang sariling pagkatao, lalung-lalo na sa paggamit ng mas maigting na anyong *'ānōkī* para sa "ako." Sa mga kasunod na bersikulo'y higit pa niyang ipahahayag ang pagkadukha't dahop nitong *'ānōkī*, na sa pasimula ng panalangin ay nagsumamong paghimalaan (*^{a}śēḥ 'ōtī*), na kasintunog ng naunang anyayang "Halika!" (*^{a}teḥ*). Tanging POONg Panginoon ang kanyang kaligtasan!

Kayâ tulad ng kanyang mga kapanalig na tapat sa Panginoon, nag-ayuno siyang nanánayâ lamang sa kanyang kalinga't pag-aadya. Hindi siya naging patpatin[82] sa pagbawas ng pagkain at ínumin lamang kundi

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ng nasa mga Slm 32,10; 51,14; atbp. Panibagong pinapatinigan ang TM na qal na táhasang palipát na *ḥālal* para maging qal na balintiyak na *ḥūlal*, isang pagbabanghay na di-alam ng mga Masoreta. Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 107.

[80]Sa muling paggamit ng paglangkap sa dalangin ng salmista (sa pagitan ng bs 21 [*ḥasd^{e}kā haṣṣīlēnī*] at bs 26 [*bōšī'ēnī k^{e}ḥasdekā*]), nais niyang ipagdiinang tanging gandang-loob ng POON ang kanyang maaasahan upang mapalaya sa gipit na gipit na katatayuan.

[81]Tgn. talâ 65 sa itaás.

[82]Gayong bahagyang makatuturán ang TM na *mišš*ā*men*, "walang langís/tabâ," sa bs 24, waring akma ang panibagong pagpapatinig dito, ayon kay Dahood, para gawing pandiwaring pual na *m^{e}šš*ū*mān* o isang kagayang anyong malapang-uri na tumuturing sa *b^{e}śārī*, "laman/katawan ko." Isa pang pagsusuring pambalarila (bagamat nanánatiling pareho ang kahulugan) ang posibleng maipanunukala ng Is 17,4: *ūmišman b^{e}śārō yērāzeh*, "At ang tabâ ng kanyang katawan ay pápayát." Kung gayón, maaari itong basahing *ūb^{e}śārī kāḥaš mišmān*, "At ang katawan kong matipuno'y naging patpatin," kung saan nakasingit ang pandiwang *kāḥaš* sa isang kadenang binanghay, isang pantulang pagbubuong kinilala ni Qimḥi, ayon kay Dahood, sa Os 8,2; 14,3 at ni A. Blommerde sa Job 17,11 sa kanyang *Northwest Semitic Grammar and Job* (Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1969). Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 108. Ang ikalawang bagong pagbasa ang sinunod sa ikalawang kolon

lalo na sa pagsalakay naman sa kanya ng mga alalahani't pangamba sa kinabukasan niya at ng buo niyang mag-anak. Lumalamon ito ng kanyang lakas at sigla sa kanyang pangangatawan. Matanda na nga siya, subali't higit pang nagpatanda[83] ang kanyang sinusuong at binabakang sulirani't mga alalahanin. Gayon, sinumang makakita sa kanya't makasalubong[84] ay malamáng na nápapaawâ, at ang karamiha'y nagsasapantaha na talagang siya'y sinumpa. Íilíng-ilíng ang mga ito, na sa kanilang palagay walang kapag-apag-asa ang kaso ng salmista.

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ng bersikulong ito; sa ganitong paraan, higit na nagkálapít ang bilang ng mga pantig ng linya (7:8) kaysa sa unang panukala at TM na orihinal na may 7:9 na bilang naman.

[83]Balikan ang inayos na tekstong Hebreo ng bs 23. Binabasa itong *kī nāṭawtī* sa halip ng TM na *kiṅ[e]ṭōtō*, at ikinakabit ang huling *w* (*ō*) sa kasunod na salita bilang pangatnig na *w[e]*. Pinanánatilì ng pagbasang *nāṭawtī* ang orihinal na ikatlong katinig na *-w* (pinatutunayan ng Arabe ang *nṭy* at ang *nṭw*), kagaya ng nasa mga pandiwang tulad ng *šalawtī*, "maginhawa ako," samantalang kinákatimbáng ng pandiing *kī* ang pandiing *kī* rin ng ikalawang (na magiging ikatlong) kolon. Matapos na mailipat ang huling *w* ng *nṭwtw* sa kasunod na salita, nasusuri ang bersikulo sa tatluhang kola na mayroong 6:4:6 na bilang ng mga pantig; bago nito ay may dalawahang kolon lamang na may 10:6 na bilang ng mga pantig.

Gumamit din ang makata rito ng dalawang ulit ng pandiíng *kī*. Ipinaliliwanag ang *nin'artī* bilang isang pandiwang nagmula sa pangngalang *na'ar*, "batang lalaki, binatilyo," at ipinalálagáy ang kahulugang nagkákaít sa anyong niphal; tgn. Ez 19,5: *nḥwlh* (basahing *nāḥōlāh*), "Nawalan siya ng lakas," at Slm 37,25: "Nagbinatâ ako, ngayon nama'y tumanda na." Ang salin ng mga naunang mga salita at ang lumilitaw na balangkas na magkabalalay ay maalwang nagsásantabí ng kinagawiang saling "gaya ng isang balang" para sa *ka'arbeh*, na makatuturán ngayong binábasang *kī 'erbeh*; sa ganitong paraan, nagiging katambal ito sa estilo ng unang kolong *nāṭ awtī*, "talagang napípipís ako." Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 107–108.

[84]Tgn. ang iwinastong pagpapatinig sa Hebreong bs 25. Madalás na kinákaltás ang mga katinig na *w'ny* (TM na *wa'ānī*, "at ako"), subalit nagiging makatuturán ito kapag pinatitinigang *w[e]'ōnay* ang pandiwaring qal ng *'ānāh*, "sumalubong," na tinalakay sa talâ vi ng Slm 51,5. Ayon sa balarila, isang halimbawa ito ng tinatawag na *casus pendens* ang *w[e]ōnay*, na ipinagpapatuloy sa *lāhem*, "sa kanila." Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 108.

Sa ganitong kalagayan, kanino pa siya kakanlong? Kayâ muling hilíng niyang marubdob bilang paglangkap,[85] gaya ng sa simula ng kanyang dalangin, "Saklolohan mo ako, POONg Diyos ko! Iligtas mo ako ayon sa gandang-loob mo!" Talagang desperado, walang magagawa mula sa likas na kakayahan, ni mula sa tulong ninuman na ang mga pakita pa sa kanya ngayon ay pawang pang-uuyam at pagpapahina ng loob. Sa gitna ng kawalang-pag-asang ito, napatibay pa rin ang pananalig ng salmista na tapat ang Diyos at may kiling sa mga dukha't inaapi. Kung gayon, ang tulong na pagpapalaya't kaligtasan na inaasam-asam ng makata ay patotoong muli na ang Diyos ng katuwira't katarungan ay kumikilos at siguradong kikilos para sa kanyang deboto at bayang sukol na sukol sa pahirap at pang-aapi. Muling maihahayag na kamay ng POON ang gumawa ng ganitong paghango, na mismong Siya ang may-akda ng kaligtasang minimithi.[86]

2.4.6. Kinálabasán ng Dalangin ng Makata (bs 28). Gayong taimtim at buong pananalig na nanalangin ang banal na makata, makakarinig siya ng sagot sa gitna ng pusikit na dilim at pasakit. At tayo, na sa kasalukuyang panahong nakararanas ng kawangis na mga pangyayari, ay marapat na magmalay sa pagsunod kay Yeshu'a na taga-Nazaret na sumuong sa dilim ng mga pasakit at kamatayan alang-alang sa atin. Katulad ng ating salmista, naririnig din tayo. Sasapit din ang bulong sa puso't isip na warak at nasiphayo: "Dinggin ninyo ang wika ng di-matuwid na hukom: 'Hinding-hindi kayâ igagawad ng Diyos ang

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[85]Tgn. talâ 62 sa itaás.

[86]Isang halimbawa naman ng *ellipsis* at ng kaugnay na dobleng-gamit ang bs 27: Ipinanúnukalà ni D. N. Freedman, ayon mismo kay Dahood, na nagsisilbi rin ang pandiwa ng ikalawang kolon doon sa unang kolon, ayon sa simulain ng dobleng-gamit o elipsis, kung saan nagiging kasangkapan ang *yādᵉkā*, "sa pamamagitan ng 'yong kamay"; ayon sa kasalukuyang manunulat, batay sa saling Ingles ni Dahood sa *Psalms III* (p. 109), nagsisilbi rin ang *zō't* ng unang kolon bilang tuwirang nilalayon ng pandiwang *ʿaśītāh* sa ikalawang kolon, ayon sa dobleng-gamit. Kung magkágayón: "Upang matalastás nila, na sa pamamagitan ng 'yong kamay ginawa mo ito, / ikaw, POON, ang gumawa nito." Sa tingin ng kasalukuyang tagasalin, higit na maayos ang daloy ng bs 27 kung ganito ang magiging salin, at ito ang sinunod sa saling Tagalog na ito.

katuwiran sa kanyang mga hinirang na sumisigaw sa kanya araw at gabi, at matitiis kaya niya sila?'"[87] Kung gayón, nasasaksihan na mula sa taimtim na dalangin ang pasimula ng himalang hiningi. May lakas na bumabalong mula sa loob na warak ng makata na sinalíng ng kamay ng POON. Makahaharap na siya gayón nang buong tapang at giting sa kanyang mga máninirà at mga mang-uuyam, at mismo sa bulok na hukom. Magsibangon[88] man sila para manumpa, mandusta man at manghiya, napatibay ang kanyang loob at muling napaliksi ang kanyang pangangatawan habang matatag ang kanyang paniwalang POONg Diyos sa kanya'y magpapala.[89] Hindi ba ganito rin ang naging tikas ng nagdurusang Lingkod ng POON[90] at ng lahat ng mga saksi at martir ng POON, maging ng mga nakaraang kahapon at maging sa mga nagaganap ngayon?

2.4.7. Maikling Sumpa Muli sa mga Máninirà (bs 29). Hinangad ng mga kaaway ng salmista ang kanyang kahihiyan, pati na pagkamatay bilang hatol sa krimeng paratang. Ngayon ang katarunga't katuwiran ng POON ang tatambad sa madlang-bayan; mga yaon ang mawawalan ng dangal at sa halip ay paghamak ang kanilang karamtan.

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[87]Lc 18,6–7.

[88]Sa bs 28, tulad ng sa Slm 27,12 kung saan inilalarawan ng perpektong pahilíng na *qāmū* ang galaw ng mga bulaang saksi, katimbang nito ang paatás na *yᵉqālᵉlū*, "Bayaan silang manumpa, na nagsásaysáy ng alituntunin ng mga saksi sa isang hukuman." Ang dalawang anyong ito ng pandiwa'y mga baryante ng paatás bilang bahagi ng pagbabago ng estilo. Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 109.

[89]Tingnan ang may pinanibagong pagpapatinig na Hebreong teksto sa p. 124. Sa palagay ng kasalukuyang manunulat, ikinakatlig ng ginawang dalawang dalawahang kola sa halip ng isang linyang may iisang dalawahang kola lamang ng bs 28 ang natamong tiwala ng salmista sa pananalangin. Paganitong paraan, parang *staccato* sa orihinal na Hebreo sa dalawahang kumpas ng bawa't kolon (2+2 // 2+2), na mayroong tig-aanim na mga pantig (6:6 // 6:6), ay naipahihiwatig ang kilos ng mga kaaway ng salmista at ang inaasahang tugon naman ng POON sa kanyang lingkod. Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 109.

[90]Tgn. Is 50,8–9; ganito rin, sa palagay ng may-akda ng sanaysay na ito, ang panimdim ni Pablo sa harap ng mga pagdurusa dahilan sa pagsaksi kay Yeshu'a, ang Mesiyas, sa kanyang sulat sa mga taga-Roma, 8,31–39.

Ipinamalas sa bs 29 ng nanaghoy na makata, na ngayo'y nagtamo ng lakas-ng-loob at tiwala makapanalangin, ang mapang-uyam na pananalitang ito sa paglalaro niya ng mga ugat ng mga salitang *lābaš*, "magdamit, magsuot," at *bōšet*, "kahihiyán." Kabahagi ito ng mga larong mga salitang nagpapakita ng kátatawanáng mapanuyâ ng maraming mga panaghoy ng TaPaK at ng mga Kananeo.[91] Marahil ang magkatimbang na bilang ng mga pantig ng linya (9:9) ay nagpapahiwatig naman sa kahinahunan ng kakatwang pang-uuyam kapag ihahambing natin ito sa naunang maikling panunumpa sa bs 20.

2.4.8. Pangmadlang Pasasalamat at Papuri ng Salmista (bss 30–31). Tunay ngang naglalaman ang isang panaghoy ng lahat ng ating inaaayawan at aayawan sa buhay nating taglay: kawalan ng dangal, kabulaanan, kawalan ng katarunga't katuwiran, kahihiyan, at napakarami pang iba, pati na ang kamatayan. Subali't mayroong mga pagkakataong dumarating sa buhay ng ilan na ang mga ito ang nagsisilbing daan tungo sa pagpanday ng tamang kaugnayan: sa Diyos, sa sarili, sa kapwa, at sa buong sangnilikha, kasama ng mga gawa ng ating isip at mga kamay. Ang mahalaga'y hanapin, tuklasin, alamin, at akuin ang daang tinahak ng mga nauna na sa atin sa landas ng buhay, na kailanma'y di-ligtas sa mga pagsubok at hamon. Ito ang dahilan kung tunay nga, matapos bumagtas sa makitid na daan ng pananalig sa Diyos, sa katapatan sa paninindigang wasto, at sa pagsunod sa lahat ng kanyang mga pahiwatig, na nakapagtatapos ang salmista ng kanyang tinaguriang awit ng papuri't pasasalamat sa POON Siyang-Dakila.[92]

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[91]Tgn. Slm 60,5. Ipinaliwanag ni Dahood kung paano napanatili ng makata ang ganap na timbang ng dalawahang kola ng bs 29: Nakikibahagi ang walang hulaping *kᵉlimmāh*, "kawalang-dangal," sa hulapi ng katambal nitong *bošṯām*, "kahihiyán nila." Kung nilagyan ng makata ang *kᵉlimmāh* ng hulapi (=*kᵉlimmātām*), madaragdagan niya ng isa pang pantig ang unang kolon, at sa gayón ay masisira ang kasalukuyang bilang ng mga pantig na 9:9. Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 109.

[92]Ayon kay Dahood, inilalantad sa pagsusuri sa mga sangkap ng bersikulo ang parisáng kiástikong A+B // B'+A', na natatagpuan sa Slm 22,23 na naghahayag din ng kahalintulad na kaisipán. Kung magkatambál ang *bᵉpī*, "sa pamamagitan ng bibig ko" (B), at ang *bᵉtōk rabbīm*, "sa gitna ng mga matatandâ" (B'), gayón tútugmâ ang *'ōdeh yhwh m'd* (A) sa *'ᵃhalᵉlennū*, "pupurihin ko siya." Ang kahulugan

Lagi niya siyang darakilain sa kanyang kinabibilangang kalipunan ng mga matatandang[93] may maselang katungkulan na mag-iwan ng pamanang saksi ng buhay na matuwid at makatarungan. Matibay at matatag ang kanyang tikas at paninindigang ang kanyang tinaguriang paiba-iba sa kanyang mapanlikhang pamamaraan—"Diyos ko" (bs 1), "El na POON" (bs 14), "POON" (bs 20), "POONg Panginoon ko" (bs 21), "POONg Diyos ko" (bs 26), at "POON Siyang-Dakila" (bs 30)—sa iba't ibang yugto ng buhay at dalangin ay tatayo sa kanyang kanan, siyang dahop[94] dito sa lupa, upang ipagtanggol siya mula sa kuko ng bulok na hukom,[95] na sa kabilambuhay sa hukumang makalangit

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nito'y dapat na binubuo ang *'ōdeh yhwh m'd* ng isang pandiwang papuri at ng tuwirang nilalayon nito. Kung magkágayón, patinigang *yhwh ma'ēd* (sa halip ng TM na *mᵉ'ōd*), "Ang POON Siyang-Dakila," at ihambing ang Ugaritikong pang-uring *mid*, "maringál, dákilà." Kapansin-pansing natatagpuan din ang mga pamagat na mabathalang *ʾᵉlōhīm*, "Diyos," at *mā'ēd*, "Siyang-Dakila," sa isang paglangkap sa Slm 46,2 (may kahalintulad na mga paglangkap ng ibang mabathalang pamagat sa mga Slm 58,7 [O Diyos … O POON] at Slm 77,14 [Diyos … Diyos]). Tgn. din ang mga Slm 46,2; 92,6; at 96,4; at gayundin naman ang mga Slm 119,196.138.140; 142,7; 145,3; at Job 8,7. Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 109.

[93]Sa pariralang pang-ukol sa bs 30, kaisa na naman ang makata sa gawing Ugaritiko sa gamit ng magkabalalay na *bᵉ* // *bᵉtōk*. Makikita rin sa UT, 75:I:19–22, *wẓl baln tkn btk mlbr ilšỉy*, ang pagtambal ng *bᵉ* at ng *bᵉtōk* ng kasalukuyang bersikulo ng ating salmo; sa nasabing tekstong Ugaritiko, mas malinaw ang pagkakábalalay ng *b* at ng *btk* kaysa kahulugan ng karamihang mga kalapit na mga salita. Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 109–110.

[94]Inihayag rin ito ng makata sa muling pagkawing ng bs 22 sa bs 31 sa paggamit ng paglangkap ng kanyang pagkakilala sa sarili, ang pinaka-ID niyang *'ebyōn*, "dahóp," na kasalungat sa tinawag niyang POON Siyang-Dakila sa bs 30.

[95]Ayon kay Dahood, naaabot ang katuturán mula sa pinagtalunang mabuting *miššōpᵉṭē* kung papatinigang panibagong *miššōpᵉṭī* na ang hulapi ay tumutukoy sa ikatlong panauhan. Ang pagsasaalang-alang sa estilo ang maaaring dahilan sa pagkakásintabí ng dalawang magkaibang mga hulapi sa ikatlong panauha't isahan sa *miššōpᵉṭī napšō*. Mayroong kahalintulad na pagkakásintabí sa Is 53,10: *wᵉyhwh ḥāpēṣ dakkᵉ'ō hᵉḥilli* (TM na *heḥᵉlī*) *'ᵉmet šimā* (TM na *'im tāšīm*) *'āšam napšō*, "Subalit ang POON ay nalugod na pahirapan siya, sibatín siya; talaga namang naging alay para sa kasalanan ang kanyang buhay"; masusuri ang mga katinig na *hḥḷy*

ay tatayuan naman sa kanyang kanan ng karumal-dumal na si Satanas bilang tagapagsakdal[96] kung hindi niya babayaang paghimalaan ng POON Siyang-Dakila tungo sa pagbabago at tunay na kadakilaan.

3. Pantapós na Salita't mga Mungkahi

Sa ating paglalakbay sa Slm 109, natalastas sana nating lahat kung gaano kayaman ang banal na tulang kinatha ng isang matanda nang sinukol ng mga mapang-aping balangkas ng lipunan noon ng mga Israelita bago sila mapatapon sa Babilonia. Sa pamamagitan ng mga natuklasang teksto sa dakong mga dalampasigan ng HKS, natulungan tayong higit na mabalikan ang tekstong orihinal na mga katinig. Sa palagay naman ng kasalukuyang manunulat, malinaw na naipakita niya ito sa sanaysay tungkol sa Slm 109. Napatotohanan ang katunayang ang kalinangang Hebreo ay kabahaging-kabahagi ng HKS, bagama't nilinang at pinanday ang anumang di-kaayon sa pananampalataya sa POONg Diyos ng Tipan. Kung gayon, inaanyayahan ng manunulat na ito ang lahat sa CBAP na tingnang muli ang nasabing *magnum opus* ni Dahood na nagpakitang nakaugat talaga nang malalim ang panitikang Hebreo, lalo na ang panunulâ, sa kalinanga't panitikang Kananeo.

Kayo na ang tumimbang kung ang saling Tagalog na ito ng Slm 109, at pati na ng buong Salterio, kung loloobin ng kaybait na POON

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bilang hiphil na pawatas na binanghay ng *ḥll*, "saksakín, sibatín, patagusín," na sinundan ng hulapi sa ikatlong panauha't isahang *-y*. Pinagtitibay ang kawastuhán ng ganitong pagsusuri ng Balumbon ni Isaias na natuklasan sa lungga ng Qumran (1QIs[a]), *wyḥllw*, "at kanyang sinibát siya," na nagpapahiwatig na naunawaan ng eskribang taga-Qumran na ang hulapi ay dapat na nasa ikatlong panauha't ísahan. Tgn. Dahood, *Psalms III*, 110–111. Isang patunay ito ng kasanayan ng salmista sa mga sinaunang ganitong gamit ng hulaping panghalip na *-y*.

Ayon naman kay Althann, sa pag-aaral niyang nabanggit sa simula ng sanaysay na ito, "[there are] no clear examples of a final *yod* representing the 3 f.s. ending. Orthographic confusion between *y* and *w* cannot be ruled out to explain some other alleged examples of the phenomenon" (tgn. *Studies in Northwest Semitic*, 78).

[96]Basahin ang bss 6–7 ng ating Salmo at tgn. 2.1.2. sa itaás.

(Kapuri-puri ang kanyang Ngalan!), na ibinatay ng manunulat na ito sa nasabing *magnum opus* ng kanyang matagal nang nakaraang naging guro, ay higit na nagbibigay ng katuturan sa salmong malimit kalituhan at inayawan ng mga liturhistang isama sa Panalanging Opisyal ng Sambayanang Katoliko. Isang malaking katanungan ng kasalukuyang manunulat: Bakit isinama ito sa huling koleksiyon ng mga banal na awit ng iba't ibang mga mananampalataya ng Matandang Tipan? Marapat na talakayin ito nang malaliman, subali't hindi sapat ang panahon para gawin ito rito. Nais lamang banggitin nitong manunulat ang kanya nang nasabi, na ang karanasan ng ating salmista ay hindi lamang noong malayong kahapon kundi ngayon din sa ating panahon! Paano natin masasabayan ang gayong karanasan maging sa ating panalanging nakaugat sa katunayan ng karanasan at sa kaugnayan sa Diyos at Ama ng ating Panginoong Yeshu'a, na malinaw na sumalungat sa marahas na hangarin ng magkapatid na mga anak ng kulog na manalanging magpaulan ng apoy ng asupre sa nagiging balakid sa kanilang pag-ahon sa Herusalem?[97] Bukod pa rito, mismong pahiwatig ng kanyang mga aral, lalo na sa tradisyon ni Mateo sa pangangaral ni Yeshu'a sa bundok,[98] ay tumútumbók sa isang buhay na ayon sa tunay na kapalaran at kabanalan sa pagsasagawa ng kalooban ng Diyos. Tiyak na binigyan niya ng radikal na pakahulugan ang batas ng pagganti (*lex talionis*): "Narinig ninyong sinabi: […] *subalit sinasabi ko naman*: […]."[99]

Kung ano ang ating pinagsimulan, iyon din naman ang hangad pagtapusan ng kasalukuyang manunulat. Napapanahon, sa ating pagdiriwang ng ikalimang dantaon ng pagsapit ng pananampalatayang Kristiyano sa mga Kapuluang ito, na bakahin ang hamon ng pag-ugat nito sa ating katutubong kalinangang Pilipino sa pamamagitan ng ating sariling wikang Tagalog. Marapat na masdan at suriin ang ating kalalagayan ngayon bilang mga mananampalatayang Pilipino sa tanglaw ng mga Banal na Kasulatan, na siyang pinakapangulong pinagkukunan

[97]Tgn. Lc 9,51–55.

[98]Tgn. Mt 5,1–7,28.

[99]Tgn. Mt 5,38–48 (pagdiín ay sa kasalukuyang mánunulát).

natin ng mabathalang pananaw bilang mga tagasunod ni Yeshu'a na taga-Nazaret, na ngayo'y itinampok na Mesiyas at Anak ng Diyos.

Sa okasyon ng ikalabing-anim na dantaon ng pagkamatay ni San Jeronimo sa Bethlehem noong ika-30 ng Setyembre, 2020, naghayag si Papa Francisco ng isang Liham na Apostolikong pinamagatan niyang *Scripturae Sacrae Affectus*. Isa sa kanyang maikling tinalakay ay ang usapin ng paglilinang, na pangkasalukuyang hamon pa rin para sa atin lalo na sa Asya. Bayaan ninyong sipiin dito ng kasalukuyang manunulat ang ilang mga talatà mula sa salin sa wikang Inglés ng nasabing Liham na nagtuturong ang pagsasalin ay isang gawain ng paglilinang:

> By his translation, Jerome succeeded in "inculturating" the Bible in the Latin language and culture. His work became a permanent paradigm for the missionary activity of the Church. In effect, "whenever a community receives the message of salvation, the Holy Spirit enriches its culture with the transforming power of the Gospel." Here a kind of circularity is established: just as Jerome's translation is indebted to the language and culture of classical Latin, whose influence is very evident, so his translation, by its language and its symbolic and highly imaginative content, became in turn an impetus to the creation of a new culture.
>
> Jerome's work of translation teaches us that the values and positive forms of every culture represent an enrichment for the whole Church. The different ways by which the word of God is proclaimed, understood and experienced in each new translation enrich Scripture itself since, according to the well-known expression of Gregory the Great, Scripture grows with the reader, taking on new accents and new resonance throughout the centuries. The entrance of the Bible and the Gospel into different cultures renders the Church ever more clearly "a bride bedecked with jewels" (*Is* 61:10). At the same time it witnesses to the fact that the Bible continually needs to be translated into the linguistic and mental categories of each culture and generation, also in the secularized global culture of our time.[100]

[100]Francisco, *Scripturae Sacrae Affectus* (Roma: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2020), https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_letters/documents/papa-francesco-lettera- ap_20200930_scripturae-sacrae-affectus.html (nabisita noong ika-28 ng Hunyo 2021).

Marami na tayong mga salin ng Banal na Kasulatan, maging ng Matandang Tipan at ng Bagong Tipan, sa iba't ibang mga wika sa ating mga Kapuluan, salamat sa marubdob na gawain lalo na ng ating mga kapatid sa Pastoral Bible Foundation ng mga Claretiano at mangyari pa sa Philippine Bible Society na matagal nang panahong pinagsikapang maipaabot ang Banal na Salita ng Diyos sa mas marami pang mga pangkat na kultural ng ating bansa. Marahil nagpasimula na sila na lumikha ng Bibliang magagamit, lalo na ng mga mag-aaral at mga tagaturo ng teolohiya, bagamat may kaalaman na sila ng mga orihinal na banal na wika sa nasabing dalawang Tipan. Sa kaalaman ng kasalukuyang manunulat, iminumungkahi pa ring gamitin hanggang ngayon ang RSV sa mga mag-aaral sa wikang Ingles ng mga Banal na Kasulatan.

Kung gayon, huwag sanang masamaing ulitin rin dito ng kasalukuyang manunulat ang mungkahing binanggit niya sa pasimula ng sanaysay na ito: Marapat na magkaroon tayo ng isang mahusay na salin sa Tagalog na malapit na malapit sa mga orihinal na wika ng Banal na Kasulatan. Isang hamon ito para sa CBAP sa okasyon hindi lamang ng ikalimang dantaong ipinagdiriwang natin noong taong 2021 kundi rin naman sa ating paggunita sa pagkamatay ng isang Ama't Pantas ng Sambayanang Kristiyano na nagtaglay ng marubdob na pagmamahal sa Salita ng Diyos, si San Jeronimo. Gaya ng sinabi ni Francisco sa nabanggit na Liham, si San Jeronimo ay "silid-aklatan" ng Mesiyas, na maging hanggang ngayon ay "patuloy sa pagtuturo sa atin ng kahulugan ng pag-ibig sa Mesiyas, isang pag-ibig na hindi maaaring ihiwalay mula sa pakikipagtagpo sa kanyang salita."[101] Kahimanawaring magbunsod ang CBAP, na binubuo na ng karamihang mga Pinoy/Pinay na biblista,[102] ng isang proyektong *sama-sama't organisadong mahusay*

[101]Francisco, *Scripturae Sacrae Affectus* (salin ng kasalukuyang manunulat).

[102]Sa kahuli-hulihang pagtatalâ ni Sr. B. Dianzon noong ika-15 ng Setyembre 2021 ng mga kasapi ng CBAP para sa isang direktoryo nito, mayroon na tayong 42 kasapi. Tatlumpu't dalawa rito ay ganap na mga kasapi samantalang sampu naman ang mga kasamá. Karamihan (28) sa kanila'y sa Kamaynilaan naninirahan samantalang nasa labas nito ang iba (14); sa katunayan, lima sa huli ay nasa ibang bansa (EUA [2] at Vietnam, Belhika, at Sri Lanka [tig-iisa]).

na pagsasalin ng ating mga pinagkukunang biblikong makakatulad ng RSV, na siyang karaniwang ginagamit sa Inglés. Maibunsod pa nawang higit sa ganitong paraan ang pagteteolohiyang Pilipino sa mga parating na panahon at di manayâ lamang sa Inglés na mananatiling banyaga sa ilan marahil sa atin, at lalung-lalo na sa karamihan ng ating mga kapanalig at kamamamayang Pilipino.

Magsaloob nawa tayong lahat—tayo sa CBAP na umako sanang magsalin at ang CBCP-ECBA (Episcopal Commission for Biblical Apostolate), pati na ang AMRSP (Association of Major Religious Superiors in the Philippines), na umako namang magtaguyod ng proyektong ito higit sa lahat sa mga tauhan at pananalapi[103]—na maisakatuparan ang inasam-asam ni Francisco sa nasabing Liham na Apostoliko:

> With the celebration of this anniversary of the death of Saint Jerome, our gaze turns to the extraordinary missionary vitality expressed by the fact that the word of God has been translated into more than three thousand languages. To how many missionaries do we owe the invaluable publication of grammars, dictionaries and other linguistic tools that enable greater communication and become vehicles for "the missionary aspiration of reaching everyone!" We need to support this work and invest in it, helping to overcome limits in communication

[103]Kung tatanggapin at pagtitibayin ang mungkahing ito, napakahalagang lubos na sama-sama't mahusay na organisado ang kilos. Kung gayon, marapat na ang proyekto'y:

1) Inako bilang institusyon ng CBAP at ng CBCP-ECBA.
2) Mayroong Komisyon ng Pagsasaling may sariling mga Panuntunang pinagtibay ng dalawang institusyong magkasamá sa banal na misyong ito.
3) May Panuntunang naglalaman man lamang ng mga sumusunod na sangkap:
   3.1) Komposisyon at mga kasapi,
   3.2) Tunguhin ng Komisyon,
   3.3) Proseso ng Gawaing Pagsasalin,
   3.4) Lupon ng mga Tagasuri/Patnugot, at
   3.5) Lupon ng Pananalapi.
4) May tiyak na Badyet na sagót ng CBAP at CBCP-ECBA.

> and lost opportunities for encounter. Much remains to be done. It has been said that without translation there can be no understanding: we would understand neither ourselves nor others.[104]

Kapuri-puri nawa ang POONg Diyos ng sanlibutang bumubuhay sa atin sa pamamagitan ng kanyang Banal na Salita!

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[104]Francisco, *Scripturae Sacrae Affectus*.