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EDITOR'S PREFACE
Salvador G. Agualada, Jr., CMF

ARTICLES

Are Animals "It"? Restoring Animals in our Language
Gaizel Arguelles Adan

The Role of the Cosmic Christ in God's Universal Salvific Plan: An Assessment of Michael Amaladoss' Christology
Manuel V. Francisco, SJ

Ministry of "Listening Deeply" in an Inculturated Church in North Vietnam
Jojo M. Fung SJ

Tensions in Translating: The Case of the Misa ng Bayang Pilipino
Teofilo Giovan S. Pugeda III

Augustine's Account of His Personal Conversion to God in the Confessions (Part I)
Thomas Sherman, SJ

The First Companions:Finding Grace in Dispersion, Sickness, and Conflict
Christopher Staab, SJ

The Status of Societies of Apostolic Life. A Canonical Overview: From the Code of 1917 to Vatican II
Arnaud Touré, PIME

Myth as a Bridge Between Science and Religion in the Timaeus
Earl A. P. Valdez

NOTES AND COMMENTS

The Tagalog Verb, Rich in Nuance: Samples from the Vocabulario de Lengua Tagala (SB 1613), Part I
Emmanuel C. Marfori

BOOK REVIEW

Integral Ecology Ministry: Doing Ecological Theology and Advocacy in Light of Laudato Si'
Norlan H. Julia, SJ

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From its inaugural issue in 1987, *Landas* has expressed a clear vision: to make a modest contribution to the need for published material written by authors living and working in the Philippines and Asia. The title *Landas* carries venerable biblical significance. While this was not the first theological journal to adopt the name, the founding editors were drawn to it for its capacity to express a fundamental reality regarding theological reflection: that faith is a pilgrimage, a way of life, and an authentic orientation toward Christ and the world — a metaphor for the theological journey undertaken by both authors and readers.

Since its inaugural issue in January 1987 (Vol. 1, No. 1), Landas has been published regularly and continues to serve as a forum for scholarly dialogue that engages Scripture, Christology, Ecclesiology, Spirituality, Mission, and other theological disciplines in the context of the Church and society.

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Contents

Landas
Vol. 38, No. 2 (2026)

v *Editor's Preface*
Salvador G. Agualada, Jr., CMF

ARTICLES

1 *Are Animals "It"? Restoring Animals in our Language*
Gaizel Arguelles Adan

37 *The Role of the Cosmic Christ in God's Universal Salvific Plan: An Assessment of Michael Amaladoss' Christology*
Manuel V. Francisco, SJ

69 *Ministry of "Listening Deeply" in an Inculturated Church in North Vietnam*
Jojo M. Fung SJ

83 *Tensions in Translating: The Case of the Misa ng Bayang Pilipino*
Teofilo Giovan S. Pugeda III

101 *Augustine's Account of His Personal Conversion to God in the Confessions (Part I)*
Thomas Sherman, SJ

129 *The First Companions: Finding Grace in Dispersion, Sickness, and Conflict*
Christopher Staab, SJ

153 *The Status of Societies of Apostolic Life. A Canonical Overview: From the Code of 1917 to Vatican II*
Arnaud Touré, PIME

177 *Myth as a Bridge Between Science and Religion in the Timaeus*
Earl A. P. Valdez

Notes and Comments

195 *The Tagalog Verb, Rich in Nuance: Samples from the Vocabulario de Lengua Tagala (SB 1613), Part I*
Emmanuel C. Marfori

Book Review

223 *Integral Ecology Ministry: Doing Ecological Theology and Advocacy in Light of Laudato Si'*
Norlan H. Julia, SJ

EDITOR'S PREFACE[1]

My first serious piece of intellectual writing was my undergraduate thesis in philosophy, which I wrote during my final year at the college seminary in 1989–1990. We did not have computers then, so all our papers, especially our theses, were written on typewriters. The seminary had well over twenty of them, although I can only remember two brands: *Olympia* and *Olivetti*. Each had its own distinctive typeface, which explains why my thesis still bears different typefaces from one chapter to another, or perhaps even from one section to another. Before typing, we would prepare handwritten drafts, revising them patiently until we were satisfied that our thoughts had become sufficiently clear.

Writing in those days was demanding in its own way at every stage—from research and the organization of ideas to composition and revision. Composition and revision, in particular, required considerable patience and attention to detail. With every draft, we had to verify the spelling of words, check whether our grammar was correct, search patiently for the most appropriate expression, and ask ourselves repeatedly whether a particular sentence truly conveyed what we intended to say. Even before striking the keys of the typewriter, we would often pause for a considerable time, thinking carefully about every sentence. Was this really what we wanted to say? Could it be expressed more accurately? Was there a better word? Although correction fluid—what we commonly called Liquid Paper—could cover

[1] ChatGPT (OpenAI) was used solely for grammar checking and proofreading.

typing mistakes, a page full of white patches was hardly pleasant to look at. Precision and accuracy were therefore not simply desirable; they were expected, for every keystroke carried a certain sense of finality and consequence.

When I began my theological studies in 1992, personal computers (PCs) were still relatively uncommon, at least in the Philippines, and seminaries were among the few institutions that owned them. We stored our documents on floppy disks, and those who lived through those years will probably remember—at least in our theology house—the occasional cries of despair late at night when someone, trying to finish a term paper due the next day, lost everything because of a sudden power interruption. Frustrating as such experiences were, they seemed almost a natural part of student life in those days.

More than four decades have passed since then, and the pace of technological development has been nothing short of astonishing. Computers have become incomparably more powerful and have now entered almost every sphere of human activity. Today, a laptop is no longer considered a luxury but a necessity, especially for college students and those whose work depends on computers. As computers have become an ordinary part of our daily lives, they have inevitably transformed many of the ways in which we work, communicate, and learn. Inevitably, the way we write with computers has also changed. We type with far less hesitation and caution now because we know that whatever we have written can easily be deleted, revised, rearranged, or polished, and there is no denying that this is one of the greatest advantages modern technology has given us.

Yet, as I reflect on this remarkable journey from the age of typewriters to the era of computers, I cannot help but ask a simple question. Has technology merely changed the instruments with which we write, or has it also begun to change the way we think? Have we gradually lost something of the discipline of pausing before writing, of weighing our words carefully, of searching patiently for the most accurate expression, and of thinking through an idea before committing

it to paper? These habits were not merely techniques of writing; they were also disciplines of thinking.

The emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) gives this question an even greater urgency. Although AI has existed as a field of research since the 1950s, it is only in the past few years that it has entered everyday life with extraordinary speed, transforming the way we work, communicate, learn, and increasingly, the way we write.[2] Today, it can draft essays, summarize books, answer questions, and organize arguments. These developments undoubtedly offer extraordinary possibilities, yet they also raise an important concern. If technology increasingly performs intellectual tasks that once demanded sustained effort on our part, might we gradually become less willing to undertake the demanding work of critical thinking ourselves? Might we eventually come to rely so heavily on technology that we lose the patience required for careful reflection, rigorous analysis, and independent judgment? The possibility is sufficiently serious that it deserves careful theological reflection.

It is precisely within this context that Pope Leo XIV, elected on May 8, 2025, issued his first encyclical, *Magnifica Humanitas:* On Safeguarding the Human Person in the Time of Artificial Intelligence, on May 15, 2026, devoting it to one of the defining questions of our time: artificial intelligence.[3] Since its publication, the encyclical has sparked widespread discussion in newspapers, opinion pages, digital news platforms, technology circles, and across social media, eliciting both praise and criticism from theologians, AI researchers, ethicists, technology experts, journalists, and scholars from various disciplines.

The publication of *Magnifica Humanitas*, however, did not come as a surprise. Those who had followed Pope Leo during the first year of

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[2] Melanie Mitchell, *Artificial Intelligence: A Guide for Thinking Humans* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2019).

[3] Pope Leo XIV, *Magnifica Humanitas: On Safeguarding the Human Person in the Time of Artificial Intelligence,* May 15, 2026, Encyclicals, https://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiv/en/encyclicals/documents/20260515-magnifica-humanitas.html.

his pontificate could already see that artificial intelligence had become one of his principal pastoral and theological concerns. From the earliest days of his ministry as Bishop of Rome, he returned repeatedly to the subject because he recognized that the rapid development of artificial intelligence was raising fundamental questions about the human person. Seen together, his early speeches and addresses reveal a coherent line of thought that gradually matured and eventually found its fullest expression in his first encyclical.

The first clear indication came only two days after his election. Addressing the College of Cardinals on May 10, 2025, Pope *Leo* XIV explained that he had chosen the name Leo principally because Pope Leo XIII, through *Rerum Novarum*, had guided the Church during the profound social changes brought about by the first Industrial Revolution. Today, he observed, the Church once again finds herself facing "another industrial revolution," one driven by the rapid development of artificial intelligence.[4] Like his predecessor more than a century earlier, Pope Leo recognized that the emergence of a new technology was not merely transforming the workplace or the economy but was reshaping the conditions of human life itself. Such a moment, he believed, demanded not only scientific expertise or technological innovation but also careful moral discernment and renewed theological reflection.

In the months that followed, Pope Leo returned to this theme on several occasions, each time adding another layer to his reflection. Speaking to different audiences and in different contexts, he consistently acknowledged the extraordinary possibilities opened up by artificial intelligence. At the same time, however, he repeatedly reminded the Church that technological progress cannot become the measure of human progress. The true question is not simply what artificial intelligence can do, but how it can serve the dignity of the human person and the common good. It was within this broader moral and theological horizon that his reflections continued to unfold.

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[4] Pope Leo XIV, *Address to the College of Cardinals*, May 10, 2025, Speeches, https://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiv/en/speeches/2025/may/documents/20250510-collegio-cardinalizio.html.

One of the recurring themes in Pope Leo XIV's early addresses was his insistence that artificial intelligence should always be understood as an instrument rather than an end in itself. Addressing participants in the Second Annual Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Ethics, and Corporate Governance, held in Rome on June 19–20, 2025, Pope Leo reaffirmed a principle first articulated by Pope Francis: that artificial intelligence is "above all else a tool."[5] A tool has no purpose of its own, as its moral significance depends entirely on the way it is used and the ends it is intended to serve. Like every human invention, artificial intelligence can be placed at the service of authentic human flourishing, but it can also be used in ways that diminish human dignity, weaken solidarity, deepen existing inequalities, or even take human life. The decisive question, therefore, is not whether artificial intelligence is good or bad in itself, but whether it genuinely serves the integral development of the human person and of the whole human family.

As Pope Leo continued to reflect on artificial intelligence in the months that followed, his attention increasingly shifted from the technology itself to the human person. The more he spoke about AI, the more evident it became that his principal concern was not the remarkable capabilities of intelligent machines but the future of human intelligence itself. This concern found particularly clear expression several months later in December 2025 in his Address to Participants in the Conference "Artificial Intelligence and Care of Our Common Home," where he raised one of the defining questions of his developing teaching on artificial intelligence: "What does it mean to be human in this moment of history?"[6] Its significance became

[5] Pope Leo XIV, *Message to Participants in the Second Annual Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Ethics, and Corporate Governance*, June 17, 2025, Messages, https://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiv/en/messages/pont-messages/2025/documents/20250617-messaggio-ia.html, citing Pope Francis, *Address at the G7 Session on Artificial Intelligence*, June 14, 2024, Speeches, https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2024/june/documents/20240614-g7-intelligenza-artificiale.html.

[6] Pope Leo XIV, *Address to Participants in the Conference "Artificial Intelligence and Care of Our Common Home,"* organized by the Centesimus Annus Pro Pontifice Foundation and the Strategic Alliance of Catholic Research Universities,

even clearer several weeks later when, in his Message for the 60th World Day of Social Communications, the Pope observed that "the challenge, therefore, is not technological, but anthropological."[7] This brief statement may well be regarded as the interpretative key to his entire teaching on artificial intelligence. The deepest questions raised by AI cannot be answered by technology alone because they concern the human person: our dignity, our freedom, our moral responsibility, our relationships, and ultimately our vocation before God. Artificial intelligence undoubtedly represents one of the greatest technological achievements of the modern world. Yet the more sophisticated our technologies become, the more urgently we are called to rediscover what is uniquely and irreducibly human.

It is difficult not to hear, in these reflections, an echo of the question with which this Editor's Preface began. Looking back on the years of typewriters, handwritten drafts, and countless revisions, I found myself wondering whether, as the instruments with which we write have changed, some of the habits through which we exercise critical thinking may have gradually weakened. Pope Leo's reflections suggest that this is precisely the question confronting us at this moment in human history. Artificial intelligence can greatly assist the work of the human mind. It can organize information, summarize arguments, translate languages, and perform tasks in seconds that once required many hours of patient labor. These are extraordinary achievements for which we may rightly be grateful, yet they also invite us to ask whether we are becoming less willing to undertake the demanding work of thinking for ourselves.

For this reason, Pope Leo repeatedly distinguished information from wisdom. Speaking once again to the participants in the same

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December 5, 2025, Speeches, https://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiv/en/speeches/2025/december/documents/20251205-conferenza.html.

[7] Pope Leo XIV, *Message for the 60th World Day of Social Communications: Preserving Human Voices and Faces,* January 24, 2026, Messages, https://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiv/en/messages/communications/documents/20260124-messaggio-comunicazioni-sociali.html.

conference, he cautioned that "access to data—however extensive—must not be confused with intelligence," adding that "authentic wisdom has more to do with recognizing the true meaning of life, than with the availability of data."[8] These observations return us to a truth that previous generations perhaps understood instinctively. Information can be accumulated, organized, and transmitted with astonishing speed. Wisdom, however, cannot be downloaded; it grows slowly through study, experience, prayer, discernment, and the patient search for truth. No machine, however powerful or useful, can relieve us of that profoundly human task and vocation.

While Pope Leo was articulating these reflections during the first year of his pontificate, many of the same questions had already begun to emerge here in the Philippines, even before the publication of *Magnifica Humanitas*. In January 2026, almost four months before the appearance of the encyclical, the Institute for Consecrated Life in Asia (ICLA) devoted its annual Religious Life Week to the theme, *Mystical Intelligence in the Era of Artificial Intelligence*.[9] Looking back today, it is difficult not to recognize something providential in that choice. Without knowing what the Holy Father would later write in his first encyclical, consecrated men and women, theologians, educators, and pastoral ministers in Metro Manila and beyond had already begun reflecting together on many of the same questions that would soon become central to the Church's universal conversation in the encyclical.

One conversation at the conclusion of the Conference remains particularly vivid in my memory. During lunch on the third and final day, I found myself seated beside Archbishop Charles J. Brown, the Apostolic Nuncio to the Philippines, who had graciously accepted our invitation to preside over the Mass and deliver the Concluding Remarks, and who remained with us in a spirit of fraternity and informal

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[8] Pope Leo XIV, *Message to Participants in the Second Annual Conference on Artificial Intelligence.*

[9] See *Religious Life Asia* 28, no. 1 (2026), containing the presentations from the 2026 Religious Life Week of the Institute for Consecrated Life in Asia, held under the theme "*Mystical Intelligence in the Era of Artificial Intelligence*."

fellowship. I asked him whether he knew of any recent academic or ecclesial gathering elsewhere in the Philippines that had been devoted to a similar theme. After reflecting for a few moments, he replied that he knew of none. His answer was brief, but it remained with me. In retrospect, Religious Life Week 2026 may rightly be seen as one small example of what the Church has always sought to do: to read the signs of the times in the light of the Gospel and to begin asking the right questions even before all the answers have become clear.

Taken together, the four presentations of Religious Life Week approached the subject from different perspectives, yet they converged on many of the same concerns that Pope Leo would later articulate in *Magnifica Humanitas*. Although they were prepared independently and presented several months before the publication of the encyclical, they shared a fundamental conviction: artificial intelligence is one of the defining realities of our world today, but it must always remain at the service of the human person. The deepest questions raised by AI are therefore not simply technological. They are also profoundly human, moral, and spiritual, for they ultimately concern not only what intelligent machines are capable of doing, but what kind of persons we ourselves are becoming through the ways we choose to use them. In this sense, the questions raised during Religious Life Week belong to the much broader task of theology itself: to reflect upon the changing realities of our world in the light of faith and to discern what they mean for the human person, the Church, and our common life.

It is within this broader task of theological reflection that I find myself returning, finally, to the present issue of *Landas*. The articles gathered in these pages explore diverse theological themes, yet each bears witness to something they all hold in common: the enduring human desire to seek understanding in faith and to place the fruits of that search at the service of the Church and the wider world. At a time when artificial intelligence increasingly assists us in tasks once regarded as uniquely human—such as thinking, researching, and writing—these studies quietly remind us that theology remains, at its heart, a profoundly human vocation. Each article represents not merely the communication of ideas but the patient work of minds and hearts listening to God's

Word, wrestling with the questions of our time, and offering their reflections in the hope that they may contribute, however modestly, to the Church's continuing work of faith seeking understanding. It is in this spirit that we offer these reflections, confident that, even in an age increasingly shaped by artificial intelligence, the Church's search for truth and wisdom will always remain a profoundly human response in faith to the God who first speaks to us and calls each of us by name.

Salvador G. Agualada Jr., CMF
Editor-in-Chief

Landas 38:2 (2026) 1–35

ARE ANIMALS "IT?" RESTORING ANIMALS IN OUR LANGUAGE[1]

Gaizel Arguelles Adan

Abstract. This essay examines how language marginalizes animals by reducing them to "it"—a grammar convention that obscures the giftedness of animals (i.e., cognition, agency, communication, empathy). In this linguistic marginalization, there are metaphors and colloquial words that simultaneously violate women and animals. It is argued that the linguistic marginalization of animals is reinforced by anthropocentric philosophical and theological traditions. Thomistic philosophical and theological thought has influenced our view of animals, favoring human superiority. Despite Thomas Aquinas' shortcomings in his appraisal of animals, his affirmative teachings on animals can be retrieved. Animals, for him, are participants in God's community of creation who reveal God's goodness and glory. Moreover, this essay aims to uncover the greatness of animals by acknowledging their capacities through the lens of animal reciprocity. While it is critical to redress false claims about animals, this essay eschews reproducing anthropocentric practices by simply valuing animals using human standards. Thus, feminist animal care, particularly *entangled empathy*, will be explored as an ethic of care that is affirmative of the value of animals based on their wholeness and

[1] This essay was adapted from a chapter in the author's doctoral thesis. See Gaizel Arguelles Adan, "Woman-Animal Companionship: A Multispecies Home of Ministry," (DMin thesis, Catholic Theological Union, 2026), Research in Ministry (RIM), ATLA Religion Database, 72-107, https://rim.ir.atla.com/concern/etds/6504ac93-af8a-4858-af0e-79b5a626dffe?q=gaizel%20arguelles%20adan.

uniqueness. Naming is proposed as a counter-cultural practice against demeaning descriptions for animals in our language.

Keywords: animal theology, feminist theology, feminist animal care, animal reciprocity

Introduction

Feminist theologians suggest that the anthropocentric dominating paradigm for reading of Scripture has created biases against animals and the whole creation. Building on this, I argue that aside from a biased interpretation of biblical texts on the relationship between animals and humans, the marginalization of animals also pervades everyday language. Our language unjustly marginalizes animals and considers them inferior beings or mere "it." But this phenomenon is merely a manifestation of a larger issue. Language biases against animals reflect and are reinforced by philosophical and theological traditions that espouse human exceptionalism and anthropocentrism.

One way of honoring animals is by decentering humans as the only beings thought to be endowed with divine giftedness. Affirmative theologies toward animals, for instance, deep incarnation,[2] recognize animals as co-sharers in God's creative and redemptive plan. Acknowledging the fullness of animals—including their gifts—is vital in creating a more affirming relationship with them. In the long

[2] Denis Edwards reviewed the development of the theology of deep incarnation, which was originally proposed by Niels Gregersen. Gregersen first attended to reconciling God's mercy with the existential question of suffering involved in evolutionary processes. His theology posits that the Incarnation is a materially binding reality that extends to all creation, both biologically and evolutionarily. Christ's becoming human was meant to offer life and provide care for the whole creation, even in its suffering and death. Deep incarnation conveys that creation is not alone in its suffering, deterioration, death, and extinction. Christ suffers with creation. Edwards then examined the contributions of Elizabeth Johnson, Celia Deane-Drummond, Christopher Southgate, and Richard Bauckham in constructing the theology. See Denis Edwards, *Deep Incarnation: God's Redemptive Suffering with Creatures* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2019), 1–20.

history of the Christian tradition, while some theologians (e.g., Francis of Assisi, Bonaventure, John Duns Scotus, Karl Rahner, Elizabeth Johnson, Sallie McFague, Denis Edwards, Andrew Linzey, Clair Linzey, etc.) have spoken about the value of animals as co-sharers in divine goodness and God's redemptive plan, their voices have tended to be overshadowed by dominant anthropocentric theologies and philosophies.[3] Likewise, Carol Adams refers to Christian patriarchal theology that ranks God, humans, and animals in such a progression, beastly theology. In this theology, animals have been assigned the identity of beasts—a derogatory term that contrasts them with humans and conveys that they are of lesser value.[4] This work aims to facilitate a conversation that reaches public ministry and promotes dialogue on how to rectify this unjust supposition about animals through a feminist lens.

While it is necessary to redress false claims about animals that have been produced by hierarchical and anthropocentric philosophies and theologies, I argue that it is equally important to provide a corrective framework that moves beyond recognizing animals' worth solely based on their capabilities to a more just acknowledgment of their worth. This essay aims to recover animals in our negative linguistic practices by appreciating their intrinsic worth based on their full participation in God's creative life and being fellow members of the community of creation.

I approach this essay by first discussing how language has failed to give justice to animals and their gifts. I will sketch out examples of animal metaphors that are universally used across cultures and ones that are prominent in the Filipino language. Second, I will argue that biases against animals in our language are reinforced by

[3] Elizabeth Johnson acknowledges that Christian faith tradition is not inherently "anti-ecological faith," the voice of eco-theology, however, had not fully registered in institutions until the latter part of the twentieth century. Thus, it is of great importance that this essay reinforces that animals are co-sharers in divine goodness. See Elizabeth A. Johnson, *Ask The Beasts: Darwin and the God of Love* (London: A&C Black, 2014), 3.

[4] Carol J. Adams, *Neither Man nor Beast: Feminism and the Defense of Animals* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), 175-176.

anthropocentric philosophical and theological traditions. A relevant philosophical and theological tradition that has shaped our view of animals is that of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas' theological tradition has its own hierarchical and anthropocentric limitations, but at the same time offers valuable insights into the divine goodness and worth of animals. This tension will be nuanced and weighed accordingly. Third, I will discuss the capacities of animals that have been denied or reduced by anthropocentric traditions through the lens of animal reciprocity. However, valuing animals for resembling human-centered abilities is still anthropocentric. Thus, feminist animal care, particularly *entangled empathy*, will be explored as an ethic of care that is affirmative of their value based on their wholeness and uniqueness. Lastly, I will propose naming as a counter-cultural practice against demeaning descriptions for animals in our language. Naming reverses the way we relate to animals by acknowledging their intrinsic worth and their relational capacities. Front and center of this essay is care as a co-constitutive act of humans and animals in recreating relationships within the community of creation.

Language Has Failed Animals

Speciesism is the unjust treatment of those who do not belong to a certain species.[5] It is the assumption that humans are superior to nonhuman creatures, a belief reproduced in language. Such can occur in the negative representation of animals in our everyday language. Robin Wall Kimmerer, an Indigenous botanist, notes, "In English, you are either a human or a thing."[6] This statement reveals the anthropocentric

[5] Oscar Horta, "What Is Speciesism?" *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics* 23, no. 3 (June 2010): 243–66, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-009-9205-2. Speciesism was coined by Richard Ryder in 1970 and popularized by Peter Singer in his book *Animal Liberation*. Singer believes that most humans are speciesists. He argues that "speciesists allow the interests of their own species to override the greater interests of members of other species." See Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation* (London: The Bodley Head, 2015), 9.

[6] Robin Wall Kimmerer, *Braiding Sweetgrass: Indigenous Wisdom, Scientific Knowledge and the Teachings of Plants*, 1st ed. (Minneapolis: Milkweed Editions, 2013), 56,

nature of language. Joan Dunayer, philosopher and animal rights advocate, points out that the standard pronoun usage *thingifies* animals that "obscure[s] their sentience, individuality and right to autonomy."[7] The pronoun "it" is for animals, the same pronoun for lamps, apples, coins, blankets, and inanimate objects. In Sharisse Kanet's survey of literature, "it" obscures the sentience and moral status of animals while sustaining the human-animal binary.[8] Carol Adams posits that "it" "erases the living, breathing nature of the animals and reifies their object status."[9] The reduction of animals to inanimate objects, represented by "it," is often linked to René Descartes' conception of animals being *automata* or machine-like beings. People who have had companion animals[10] for a while would say otherwise. Many animals exhibit intelligence, emotional awareness, and the ability to learn and adapt. Their intellect may differ from human intelligence, but it has the potential to accomplish unbelievable things.

EBSCOhost.

[7] Joan Dunayer, "On Speciesist Language," *On The Issues Magazine*, February 28, 1990. Dunayer's specific assignment of the term "*thingifies*" makes it evocative and powerful. It illustrates how animals have been subjugated in our language system, implying their subordinate position in our consciousness and the construction of knowledge.

[8] Sharisse Kanet, "Animal Pronouns Matter: The Importance of Language for Activism and Education," *Journal of Animal Ethics* 15, no. 2 (2025): 138-150, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/397312939_Animal_Pronouns_Matter_The_Importance_of_Language_for_Activism_and_Education.

[9] Carol J. Adams, *The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory (20th Anniversary Edition)* (New York: Continuum, 2010), 93.

[10] The term "companion animals" refers to domesticated animals, whether domestically bred or taken from the wild, that closely live with humans for psychological support, company, enjoyment, or work. See Maaten der Sterneberg-Van, T. D. Turner, J. Van Tilburg, and J. Vaarten, "Benefits and risks for people and livestock of keeping companion animals: searching for a healthy balance," *Journal of Comparative Pathology* 155, no. 1 (2016): S8-S17. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcpa.2015.06.007

Speciesism in language uses animal metaphors to inflict insult or shame on others.[11] Filipino idiomatic expressions like *asal hayop* (acting like an animal/beast) and *masahol pa sa hayop* (worse than an animal) demonstrate this reality. Similarly, speciesism is also evident in the use of animal behaviors or qualities that intend to shame or insult a person: *utak-biya* (brain of a fish), *balat kalabaw* (buffalo skin), and *bahag ang buntot* (tucked tail). Animal qualities are used to degrade the target individual or group by denying them human characteristics. In Sergei Klimenko's inventory of Tagalog animal metaphors, it is concluded that most of these words have negative connotations, estimated at 81%. The meanings attached to them reflect negative traits associated with humans.[12] Nick Haslam proposed that one way of dehumanizing a target individual or group is by likening them to animals and denying the target uniquely human qualities, which is called *animalistic dehumanization*.[13] Dehumanization that employs animal qualities or compares humans to animals is not only harmful to the human victim but also to the animals involved. Animals become linguistic instruments for projecting

[11] While some animal metaphors convey positive portrayals of animals and may cultivate emotional proximity with them, we are still challenged to move beyond treating animals primarily as metaphors. Simply regarding animals as metaphors can have ethical implications for how they are perceived and treated. This is further substantiated by Carol Adams' concept of the *absent referent*, discussed in the later section of this essay. Biblical animal imagery, for instance, often serves as a powerful theological device that conveys moral insight. However, we observe in the parabolic teaching of Jesus that animals are not only depicted as imagery but encountered as living beings worthy of care, concern, and moral consideration (e.g., the lost sheep).

[12] Sergei Klimenko, "Speaking about Humans in Animal Terms: Animal Metaphors in Tagalog" (unpublished manuscript, Department of Linguistics, University of the Philippines Diliman, 2009), 8-13, https://www.academia.edu/1872761/Speaking_About_Humans_in_Animal_Terms_Animal_Metaphors_in_Tagalog.

[13] Nick Haslam, "Dehumanization: An Integrative Review," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 10, no. 3 (July 22, 2006): 252–64, https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_4. The characteristics that Haslam believes are uniquely human are refinement, civility, morality, and higher cognition. I presume that these descriptors or standards originate from Aquinas' five criteria for humanity.

undesirable behaviors or qualities of humans. Another way animals are marginalized in language is by describing our relationship with them with hierarchical connotations. Humans who care for companion animals are called *pet owners*. Calling oneself "owner" implies hierarchy. Ownership, as a basis for the relationship between animals and humans, signifies that humans have a higher stature and animals are viewed as objects that are kept or collected. Animals are subjected to human supremacy and subordination.

The derogation of animals often intersects with gendered oppression. In some situations, animal metaphors contain sexism and speciesism that degrade women. Almudena Fernández-Fontecha and Rosa Jimenez-Catalan observed that in both English and Spanish, animal metaphors carry a more punctuated derogation toward women than men.[14] Zoubida Madani and colleagues found that animal metaphors in Algerian and Jordanian proverbs associate more negative connotations with women than with men, highlighting the prominence of men over women.[15]

In the Philippine context, in the survey of Francine Yvonne Dela Cruz of gender biases in Filipino gendered idiomatic expressions and slang, many of these rely on animal portrayals (e.g., *hipon, kulasisi, barako,* etc.). The expressions either glorify masculinity or reduce women to property and objects of sexualization.[16] Similarly, the word *kasta* (mating) in Filipino is a sexual expression for both genders; however,

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[14] Almudena Fernández-Fontecha and Rosa M. Jimenez-Catalan, "Semantic Derogation in Animal Metaphor: A Contrastive-cognitive Analysis of Two Male/Female Examples in English and Spanish," *Journal of Pragmatics* 35, no. 5 (March 25, 2003): 771–97, https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-2166(02)00127-3.

[15] Zoubida Madani, Nimer Abusalim, and Mohammad Rayyan, "Gender representation in animal-related proverbs: Algerian vs. Jordanian Arabic," *Frontiers in Sociology* 8 (June 8, 2023): 1-15. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2023.1145200.

[16] Francine Yvonne B. Dela Cruz, "*Siya nga ba'y* Gender Neutral?: A Preliminary Linguistic Analysis of the Genderedness of Filipino," *UP Working Papers in Linguistics* 2, no. 1 (2023): 107-108, https://linguistics.upd.edu.ph/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/13-Siya-nga-ba_y-Gender-Neutral.pdf.

women are called *pakasta*, which is a colloquial adjective synonymous with being sexually promiscuous. When *kasta* is associated with men, it is a compliment to their virility. Men in their inner circles would remark, *"marami na 'yang kinasta"* (he has slept around) to mean that the man is well-experienced in sex. There are animal metaphors that illustrate the roles of women, but have no counterparts for the roles of men. *Inahin [na baboy]* (hen pig) is used to stress motherhood or pregnancy, specifically women who have several children and can hardly prioritize themselves. Another one is the word *ahas* (snake) or *inahas* (the act) to describe a woman having an affair with a committed man. I cannot think of equivalent animal metaphors that depict men in a similar fashion. In Filipino fables, animals represent women's everyday domestic struggles amid men's more comfortable lives.[17]

Animal metaphors tend to have more weight when they are directed at women, reflecting forms of "benign sexism"[18] that sound complimentary but reinforce women's subordinate status. For instance, men in the Philippines describe physically attractive women as chicks (a young bird) or *chickababes* to connote desirability, but it simultaneously objectifies and sexualizes the receiver. These animal metaphors not only function as harmful descriptors for the identities and qualities of women, but they also aggravate the socially constructed roles and subordination of women.[19] They reflect how society expects women to

[17] Genevieve Jorolan Quintero and Connie Makgabo, "Animals as Representations of Female Domestic Roles in Selected Fables From the Philippines and South Africa," *Scholarship of Teaching and Learning in the South* 4, no. 1 (April 28, 2020): 42-47, https://doi.org/10.36615/sotls.v4i1.121.

[18] Nick Haslam, Steve Loughnan, and Pamela Sun, "Beastly: What Makes Animal Metaphors Offensive?" *Journal of Language and Social Psychology* 30, no. 3 (September 2011): 313, 320.

[19] Nasambu M. Barasa and Isaac N. Opande, "The Use of Animal Metaphors in the Representation of Women in Bukusu and Gusii Proverbs of Kenya," *The Journal of Pan African Studies* 10, no. 2 (2017): 91-105, https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/84671634/10.2-7-Barasa_201-libre.pdf?1650623902=&response-content-disposition=inline%3B+filename%3DThe_Use_of_Animal_Metaphors_in_the_Repre.pdf&Expires=1785196457&

perform domestic work, bear a child, and provide sexual satisfaction to men.

Language constructs power asymmetries.[20] The animal metaphors delineated earlier have layers of marginalization toward women and animals. Both women and animals are oppressed by patriarchy in language, among others. Words that mortify animals or caricature them as inferior to humans conveniently marginalize them. Vilifying language toward animals depicts them as monstrous and beastly. Biased and inaccurate media portrayals of animals have instilled fear and distrust in our minds. For instance, the American film Jaws has affected the public perception of sharks as marine "villains." Mary Midgley critiques society's antagonization of animals as vicious. Referring to the portrayal of sharks in Jaws, Midgley opposes their depiction as "conscious criminals," as if these creatures intend to harm people rather than simply acting according to their nature.[21]

Across cultures, animal metaphors convey hostile meanings that pertain to human deficits. Such words, references, idioms, and metaphors exacerbate the otherness of animals. Although we do not contemplate animal metaphors when we utter them, they deliver a message that animals and their qualities are not desirable, and conveniently use them to describe the worst in humans. We turn to animals as a vocabulary for incompetence, aggressiveness, promiscuity, abuse, and the list goes on. Sexist remarks with animal metaphors

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[20] Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power* (New York: Longman Inc., 1989), 3-4.

[21] David Midgley, ed., *The Essential Mary Midgley* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 45.

towards women amplify the entanglements between humans and animals, with women and animals instrumentalized by men to assert illusory power over both classifications. However, when we use this type of language, we overlook that animals become victims in the process. Joan Dunayer writes that animals are oppressed by speciesism in language, as women are by sexist language:

> Speciesist language has far from trivial consequences. Although nonhuman animals cannot discern the contempt in the words that disparage them, this contempt legitimates their oppression. Like sexist language, speciesist language fosters exploitation and abuse. As feminist philosopher Stephanie Ross (1981) has stated with regard to women, 'oppression does not require the awareness or co-operation of its victims.'[22]

Dunayer adds that the pejorative images we attach to animals do not accurately represent who they are.[23] She reasons that they are a projection of our bad traits onto innocent subjects, which widens the divide between animals and humans, further encouraging humans to perpetuate it without scrutiny.

> Every negative image of another species helps keep that species oppressed. Most such images are gross distortions. Nonhuman animals rarely possess the character traits that pejoratives assign to them. In reality the imputed traits are negative human traits between humans and animals that explicitly shape how we view and relate to animals… Why the lies, then? Why the contempt? With contemptuous words, humans establish and maintain emotional

[22] Joan Dunayer, "Sexist Words, Speciesist Roots," in *Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations*, ed. Carol J. Adams and Josephine Donovan (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), 17, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1198x6d.5.

[23] Dunayer, "Sexist Words," 17-18. Dunayer provides examples of how specific animals are not what humans have imagined them to be. Pigs are not as dirty as they are culturally portrayed. They keep their living space neat. Rats do not betray their kind, which is the opposite of the "ratting" description associated with people who are not trustworthy. Rats attend to the vulnerable members of their community. The defensive traits of chickens are to protect their young, which negates the cultural association of fierceness with young women.

> distance from other animals. This distance permits abuse without commensurate guilt. Humans blame their nonhuman victims. [24]

When animal metaphors are deliberately spoken to inflict pain or dehumanize others, it is assumed that they only harm human relationships. In reality, it also injures animals and humans' shared relationships with them. It reinforces their oppression and denies their dignity—leading to the aggravation of the distance between animals and us. This phenomenon is a serious threat to the harmony of all relationships within the ecological family. We should inquire why we exploit animals for the fractures in our humanity instead of confronting those fractures directly. Doing so exposes two limits: the limits of human language and human intellect. We have long claimed that these faculties set us apart from animals, yet they cannot function without drawing meanings from animals. Tragically, the meanings we choose are the cruel ones—those that turn animals into instruments of human insult and injury.

Anthropocentric Philosophical and Theological Traditions: Thomistic Scholarship

Many of the animal metaphors mentioned earlier most likely predate medieval anthropocentric philosophies and theologies. However, these metaphors are buttressed by those traditions. Anthropocentric philosophical and theological traditions, as a modality of discourse, have influenced our language. These traditions do not fully recognize the capabilities of animals proposed by contemporary animal studies. As a caveat, I want to emphasize that these anthropocentric philosophies and theologies were pre-modern scientific inventions, which is why they run contrary to the recent findings about animals. However, it is necessary to note that despite this, these traditions have shaped the different disciplines that inform our animal rhetoric. Thus, we still carry them in our consciousness, which flows into our linguistic orientation and moral agency. Andrew Linzey posits that Thomas Aquinas' theology, particularly his teachings on animals,

[24] Dunayer, "Sexist Words," 17-18.

remains influential in the Catholic tradition.[25] This section examines Aquinas' claims regarding animals centered on their lack of rationality, agency, fellowship, and moral standing. These have implications for the current moral valuation we associate with animals—visible in our linguistic violence toward them. Particularly, his assertion on animal instrumentalization is still intact in the Catechism of the Catholic Church. Simultaneously, this section seeks to recover Aquinas' theological affirmation of animals as sacramental and participants in the community of creation to challenge anthropocentrism.

Rationality

Thomas Aquinas' medieval thinking about animals was highly influenced by Aristotelian thought. Aristotle predominantly endorsed the hierarchical ordering of creatures, with humans occupying a higher rank than animals. He believed that every creature has a soul or form and characteristics that allow the body to function. The soul of plants makes them achieve nutritive function; the soul of animals enables them to perceive, move, and sense.[26] On the other hand, he justifies that only the soul of humans can think or reason.[27]

Aquinas' works *Summa Theologica* and *Summa Contra Gentiles* reveal his stance on human-animal relations. Aquinas believes that the primary distinction between humans and animals is humans' possession of an intellectual soul, "for an animal is such by its sensitive soul, while a man is a man by the intellectual soul," highlighting that rationality is not a feature of animals.[28]

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[25] Andrew Linzey, *Animal Theology* (University of Illinois Press, 1995), 12.

[26] Aristotle, *De Anima*, trans. J. A. Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931), 414a30–414b15.

[27] Aristotle, *De Anima*, 414b15–414b20.

[28] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, Ltd., 1913) I.76.3, https://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/1225-1274,_Thomas_Aquinas,_Summa_Theologiae_%5B1%5D,_EN.pdf#:~:text=Translated%20by%20Fathers%20of%20the,%E2%96%A0%20FIRST%20

This distinction Aquinas makes has implications for the relational and ontological belonging of creatures. Among all mortals, humans hold the highest position of governance over everything on earth, which gives humans the authority to utilize everything else below them. He expounds on Genesis 1:26 as the basis for human hierarchy. The hierarchy of cosmologies implied by Aquinas in his writing pertains to the designation of "mastership" or power to govern the *inferior*[29] one. Moreover, he also categorizes creatures as "perfect" and "imperfect". Those that are imperfect are for the use of the perfect. It is assumed that the consumption or utilization of the perfect or the imperfect is dictated by the same hierarchy associated with Aristotle. He articulates that humans, being endowed with God's image, should be masters over animals. Such a hierarchical stance rationalizes the subordination of animals, referring to them as *property*. Further, he says that this mastership is natural.[30] Daniel Horan remarks that the primacy of rationality as a defining attribute that distinguishes humans from animals has perpetuated superiority.[31]

Agency

In Aquinas' framework, rationality is a crucial aspect of the agency of animals, which for him they do not possess. Aquinas suggests that animals act out of instinct that is indicative of limited reason, which enables them to respond in obedience to humans. This is an important detail about his perspectives on animals. It delineates human intellect

PART&text=%E2%96%A0%20QUESTION%205.%20OF%20GOODNESS,7.%20THE%20INFINITY%20OF%20GOD

[29] Aquinas uses the term "inferior" to highlight the hierarchical relationships of creatures with one another. He argues that this system of order is divinely ordained. The one inferior is subject to the ruling of the one at a higher rank.

[30] Thomas Aquinas, *The Summa Theologica*, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947), I, q. 96, a. 1, ad 4. https://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/1225-1274,_Thomas_Aquinas,*Summa_Theologiae*%5B1%5D,_EN.pdf

[31] Daniel P. Horan, *All God's Creatures: A Theology of Creation* (Lanham, MD: Fortress Academic, 2018), 6.

from the instinctive responses of animals when they interact with fellow animals and humans alike.

> All animals by their natural instinct have a certain participation of prudence and reason: which accounts for the fact that cranes follow their leader, and bees obey their queen. So all animals would have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the present state some domestic animals obey him.[32]

It implies that animal instincts underpin the relationship between animals and humans, characterized by a command-obedience dynamic. For Aquinas, animals are capable of obeying their master, but not to the extent of exhibiting agency that equates with human rationality. Celia Deane-Drummond posits that Aquinas does not fully deny that animals possess some form of intelligence through sensory and impulse-oriented capacities. However, he does not render them the type of intelligence that enables them to internalize abstract truths and discern God. This makes them share likeness with God but not bear the "image" of God.[33] Horan, on the other hand, estimates that Aquinas has rendered animals a certain level of divine image through their possession of the goodness of God,34 which I am elaborating on in my retrieval of Aquinas' affirmation of animals.

Moral Standing and Fellowship

Due to Aquinas' belief that animals are not rational, humans are not morally culpable for killing them. His only concern about killing animals is that it might evoke violence toward humans.[35] Therefore,

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[32] Aquinas, *Summa Theologic*a, I, q. 96, a.1, ad 4.

[33] Celia Deane-Drummond, "God's Image And Likeness In Humans And Other Animals: Performative Soul-Making And Graced Nature," *Zygon*® 47, no. 4 (2012): 936-937, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9744.2012.01308.x.

[34] Horan, *All God's Creatures*, 116.

[35] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles: Book Three – Providence, Part II*, trans. Vernon J. Bourke, online edition at Isidore, III.II.112, 113, https://isidore.co/aquinas/ContraGentiles3b.htm#112.

animals are not part of Aquinas' imagined moral vocation of humans, as they do not have moral standing.[36] With this notion that animals are not moral subjects, he recognizes them as instruments for humans to attain their perfection. This means that they are to play a role in human subsistence, intellectual progress, and spiritual perfecting. Aquinas maintains that humans have the authority to utilize animals for food, clothing, and other material needs. The Catechism of the Catholic Church upholds this position on the use of animals for material needs.[37] Aquinas writes in *Summa Contra Gentiles*:

> In fact, man uses all kinds of things for his own advantage: some for food, others for clothing…because he can obtain food for himself from a variety of things. Other things he uses for transportation, since we find man the inferior of many animals in quickness of movement, and in the strength to do work; other animals being

[36] It is intriguing for many people when we associate moral standing with animals. Such an assertion may raise questions about whose life is more important, between a human being and an animal, in a scenario where only one can be saved. If we were to follow the traditional Western dualist ethical principle, human life would merit deliverance over animal life. Lois K. Daly takes on an ecofeminist stance and turns to the ethics of "reverence for life," articulated by Albert Schweitzer. The principle contends that there must be no dichotomy between the life of humans and that of other species: "The ethics of reverence for life makes no distinction between higher and lower, more precious and less precious lives." Schweitzer presumes that all living beings have the "will-to-live," or the drive to exist, which we must respect. However, Schweitzer acknowledges that in real life, one being may need to perish while another survives. To address this dilemma, we are left to our subjective discernment, guided by our conscience, and by "bear[ing] the responsibility for the life which is sacrificed." Lois K. Daly, "Feminism, Reverence for Life, and Feminist Theological Ethics," in *Liberating Life: Contemporary Approaches in Ecological Theology*, ed. Charles Birch, William Eaken, and Jay B. McDaniel (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1990), 86–110. The ethics of "reverence for life" cited here can be found in Albert Schweitzer, *The Teaching of Reverence for Life*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965); Albert Schweitzer, *Out of My Life and Thought: An Autobiography*, trans. C. T. Campion (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1949).

[37] John Paul II, *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 2nd ed (Washington, DC: United States Catholic Conference, 2000), sec. 2418, https://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM.

> provided, as it were, for his assistance. And, in addition to this, man uses all sense objects for the perfection of intellectual knowledge. Hence it is said of man in the Psalms (8:8) in a statement directed to God: 'You have subjected all things under his feet.'[38]

This stance offers a moral dilemma in our relationship with animals. It presupposes that animals are simply to fulfill our temporal needs. This ultimately raises questions about our consumption and utilization of animals for our ends. Andrew Linzey and Clair Linzey view the teaching of Aquinas on animals as anthropocentric, which culminates in the killing of animals for human use.[39] David Clough disputes the stance of Aquinas on nonhuman animals being "naturally enslaved" to humans, which leads to the killing of animals. Clough asserts that animals must be appreciated for their goodness as they participate in the Triune life.[40]

As illustrated, the relationship animals share with humans is instrumentality, not relationality. It implies that even if animals have a relationship with humans, it is not a profound communion that enriches both ends. On the question of whether we should extend charity to animals, Aquinas responds that "the love of charity extends to none but God and our neighbor. But the word neighbor cannot be extended to irrational creatures, since they have no fellowship with man in the rational life. Therefore, charity does not extend to irrational creatures."[41] This statement not only withholds charity for animals but also eliminates any form of fellowship or communion between animals

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[38] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles: Book Three – Providence,* trans. Vernon J. Bourke, online edition at Isidore, III.XXII.8, https://isidore.co/aquinas/ContraGentiles3a.htm#22.

[39] Andrew Linzey and Clair Linzey, "Introduction: Before Animal Theology," in *Animal Theologians*, ed. Andrew Linzey and Clair Linzey (New York: Oxford University Press, 2023; online ed., Oxford Academic, April 20, 2023), 5, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197655542.003.0001

[40] David L. Clough, *On Animals, vol. 2, Theological Ethics* (London: T&T Clark, 2019), 19.

[41] Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II-II. q 25. a 3.

and humans. Anatoly Angelo Aseneta expounds on Aquinas' position, stating that "charity" here refers to friendship. It is contended that animals cannot be in a state of friendship due to their irrationality.[42] Later, I will respond to this with empirical data on animal reciprocity and the framework of entangled empathy.

Retrieval of Thomistic Affirmation of Animals

Despite Aquinas' hierarchical valuation of animals, we find theological affirmations about them that can be retrieved. Elizabeth Johnson emphasizes Aquinas' view of creatures as participants in God's community of creation. In her analysis, God is alive "in all things" through God's dwelling in all things.[43] But the dwelling of God is magnified by the creaturely participation of all beings, including animals.[44] This gestures to the sacramental attribute of creation. This denotes the importance of animals in the theological imagination of Aquinas. It highlights the divine goodness that animals partake in as "every created good is good by participation in the One who is good by nature."[45]

Supporting the participation of animals in the community of creation as sacramental, Aseneta argues that this view of Aquinas must also be a strong reason for humans not to subject animals to cruelty.46 It also informs us of our divine duty to care for them and honor their intrinsic worth, regardless of whether or not they possess advanced levels of cognition. This theological affirmation of Aquinas—obscured by his Aristotelean pronouncements about animals—must take precedence over his hierarchical assertions. This theological thought can construct a promising moral posture for how

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[42] Anatoly Angelo R. Aseneta, "*Laudato Si*' on Non-Human Animals," *Journal of Moral Theology* 6, no. 2 (2017): 232.

[43] Johnson, *Ask The Beasts*, 147.

[44] Johnson, *Ask The Beasts*, 147.

[45] Johnson, *Ask The Beasts*, 149.

[46] Aseneta, *"Laudato Si,"* 231.

we should use language to describe animals and humans. Animals are co-participants, fellow members, and collectively a divine reflection of God's gratuitous love in God's community of creation.

Concluding Notes on Aquinas

Aquinas' perception of animals has placed them in a subordinating position and designated them an ancillary role. These explicitly outlined qualities within Aristotelian hierarchical ordering of beings have supported linguistic expressions that minimize or completely deny animals their true capacities. They insist on the superiority of humans and downplay the abilities of animals. The human-animal divide has widened by anthropocentric and hierarchical traditions like that of Aquinas. However, despite the shortcomings of his philosophical thought, we must retrieve the affirmative teachings of Aquinas about animals. These are instructive in reformulating how we perceive, interact with, and protect animals. Such a renewed understanding should flow into our linguistic practices.

Animal Relationality and Feminist Animal Care

Threads of hierarchical and dualistic Western thought, like that of Thomas Aquinas, have long denied or minimized the abilities of animals. This reality is evident in our linguistic practices. Contemporary animal studies challenge these assumptions. Thus, for this section, my task is to counter them and reclaim the capabilities of animals. I will draw on scholarship on animal reciprocity through the lens of feminist animal care that prioritizes embodied knowing and affective reciprocity with animals over a hierarchical and abstract manner of encountering them. This section argues that animal reciprocity[47] is

[47] Animal reciprocity or reciprocal altruism refers to the behavior of animals extending help to their fellow species or another with the expectation that it will be returned in the future. The concept was introduced by evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers in his 1971 paper, "The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism." See Robert L. Trivers, "The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism," *The Quarterly Review of Biology* 46, no. 1 (1971): 35-57, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2822435. Not all animals are preconditioned to perform reciprocal altruism due to the complex

an inherent capacity in animals that demonstrates cognition, agency, communication, and empathy.

This section requires a deep and relational understanding of animals, one that extends beyond a behaviorist analysis of their existence. Thus, I will incorporate my personal observations of Pancake,[48] my dog, and other animals to establish that animals are indeed capable of being in communion with humans. Their capacity to be in fellowship with us is not simply a product of instincts but of their multiple gifts.

Animal Reciprocity

While my dog Pancake and I were walking, I noticed a white bird with a seemingly injured wing. It attempted to flap its wings but struggled to lift itself off due to the left wing being stuck. Moments later, a black bird approached the wounded bird. I was scared that it might prey on the wounded one. It appeared that the injured bird was being pursued. However, the wounded one was being guided to find the momentum to fly. Soon, another bird landed, then two more. They began to circle the wounded bird, providing it with assistance. This moment showcased how animals can cooperate and work together

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cognitive abilities it requires. Species observed exhibiting it include primates, vampire bats, vervet monkeys, and various bird species. While pets or companion animals may not necessarily display an evolutionary form of reciprocal altruism in a strict sense due to their domestication, it is undeniable that they are capable of being altruistic through their emotional attunement and mutual care.

[48] In line with the theoretical shift in feminist animal care toward embodied and relational care for animals, close observations of animals are an important source of knowledge about human-animal relations. Thus, honoring autoethnography as a method for building knowledge about animals must be positively constructed in research. This, however, must be in conversation with scientific findings to validate, analyze, or challenge our observations. I illustrate this dialogical approach by supporting my personal observations of Pancake with empirical data on the abilities of animals to demonstrate reciprocity, emotional attument, and cognitive aptitude.

to survive and navigate their environment. It was a beautiful sight to behold that both Pancake and I witnessed.

Reciprocal altruism refers to evolutionary behavioral responses between non-kin beings that involve beneficial acts toward one another, with the expectation of future reciprocation.[49] This behavior is a fundamental aspect of animal cooperation. Reciprocity is argued to be uncommon among animals as it requires sophisticated cognitive abilities, and yet it can occur in long-term social bonds.[50] Furthermore, research indicates that while reciprocity demands advanced cognitive skills, it is not a single strategy; other strategies can also be explored.[51]

It is improbable for animals to engage in reciprocal relationships without some form of agency, communication, and cognition. Thus, animal reciprocity demonstrates their unique ability to interact with purpose and intention. Critics may contend that such behavior is merely a conditioned behavior or a product of evolutionary instinct. Frans de Waal has argued that primates and other species can exhibit empathy and that their actions are more than mechanical responses.[52] In a similar vein, Mark Rowlands posits that some animals may act out of moral consideration.[53] These behaviors imply intentionality, which cannot be reduced to instinct alone. In this context, intentionality is

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[49] Trivers, "The Evolution," 35.

[50] Esteban Freidin, Fabricio Carballo, and Mariana Bentosela, "Direct Reciprocity in Animals: The Roles of Bonding and Affective Processes," *International Journal of Psychology* 52, no. 2 (April 1, 2017) 163–70. doi:10.1002/ijop.12215.

[51] Manon K. Schweinfurth and Josep Call, "Reciprocity: Different behavioural strategies, cognitive mechanisms and psychological processes," *Learning & Behavior* 47, no. 4 (2019) 284-301, https://doi.org/10.3758/s13420-019-00394-5.

[52] Frans B.M. De Waal, "Putting the altruism back into altruism: the evolution of empathy," *Annu. Rev. Psychol.* 59, no. 1 (2008) 279-300, https://science.umd.edu/faculty/wilkinson/BIOL608W/deWaalAnnRevPsych2008.pdf.

[53] Mark Rowlands, *Can Animals Be Moral?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 7–14.

defined as a planned response to the situation that may or may not require complex problem solving. Simply put, it is when animals attain a goal. Intentionality is evident when animals solve problems, express their desires, and respond to changes in their environment. This form of intentionality is observable in Pancake. I am amazed at Pancake when she plans to retrieve her ball underneath the sofa or when she prefers sardines to meat. When she knows that our walk is about to end, she pulls me the other way so we can continue walking, or sits on the ground to prevent going home. I have seen videos of dogs and cats protecting babies or saving them from a sudden fall. These acts suggest that they are not just sensation-driven responses. They require a multi-step process of thinking. Animals can perform more than rudimentary tasks with self-awareness or intentional action. Donald Griffin, a zoologist, argues that animals are conscious and, as such, they experience mental images and are self-aware.[54] When I cry, Pancake approaches me and leans in. Although she does not fully understand my feelings, she seems aware that something is amiss. I find weight in my anecdotal observations of Pancake, but I wish to stress with caution that animal intentionality or even moral consideration (with emphasis on relationality with other species including humans) can be usurped by domestication. On the other hand, Donna Haraway observes that dog training can be a "positive bondage" in which dogs and humans develop a form of communication, and the former are trained to be in communi z on with humans in different settings.[55] Moreover, while training has gained various opinions, for Haraway, it is a complex and situated intervention that can enrich cohabitation between dogs and humans in the more-than-human world.

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[54] Donald Redfield Griffin, *The Question of Animal Awareness: Evolutionary Continuity of Mental Experience* (New York: The Rockefeller University Press, 1981), 21–32.

[55] Donna J. Haraway and Cary Wolfe, "The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness," in *Manifestly Haraway* (Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Scholarship Online, 2017), 137-145, https://doi.org/10.5749/minnesota/9780816650477.003.0002.

Relational reciprocity between companion animals and humans is well-established. Research shows that puppies develop attachment patterns toward their humans and respond differently to strangers.[56] Gazing is a powerful form of communication that conveys messages even without verbal cues. Dogs are also capable of this interaction. As dogs engage in mutual gaze with humans, it increases oxytocin levels in both, forming a strong interspecies bond.[57] This gaze is particularly observable when dogs maintain eye contact with their companions. Gregory Berns, a neuroscientist, explains the distinctiveness of dogs' social intelligence that presumes their empathy:

> The defining trait of dogs, therefore, is their interspecies social intelligence, an ability to intuit what humans and other animals are thinking. Wolves do this to hunt prey. But dogs evolved their social intelligence into living with other species instead of eating them. Dogs' great social intelligence means that they probably also have a high capacity for empathy.[58]

As suggested, the intelligence of dogs surpasses Western thought about animals with their ability to express empathy towards others. Moreover, it repudiates that they cannot be in fellowship and build a reciprocal relationship with humans.

Although more literature illustrates attachment patterns among dogs, some research supports that socio-cognitive abilities are also observable in cats as they interact with their caregivers.[59] Moreover,

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[56] József Topál et al., "Attachment to Humans: A Comparative Study on Hand-reared Wolves and Differently Socialized Dog Puppies," *Animal Behaviour* 70, no. 6 (November 8, 2005): 1367–75, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2005.03.025.

[57] Miho Nagasawa et al., "Oxytocin-gaze Positive Loop and the Coevolution of Human-dog Bonds," *Science* 348, no. 6232 (April 16, 2015): 333–36, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1261022.

[58] Gregory Berns, *How Dogs Love Us: A Neuroscientist and His Adopted Dog Decode the Canine Brain* (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013), 229.

[59] Kristyn R. Vitale, Alexandra C. Behnke, and Monique A.R. Udell, "Attachment Bonds Between Domestic Cats and Humans," *Current Biology* 29, no. 18 (September 1, 2019) R864–65, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2019.08.036.

research shows that cats have a functional understanding of human emotions,[60] which assists them in forming bonds with humans. Despite these examples being primarily about companion animals, wild animals also exhibit great abilities. Scientific studies prove that other animals like dolphins, elephants, and pigs are smart. For instance, chimpanzees are capable of communicating through sign language.[61] A study suggests that there is no difference in intelligence between wild and domestic animals of the same species.[62]

These empirical findings on animal capacities suggest that animals are gifted with a spectrum[63] of cognitive, emotional, and relational capacities. In the same vein, it is also noteworthy to acknowledge how these animal behaviors and abilities are in dialogue with our existential realities. It denotes that human-animal relations extend beyond a capacity-based relationship—one that honors fellowship and mutuality.

Jacques Derrida offers a deeply personal reflection that sheds light on this dynamic. Recounting an experience of being naked before his cat, he questions the strict and normative divide between humans and animals.[64] He states that the animal gaze motivates humans to introspect

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[60] Angelo Quaranta, Serenella d'Ingeo, Rosaria Amoruso, and Marcello Siniscalchi, "Emotion Recognition in Cats," *Animals*, 10, no. 7 (June 28, 2020): 6-10, https://doi.org/10.3390/ani10071107

[61] Mary Lee Abshire Jensvold, Kailie Dombrausky, and Emily Collins, "Sign Language Studies with Chimpanzees in Sanctuary," *Animals* 13, no. 22 (2023): 1-20, https://doi.org/10.3390/ani13223486.

[62] Vitor Hugo Bessa Ferreira et al., "Are Domesticated Animals Dumber than their Wild Relatives? A Comprehensive Review on the Domestication Effects on Animal Cognitive Performance," *Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews* 154 (2023): 1-14, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105407.

[63] I emphasize the term "spectrum" as animals' abilities are not homogeneous. There are animals whose abilities are more complex, while others lean more on simpler abilities. This is the reason why respect for animals must not rely on capacities; their worth is not determined by what they can do.

[64] Jacques Derrida, *The Animal That Therefore I Am* (Fordham Univ Press, 2008), 5.

and acknowledge the subjectivity of animals. Derrida's compelling experience of being gazed at by his cat disrupts Jacques Lacan's theory of reaction and response. Lacan argues that animals can only react through their instincts and are incapable of responding due to the lack of a language system and symbolic order. Derrida rejects complicity in philosophical ideas that maintain animal passivity, as animals are more than mechanically configured beings. Animals can make one aware of their vulnerabilities and truths. Derrida invites us to attune to animal responses and discern how these might involve signals expressing that they see us from their own world. Perhaps, they, too, have something to tell us if we learn to practice intimate observation, listening, and openness. Furthermore, reciprocity with animals does not always mean interpreting how they respond to us but examining how we respond to their presence.

Animal reciprocity provides us with a lens into the wide spectrum of animal capabilities. It challenges the anthropocentric assumptions of Western philosophical and theological traditions that deny them these capacities. Grounding their worth in human-like qualities reproduces anthropocentrism. Lori Gruen argues that simply depending on human-like qualities of animals for us to respect them is anthropocentric (arrogant anthropocentricism).[65] While it is vital to redress our reduction of animals into passive and unintelligible beings, it is equally important to respect them in their fullness as co-participants in God's creative life. By embracing them as our fellow members in God's community of creation, we are drawn into a deeper and more authentic communion with them.

Feminist Animal Care and Entagled Empathy

Medieval theologians like Aquinas consider intellect and morality as the defining traits that distinguish humans from animals. Thus,

[65] Arrogant anthropocentrism is the belief that glorifies humans as the center and basis of worth because of their superior traits. Lori Gruen, *Entangled Empathy: An Alternative Ethic for Our Relationships with Animals* (Woodstock, NY: Lantern Books, 2015), 24.

regarding animals as moral subjects disturbs the long-held position on hierarchy and primacy of humans over animals and other species. Feminist animal care theory[66] directly responds to theological and rationalist traditions that do not fully recognize our fellowship with animals as an ethic of care, particularly our emotional fellowship with them. Josephine Donovan argues that the agenda of utilitarian animal rights scholars (e.g., Peter Singer) fighting for animal rights has its own merit, and yet she urges that "it is also possible indeed, necessary to ground that ethic in an emotional and spiritual conversation with nonhuman life-form"67 to underscore that relationality on the basis of affective domains can also be a valuable point for departure. Donovan calls for forging a relationship with animals that is founded in empathy and care as a basis for protecting them, not one based only on abstraction and calculation. Sentimentalism and emotionalism are attachments that are not fully acknowledged in the male-dominant animal rights strand. However, feminist theorists of animal ethics argue that forming emotional bonds with animals through care and fellowship can be more impactful and beneficial for them. Mary Midgley remarks that animals show "social and emotional complexity of the kind which is expressed by the formation of deep, subtle and lasting relationships."[68] Feminist animal care shifts the focus from rights to relationships, which is more lasting and capable of fostering genuine care from humans. Donovan also reimagines animals as interlocutors within feminist standpoint theory, implying that, like women, they embody situated knowledge of oppression and marginalization. To defend their incapacity to articulate their oppression due to the absence

[66] Feminist animal care contrasts with utilitarian animal rights theory by advocating for animal ethics grounded in emotional fellowship, relational care, and the intricate interconnections between humans and animals. Carol J. Adams and Josephine Donovan are the prominent proponents of this theory. See Josephine Donovan and Carol J. Adams, *Beyond Animal Rights: A Feminist Caring Ethic for the Treatment of Animals* (London: Burns & Oates, 1996).

[67] Josephine Donovan, "Animal Rights and Feminist Theory," *Signs* 15, no. 2 (January 1, 1990): 375, https://doi.org/10.1086/494588.

[68] Donovan, "Animal Rights," 351.

of language as posited by earlier philosophical trends, Donovan opines that humans should learn to understand animal language.[69] Carol Adams pushes the boundaries of reimagining animals within our linguistic and moral particularities, suggesting: "What if trying to have a conversation with an animal is like trying to have a conversation with God? Would we then bring a discipline of attending to our relationships with animals?"[70] These questions are cogent, asking whether animals are any less worthy of receiving moral consideration than God or our fellow humans. Further, within this theological paradigm, animals must necessarily be conceived in association with God as a means of grounding such respect.

One specific framework within the feminist animal care theory is entangled empathy, developed by feminist ethicist Lori Gruen. Entangled empathy is a strand of care that integrates affect and cognition, in which humans understand the diverse needs, feelings, desires, and circumstances of particular animals. It fosters a sense of empathic awareness and reflection of the other while recognizing the existing ethical and experiential differences between humans

[69] Josephine Donovan suggests understanding animals through "analogy based on homology" by reading the body responses of animals and imagining how they would feel being in the same situation. For instance, she explains, "If that dog is yelping, whining, leaping about, licking an open cut, and since if I had an open wound I know I would similarly be (or feeling like) crying and moving about anxiously because of the pain, I therefore conclude that the animal is experiencing the same kind of pain as I would and is expressing distress about it. One imagines, in short, how the animal is feeling based on how one would feel in a similar situation." See Josephine Donovan, "Feminism and the Treatment of Animals: From Care to Dialogue," *Signs* 31, no. 2 (January 1, 2006): 321-322, https://doi.org/10.1086/491750.

[70] Carol Adams redresses "beastly theologies" through "second-person theologies," which shift the position of animals in theological discourse from objects to subjects, from metaphors (of what human beings are not) to embodied beings, and from the "absent referent"—the linguistic and material displacement of animals that obscures their suffering (e.g., the transformation of cows into beef and pigs into pork)—to a recognition of their real, fleshly existence. See Adams, *Neither Man nor Beast*, 192.

and animals.[71] Entangled empathy is not simply imagining ourselves in the position of specific animals but realizing that we have been in relationships with animals through our shared lives, motivating us to respond to them according to their specific design.[72] As we attune to the complex behaviors of companion animals or animals in general, we may notice habits or expressions that our limited minds cannot easily grasp. Gruen acknowledges this challenge of not fully comprehending every act they perform, and perhaps they experience the same uncertainty about us. This gap is a great opportunity to be in the liminality of not knowing while still being respectful of them. The lack of understanding on our part should not discourage us from caring for them and creating moments of continuing to learn about them, always in the context of respect for differences and a desire to relate empathetically. Gruen advises that we may not fully access the mystery of their being, but we can somehow be in the space of embracing their nature as they are.[73]

For feminist animal scholars, our relationship with animals is always situated and complex. For instance, Carol Adams observes that personhood and special care are easily extended to companion animals but not to farm animals.74 Currently, there is a pronounced disparity in the care given to traditional pet animals and non-traditional pet animals. Based on a study on Chinese pet owners, traditional pets (i.e., dogs and cats) are perceived to have higher moral standing than non-traditional

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[71] Lori Gruen, "*Animal Ethics: Figuring Out What Is Right and Wrong*," *Brooks Institute for Animal Rights,* https://thebrooksinstitute.org/sites/default/files/article/2023-09/Animal%20Ethics%20-%20Figuring%20Out%20What%20Is%20Right%20and%20Wrong%20by%20Lori%20Gruen.pdf (accessed February 1, 2026) 39–40.

[72] Myisha Cherry, "What an [En]Tangled Web We Weave: Emotions, Motivation, and Rethinking Us and the 'Other,'" *Hypatia* 32, no. 2 (March 2019, 2017): 440, https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12325.

[73] Gruen, *Animal Ethics*, 40-41.

[74] Adams, *Neither Man nor Beast*, 39.

pets.[75] This has serious implications for how animals continue to be exploited in capitalist industries (e.g., meat industry, pharmaceuticals, fashion industry, sports, etc.). Their suffering is often shrouded by the phenomenon of absent referent or the systemic obscuring of animal pain by transforming animals into consumable products.[76] Entangled empathy is instructive because it places care within the framework of relationality and stimulates awareness of animal suffering obscured by oppresive systems.[77] In this framework, compassion for animals is an integral ethical concern for all types of animals that may begin with the animals near us, then broaden subsequently. Drawn from Gruen's friendship with Emma, a chimpanzee, it is shown that providing care to the animals in our proximity can unlock empathy for other animals:

> Once one's perception is altered, other relations move to the foreground. Entangled empathy can occur with those who are more distant. We are in relationships of all kinds with many, many animals and we may never have the opportunity to meet them or look them into their eyes. But once we are attuned to some of them, as

[75] Kepeng Xu et al., "Traditional Pettism: The Influence of Pet Ownership Status, Pet Type, and Pet Properties on Pet Moral Standing," *Acta Psychologica Sinica* 55, no. 10 (January 1, 2023): 9-10, https://doi.org/10.3724/sp.j.1041.2023.01662.

[76] As mentioned in footnote n.70, the absent referent hides the immense suffering of animals. For instance, the meat industry deliberately conceals their suffering as animals as they are transformed into linguistic metaphors (e.g., beef, pork, steak, sausage) to obscure the horrendous pains they undergo. They are served to us as meat, but we fail to acknowledge that we consume real animals—flesh and blood—who once lived with us and were overwhelmed by fear as they faced their death. This systemic obscuring of animals and their suffering buries the reality that the satiation of the palate is at the expense of animals. Adams writes, "The absent referent permits us to forget about the animal as an independent entity; it also enables us to resist efforts to make animals present." Adams, *Neither Man nor Beast*, 192.

[77] Animal exploitation is a vast and complex ethical issue. As an ethical framework, entangled empathy may be criticized for its seemingly localized approach. However, I contend that this ethics of care can be transformative when adopted as a paradigm for moral consideration and lifestyle choices.

> I became attuned to chimpanzees, we can begin to understand our relationships with and responsibilities to many others differently.[78]

Feminist animal care reorients our perspectives on why we must care for animals. It does not ask if animals are as intelligent as humans. It urges us to value animals because they are part of our community, existence, and belonging. Donna Haraway discusses the relationship between companion animals and humans, referring to it as "co-constitutive" and "co-evolution," gesturing to the fact that animals and humans have historically shaped each other's lives.[79] In the same light, companion animals shape our lifestyles, emotions, ways of thinking, and other facets of our being, just as we also participate in their lives.

Naming: Restoring Animals in our Anthropocentric Language

To mitigate our systemic subjugation of animals in our language, reinforced by hierarchical and anthropocentric philosophies and theologies, we should recognize their fullness and participation in God's creative life. For this reason, I aim to offer a pastoral intervention to restore the image and dignity of animals in our linguistic meaning-making. I propose the concept of naming as an intervention that resonates with the vision of Laudato Si' toward universal communion and in alignment with feminist animal care.

While watching a TikTok video, a woman addressed her dog, "Jefferson." I could not help but burst into laughter. In the Filipino context, Jefferson is undeniably a human name that no one would

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[78] Gruen, *Entangled Empathy*, 79. Caring for companion animals can be an impetus for greater empathy for all animals, which may lead to a lifestyle change and animal welfare activism. See, for example, Catherine E. Amiot, Christophe Gagné, and Brock Bastian, "Exploring the Role of Our Contacts with Pets in Broadening Concerns for Animals, Nature, and Fellow Humans: A Representative Study," *Scientific Reports* 13, no. 1 (October 10, 2023): 1-11, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-43680-z.

[79] Donna Jeanne Haraway, *The Companion Species Manifesto : Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness* (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003), 32.

give their companion animal. It was indeed amusing, but it provided me with insights into the significance of naming in human-animal companionship. Naming companion animals with human-associated names impresses upon the fact that the companion animal is considered a living being, with personality and unique attributes. It removes the category of the animal from being treated as an object to being seen as a being with dignity and life. This resonates with Joan Dunayer's claim that "every sentient being is a someone, not a something."[80] Similarly, when Jane Goodall observed chimpanzees in Gombe, she named them David Greybeard, Flo, Goliath, and Frodo, believing that they were not simply data for her research but individuals. In an event, she shared the importance of naming in acknowledging animal individualities, "Every animal has an individuality just like every human being, and without a name the individuality kind of fizzles away."[81] Her bold move was not the norm in the academy at that time, as research subjects, such as animals, had to be assigned numbers to maintain objectivity and impartiality. And yet, she paved the way for a more relational research approach with animals that ethologists practice today. Naming is imperative; it recognizes the life within the animal. Calling them by name somehow animates relationality with them, grounded in respect and care for their existence beyond our anthropocentric assumptions. In line with the reframing of animals, Martha Nussbaum asserts that animals possess intrinsic worth that merits them justice.[82] This

[80] Joan Dunayer, "On Speciesist Language," 2.

[81] College Tour, "Jane Goodall on naming animals during her research," YouTube video, February 5, 2016, 1:30 to 1:37, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Td-a7FcCfm4.

[82] Martha Nussbaum's *Capabilities Approach* is an extension of Amartya Sen's theory of development. Nussbaum posits that each person, endowed with dignity, must flourish in society according to their capabilities. She expands this theory by including animals in her framework. She notes that animals have species-specific capabilities. Her framework demands protecting the dignity of animals as moral subjects. See Martha C. Nussbaum, "The Moral Status of Animals," *The Chronicle of Higher Education* 52, no. 22 (February 3, 2006): B6-B-8. Lori Gruen expounded on the list of capabilities of animals that Martha Nussbaum developed with the following: 1) Life – animals are entitled to life even without a "conscious interest."

proposition is an invitation to consider animals as subjects of moral concern whose existence provides us with illuminating insights.

In Genesis 2, the first man was granted the privilege of naming all the animals in the Garden of Eden: "The man gave names to all the tame animals, all the birds of the air, and all the wild animals" (Gn 2:20). Departing from the traditional illustration of naming as an exercise of power and authority, Arthur Walker-Jones takes on a more relational perspective. Walker-Jones claims that naming implies a kinship between animals and humans in which animals "share practical wisdom and knowledge that is essential to humans in maturing and fulfilling their purpose."[83] This may seem to suggest that animals are portrayed as instruments of human vocation, but it implies a balance between pragmatism and reciprocity. It suggests that animals possess wisdom and knowledge that are vital to human flourishing and growth. Animals, therefore, are not alienated from knowledge production and world-making. They are not mere motivators for humans to perfect their morality based on pain or brutality, but animals extend their charity by allowing humans to gain insights from their presence. In this light, animals are transformed as co-sharers in divine wisdom and design. This also reflects in God's vision of salvation. In the

2) Bodily Health – animals need to receive proper nutrition and hydration suited to their bodily needs, and to be defended from any threats of abandonment or cruelty. 3) Bodily Integrity – animals must live a life free from abuse, violence, threats to their safety, or any form of suffering. 4) Senses, Imagination, and Thought – animals are entitled to be provided an environment where they can freely tap into their capacity to make choices, communicate, and be themselves, without constricting their natural abilities. 5) Emotions – animals must first and foremost be acknowledged as sentient beings and thus have freedom to form bonds with other beings through love and care. 6) Practical Reason – animals must be given opportunities to apply their cognition to activities they deem appropriate for their enrichment. 7) Play – animals are entitled to evolve in an environment where they can be with their fellow species while enjoying freedom. See Gruen, *Animal Ethics*, 36–37.

[83] Arthur Walker-Jones, "Naming the Human Animal: Genesis 1–3 and Other Animals in Human Becoming," *Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science* 52, no. 4 (2017): 1005–28, https://doi.org/10.1111/zygo.12375.

account of the Great Flood, God included all creatures in the saving plan: "I will remember my covenant between me and you and every living creature—every mortal being—so that the waters will never again become a flood to destroy every mortal being" (Gn 9:15). Being incorporated into the community of God, they, too, are promised God's protection and love. Christopher Steck argues that nonhuman creatures participate in the Trinitarian life and are promised redemption by virtue of their relationality with God and their fellow creatures and the goodness they possess; God embraces nonhuman creatures in their unique identity and finitude; and God plays a principal role in the completion and fulfillment of their life.[84]

Shannon Craigo-Snell explains that from a feminist theological perspective, naming is an important act of liberation for women who have been "restricted from the powerful place of naming and subjugated into the space of either being named or living in a reality that has been named by others."[85] Although women have participated in naming, for instance, naming their children, the authority of naming has been dominated by men. Even in contemporary contexts, women are excluded from being acknowledged for their inventions and discoveries. Extending this to human-animal relationships, naming affirms the dignity of animals while simultaneously enabling women to exercise their agency in initiating a reciprocal relationship. The feminist reframing of naming, however, does not condone possessive

[84] Although Steck is convinced that nonhuman creatures are part of God's redemptive plan, he objects to the claim that nonhuman creatures will have the same experience of resurrection, given the differing capacities of nonhuman creatures (e.g., consciousness, sensation, and affect). He posits: "[Due to the] variety of creaturely capacities, it is hard to imagine the eschatological life of all animals simply in terms of the resurrection of each and every one of them… My argument is not that all creatures will share in a resurrection similar to ours (though I am not excluding the possibility), but only that we can hope that at least some of them will." See Christopher Steck, *All God's Animals: A Catholic Theological Framework for Animal Ethics* (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2019), 124.

[85] Shannon Craigo-Snell, "Feminist Theology, Plant Names, and Power," *Religions* 10, no. 3 (2019): 5. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10030184.

or consumerist forms of animal companionship. Rather, it calls for a relationship that is sensitive to the animal's autonomy and well-being. Naming calls for stewardship anchored in divine communion. By naming an animal, a sense of personhood or being is acknowledged, as if blessing them.

This act plants a seed of respect and honor. While naming does not automatically eliminate the potential for abuse, it encourages a more personal relationship rooted in relationality. Jesus illustrates this intimate relationship in the parable of the Good Shepherd, where the shepherd calls the sheep by name. The shepherd "calls his own sheep by name and leads them out" (Jn 10:3). Calling animals by name can change our perspective on them. They become part of our family, home, and priorities. Naming, therefore, animates love, not in a romanticized sense, but a love that empowers human companions to suffer with, empathize with, and become with their companion animals. This love can only arise from a love grounded in God's love, as Jesus echoed in the Gospel: "No one has greater love than this, to lay down one's life for one's friends" (Jn 15:13).

Conclusion

In this essay, I have argued that anthropocentric understanding of animals also influences our language. Animals are reduced to the pronoun "it," categorizing them as objects—devoid of agency, emotions, cognition, and communication. This grammar convention has been reinforced by anthropocentric philosophical and theological traditions. Moreover, across cultures, animals are often instrumentalized as a means of conveying negative messages to insult and oppress humans, as well as other animal species. Those demeaning expressions reflect how little value we give to them. In the same chain of oppression, women, more than men, become targets of crueler animal metaphors. This phenomenon entangles animals and women in multi-layered oppression. To trace how these metaphors are legitimized and reinforced by philosophical and theological traditions, I examined Thomas Aquinas' claims regarding animal rationality, agency, fellowship, and moral standing. These claims have contributed to the hierarchical

understanding of human-animal relations. Notwithstanding his claims, Aquinas recognizes the sacramental attribute of animals and their participation in God's community of creation.

I proposed animal reciprocity through the lens of feminist animal care to counter the false claims about animals' abilities. Animal reciprocity sheds light on the capacities of animals to form reciprocal relationships with their fellow species and humans. While we rectify the unjust claims of philosophical and theological traditions about the lack of capacities of animals, it is worthwhile to embrace animals beyond these human-centered measures by respecting them because of their worth. This paradigm can redirect our attention to the wholeness of each animal in our shared environments. Entangled empathy, as an ethic of care, exposes the suffering of animals through attentiveness to their lived experiences. In this light, we are challenged to listen and encounter animals by responding to their suffering.

Lastly, to end with a pastoral intervention, I turned to the concept of naming to allude to the relationality between animals and humans—consistent with the vision of *Laudato Si'* toward universal communion. Through naming, the intrinsic worth of animals is restored in our communicative devices, while simultaneously enabling women to exercise their agency in the spirit of stewardship. Contrary to hierarchical Western thought, they are not mere "it", created to simply serve human ends. By naming, our perception of animals is transcended as we acknowledge their integrity as participants in God's community of creation. They are beings with intrinsic worth—co-sharers in God's creative design—capable of communing with all members of the community of creation.

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Landas 38:2 (2026) 37–67

THE ROLE OF THE COSMIC CHRIST IN GOD'S UNIVERSAL SALVIFIC PLAN: AN ASSESSMENT OF MICHAEL AMALADOSS' CHRISTOLOGY[1]

Manuel V. Francisco, SJ

Abstract. This paper examines the Christology of Michael Amaladoss, particularly his understanding of the Cosmic Christ within God's universal salvific plan. Situating Amaladoss within the context of Indian contextual theology and religious pluralism, the study explores his use of Advaitic philosophy, symbolic hermeneutics, and dialogical theology in articulating the relationship between Christianity and other religions. Amaladoss argues that God's salvific activity extends beyond the historical Christ-event and is mediated through diverse religious traditions, which function as authentic paths of divine-human encounter. Central to his theology is the distinction, without separation, between the historical Jesus and the Cosmic Christ, whose universal presence transcends yet includes the incarnation. The paper critically assesses the theological implications of this position in relation to Chalcedonian Christology, Vatican II, and *Dominus Iesus*. While recognizing Amaladoss' contribution to interreligious dialogue and contextual theology, the study questions whether his framework sufficiently preserves the unity of the one economy of salvation in Jesus Christ.

[1] GenAI Disclosure Statement. No generative AI technologies were used in the writing or research process of this paper.

Keywords: Cosmic Christ, Michael Amaladoss, religious pluralism, contextual theology, universal salvation

Doing Contextual Theology in India Today

Amaladoss explains that the Christian theological enterprise does not consist in repeating past faith interpretations and formulations articulated in the language and culture of Western Europe, but reinterpreting the deposit of Revelation in language that is intelligible to present cultural contexts.[2]

Contextual theology arises out of present experience and the questions they elicit, which are reflected upon through the lenses of a religious tradition, which in turn is challenged by contemporary experiences and questions. This theological-pastoral cycle is completed when reflection leads to the discernment of the course of action, which after implementation is submitted once again to the never-ending cycle of experience-reflection-discernment-action. Academicians, who are part of and not apart from the faith community, articulate the thoughts and sentiments of the community seeking expression and clarification.[3]

An important consequence of contextual theology is that theologies will be plural and diverse. Different epochs, different cultures, and Christians of varying social locations will raise different questions. The same set of primary religious symbols, such as the

[2] Michael Amaladoss is an Asian-Indian (as he would like to be called) Jesuit theologian, who has published thirty-six books in English and over five thousand articles. See Enrico Beltramini, *Michael Amaladoss and the Quest for Indian Theology* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2024), Foreword (ix), Acknowledgments (xiii-xiv) and Premise (xix-xx).

[3] Michael Amaladoss, "From Experience to Theology: Methodological Explorations," *Vidyajyoti Journal of Theological Reflection* 61 (1997): 372. See also Amaladoss, "An Emerging Indian Theology: Some Exploratory Reflections (Part I)," *Vidyajyoti Journal of Theological Reflection* 58 (1994): 474-75.

Kingdom of God or the Eucharistic banquet, may be appropriated and may evoke different nuanced meanings for different local communities.[4]

Contextual theology makes use of the social sciences as tools for analyzing society. But against the reductionist economic or psychological analysis of Marxist or Freudian frameworks respectively, Amaladoss proposes an integral analysis that covers the economic-political, the personal-social and the cultural-religious dimensions of Indian society.[5] While proposing economic or political plans is not the domain of theology, the theological enterprise can and should critique economic, political and cultural systems and structures, and "can directly influence culture, its worldview and value-system on the one hand, and on the other, motivate and inspire people to commit themselves to promote change."[6] Theologizing in India, aided by the fruits of an integral analysis, will hopefully lead to insights relevant to the struggles of Indian society with regard, for instance, to the caste system and the plight of the Dalits, the oppression of women, the tendency of the Indian State towards communalism, and the negative impact of globalization, themes about which Amaladoss has written extensively.

Indian society is characterized by its religious and cultural diversity—Hindu, Buddhist, Jainist, Muslim, Christian and others. Amaladoss clarifies that the starting point for theologizing within the Indian context of religious plurality is not an abstract comparison of religions, but reflection on the proclamation of Jesus Christ amidst religious diversity.[7] He maintains that

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[4] Michael Amaladoss, *Beyond Inculturation: Can the Many Be One?* (Noida: Vidyajyoti Education & Welfare Society/ISPCK, 1988), 99.

[5] Ibid., 58-63.

[6] Amaladoss, "From Experience to Theology," 378.

[7] Michael Amaladoss, "Pluralism of Religions and the Proclamation of Jesus Christ in the Context of Asia," in *Proceedings of the Fifty-Sixth Annual Convention*, ed. Richard Sparks (Milwaukee: The Catholic Theological Society of America, 2001), 1.

> people are saved not only in spite of, but in and through their religions, because God has been reaching out to them in the context of their life, community and history. This realization is not so much the conclusion of an argument, but is born out of a living experience of other believers.[8]

Amaladoss identifies the theological problem as the task of reconciling the intuition of many Christians regarding the possibility of salvation of non-Christians in and through their respective religions without undermining Christianity's faith in Christ as universal savior. The appropriate method is not an *a priori* approach, a theology from above that proceeds from dogmas by which other religions are evaluated and judged, but a dialogical approach.

> We are not starting from our self-understanding as Christians and our beliefs about means of salvation and from this point of view judge from the outside ... the other religions and their role in the history of salvation. Our approach will be dialogical. We listen to the other believers, be challenged by their faith and life. Even if we are not actually dialoguing with them, we have to be present to them in mind and imagination as we reflect on the meaning, for our faith, of this multi-religious situation.[9]

Amaladoss cautions against making judgments about non-Christians prior to listening, learning and being challenged by them.10 This does not mean that he recommends that we bracket our Christian faith perspective in dialoguing with non-Christians, for hermeneutically, we cannot detach ourselves from our particular perspective. We cannot interpret any reality from an Archimedean ahistorical point of view.

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[8] Michael Amaladoss, "The Pluralism of Religions and the Significance of Christ," *East Asian Pastoral Review*, no. 3 & 4 (1989): 276. Hereafter "Significance of Christ."

[9] Ibid., 278.

[10] Ibid., 278-280; 290. Cf. also Michael Amaladoss, "The Mystery of Christ and Other Religions: An Indian Perspective," *Vidyajyoti Journal of Theological Reflection* 63 (1999): 327-328; 335, 337-338. Hereafter "Mystery of Christ."

We interpret reality inescapably from the perspective of our cultural location and faith commitment.

The work of dialoguing with adherents of other religions is not to accomplish a comparative study of religions. The objective is not to formulate

> an abstract universal scheme that will somehow unify all religions…. We are searching to make place for other believers in the perspective of our own faith, while respecting the identities of others without somehow reducing them to or interpreting them in terms of our own.[11]

The Symbolic Nature of All Religions

Amaladoss defines religion as "a symbolic structure that mediates a living relationship between the person/community and the Absolute."[12] Religions are encounters between human beings-in-community and the divine. While the phenomenological study of religions tends to reduce religions to systems of doctrines, rituals, and norms for behavior, he explains that religions are essentially saving relationships between God and human persons. Religions are systematized human responses to the divine initiative and invitations to ultimate human fulfillment. Second, in contrast to the Roman Catholic Church's tendency to view non-Christian religions as deficient human searches for the divine, religions are simultaneously varied manifestations of the divine reaching out to human beings. Third, the diversity of religions is the outcome of the interplay of the creative freedom of God who discloses God's self in a multiplicity of manners and the freedom of human beings who respond in a multiplicity of ways. "Pluralism of religions is then seen primarily as a pluralism of relationships."[13] Fourth, God reaches out to all peoples in the context of their culture and history. God, in God's

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[11] Amaladoss, "Significance of Christ," 279. Emphasis by the author.

[12] Michael Amaladoss, *Making All Things New* (Anand, Gujarat: Gujarat Sahitya Prakash, 1990), 232.

[13] Ibid.

desire to encounter human beings, adapts God's self to the ontological structures of human beings and the ontological conditions for human knowledge—corporeality, linguistic and cultural-situatedness, and historicity. God takes the human situation seriously, so that God manifests God's self to human beings in ways and means that human beings might perceive, encounter and come to know and be drawn to God. All religions, insofar as they are various expressions of God reaching out to peoples, are to some extent incarnational.

Despite the plurality of religions, Amaladoss underlines the unity and universality of the Word of God manifested in various religions in various ways: "the manifestation and understanding of the Word, which is fullness itself, may only be partial and limited in Christianity, in its pilgrim state, conditioned by history and culture."[14] Moreover, this diversity of religions is integrated within the one economy of salvation that God has for the world. We must clarify, though, that his claim about the universal salvific will of God is a theological assertion that, while not being open to demonstration, is a presupposition expressive of the religious ethos of modern Christianity.

While revelation is God's Self-communication to people of various cultures in various ways, faith is the personal response to the divine initiative. One's personal divine-human encounter is mediated by the systematized faith of the community to which one belongs; at the same time, one's faith response nourishes the faith of the community. He contends that insofar as all religions mediate a divine-human encounter, comparing the effectivity of religions is pointless: "For a particular person the way in which God is actually reaching out to him historically is the best way."[15] Despite the limitations of the human being's capacity to know and respond to God because of human finitude and sinfulness, faith, nevertheless, can be an absolute commitment to God. Each one is called to witness to the manner through which God has manifested God's self to the individual:

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[14] Amaladoss, *Beyond Inculturation*, 26.

[15] Amaladoss, *Making All Things New*, 236.

> For that person this will have an absolute--that is obliging--value. Yet one can be aware of a certain relativity in the heart of that absolute imperative if one is conscious of the distinction between God who obliges and the concrete way in which this obligation comes to an individual.[16]

To engage in interreligious dialogue thus enables one to witness to God's presence and activity in the lives of other people. Because God has revealed and continues to manifest God's self in and through one's religion and in others' too, an individual engaged in interreligious dialogue "need not hesitate to confess one's deepest experiences and convictions because one does not engage in discussion, much less in polemics, but in doxology, thanking and praising God-and in praxis-open and responding to God who is calling."[17]

One cannot appreciate Amaladoss' pluralist Christology unless one understands his hermeneutics of symbol, which coheres with the main insights of Ricoeur, Tillich, Dulles, and Haight. Culled from several essays on symbolism, the following are the salient characteristics of symbols that Amaladoss notes.[18]

Advaitic Dialectic. The dialectical relationship between the symbol and the signified means that while the material symbol makes present a transcendental reality, the latter can only be perceived through the material symbol. While Western dialectics stresses the interpenetration of two separate entities in a dialectical relationship, the Advaitic approach stresses the unity-in-difference of the two elements. *Advaita* literally means "not two;" it denies duality and dichotomy. All reality is understood as a unity-in-difference.[19]

Aside from the advaitic-dialectical relationship between the symbol and referent, a dialectic relationship also exists between the symbol

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[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid., 237.

[18] See Michael Amaladoss, *The Asian Jesus* (New York: Orbis Books, 2006), 1-8.

[19] Amaladoss, "An Emerging Indian Theology (Part I)," 480-82.

and the perceiver. Whereas the meaning of the symbol is grounded in the reality behind the symbol, its meaning is dependent on the cultural matrix in which the symbol is situated. This dialectic between the reality symbolized and the meaning assigned by the community is that which gives rise to culture.[20]

Relativity of Symbols. Amaladoss explains the need to uncover and encounter the reality behind the concrete symbols, which are relative both to the transcendent referent of the symbol and to the human, cultural, and historical conditions that shape the symbol. This principle cautions us, on the one extreme, from absolutizing the concrete symbol which is historically conditioned, and, on the other extreme, denigrating symbols as mere pointers to and not embodiments, albeit limited and relative, of transcendent realities.

In an advaitic dialectic, the two poles need not be equal, for while the symbol is permeated by the reality symbolized, the referent, on the other hand, is not totally subsumed by the symbol. This principle will have important consequences in understanding the personal presence of the Word of God in Jesus Christ without restricting the freedom of the Word to be present and active outside the Christ-event.[21]

Because symbols are relative to the socio-cultural matrix that gives rise to them, their meaning can change through time. Symbols are not only polyvalent at any given moment, but also across time. Paradoxically, symbols, on the one hand, are not arbitrary, for there is a certain ontological reality on which the symbol is dependent and in which the symbol subsists—a reality which may not be manipulated, for instance, that water is a symbol for life.[22] On the other hand, symbols may lose their capacity to communicate the underlying reality, for instance, in monarchies that have become republics, wherein kingship has either been abolished or its symbolic power diminished.

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[20] Amaladoss, *Making All Things New*, 155.

[21] See Michael Amaladoss, "How Does Jesus Save Us? An Indian Approach," *Landas* vol. 25, Issue 1-2 (2011): 258-261.

[22] Amaladoss, "An Emerging Indian Theology (Part I)," 483.

Religions: The Universal in the Particular

The relationship between the Divine and human beings is characterized by a dialectical relationship between the universal and the particular, the eternal and the historical, the absolute and the relative. In the language of Advaitic Indian philosophy, the relationship between the Divine and human beings is that between the one, absolute Real and the plural, relative phenomena or historical manifestations. *Advaita*, the non-dichotomy of unity-in-diversity, is the Indian philosophical symbol of the inter-relatedness and participation of all phenomena in the Real. From an Indian religious perspective, *Atman*, the Self, in whom all phenomena emanate and participate, is the symbol of the unity of all being. The philosophical category of the non-duality of all reality, *Advaita*, has been personalized in Hinduism as *Atman*.[23]

While God is absolute and human beings relative, the human response to the divine initiative, which we call faith, may take on an absolute character. However, the expressions of this absolute faith commitment to the absolute God are relative: "The symbolic expression of it [faith] is culturally, historically and humanly conditioned and therefore relative."[24] Therefore, relative human beings express their absolute faith in the Absolute through relative symbols. The danger lies in confusing one's absolute faith with one's relative faith expression, which, because its object is the Absolute and its conviction unflinching and certain, is often absolutized.

The Universal Salvific Will of God and the Indian Conception of God. While we have numerous terms for God—Father, Mother, Creator, King, Judge, Victim, Bridegroom—all these images of and names for God only partially convey the mystery of God who is ineffable and beyond name and form.[25] In the Indian tradition, the

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[23] Michael Amaladoss, "The One and the Many: Reality and Manifestation," *Indian Theological Studies* 29, no. 4 (1992): 305-09.

[24] Amaladoss, "Significance of Christ," 280.

[25] Michael Amaladoss, *Creative Conflict: Theological Musings* (Bandra, Bombay: St. Paul Press, 1995), 13.

Hindu notion of purnam or fullness is an apt symbol for ultimate mystery. This fullness is dynamic, creative and effusive; it is full of life and shares its abundance with creation. Moreover, the *purna kumbha*, the full vessel, serves as a metaphor for divine fullness. In the Indian festival celebrating abundance, the *pongal*, the pot of boiling and overflowing rice, is used as a symbol for the fullness of the divine overflowing into creation.[26] According to Hindu tradition, "the fullness of God is fullness of the *cosmos* in God,"[27] which, Amaladoss explains, resonates with the Christian notion of *pleroma*.

Reality as *Advaita,* God as *Atman*. Amaladoss proposes an advaitic epistemological approach rather than a dichotomous approach to reality. The dichotomous approach tends to objectify and separate the knower and outside reality in the process of knowing and to reify anything perceived and subjected to analysis or reflection. In contrast, the advaitic approach denies duality and dichotomy; it affirms unity amidst plurality, which, however, is not monistic. The advaitic approach does not attempt to explain the how and why of this unity-in-difference; it merely points to the complexity of reality as interrelated and unified, despite the diversity of phenomena.[28]

Amaladoss calls attention to the human body to illustrate the advaitic approach. The human being is a spirit-body. On the one hand, the body is, but is not only, material and chemical compounds, intelligence, and emotions. While we do sense a personal identity beyond or underlying the body's corporeality, the intangible and mysterious human person (which Amaladoss identifies as the soul or spirit) does not exist in itself, but rather is present to itself and to others only in and through one's body: "In a human, therefore, the 'soul' and the 'body' are not two different things. They are two and yet not-two. I do not have a body. I am my body, though I am not only

[26] Amaladoss, *Towards Fullness: Searching for an Integral Spirituality* (Bangladore: Revisuality & Sevasadan Training Institute, 1994), 3.

[27] Ibid., 44.

[28] Ibid., 44-48. See also Amaladoss, *Beyond Inculturation*, 108-110.

my body. Similarly, I am my spirit, though I am not only my spirit. I am a spirit-body."[29]

Amaladoss employs the advaitic approach and expounds on the relationship between God and creation and human beings. Theists assert that God created and continues to create the world; however, creation does not exist autonomously outside God. God pervades and grounds all that exists. The advaitic approach to reality explains that the transcendent God is at the same time the most immanent reality of my personal being: "God is a deeper-I. I am not-God. Yet, I do not face God as an Other. God and myself, we are not-two."[30]

The Upanishads, which in the Indian tradition were the first to speak of God as *Atman,* declare that everything is related and integrated to the Self: "Though our superficial experience is pluralistic, yet our deeper experience reveals, not identity, but a non-duality."[31] The hymn of Sankara illustrates the advaitic relationship between God and creation: "Even when I am not duality's slave, O Lord, the truth is that I am Thine, and not that Thou art mine; the waves may belong to the ocean, but the ocean does not belong to the waves."[32] For Amaladoss, human beings are thus manifestations of the divine. The identity between the human and the divine is formulated in a negative manner, in the advaitic manner of "not-two." However, our identity with the divine is a process of divinization. Human beings are transformed by God who is not external to us, but is a deeper-I, an indwelling Spirit that does not suppress human freedom, but rather "englobes our freedom,"[33] the end of which is deeper communion and identification with *Atman.*

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[29] Amaladoss, *Towards Fullness*, 46. See also Amaladoss, "How does Jesus Save Us?" 259.

[30] Amaladoss, *Towards Fullness*, 46.

[31] Ibid., 47.

[32] As quoted in Amaladoss, *Towards Fullness*, 47.

[33] Amaladoss, *Creative Conflict*, 92.

God's Universal and Salvific Will

Amaladoss steers us away from a conception of salvation that focuses on the redemption of the human soul and proposes a notion of integral salvation that is multi-dimensional, cultural-spiritual, economic-political, environmental-cosmic. He proposes the Reign of God as the imaginative symbol of the gathering of all that is that is grounded on scriptures, which proclaim God's plan to reconcile all things (Col. 1:20), to gather up all things (Eph 1:10), so that God may be all in all (1 Cor 15;28), according to God's one salvific economy (1 Tim 2:4-5).

The ecclesiological consequence of Amaladoss' fundamental theological presupposition in the universal salvific will of God is that the Church is not the efficient cause of grace but an instrumental cause of salvific grace, which emanates from God alone. The Church embodies God's saving presence in history. Amaladoss explains that this theocentric soteriology "will also help us not isolate God's action in Jesus, but ... set it in the context of the totality of God's action in the world seeking to communicate himself to human beings which embraces the whole process of history from creation . . . to its ultimate consummation."[34] A crucial question underlying the notion of salvation from God alone is whether Jesus Christ is the sole mediator of God's universal salvific will.

Because God's offer of salvation extends to all peoples in their historico-cultural contexts, God's redemptive activity extends beyond the Christ-event—Jesus' life, death and resurrection—and is operative in and through all cultures and religions, and not despite them. As God reaches out to people through the multitude of religions (which for Amaladoss is the highest point of a culture), people respond to God not only as anonymous Christians, but in and through their very religions.

> God's universal salvific will ... reaches out to the members of other religions not only in the secrets of their hearts but in and through their religions so that these...can be called ways of salvation. Some may call it the cosmic activity of the Spirit. Others may see in it the active presence of the unknown Christ. In whatever way, God's

[34] Amaladoss, *Making All Things New*, 282.

> saving love has been present to people through prophets, their Scriptures and their rituals. Not that these are free from human limitations. But these limitations do not radically vitiate God's self-manifestation in them.[35]

Amaladoss' theology of religions presents a God who does not only manifest God's self in the intangible interiority of human hearts, but in and through all that is material, in and through all the material symbols and symbolic actions of human communities.

He thus cautions against restricting God's saving activity to Christianity, as Christian exclusivists do, or to the mediation of Jesus Christ, as inclusivists do. Non-Christians' experience of God's offer of salvation is not grounded upon the historical life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ but on the universal activity of God or of the Mysteric Christ manifesting, calling and redeeming humanity in a myriad of ways: "God calls me to himself through the Church, but He seems to be calling my brother through another religion. My friend is not only free, but obliged to respond to God's call along the way in which he feels God is directing him."

Against the charge that he promotes religious relativism, Amaladoss explains that it is not a matter of indifference whatever religion one embraces: "The world is not a supermarket of religions.... Religion is a matter of God's call: a vocation." Hence, although Amaladoss affirms the Indian saying that all rivers lead to the sea, he refutes the notion of religion as a personal preference and choice among a variety of options and underlines God's initiative in reaching out to the person, calling the person in and through the religious tradition of one's community. This view does not exclude personal decision or conversion to a religion different from one's community of origin; however, the personal decision to embrace the religion of one's community or to convert to another religion is always a response to a prior call from God:

> [E]very divine-human encounter is salvific... while there may be limits to the free human response, the divine offer of love and fellowship is always boundless. This supposes that all religions mediate or facilitate

[35] Ibid., 168.

> divine-human encounter. We do not know how this is a participation in the paschal mystery of Jesus Christ, as we Christians claim.[36]

Amaladoss asserts that while Christians proclaim to have experienced salvation through the Christ-event, the one, same God offers non-Christians salvation through their respective religions.

Christology

Amaladoss affirms, firstly, that Christ mediates God's offer of salvation to all humanity and, secondly, that other religions facilitate salvation, defined and experienced as a divine-human encounter. While inclusivists maintain that adherents of other religions are saved through the Christ-event and not through the instrumentality of their respective religions, Amaladoss speaks of the *margas* or paths to God and argues that non-Christians are saved not despite their religions, but in and through their religious traditions.

While John Paul II in the *Mission of the Redeemer* reasserts, "The Church ... alone possesses the fullness of the means of salvation,"[37] Amaladoss notes that the International Theological Commission (ITC) has recently shown greater openness to the possibility that other religions mediate God's universal offer of salvation through their respective religious worldviews and traditions: "Whether the religions as such have salvific value is a point that remains open."[38] What the ITC acknowledges as a possibility, he argues, is, de jure, integral to God's universal salvific plan. He pushes the logic of the Second Vatican

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[36] Amaladoss, "Proclamation of Jesus Christ," 2.

[37] John Paul II, *Redemptoris Missio (Mission of the Redeemer) on the Permanent Validity of the Church's Missionary Mandate*, Encyclicals, December 7, 1990, no. 55, https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_07121990_redemptoris-missio.html, as cited in Amaladoss, "Mystery of Christ," 328.

[38] International Theological Commission, *Christianity and the World Religions*, Documents, 1997, https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_cti_1997_cristianesimo-religioni_en.html, no. 81, as cited in Amaladoss, "Mystery of Christ," 327.

Council's recognition that other religions offer "rays of truth" (GS 22) by arguing that God's revelation cannot be dichotomized from God's work of salvation. It would not make sense for God to reveal or communicate God's self to other peoples without at the same time drawing them to God. Moreover, other religions, if by concession are labeled extraordinary means of salvation, facilitate God's full offer of salvation: "we can make a good case that the other religions are extraordinary means of salvation ... [and] the salvation that they facilitate can only be full, because one cannot be saved partially."[39]

In relation to the Symbol of Chalcedon, Amaladoss distinguishes, firstly, between the divine and human natures of Jesus Christ: "The human nature cannot act alone, but it cannot be separated from the divine nature. But the divine nature cannot be limited or conditioned by the human nature."[40] Secondly, he distinguishes between the historical Jesus and the eternal Word: "[W]e can say that whatever the human Jesus did, the Word/God did. But we cannot reverse this relationship and affirm that whatever the Word of God did, the humanity of Jesus did too."[41]

He maintains that "this distinction, not separation, in the incarnate Word is not only before but also after the incarnation."[42] By this he means that the Word was not restricted by the event of the incarnation so as to be present solely or exclusively in the person and life of Jesus. Furthermore, he asserts that the eternal Word and the historical Jesus remain distinct even after the resurrection of Jesus.[43]

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[39] Ibid., 328.

[40] Amaladoss, "Mystery of Christ," 331. The Indian theologians correctly interpret the principle of *communicatio idiomatum* in terms of predicating the divine attributes on the human nature, but not vice versa.

[41] Ibid., 330.

[42] Ibid., 331.

[43] Amaladoss' position apparently counters that of *Dominus Iesus*, which maintains that the divine *Logos* or Son of God cannot be separated from its

> We have no real experience of what a risen humanity is. . .. But the Chalcedonian paradigm commits us to the affirmation that even after the resurrection, the risen humanity of Jesus does not become divine, that is, cease to be human. It is alive and shares in the life of God and of the world in a new way, certainly, but in a human way.[44]

The key to the Christology of Amaladoss is to understand the advaitic relationship between the historical Jesus and the Cosmic Christ. Because different Christologies often employ the same fundamental terms with different meanings, Amaladoss advocates the need to distinguish Jesus from the Christ, from the Word, from the risen Christ, and from the Christ at the End Time.[45] For Amaladoss, the "Word" refers to the Second Person of the Trinity; the "Incarnate Word" to the divine-human composite, Jesus Christ; "Jesus" refers to the humanity of the incarnate Word; and "Christ" refers both to "the anointed" of God and to the pre-existent Cosmic Christ. In his framework, Amaladoss identifies the eternal Word with the cosmic Christ. The most distinctive element in his usage of Christological terms is his identification of the Word with Christ:

> [S]ince the Word has become incarnate, the term Christ, which refers directly to the anointed humanity of Jesus, can be used to refer to the Word by extension. It shows that the Word that we are talking of has become incarnate and united to Jesus who is the anointed one.[46]

The Historical Jesus Is the Christ. Firstly, to claim that Jesus is the Christ is to recognize in him the anointed or the chosen of

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incarnation in Jesus Christ, so that according to *DI* the salvific action and presence of the *Logos* is always the salvific action and presence of the risen Jesus Christ.

[44] Amaladoss, "Mystery of Christ," 331.

[45] Amaladoss, "Significance of Christ," 283.

[46] Amaladoss, "Mystery of Christ," 332-33. Amaladoss uses the title Christ in its patristic sense: the Alexandrians spoke of Christ as the divine person that became incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth, a composite of two natures, divine and human; the Antiochenes, on the other hand, spoke of Christ as the result of the hypostatic union of the divine and human natures. Amaladoss employs Christ, referring to the divine *Logos* in the Alexandrian sense.

God. According to Jewish expectations, the anointed of God was not necessarily a divine being, but rather a human being who had been specially favored by God for a spiritual-political function in the salvation history of Israel. Secondly, the Christian claim goes further, because Christians proclaiming Jesus as the Christ do not merely point to his anointed character, but to the faith claim that Jesus is the historical enfleshment of the eternal Word of God.

Amaladoss thus cautions against the tendency of radical Christology from below towards reductionism: "[l]f we simply reduce him to being a human person, however extraordinary, then of course the question of uniqueness and universality does not arise."[47] Moreover, reducing Jesus to a mere prophet undermines the saving event of his death and resurrection. Hence, when he speaks of the earthly Jesus, he is not referring to a historical being who becomes divine in and through the resurrection, but to the divine person of the Word who is incarnated as a human being at a certain historical moment. "We do not mean that Jesus in history was a mere human person who becomes divine in his resurrection. We are rather before two manifestations of the same person."[48] Third, the historical Jesus is also not identical to the risen Jesus: "After the resurrection, Jesus becomes trans-historical, cosmic."[49]

The Cosmic Christ in relation to the Jesus of history. Amaladoss holds that the cosmic Christ is not identical to the risen Jesus: "The cosmic Christ is not just the risen Christ . .. The concern is that one should not reduce the action of Christ to what he did in

[47] Amaladoss, *Making All Things New*, 197. Hans-Georg Gadamer would argue against Amaladoss' assumption that Jesus' particularity as a human being is not universalizable. Gadamer points to the literary classic couched in its historico-cultural particularity, yet meaningful across cultures and times. See also David Tracy, "Particularity and Universality of Christian Revelation," in *Dogma: Revelation and Experience*, edited by Edward Schillebeeckx and Bas von Iersel, *Concilium* 1978/3 (New York: Seabury, 1979), 111-116.

[48] Ibid., 256.

[49] Ibid.

Jesus. Christ is also present and active in other people and their religious traditions."[50] He argues that the risen Jesus is a human nature united to the divine person of the Christ that is resurrected at a particular moment in history, thus becoming transhistorical, while the Cosmic Christ is transhistorical from all eternity, whose presence and activity permeate all existence. Secondly, while affirming the distinction between the cosmic Christ and the historical Jesus, Amaladoss rejects the Bultmannian distinction between the Christ of faith and the Jesus of history. The former, according to Bultmann, is the disciples' collective subjective hope and projection of Jesus, who persists in their hearts beyond death. Such a Christ of faith is ontologically unreal, whereas the cosmic Christ underlies all existence. Thirdly, the relationship between the historical Jesus and the Cosmic Christ is not one of simple identification, which would result in a docetic conception of Jesus, a divine being who enters history clothed in human garb, but not integrally human: "People... seem to equate the cosmic Christ with the Christ of faith quickly.... This equation is not correct. The cosmic Christ is related to the Jesus of history in the same way that mystery is related to history."[51] Instead, Amaladoss suggests an advaitic relationship between Jesus and the eternal Word, which maintains the unity of the human and the divine natures in Jesus the Christ, while making room for a distinction between them. In attempting to explain this unity-in-distinction in terms of two natures subsisting in one person, he speaks of "the reality of the Word transcend[ing] while englobing the humanity of Jesus."[52]

The Cosmic Christ is none other than the eternal Word incarnated in the historical Jesus but whose presence and activity nonetheless transcend the reality of the earthly Jesus. Based on the advaitic unity-in-distinction, the historical Jesus and the Cosmic Christ, though not identical, are united in the person of the *Logos*, which, though eternal,

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[50] Amaladoss, *Beyond Inculturation*, 111.

[51] Michael Amaladoss, "An Emerging Indian Theology: Some Exploratory Reflections (Part II)," *Vidyajyoti Journal of Theological Reflection* 58 (1994): 571.

[52] Amaladoss, "Mystery of Christ," 332.

becomes historical at a given time. This is evidently a confessional claim, the cornerstone of the Christian faith, which is rooted in the experience of the divine in the person of Jesus and the experience of God's salvation in Jesus' life, death and resurrection. The coherence of the Christian faith is grounded in the mystery of the incarnation.

> …. God is not adopting merely transcendent, transhistorical means to transform history and humans. God takes seriously the ongoing struggle between good and evil God becomes human in Jesus and gets involved in that struggle, taking the side of the poor and the oppressed. He does not use miraculous means to impose God's will on the world. Rather, he launches a new social movement... which becomes the Church.[53]

In the language of the early Councils, the doctrine of the incarnation, the faith claim of God's personal presence in Jesus, is explained theologically as the hypostatic union between the divine and human natures of Jesus Christ. The terminology of the two natures in one person, which Nicaea adopts from Cyril of Alexandria and Leo, explains the unity of the eternal Word and the historical Jesus in the one divine person. Amaladoss points to the mystery of the Incarnation as the ground of the unity between the divine Word and the earthly Jesus, giving cogency to the Christian proclamation that the divine person of the Word is truly present and incarnated in Jesus, or simply that Jesus is both human and divine.

On the other hand, the Advaitic dialectic also points to a distinction, notwithstanding the unity, between the historical Jesus and the cosmic Christ. While the divine Word is personally present in Jesus, the divine Word or Christ transcends the historical Jesus, "Jesus is the Christ, but Christ is not only Jesus."[54] Jesus thus totally subsists in Christ, but the eternal Christ does not subsist in the historical Jesus without remainder. The reality of the divine Word, while constituting the person of Jesus, is not fully exhausted by its historical manifestation.

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[53] Amaladoss, "Proclamation of Christ," 9.

[54] Amaladoss, "Significance of Christ," 284. See also Amaladoss, *Making All Things New*, 235.

The logical consequence of this claim is that Christ, while present and active in Jesus, can also be present and active elsewhere in other ways, in varying intensities, in infinite possibilities of historical manifestations. He argues that the universality of Christ refers to "'the whole cosmic breadth of the action of Christ" and cannot be limited to "his action in his incarnate form named Jesus."[55]

Hence, on the one hand, "the cosmic Christ must never be de-linked (separated) from the historical Jesus, though it has to be distinguished from and not be confused with it."[56] On the other hand,

> Christ may also be mediated by other symbols in other religious traditions. This perspective is not simply theocentric: it takes seriously the Trinity and the role of the Word in the history of salvation.... [I]t takes the incarnation seriously…. the specificity of Jesus is also affirmed.[57]

While Jesus is totally subsumed into the reality of the cosmic Christ, the cosmic Christ or Mysteric Christ, while truly present in Jesus, is more than the historical Jesus. While the cosmic Christ is universal, Jesus is a particular historical manifestation of the cosmic Christ, who can manifest himself elsewhere, even simultaneously with his actualization in the historical Jesus.

The issue at stake is the inclusivist claim of the universality of the Christ-event. For Amaladoss, this is universalizing the particular, which leads to absolutizing the particular. Instead, he proposes viewing the historical as the particularization of the universal, which leads to an openness to the multiple particularizations of the universal, without absolutizing any of them, while recognizing each one's authentic expression of and link to the universal.

This universal action of Christ cannot be localized in the sense of being reduced to a point of time in history, because it will not be

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[55] Amaladoss, "Significance of Christ," 284.

[56] Amaladoss, "Mystery of Christ," 333.

[57] Amaladoss, *Making All Things New*, 235.

complete till the last day when Christ will be all in all. The universality of Christ, therefore, includes all God's manifestations in history. While we Christians see a special, even unique place and role in this history for God's action in Jesus, we cannot universalize this particular divine act.

The Uniqueness of Jesus and the Significance of the Christ-event. While Amaladoss' advaitic, dialectical relationship between the eternal Word or cosmic Christ and the historical Jesus resonates with Justin's *logos spermatikos* and Chalcedon's dialectical relationship between the divine and human natures of Jesus Christ, and while *Gaudium et spes'* proclamation of the presence and activity of the Spirit in other religions coheres with Amaladoss' assertion about the universal presence and activity of the cosmic Christ, there remain significant differences between Amaladoss' Christology and the Christology that links Chalcedon to Vatican II and to *Dominus Iesus.* The bone of contention has to do with the extent to which Christologies will permit a distinction between the Word or cosmic Christ and the historical Jesus. The debate is not about whether the historical Jesus is divine or not. Amaladoss himself expressly rejects neo-Nestorianism, which reduces Jesus to a mere prophet.[58] The dispute concerns whether the saving presence of Christ or the Spirit in other religions is inseparable from the incarnation of the *Logos* in the historical Jesus. In other words, is the claim that the Cosmic Christ or the Spirit is active in other religions equivalent to asserting that it is Jesus Christ, the human-divine being, who is present in all cultures and religions?

Dominus Iesus asserts that the Word present everywhere cannot be distinguished from Jesus Christ. This does not mean that *Dominus Iesus* claims that Jesus, the human nature of the hypostatic union, is pre-existent. The argument of Dominus Iesus hinges on the Chalcedonian framework that Jesus Christ is not a human person but a divine person. The divine nature of Jesus Christ constitutes the subject underlying the person of Jesus Christ. The incarnation of the Logos does not involve a union with a human person, which would result in the Nestorian heresy of two-person theory in Christ, but rather with a human nature,

[58] Amaladoss, *Making All Things New*, 195.

with the resulting hypostatic union consisting in one person, the person of the divine *Logos*.

For the modern mind, it is difficult to conceive of the divine person of the Logos uniting itself with a human nature that is not in itself a human person. Sarah Coakley explains that the one person in two natures theory of the Alexandrian School, which Chalcedon adopted, is only comprehensible in the light of a Platonic understanding of human nature as an amalgam of human characteristics. Chalcedon speaks of human nature not in terms of subsistent individual beings, but in terms of a set of traits that together define being human.

Proceeding from such a framework, we can appreciate how and why *Dominus Iesus* maintains that the incarnated *Logos*, Jesus Christ, cannot be distinguished from the divine *Logos* who is present universally.

Amaladoss comments on the Church's adoption of *Logos* Christology and explains why the incarnate Jesus Christ cannot be universalized. Jesus is a historical and particular manifestation of the cosmic Christ: "The covenant in Jesus has a cosmic significance precisely because of the divine (Christ) in him."[59] The universal significance of Jesus has to do not with his particularization of the universal, but rather with the presence of the divine universal in him. What is universal in Jesus is the Cosmic Christ who is manifested in innumerable ways throughout ongoing history. Jesus Christ, hence, is universal saviour because of the presence of the Cosmic Christ in him, a presence that cannot be restricted to him: "We confess in Jesus Christ the universal saviour. We experience in our dialogue with others that God has also been active in them."[60]

Amaladoss admits that his Christology owes much to Karl Rahner, whose exposition on the Christ-event as the summit of both God's self-communication to humanity and humanity's self-communication to God has given credence and cogency to Christian faith in Jesus the Christ. However, if the Cosmic Christ is present and active everywhere,

[59] Amaladoss, "Significance of Christ," 286.

[60] Ibid., 289.

what is special about the Christ-event? What is definitively revealed and universally significant in it? The transhistorical significance of the historical Jesus can be understood, "only insofar as we liberate the mystery from its historical particularity without severing the link."[61]

As a historical being in whom the ahistorical Christ subsists, "Jesus offers a historical and symbolic (sacramental) concretization of the continuing saving action of the Word and gives it an eschatological character and urgency." Jesus actualizes in a definitive manner the Cosmic Christ's activity in the world, especially in his resurrection: "In raising Jesus to new life God has made a commitment to--an enduring covenant with—humanity.... This does not mean that the other manifestations of God in history become useless. They lead people in their own way to their personal commitments."[62] While Jesus is a particularization of the cosmic Christ, his life, death and resurrection have universal significance in relation to God's universal saving activity in other religions."[63]

> These concrete actions [of God in the Christ-event] have a universal significance and relevance as parts of this structure. But affirming this is different from universalizing the historical/particular, making it historically universal . . .. The mystery of Christ includes all the other manifestations of God in history. Therefore we cannot reduce it to its manifestation in Jesus.[64]

The Non-Absoluteness of the Christ-event. Because the Mysteric Christ transcends the historical Jesus, the incarnate Christ

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[61] Amaladoss, *Making All Things New*, 193.

[62] Amaladoss, "Significance of Christ," 286.

[63] Ibid., 285.

[64] Ibid. While Amaladoss cautions against universalizing the particular, in this quote he seems to contradict himself by expounding on the universal significance of the historical Jesus, insofar as he is God's manifestation in history. Perhaps what Amaladoss really means is that the particular ought not to be absolutized, since the historical cannot exhaust the full reality of a transcendental reality. While this assertion is valid, it does not negate the potential of the particular from becoming universal or universally meaningful.

does not exhaust the full reality of the Mysteric or Cosmic Christ. While, for Christians, Jesus' life, death and resurrection is the definitive revelation of God, in the sense that God makes an irrevocable promise to humanity that what God has done in and for Jesus, God has been doing for humanity, the Christ-event does not exhaust the full cosmic and historical breadth of God's salvific plans.

> The Christ-event ... cannot be simply equated with the Mystery, the plan of God for the world of which Paul speaks. Whatever be the key place we give to the Christ-event in this plan, the Mystery itself is cosmic and would be complete only on the 'last day.'[65]

The God who has revealed God's self as unconditional and indomitable love in the person, life, death and resurrection of Jesus manifests God's self in multiple ways in other cultures throughout history.

> God, who acts through the Word and the Spirit, acts also through a variety of human and historical mediations.... But we need not compare them or hierarchize them as if they all belong to one linear history. This means that all religions are not pre-biblical in such a way that will seek accomplishment in Jesus.[66]

Whereas Christians tend to view other religions as preparations to Christianity and revelation in them as inadequate and fulfilled in the Christ-event, Amaladoss rejects a linear view of history and suggests a synchronic view of multiple complementary revelations of God. Each religion manifests facets of the infinite Mystery not experienced, symbolized, or formulated in other religions.

God's multiple manifestations through the Word in human history do not relativize or reduce the value of God's revelation in the Christ-event, which in turn does not make superfluous or illegitimate God's manifestations in other religions: "The history of Jesus is important. But it should lead us, as it did Paul and John, to contemplate the

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[65] Amaladoss, *Making All Things New*, 173.

[66] Amaladoss, "Mystery of Christ," 334.

mystery of which it is a symbol."[67] Amaladoss seeks to maintain a balance between the Christian claim of God's definite revelation in the Christ-event (a confessional statement grounded on the experience of salvation in the Christ-event) and the invitation to recognize God's freedom to manifest God's self elsewhere. "The act of God in Jesus ... does not seek to limit God's universal salvific action to its particular history. On the contrary, the history of Jesus opens out to the mystery of God's universal salvific presence and action."[68]

Assessment

On God's Universal Salvific Will. Amaladoss identifies himself as both an inclusivist and a pluralist: "The paradigm I am trying to evolve will find a place between inclusivism and pluralism. It is inclusivist in so far as it is reflecting in the perspective of the Christian faith in the mysteries of the Trinity and of the Incarnation and their ongoing action in history."[69]

He remains a Christian inclusivist insofar as he professes faith in Jesus Christ as the incarnation of the divine Cosmic Christ, the redeemer of all creation. He confesses, "I have discovered the mystery of God's universal salvific will in Christ through Jesus."[70] However, he maintains a real differentiation between Jesus and the Christ, and understands inclusion "only at the level of the mystery of God and Christ whose universality we affirm."[71] For Amaladoss, God, the efficient cause of salvation, redeems the world through the mediation

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[67] Michael Amaladoss, "Jesus Christ in the Midst of Religions: An Indian Perspective," in *The Myriad Christ: Plurality and the Quest for Unity in Contemporary Christology*, ed. T. Merrigan and J. Haers (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2000), 224.

[68] Amaladoss, *Beyond Inculturation*, 38.

[69] Amaladoss, "Significance of Christ," 290.

[70] Ibid., 291.

[71] Ibid., 290.

of the Cosmic Christ who actualizes salvation in history in various ways, the Incarnation of the Cosmic Christ in Jesus of Nazareth being one of them.

He is also a pluralist who recognizes God's multiple ways of revealing God's self and redeeming peoples across time and space. At the same time, he recognizes the multiplicity of ways people seek God and respond to God's revelations, the various ways people conceptualize their experience of the divine and systematize their beliefs into a religion. Amaladoss hence affirms the legitimacy of various religions as authentic ways that God and peoples of various cultures are reaching out to each other. Moreover, he deems inappropriate the Christian tendency to view other religions as partial, inadequate, or non-redeeming revelations compared to the definitive, full, and salvific revelation of God in Jesus Christ. In sum, Amaladoss is a moderate pluralist insofar as he breaks the causal link between salvation through the Christ-event and salvation through other religions.

Because religions are, in essence, divine-human encounters, Amaladoss asserts that Christians cannot judge the quality or the authenticity of the encounters of non-Christians with God through their religious traditions. A Christian, however, unavoidably views others' experience of the divine through one's Christian perspective. Nevertheless, by dialoguing with others, a Christian is invited to encounter vicariously the Mystery that others encounter through their religions. Because faith is an absolute commitment through a relative religion, a believer cannot but speak in terms of a definitive and transformative or saving encounter with God through one's religion. While Amaladoss holds on to his faith conviction in Jesus Christ as the definitive revelation of God and saviour of humanity, he recognizes the equally absolute commitment of non-Christians to the Ultimate Mystery, which they have every right to claim as saving, liberative or illuminative.

As an inclusivist-pluralist, he explains, "[i]n faith I affirm that this pluralism is structured into a unity. All believers, because they believe that God is one, will have to affirm this. But this unity is

eschatological."[72] That Ultimate Reality or Divine Mystery, whom Christians call God and non-Christians call by other names, is One is a theological presupposition that Amaladoss maintains. He sees an inclusivity of all religions at the level of Mystery; however, he explains, too, that this inclusivity and unity amidst phenomenological religious plurality is eschatological. Consequently, he does not feel compelled to structure all religions into a unified system of beliefs and practices. Because he recognizes the authenticity of the divine-human encounters in all religions, he feels compelled and invites others, too, to dialogue with adherents of other religions, so that each party might be mutually enriched and challenged by the other's encounter with the one Divine Mystery manifested in diverse ways.

On Christology. The Universal and the Particular. It seems to me that Amaladoss is unclear about the universality of the historical Jesus because he confuses universality with absoluteness. Historical consciousness has taught us that the particular is unavoidably relative. Jesus, as a historical being, may reveal the absolute without exhausting the reality of the Absolute: "Jesus is the Christ, but Christ is not only Jesus."[73] Amaladoss is therefore correct to say that the particular cannot be identified non-dialectically with the absolute. However, I disagree with Amaladoss' assertion that Jesus' universal significance cannot emanate from his particularization of the universal, but only from the presence of the universal Word incarnated in him. Jesus' universality also ensues from his particularity, from his message and way of life, which are trans-culturally and trans-religiously relevant. Following Gadamer, David Tracy explains that the literary classic, while ensconced in its historico-cultural location, has universal significance. The classic couched in the myriad details of its culture and period reveals to others across time and space some aspect of reality and universal human existence.

Jesus in this sense is universal not only because of the fundamental Christian claim that the universal Word is incarnated in him, but also

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[72] Amaladoss, "Significance of Christ," 290.

[73] Amaladoss, "Significance of Christ," 284.

because his message and praxis—his inclusive love that embraced the poor and marginalized in a preferential way, his fidelity to his vision and convictions despite the threat of death, his unwavering faith in God amidst pain and suffering—have universal significance.

Ontological Unity of Jesus of History and the Cosmic Christ. Amaladoss maintains that while the Cosmic Christ subsists in Jesus of Nazareth, the mystery of the Cosmic Christ extends beyond the historical Jesus. The Cosmic Christ has been present and actively redeeming people before, during and after the Incarnation, independently of and simultaneously with the Christ-event, the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.

In Chalcedonian terms, there is only one divine person—the second person of the Trinity—that subsists in the *Logos*, the Cosmic Christ, the historical Jesus and the Risen Lord. There is only one acting subject underlying the eternal *Logos* and all its various historical manifestations. The *Logos* is the acting subject, the who-this-is, underlying the historical Jesus. Ontologically, the person of Jesus of Nazareth is divine, his nature both divine and human. Consequently, the divine person of Jesus of Nazareth cannot be separated or distinguished from the divine person of the *Logos* pre-incarnation or post-resurrection. In *Redemptoris Missio*, St. John Paul II clarifies, "To introduce any sort of separation between the Word and Jesus Christ is contrary to the Christian faith."[74] It is the same person of the divine *Logos* that has become incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth and has, at the same time, been acting and redeeming peoples of various cultures before, during, and after the Incarnation.

Amaladoss counters that the Chalcedonian or Thomistic interpretation of the ontological being of Jesus Christ need not be the only framework through which the Mystery of Christ is understood and comprehended: "We do not wish to ignore two thousand years of doctrinal and theological development. But a pole of dialogue is

[74] St. John Paul II, *Redemptoris Missio* (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1990), no. 6.

different from a norm."[75] He rightly contends that the same Revelation in the Christ-event can be interpreted through other cultural lenses. He proposes the Advaitic approach of unity-in-difference, which speaks of the self as my-body but not only my-body. In a similar vein, Amaladoss speaks of the Cosmic Christ as the historical Jesus, but not only the Jesus of Nazareth. This Advaitic unity-in-difference allows Amaladoss to speak of the Cosmic Christ as the unifying element and the various manifestations of the Cosmic Christ as the differentiating elements. The one Cosmic Christ redeems humanity and the world through its various manifestations.

The One Economy of Salvation Mediated by Jesus Christ. Because, according to Amaladoss, the Cosmic Christ has been redeeming peoples of various cultures before, during, and after the incarnation, he has been suspected of proposing two economies of salvation, one by the Incarnate Word and the other by the Cosmic Christ. *Dominus Iesus*, while not mentioning Amaladoss' name, declares that there is only one economy of salvation that originates with the Father and is actualized in history by the Christ-event. The document rejects those who claim that "there is an economy of the eternal Word that is valid also outside the Church and is unrelated to her, in addition to an economy of the incarnate Word."[76] There is no saving work of the Triune God that is separate from or independent of the redemption brought about by the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ.

Amaladoss, however, does not propose two economies of salvation, one through the eternal *Logos* and the other through the incarnate Word in Jesus Christ. He maintains that there is only one economy of salvation; that is, that God alone saves and that God redeems various peoples in various ways through the Cosmic Christ,

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[75] Beltramini, *Michael Amaladoss and the Quest for Indian Theology*, 17, citing Michael Amaladoss, "Toward an Indian Theology," in *Theological Explorations: Centennial Festschrift in Honour of Josef Neuner, SJ*, edited by Jakob Kavunkal (Delhi, ISPCK, 2008), 19.

[76] Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, "*Dominus Iesus*," in *Sic et Non: Encountering* Dominus Iesus, edited by Stephen J. Pope and Charles Hefling, (New York: Orbis Books, 2002), 9.

who has been incarnated in Jesus of Nazareth but has also been variously manifested elsewhere.

Conclusion

As a Catholic theologian raised in a Hindu-Christian environment, Amaladoss addresses the phenomenon of religious diversity and constructs a Christian theology of religions grounded in a Trinitarian Christology that affirms the incarnation of the *Logos* in the historical Jesus, but recognizes the saving presence of the Word and Spirit in non-Christian religions.[77] While inclusivism recognizes God's universal salvific will and actions, Amaladoss goes further by arguing for the salvation of non-Christians through the mediation of their respective religions, while independent of the historical Jesus, dependent on the divine person of the *Logos* or the Christ. This does not imply two economies of salvation or a separation of the eternal *Logos* from the historical Jesus. The logic of Amaladoss' assertions is rooted in the advaitic notion of unity-in-distinction. There is only one economy of salvation, but multiple ways that God is reaching out to and redeeming various peoples. There is only one Christ, but multiple ways the Christ is manifesting himself and saving Christians and non-Christians.

To end, theology of religions reflects on the relationship of non-Christians to the saving Christ-event. While speculative, it is an important field of theological reflection that impacts missiology

[77] While the Cosmic Christ and the Spirit are present in the Church, they are present and active, too, elsewhere. Amaladoss explains that the Church's mission is to be a sacrament or a seed of the Kingdom of God, which is not identical with the Church. The Kingdom extends beyond the confines of the Church, inviting everyone, whatever ethnic race or religion, to enter. See Michael Amaladoss, *Beyond Dialogue: Pilgrims to the Absolute* (Bangalore: Asian Trading Corporation, 2008), 115-32. See also Michael Amaladoss, "People's Theology in Multireligious Communities," in *Wisdom and the People's Theology*, edited by Carlos Mendoza-Álvarez and Po-Ho Huang, *Concilium*, 2018/3 (London: SCM Press, 2018), 45-54. This raises the important question of the role of the Spirit and the Church in God's universal salvific plan. This paper though is limited to an exploration of Amaladoss' Christology.

and inter-religious dialogue, for one's attitudes about the religiously other affect how one thinks of, behaves toward, and engages the other. Amaladoss, who theologizes in a multi-religious milieu where Christianity is a minority, asserts the possibility of salvation of non-Christians in and through their religions. He employs a Trinitarian framework and refers to the Cosmic Christ as the agent who redeems Christians through Christ's incarnation in the historical Jesus, but non-Christians through their own religions in whom the Cosmic Christ, too, is present and drawing people to the Triune God.

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MINISTRY OF "LISTENING DEEPLY" IN AN INCULTURATED CHURCH IN NORTH VIETNAM[1]

Jojo M. Fung, SJ

Abstract. This synodal process foregrounds the relevance of "listening deeply" as a ministerial praxis which is grounded in a mystagogy with a theology of God's corporealization in creation/cosmos[2] through the incarnation, and a spirituality of interiority discerning God's communication *ad extra* and *ad intra* facilitated by the everyday exercise of Cosmic One-ing. This ecclesial praxis is relevant in the synodal process of communal discernment. Church leaders/ministers need to be formed in this ministerial practice to become truly inculturated communities that integrate their faith with the local living traditions of the faithful. At the same time, the faithful also incorporates the other living traditions of the primal and world religions of their co-pilgrims. In this way, inculturation thus enhances the evangelizing mission of the local Churches of Asia.

[1] GenAI Disclosure Statement. The author declares that no GenAI tools were used in the conception, research, analysis, and writing of this manuscript.

[2] See Mark I. Wallace, "The Wounded Spirit as the Basis for Hope in an Age of Radical Ecology," in *Christianity and Ecology: Seeking the Well-Being of Earth and Humans*, edited by Dieter T. Hessel and Rosemary Radford Ruether (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 51-72.

Keywords: Listen deeply, mystagogy, corporealization, synodality, *Đọc Kinh, Ngắm, song thất luc bát, chèo*, *tuồng, Ngắm Mùa Chay, hiên Chúa*, *sensus fidei, entire cum ecclesia,* historic traditioning, religiocultural traditions

Introduction

The notion of doing ecclesial ministry has morphed from the days of Vatican I to Vatican II, and to the FABC. This process of change over the centuries is like a metamorphosis, which is influenced in large measure by: first, the paradigm shifts in the ecclesiological notion of being Church in *aggiornamento,* particularly since Vatican II; second, the interrelated shifts in the underlying presuppositions in soteriology, missiology and spirituality. All these shifts foregrounds the relevance of all the processes of communal discernment in a synodal Church. This paper examines the evolution of the notion of ministry in terms of a concentric circle in section one. Section two explains this ministerial praxis of "listening deeply" as integral to the theology of God's Mission.[3] This ministerial praxis is described as a mystagogy with the praxis of Cosmic One-ing which facilitates two interrelated moments in section three. The fourth section situates this praxis within the synodal processes. The final section explains an inculturated Church as a situated context for the exercise of this ministry of "listening deeply" to God in local ecclesial communities.

1. Ministry as a Concentric Notion

My personal understanding of ministry from the past to now has expanded. This maturation process is like a concentric circle. In the past, ministry has always been an extended engagement in the parish, engaging in particular activities like organizing the masses, attending the regular events such as meetings and gatherings of the BECs,

[3] Heartfelt gratitude to Scholastic Nguyễn Huy Kim SJ for his sharing of his pastoral experience in his regency on the 1st of May, 2026. in which the phrase "listen deeply" struck a chord in my heart based on his reflection of the Jesuit pastoral ministry in the seven parishes in the Bac Ninh Diocese of North Vietnam

acting as a guide of the youth ministry, visiting the poor in the slum-dwellers, the homes of the workers of the factories, the oil palm and rubber plantations, participating in the charismatic prayer group, given formation to the leaders of the CSS (Catholic Students Society in the universities) and the YCW (young Christian Workers). These ministerial engagements are motivated by a soteriology and ecclesiology that "*God's salvation can also be found outside of the Catholic Church*" alone. This notion then transitioned to "*God's salvation is found outside of the Catholic Church*" as God's Kin-dom[4] is beyond the confines of the formal religions. Now the ecclesio-soteriological framework is "*God saves humankind and otherkinds in ways only known to God albeit unknown to us (cf. Nostra Aetate/ NA* §2*), including other planets and multiverse in our cosmos.*" It is humbling to realize that the fullness of understanding God's known ways will only be known when we "see God face to face" (1 Cor 13:12).

2. *Missio Dei* with a Theology

"Listening deeply" calls for re-imagining ministry as our participation in God's Mission (*Missio Dei).* This accentuated emphasis has to be kept in view even when we engage in ministry that is diocesan (participation in the triple functions of the episcopal mission), national (participation in the mission of the Philippine Church), regional (participation in the mission of the triple dialogue of the FABC) and global (participation in the mission set forth by Vatican II).

God's mission is cosmic, planetary and particular. God initiated this divine mission when God "decides to other Godself" in the act of creation through the creative power of *Rûah Elohim.* On God's othering of Godself, Origen explains, "God is one, who created and set in order all things, and who, when nothing existed, caused the universe to be."[5] According to Teilhard de Chardin, "creation is now

[4] In the ASEAN usage, the word Kin-dom highlights the relevance of being kins to one another under the reign of God enjoying fraternity, solidarity, justice and peace.

[5] This is taken from Parch II, 1–2, 12–18, quoted in Henri Crouzel, *Origen*, trans. A.S. Worral (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1989), 182.

seen to be, in some sense, a reflection of God outside of Himself rather than within Himself."[6] What is for Origen "causing the universe to be" is confirmed by Mark I. Wallace who avers that "the Creator Spirit (*ruah*) breathes the world into existence and thereby enfleshes itself in the creation and maintenance of the natural order."[7] Once created, creation becomes, as it were, God's "mission ground" in which God is present and active. God's saving presence and actions take on a sharper focus in the incarnation, which focalized God's presence and mission in one particular planet (Earth), country (Israel), hometown (Nazareth in Galilee) and birthplace (Bethlehem in Judea).

Like Jesus, God invites us to engage in God's mission. The incarnated God, as the Word-made-flesh (Jn:1-3), is the divine presence in our hearts that capacitates us to respond to God's call as co-creators so that we engage in God's mission. We are graced to collaborate intimately with God solely for God's glory. In other words, we listen to God so that we do what God desires of us. Through our ministries, God draws God's people closer to God. Through us, God ushers in God's Kin-dom of fraternity, justice, peace, and promotion of the global commons. In this way, our co-creative ministries[8] contribute to God's cosmic mission of bringing about a new earth, a new heaven and a new creation (Is 65:17; 66:22; Rom 8:19-23; 2 Cor 5:17; Gal 6:15; Col 1:1-20; Phil 3:20-21; Rev 21-22), whence God is in all, over all, and all in all (Eph. 4:6).

3. A Mystagogy with One-ing and Two ways

Our ecclesial ministry as the baptized, the consecrated and the ordained (BCO) calls for the ministry of "listening deeply" as discerning disciples of Jesus in Asia. We listen to God's communication *ad extra* in

[6] Donald P. Gray, *The One and the Many: Teilhard de Chardin's Vision of Unity* (London: Burns & Oats, 1969), 19.

[7] Wallace, "The Wounded Spirit as the Basis for Hope in an Age of Radical Ecology," 58.

[8] The term co-creative ministries denote that God invites us to be co-creators with God in God's co-creative ministries.

creation, in the cries of the wounded earth and the vulnerable on the margin of the church and society because God has pitched a tent in our midst (John 1:14). We also listen deeply to God's communication from within (*ad intra*) the recesses of our hearts.[9]

Engaging in the everyday practice of the one-ing exercise is important to facilitate two interrelated moments of "listening deeply." One-ing with everyone and everything in one's immediate and distant milieu is illustrated in this exercise I composed, entitled *Cosmic One-ing*.

I invite you to be seated comfortably.

Close your eyes. Breathe in and out.
Now enter into a state of consciousness.

Become conscious of the presence of God's Spirit.
Become conscious of the abundance of light, joy, peace and communion, in and around you.

Allow God's Spirit to move you into this state of communion, of one-ing with everyone and everything.

Moved by God's Spirit, I feel one with everything in my room.

I am one with the chair that I sit on. The chair is one with me.
I am one with the table that I work on. The table is one with me.
I am one with the laptop, with the books. The laptop and books are one with me.
I am one with the plants and flowers inside and around my house. The plants and flowers are one with me.

I am one with the cat and dog in this house. The cat and dog are one with me.
I am one with this everyone, every animal, every plant in and around this house. Everyone, every animal and plant is one with me.

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[9] In the last statement of no. 34 of *Redemptoris Missio*, this encyclical concludes, "Hence missionary activity ad intra is a credible sign and a stimulus for missionary activity ad extra, and vice versa." See John Paul II, *Redemptoris Missio*, December 7, 1990, Encyclicals, https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_07121990_redemptoris-missio.html.

I am one with every child, youth, woman, man, one with every bee, bird, flower, every tree in this town. All of them in this town are one with me.

I am one with every inhabitant, every hill, peak, pond, lake, river, forest, valley in this country, in Asia, and they are all one with me.

I am one with the air, the sky, the clouds, with every ocean, every continental landmass, every snow-capped peak, every nation, every citizen, all lifeforms, all minerals on this earth. They are all part of me. They are one with me.

I am one with planet Earth, with all other planets in this solar system, with every galaxy and the Milky Way, every universe in this cosmos. They are part of me. They are one with me.

This whole cosmos is part of me, and this vast cosmos is one with me.

All the particles flow in this cosmos flow in and out of me. I feel they are part of me, and I am one with all particles in this cosmos.

God's Spirit is energizing all lifeforms in this cosmos and energizing me. God's Spirit unites all of us in this one-ing, in this cosmic communion.

We are one in this cosmos, this planet Earth, united as one in God, by God's Spirit.

Now let us return to this state of consciousness of one-ing, in this cosmic flow of one-ing with everyone and everything.

Let us become conscious that we are seated on this chair, in this room.

Gradually return to your body.

When you are ready, gradually open your eyes.

Feeling grateful, joyful and peaceful in your heart.

The *ad extra* listening calls for a contemplative attentiveness to God's communication through discerning the signs of the times,

because God speaks through (a) the splendor of our cosmos (multiverse with plural galaxies and milky ways), (b) what is happening to Mother Earth/nature (the climate polycrisis), and finally, and (c) the events in our global (energy insecurity due to hike in oil prices due to the geopolitical tensions in the Persian Gulf), regional (tension in the Strait of Hormuz) and local world (monetary subsidies for employees' purchase of diesel and petrol).

Second, we listen to God *ad intra*, which calls us to live in a contemplative state of being during our daily personal prayer and examen as these incidents affect us in ways that we do not yet comprehend. Through "listening deeply," we hear God speaking to us in the deep recesses of our hearts, in the form of an inspirational idea/image, accompanied by deep consolations like peace, joy, and tears that motivate us in undertaking certain initiatives/pathways. This presupposes a personal interiority which is related yet different from the daily recitation of the divine offices and other formal/said prayers. In fact, daily personal prayers and *examen* require a discerning attitude and disposition during moments of silent presence to the Triune God, the celestial assembly of angels, ancestors, mystics, prophets, sages, and Mother Mary, awaiting their communications that move our emotions (delight and solace), psyche-spirit-soul that affirm, convert/transform and motivate us both in our being so that we are increasingly free to allow the Triune God to act on our behalf through different agencies/agents, humans and institutions alike.

4. Listening Deeply: A Synodal Process

This "listening deeply" befits the three years (2021-2024) synodal processes that is local, regional and global. These processes are initiated in preparation for the 2024 synod on synodality and the Ecclesial Assembly in October 2028. These *Pathways*, prepared by the General Secretariat of the Synod, are part of the General Secretariat's service of accompaniment during the implementation phase of the Synod

on Synodality.[10] These synodal processes involve the plural BECs, organizations and movements in the local parishes, the dioceses, the regional Bishops' Conferences in what is known worldwide as the "Conversation in the Spirit" or "Spiritual Conversation." These conversations engage "listening deeply" so that the Church Universal is in a state discernment, accompanied by the Risen Lord, journeying together, under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. In this "listening deeply" together on this synodal journey, the whole Church disposes herself to learn through her rich joyful and hurtful experiences by deeply listening to God's Spirit which enables Her to live a deeper communion, to promote participation, to open Herself to mission, as envisioned by Vatican II.

5. Formation within an Inculturated Church

Becoming an inculturated church calls for formation in the mystagogy of "listening deeply" with its theology and spirituality. First, the theology of "listening deeply." According to the vision of FABC, a localized Church is "incarnated in a people, indigenous, inculturated, a church in dialogue with the living traditions and religions,"[11] which brings forth an inculturated church. Filipino theologian Jose Mario C. Francisco rightly postulates, "the decisive new phenomenon for Christianity in Asia will be the emergence of genuine Christian

[10] The second session of the 16th Ordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops (the Synod on Synodality) was held in Rome in October 2024. This followed the initial session held in October 2023, marking the conclusion of the assembly's general sessions, with the final document approved on October 26, 2024.

[11] "FABC - Contributions of the Church in Asia to the Universal Church," *Facebook*, September 10, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=430792389149381, citing the First Plenary Assembly, "Evangelization in Modern Day Asia," Statement and Recommendations, in *For All the Peoples of Asia: Federation of Asian Bishops' Conferences Documents from 1970-1991*, edited by Gaudencio Rosales, DD and Catalino G. Arevalo, SJ, vol. 1 (Quezon City/Maryknoll, NY: Claretian Publications/Orbis Books, 1992), p. 14, par. 12.

communities in Asia–Asian in their way of thinking, praying, living, communicating their own Christ-experience to others."[12]

In other words, "listening deeply" attunes the leaders/ministers to the salvific movements of the Triune God in the given contexts and the marvelous ways by which God's Spirit is guiding the dialogue between the Gospel and these diverse local contexts. As Mario Francisco insightful posits:

> [In] this dynamic of evangelizing, inculturation comes about through a 'dialogical encounter process understood in its deepest meaning that comes from the salvific movement of the Triune God because evangelization itself is above all a dialogue between the Gospel and the given reality.' It is not a mere 'adaptation of a ready-made Christianity into a given situation.' Through this universal dialogue, the presence of the Spirit is found in each context and we can reflect on the historical forms with which the Gospel is preached.[13]

Therefore, this dialogical encounter process calls for "listening deeply" to the aspirations, joys and sorrows of those in the parishes, the schools and other ecclesial contexts. Through an ongoing process of communal discernment, "listening deeply" gradually ascertains the heartfelt desires of the faithful to further inculturate the faith in their local contexts so as to enhance their evangelizing mission.

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[12] Jose Mario C. Francisco, "Inculturation in Asia and Reform in the Church," *La Civiltà Cattolica*, February 10, 2017, https://www.laciviltacattolica.com/inculturation-asia-reform-church/, citing FABC, "Asian Colloquium on Ministries in the Church," Conclusions, in *For All the Peoples of Asia: Federation of Asian Bishops' Conferences Documents from 1970-1991*, edited by Gaudencio Rosales, DD and Catalino G. Arevalo, SJ, vol. 1 (Quezon City/Maryknoll, NY: Claretian Publications/Orbis Books, 1992), p. 70, par. 14.

[13] Francisco, "Inculturation in Asia and Reform in the Church," citing International Congress on Mission, "Local Asian Churches and the Tasks of Mission: Inculturation," Consensus Paper Workshop II (CPW II), in *For All the Peoples of Asia: Federation of Asian Bishops' Conferences Documents from 1970-1991*, edited by Gaudencio Rosales, DD and Catalino G. Arevalo, SJ, vol. 1 (Quezon City/Maryknoll, NY: Claretian Publications/Orbis Books, 1992), p. 138, pars. 6-7.

To attune the communities, it becomes imperative that the baptized, the consecrated and ordained leaders/ministers are formed in this mystagogy with its underlying spirituality and theology. It means spearheading a collaborative ministry in which the baptized, the consecrated and the ordained work together. Second, such collaboration calls for pooling the the diverse competencies and resources to offer ongoing formation of the committed leaders/ministers of the different parishes, schools and related ministries. The aim is to awaken these ministers to engage in the building up of inculturated communities through the various ecclesial ministries. This formation in inculturation has two interrelated moments: first, the integration with their own living local traditions, and second, with the other living traditions of the primal and world religions in their midst. Such ongoing faith formation aims to facilitate the inculturation of their faith in the local contexts so as to empower the faithful in their evangelizing mission. In this way, the leaders/ministers are capacitated with the necessary knowledge and skills to exercise a discerning sensitivity in their everyday interaction, understanding and incorporation of the attitudes, dispositions, values, worldviews of their own living traditions, and also those of the primal and world religions.

A case in point of an inculturated Church is reflected in the faith-life of the parishes situated in northern Vietnam.[14] In closing my eyes, the melodic chants find deep resonance in the recesses of my heart as I listen contemplatively to the faithful engaging in chanted prayers before and after Mass. These chants are characterized by a slow, rhythmic, and nasal cantillation, related to traditional, indigenous melodic chants/practices known as *Đọc Kinh* (or *Ngắm* in specific contexts). *Đọc Kinh* (or *Ngắm) is known to recourse to* ancient Vietnamese poetic forms and local melodic traditions integrated into the worship of the Catholic faithful in the daily and weekend masses. The early missionaries[15] recourse

[14] Based on my personal observation, participation in the St. Joseph Feast Day Celebration on April 27, May 1 and 2, 2026 in the sub-parishes of Hiệp Lực, Thanh Hoa and Thanh Hà, outside of Hanoi, northern Vietnam.

[15] The early Jesuit missionaries responsible for composing *Đọc Kinh* or *Ngắm* are Alexandre de Rhodes SJ (1591-1660), Girolamo Maiorica SJ (1591–1656),

to chants (often in the *song thất lục bát* poetic form, or "double seven, six eight") that were adapted from traditional Vietnamese folklore and folk-style theatrical lamentation (*chèo*, *tuồng*). These chants make different Catholic devotions more accessible to Catholics in local parishes during regular liturgical and feast-day celebrations, such as their devotion to St. Joseph on May 1st and the month of Mother Mary in May and October. Nevertheless, these chants, including the *Ngắm Mùa Chay* (Lenten meditations) and others, have been preserved and inculturated across different dioceses throughout Vietnam, often with minor variations that match local dialects and tonal structures.

Such devotional chants point to a living stream of popular religiosity of the Catholic faithful in Vietnam, at once local and Catholic. The integration with their local living traditions as *Kinh* has become a communally embodied religiosity which forms a bedrock of their vibrant faith which is now deeply *integrated into* their worship. This embodied religiosity is dynamic because it is a living faith which is inextricably *interwoven with* their living local traditions. This firm bedrock forms the ecclesial matrix that reflects a collective memory of passing on the lived traditions in a process which I call "historic tradition-ing" in the last four centuries of a dynamic efforts at inculturation of the faith in the Church of Vietnam. And it is truly an inculturated Vietnamese faith of the majority of the *Kinh* who have embraced Catholicism since the 17th Century. It is the living Catholic tradition that keeps alive the *sensus fidei,* an internal, Spirit-led capacity for the faithful to discern truth in accordance with the Gospel, allowing them to "*sentire cum Ecclesia*" (think/feel intimately with the Church) as an inculturated Vietnamese Church. Looking in as an outsider, I recognize in all humility that the Gospel communicated by the early missionaries from Europe is today a felt and lived Catholic faith with a Vietnamese face, praying in *Đọc Kinh*, worshiping in unison of mind and heart the God known to the faithful as *Thiên Chúa*.[16]

Francisco de Pina SJ, Gaspar do Amaral SJ, and Antonio Barbosa SJ.

[16] Warmest gratitude to Fr. Phạm Quang Khanh SJ for proof-reading this paragraph on an inculturated Vietnamese Church.

"Listening deeply" as a mystagogy has enabled the missionaries of the past and today to inculturate the Catholic faith in the various living traditions of the *Kinh* Catholics. Gradually, the *Kinh* baptized, consecrated and ordained missionaries will inculturate the Catholics of the indigenous communities, such as the Jarai, the Hmong, Khmer… etc. This mystagogy will certainly facilitate the further inculturation of the faith/church in the *Kinh*'s plural living traditions and the incorporation of the noble values of the living traditions of fellow neighbors and co-pilgrims of the primal and world religions in the urban and rural residences.

Conclusion

Amidst the ebbs and flux of life in the Church universal, occasioned by the ever-changing yet updated theological presuppositions, aggiornamento draws the Church to the need for a ministerial praxis of personal and communal discernment. This process of discernment involves engaging in this ministry of "listening deeply" as a synodal Church to the signs of the times based on identifying the mega-trends which affect the grassroots/*minjung*/*tao* people. Moreover, the signs of the times are revelatory of God and God's saving actions as God faithfully communicates through the splendor of creation/cosmos, in particular, the *han*/cries of the poor and the wounded earth.

An inculturated Church, with the faith deeply embedded in the living traditions of the faithful, becomes the necessary context for engaging in the ministerial praxis of "listening deeply" to God. This praxis opens the Church to be guided by God's Spirit in becoming a synodal Church, characterized by intimate communion and active participation, with committed engagement in the Church's evangelizing mission. In this mission, inculturation is inseparable, as we allow ourselves to be encountered by God in and through the everyday interaction/dialogue of life with the religious Other who are steeped in their plural living religio-cultural traditions with their multifaceted richness of the popular religiosities of the primal and world religions in Asia.

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TENSIONS IN TRANSLATING: THE CASE OF THE *MISA NG BAYANG PILIPINO*[1]

Teofilo Giovan S. Pugeda III

Abstract. The *Misa ng Bayang Pilipino* (MBP) is an attempt at liturgical inculturation. Yet the inaction of the Roman Curia in the 1990s regarding the MBP is partly explainable by the MBP's use of the dynamic equivalence theory of translation and inculturated expression at a moment when norms on translation promoted by the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments were shifting towards the formal equivalence theory. As a result, it appears that the MBP came into tension with the policy changes for liturgical translation at the time. In a certain way, the translational differences between the MBP and the *Aklat ng Pagmimisa sa Roma* reflect the differences in the liturgical norms of translation between *Comme le prévoit* (1969) and *Liturgiam authenticam* (2001).

Keywords: inculturation, liturgy, *Misa ng Bayang Pilipino*, translation

Introduction

Sacrosanctum Concilium states "*Attamen Liturgia est culmen ad quod actio Ecclesiae tendit et simul fons unde omnis eius virtus emanat* (the liturgy is the summit toward which the activity of the Church is directed; at the same time it is the font from which all her power flows)."[2] Still, liturgical studies is partially a field of tensions in the Church, and one

[1] GenAI Disclosure Statement: GenAI was not used in any aspect of this paper.

[2] Cf. Second Vatican Council, *Constitutio De Sacra Liturgia Sacrosanctum Concilium* (December 4, 1963), § 10, *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 56 (1964), p. 102; Vatican Archives,

liturgical issue highlights something worth further examination. The *Misa ng Bayang Pilipino* (MBP) is an attempt at liturgical inculturation. Yet the inaction of the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments (CDWDS) in the 1990s regarding the MBP is partly explainable by the MBP's use of the dynamic equivalence theory of translation and inculturated expression at a moment when norms on translation promoted by the CDWDS were shifting towards the formal equivalence theory. As a result, it appears that the MBP came into tension with the policy changes for liturgical translation at the time. In a certain way, the translational differences between the MBP and the *Aklat ng Pagmimisa sa Roma* reflect the differences in the liturgical norms of translation between *Comme le prévoit* (1969) and *Liturgiam authenticam* (2001). In what follows, I present (1) liturgical translation efforts in the Philippines, (2) a description of the *Aklat ng Pagmimisa sa Roma*, (3) a history of the *Misa ng Bayang Pilipino*, (4) some translational nuances between the two, (5) a discussion of the dynamic and formal equivalence theories of translation, (6) and an evaluation of the *Misa ng Bayang Pilipino* through the lenses of Church documents, focusing on *Comme le prévoit* and *Liturgiam authenticam*. To be clear, I do not presume to discern in every respect the wisdom of the magisterium or question it without regard for magisterial prerogatives; instead, I intend overall to promote greater love and appreciation for the liturgy.

Liturgical Translation Efforts in the Philippines

Early translation efforts in the Philippines occurred with the Spanish missionary attempts to use the languages of the natives, which differed structurally from Romance languages, thereby creating linguistic challenges. Fr. Jose Mario C. Francisco, SJ contends that a cultural reading of translation efforts in the Philippines suggests that the process of translating was marked early on by a more fluid or flexible approach necessitated by the different linguistic characteristics between

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https://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19631204_sacrosanctum-concilium_en.html, no. 10.

the Romance and native languages.[3] Consequently, works of translation like the *Doctrina Christiana en lengua española y tagala* emerged. While not strictly set in a liturgical context, these translation attempts helped foster the basis for religious sensibilities, phrasing, and terminologies in Tagalog that would broadly structure liturgical vernacularization in later times. Vicente Rafael adds that "for the Tagalogs, translation was a process less of internalizing colonial-Christian conventions than of evading their totalizing grip by repeatedly marking the differences between their language and interests and those of the Spaniards."[4] It does not mean that there was always an active effort to differentiate when translating into Tagalog. Rather, the dynamic influence of fluidity and flexibility was historically imbued in the translation efforts. Francisco highlights the challenge of ensuring fidelity amid fluidity and flexibility, which entails conveying:

> The 'meaning of the original' by subsequently expressing it in the new language: 'this absolute criterion [of what would count as good translation] would be the same meaning, written somewhere on the top of and between the original text and the target text This third text would be the bearer of the identical meaning, supposed to move from the first to the second' (*On Translation* 34).[5]

A general purview of translating theological words is helpful to examine the process. Stanislaw Schabowicz, citing Wojciech Kluj, lays out four principles for effective translations: dual faithfulness between Christian doctrine and local culture, cultural reference to the local language, dynamic language, and communal meaning.[6] In the context

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[3] Jose Mario C. Francisco, S.J., "Fidelity in Translating Religious Practice: Illustrations from Filipino Christianity," *Kritika Kultura* 21/22 (2013/2014): 204-209, doi:10.13185/1656-152X.1507.

[4] Vicente L. Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society under Early Spanish Rule* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1988), 211.

[5] Francisco, "Fidelity in Translating Religious Practice," 207.

[6] Stanisław Schabowicz, "Translating the Sacraments of Christian Initiation: A Linguistic and Cultural Analysis in the Tagalog Context," *Studia Ełckie* 27, no.

of the Philippines, Tagalog can have a variety of translations for the same Latin word. Schabowicz gives the example of *Kaligtasan*, which can theologically mean "salvation" but also means "medical alleviation." One notable characteristic of Tagalog is that it is open to adopting foreign words changed into Tagalog spelling and pronunciation. *Communion* easily becomes *komunyon*. What is interesting is determining whether to retain the linguistic roots or use an entirely different local word. *Baptism* could be either *bautismo* or *binyag*. Yet the former is very rarely used in common speech, while the latter is prevalent. It is worth remembering that certain theological words or phrases may not translate well if the linguistic roots are retained. Alternatively, others may not translate well either if an entirely different local word is used.

Aklat ng Pagmimisa sa Roma

The liturgical reforms were implemented in the Philippines following the Second Vatican Council. Efforts at liturgical inculturation have been undertaken by Filipino liturgists like Fr. Anscar J. Chupungco, OSB. It is arguable that translating texts is a form of inculturation because it is an exercise in conceptual transcultural mediation. The official work of translation of liturgical texts was undertaken by the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines through the Episcopal Commission on Liturgy (ECL).[7] The ECL would form the National Liturgical Commission (NLC) in 1975 for the purpose of translating the Roman Missal and other texts into Tagalog. Under the NLC was the Regional Commission on Tagalog in the Liturgy, coordinated by Ricardo Cardinal Vidal and headed by Msgr. Moises Andrade. Every diocese in the Tagalog region sent a representative. The Commission began the work of translation on 11 March 1975.[8] The bishops of the

[7] Dennis C. Amarante, "A Survey of Literatures on Post-Vatican II Liturgical Reforms in the Philippines," *Philippiniana Sacra* 57, no. 173 (May–August 2022): 275–94.

[8] Ricardo Cardinal Vidal, "Philippines: Notes on the Tagalog Translation of the Roman Missal," *Notitiae* 18, num. 6-7 (1982): 367.

Tagalog region approved the Ordinary of the *Aklat ng Pagmimisa sa Roma* (ANPSR) on 18 April 1978.[9] The Commission submitted their work and other translated texts on 9 June 1978 to the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments (CDWDS). The CDWDS gave its confirmation on 13 July 1979 to the ANPSR.[10] Later on, the Holy Week Rites and other parts of the ANPSR were submitted on 30 June 1981, and the CDWDS gave its confirmation on 8 August 1981.[11] The whole ANPSR was completed and approved by 1981. Three years later, the CDWDS reported:

> While Tagalog has practically all the liturgical books, except the Rite for Christian Initiation of Adults and Liturgy of the Hours, in official translations confirmed by the Apostolic See, Ilocano, Bikol, Pampango, Pangasinan, Cebuano, Samarenyo, and Hiligaynon have the Order of Mass, Baptism for Children, and Rite of Marriage in official vernacular renditions with [the] Apostolic See's confirmation.[12]

Fr. Chupungco and Fr. Florencio P. Salvador argued that the liturgical use of the vernacular has led to increased participation and enrichment among the faithful.[13] Meanwhile, Fr. Amelito Racelis, SDB notes that the Rite of Baptism of Children, Rite of Marriage, and

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[9] Ibid., 367.

[10] Ibid., 368; Cf. also Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments (CDWDS), "*Libri Liturigici Officiales*," *Notitiae* 18, num. 12 (1982): 815.

[11] Cf. CDWDS, "*Acta Congregationis: Summarium Decretorum*," *Notitiae* 18, num. 184 (1981): 537; Vidal, "Philippines: Notes on the Tagalog Translation of the Roman Missal," 368.

[12] *Congregazione per il Culto Divino* [Congregation for Divine Worship], *Atti del Convegno dei Presidenti e Segretari delle Commissioni Nazionali di Liturgia* (Padova: Edizioni Messaggero Padova, 1986), 539.

[13] Anscar J. Chupungco, OSB, "The Liturgical Reform of Vatican II: The Philippine Experience," *Asian Perspectives in the Arts and Humanities* 1, no. 2 (2011): 79-80; Florencio P. Salvador, "The Eucharist in the Philippines: Lay Ministry and Active Participation," in *The Constitution on the Liturgy and its Impact on the Philippine Church* (Manila: CBCP Episcopal Commission on Liturgy, 2012), 38.

Funeral Liturgy have also been translated into other local languages, such as Kapampangan, Ilocano, Pangasinense, Bicolano, Cebuano, Hiligaynon, and Binisaya (Waray).[14] As recently as 2025, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Fernando completed and began using a Kapampangan translation of the third *editio typica* of the *Missale Romanum*.[15] As yet, there is still no official Roman Curial approval for it, and there are also other local languages without translation. For reference, there are over 100 languages in the Philippines. It would be impractical to translate liturgical texts into many of them as per *Decem iam annos*, which warns against translating into languages with few speakers to avoid fragmentation.[16] But, in principle, there is pastoral consideration to explore more avenues for liturgical translations. Arguably, the liturgical translation process is still an open work with much to consider.

Critiques followed the liturgical translation process. As early as 1983, Msgr. Sabino Vengco, HP questioned several translational decisions made concerning the ANPSR at the time.[17] For instance, in the opening prayer for the First Sunday of Advent, the Latin "*regnum… cæléste*" was translated into *pinaghaharian*.[18] Yet the absence of the Tagalog equivalent of the adjective *cæléste* (heavenly), for Vengco, misses

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[14] Amarante, "A Survey of Literatures on Post-Vatican II Liturgical Reforms in the Philippines," 284-285, citing Amelito Racelis, SDB, "The Impact of *Sacrosanctum Concilium* on the Celebration of Baptisms, Marriages and Funerals in the Philippines," in *The Constitution on the Liturgy and its Impact on the Philippine Church* (Manila: CBCP Episcopal Commission on Liturgy, 2012), 58-59.

[15] Tonette T. Orejas, "Kapampangan Language Finds New Life in Liturgy," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, February 2, 2025, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/2030530/kapampangan-language-finds-new-life-in-liturgy.

[16] CDWDS, "*Epistola ad presides conferentiarum episcopalium de linguis vulgaribus in sacram liturgiam inducendis (Decem iam annos),*" *Notitiae* 12, num, 8-9 (1976): 300-302.

[17] Sabino Vengco, "*Aklat ng Pagmimisa sa Roma: A Critique,*" *Philippine Studies* 31, no. 2 (1983): 253–271.

[18] Cf. Vengco, "*Aklat ng Pagmimisa sa Roma: A Critique,*" 255. The original Latin of the said opening prayer is as follows: "*Da, quǽsumus, omnípotens Deus, hanc tuis*

the eschatological dimension of the phrase.[19] Overall a recurring refrain for him is that some of the Tagalog translations in the ANPSR are not adequate in conveying certain theological nuances in the Latin, like not including at the end of the long form presidential prayers *Dominus noster, Filius tuus*, which highlights the mediatorship of Jesus.[20] Additionally, Vengco thought that the ANPSR takes unwarranted liberties in rhyming and innovations. He claimed the presidential prayers of the ANPSR begin with *Ama namin* or Our Father intending to establish a link with the Lord's prayer and the Jewish eighteen benedictions, despite weak evidence for such a link.[21]

History of the *Misa ng Bayang Pilipino*

Whereas the ANPSR is the normative and Roman Curia-approved translation of the *Missale Romanum*, there is another locally approved liturgical text in the *Misa ng Bayang Pilipino* (MBP).[22] It is alternatively known as *the Misa ng Sambayanang Pilipino*. Preparations began in 1974 at the Maryhill School of Theology under the direction of Fr. Anscar Chupungco. The following documents guided the process: The General Instruction on the Roman Missal, *Au Cours des Deniers Mois* (1968), *Comme le prévoit* (1969), the Rescript for India (1969), and *Eucharistiae Partipationem* (1973). On August 21, 1975, the translated text, based on the second *editio typica* of the *Missale Romanum*, was submitted to consultants. Three major revisions occurred by the next month. The

fidélibus voluntátem, ut, Christo tuo veniénti iustis opéribus occurréntes, eius déxteræ sociáti, regnum mereántur possidére cæléste. Per Dominum."

[19] Ibid. He compared the Latin original with that of the ANPSR: "*Ama naming makapangyarihan, bigyan mo kami ng paninindigang tumahak sa landas ng kabutihan. Sa pagdating ni Kristo makasalubong nawa kaming may mabubuting gawa upang kapiling niya sa gawing kanan kami ay makapisan sa iyong pinaghaharian sa pamamagitan niya kasama ng Espiritu Santo magpasawalang hanggan.*"

[20] Vengco, "*Aklat ng Pagmimisa sa Roma*: A Critique," 263.

[21] Vengco, "*Aklat ng Pagmimisa sa Roma*: A Critique," 259.

[22] Anscar J. Chupungco, O.S.B., *Toward a Filipino Liturgy* (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 1976), 88-93.

draft was then examined by the National Liturgical Commission, which, as will be recalled, was also working on the ANPSR in the same time period. In January 1976, the text was accepted by the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP).[23] Five months later, the final text was reviewed by an ad hoc committee of bishops and then submitted under the title "Roman Order of Mass for the Dioceses in the Philippines" to Rome for approval. After revisions following Roman Curial feedback and inspiration from the *Missel Romain pour les Diocèses du Zaïre* (1988), the CBCP submitted the MBP once more for Roman Curial approval in July 1991.[24] The revised version of the MBP aligned more with the *Missale Romanum*. Notably, the MBP has only two Eucharistic Prayers. To date, the Dicastery for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments (the CDWDS renamed) has still not given its *recognitio* to it, but the MBP has been occasionally used in the Philippine Conference on New Evangelization. I advance later that the 1991 inaction of the CDWDS for the MBP might be partly explained by its reliance on dynamic equivalence at a time when magisterial norms were gradually shifting towards formal equivalence, preferring fidelity to the *Missale Romanum* over dynamic expressions. Unfortunately, public documents on the issue are sparse, but circumstances may reveal truth on the matter. While the MBP is an inculturated rite with local practices integrated into the liturgy, what is of interest here are the texts. Since the translated texts in the 1976 MBP predate the ones in the approved 1981 ANPSR by some years, some of their wordings differ. Chupungco wrote that:

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[23] Fr. Florencio Testera, OP, "The CBCP at Work: A Systematic Compilation of the Major Decisions Taken by the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines – January 1964 – July 1979," *Boletin Eclesiastico de Filipinas* 54, nos. 602-603 (January-February 1980): 41. "The *Misa ng Bayang Pilipino*, prepared by the Maryhill School of Theology, had been accepted by the bishops at their meeting in January 1976. The bishops made one further change, then accepted the text unanimously, and forwarded it to Rome for confirmation. It is still under study by Rome."

[24] Anscar J. Chupungco, OSB, "Shaping the Filipino Order of Mass," in *Worship: Beyond Inculturation* (Washington, DC: Pastoral Press, 1994), 129-156.

> Language plays an essential role in the liturgy. The liturgy is made up of two basic elements, namely proclaimed texts and gestures. As regards the language of the *Misa*, much effort was made, including several consultations with experts in the Tagalog language, in order to ensure that the texts, when proclaimed or sung, are clear, dignified, and prayerful. The language is also slightly poetic, and often observes terminal as well as internal rhyme. Filipinos have a predilection for sentences that rhyme and place value on rhythmic cadence in solemn speech. Because of the cultural value of idioms, the Misa is attentive to idiomatic speech.[25]

Some Translational Nuances between the ANPSR and the MBP

The liturgical structure between the ANPSR and MBP is largely similar. However, the ANPSR employs a formal form of Filipino that is faithful to Latin syntax, theological precision, and traditional liturgical formulas, thereby emphasizing the universality of the Roman Rite and ensuring doctrinal consistency. On the other hand, the MBP uses a more colloquial, poetic, and dialogical Filipino, drawing heavily from Filipino cultural expressions, oral styles, and communal speech. The translation is made to sound like the prayer of the people themselves rather than a direct translation of the Latin liturgical texts. As an example of the translational nuances between them, the following table compares their Eucharistic Prayer 1 (The Roman Canon) with the *Missale Romanum*.[26] Some select corresponding portions are identifiable

[25] Anscar J. Chupungco, OSB, "Inculturation of Worship: Forty Years of Progress and Tradition," *Institute of Liturgical Studies Occasional Papers* (2003): 8, http://scholar.valpo.edu/ils_papers/5.

[26] The English translation of the Eucharistic prayer 1 excerpt is as follows: "Be pleased, O God, we pray to bless, acknowledge, and approve this offering in every respect; make it spiritual and acceptable, so **that it may become for us the Body and Blood of your most beloved Son, our Lord Jesus Christ**. / On the day before he was to suffer he took bread **in his holy and venerable hands,** and with eyes raised to heaven to you, O God, his almighty Father, **giving you thanks** he said the blessing, **broke the bread and gave it to his disciples, saying**: / Take this, all of you, and eat of it: For this is my body which will be given up for you. / In a similar way, when supper was ended, **he took this precious chalice in his holy and venerable hands**, and once more giving you

with the following order: (1) bold, (2) underline, (3) bold, and (4) bold with underline.

Missale Romanum, Editio Typica Altera	**ANPSR**	**MBP[27]**
Quam oblatiónem tu, Deus, in ómnibus, quáesumus, benedíctam, adscríptam, ratam, rationábilem, acceptabilémque fácere dignéris: ***ut nobis Corpus et Sanguis fiat dilectíssimi Fílii tui, Dómini nostri Iesu Christi.***	*Ama namin, basbasan mo ang mga handog naming ito. Marapatin mong sambahin ka namin sa Espiritu at katotohanan, kaya para sa amin ito ay gawin mong* ***maging Katawan at Dugo ng pinakamamahal mong Anak, ang aming Panginoong Hesukristo.***	*Amang makapangyarihan, ipagkaloob mo sa iyong Simbahan ang Espiritu ng kabanalan: isinasamo namin na lukuban niya at italaga ang tinapay at alak na aming alay upang ang mga ito'y* ***maging katawan at dugo ng aming Panginoong si Hesukristo.***

thanks, he said the blessing **and gave the chalice to his disciples, saying**: / Take this, all of you, and drink from it: For this is the Chalice of my blood, the blood of the new and eternal covenant, which will be poured out for you and for many for the forgiveness of sins. Do this in memory of me."

[27] The MBP texts found in the table were used in the context of the Philippine Conference on New Evangelization. As such, they reflect the changes made after 1991 following Roman Curial feedback. In other words, they are not the original texts drafted by the Maryhill School of Theology in 1974. The original texts were the following: "*Ama naming Mapagmahal, ipagkaloob mo ang iyong Espiritu Santo upang kanyang lukuban at basbasan ang mga alay na ito, sapagka't tandang-tanda pa namin, noong gabing ipagkanulo siya habang silay nagsasalu-salo sa huling pagkakataon kinuha niya ang tinapay. nagpasalamat sa iyo, hinati-hati iyon at ibinigay sa kanyang mga alagad na ang wika: Tanggapin ninyong lahat ito at kanin: ito ang aking katawan na ihahain nang dahil sa inyo. Gayon din naman, kinuha niya ang kalis, muling nagpasalamat sa iyo at nagpuri na ang wika: Tanggapin ninyong lahat ito at inumin: ito ang aking dugo, dugo ng bago at walang-hanggang tipan na sa inyo at sa lahat ay ibububo sa ikapagpapatawad ng mga kasalanan. Ipagdiwang ninyo ang hapunang ito bilang pag-aalaala sa akin.*" See: Chupungco, *Toward a Filipino Liturgy*, 106.

Qui, prídie quam paterétur, accépit panem **in sanctas ac venerábiles manus suas**, *et elevátis óculis in caelum ad te Deum Patrem suum omnipoténtem*, **tibi grátias** *agens benedíxit,* **fregit, dedítque discípulis suis, dicens**:	*Noong bisperas ng kanyang pagpapakasakit para kami at ang lahat ng tao ay masagip, nakisalo siya ngayon sa mga alagad niyang iniibig. Hinawakan ni Hesus ang tinapay* **sa kanyang banal at kagalang-galang na mga kamay**. *Tumingala siya sa langit, sa iyo, Diyos Ama niyang makapangyarihan,* **at nagpasalamat siya sa iyo**. **Pinaghati-hati niya ang tinapay, iniabot sa kanyang mga alagad at sinabi**:	*Sapagkat tandang-tanda pa namin, noong gabi bago siya magpakasakit, habang siya at ang kanyang mga alagad ay nagsasalu-salo sa huling pagkakataon, hinawakan niya ang tinapay,* **pinasalamatan ka niya, pinaghati-hati niya iyon, iniabot sa kanyang mga alagad at sinabi**:
Accipite et manducate ex hoc omnes: Hoc est enim corpus meum. Quod pro vobis tradetur.	*Tanggapin ninyong lahat ito at kanin: ito ang aking katawan na ihahandog para sa inyo.*	*Tanggapin ninyong lahat ito at kanin: ito ang aking katawan na ihahandog para sa inyo.*
Símili modo, postquam cenátum est, accípiens et hunc præclárum cálicem **in sanctas ac venerábiles manus suas**, *item tibi grátias agens benedíxit,* **dedítque discípulis suis, dicens**:	*Gayun din naman, noong matapos ang hapunan, hinawakan niya ang kalis na ito ng pagpapala* **sa kanyang banal at kagalang-galang na mga kamay**, *muli ka niyang pinasalamatan,* **iniabot niya ang kalis sa kanyang mga alagad at sinabi**:	*Gayun din naman, pagkatapos ng hapunan, hinawakan niya ang kalis, muli ka niyang pinasalamatan,* **iniabot niya iyon sa kanyang mga alagad, at sinabi**:

Accipite et bibite ex eo omnes: Hic est enim Calix Sanguinis mei, novi et aeterni testamenti: mysterium fidei, qui pro vobis et pro multis effundetur in remissionem peccatorum.	*Tanggapin ninyong lahat ito at inumin: ito ang kalis ng aking dugo ng bago at walang hanggang tipan, ang aking dugo na ibubuhos para sa inyo at para sa lahat sa ikapagpapatawad ng mga kasalanan. Gawin ninyo ito sa pag-alala sa akin.*	*Tanggapin ninyong lahat ito at inumin: ito ang kalis ng aking dugo ng bago at walang hanggang tipan, ang aking dugo na ibubuhos para sa inyo at para sa lahat sa ikapagpapatawad ng mga kasalanan. Gawin ninyo ito sa pag-alala sa akin.*

The consecratory words of both are the same for sacramental validity. But the MBP takes liberties elsewhere in translation to promote an inculturated liturgy. While the topic of inculturation is quite broad, it can be seen above in limited terms how cultural attitudes characterize translation. Anscar Chupungco framed the original Eucharistic Prayer 1 of the MBP as expressing "values that Filipinos traditionally cherish: reciprocity (*pagtitiwala*, *utang na loob*, *pagpupuno ng kakulangan*) and solidarity (*pakikisama*, *pakikiramay*)."[28] Nevertheless, compared with other parts of the Eucharistic Prayer, Edward Foley observes:

> The central core of the Eucharistic Prayer—consecratory epiclesis, institution narrative, anamnesis, offering, and communion epiclesis—follows more closely the formulae found in the Roman Missal. Notable nuances occur in the consecratory epiclesis, which prays for the Spirit to be given to the church (*ipagkaloob mo sa iyong Simbahan ang Espiritu ng kabanalan*, 'Grant to your Church the Spirit of Holiness') and not simply to come upon the elements of bread and wine as in the official Latin text. This inculturated epiclesis also seems to mirror the prefaces' emphasis on relationality. The use of *ipagkaloob* ('grant') is significant as it 'contains the sense of giving a gift (*kaloob*) … that comes from one's heart (*loob*).' As there is no equivalent word in Filipino for '*epiclesis*,' the text uses *lukaban*, which 'literally means 'to hatch' [or take under the wing], an action which is

[28] Anscar J. Chupungco, OSB, *Misa ng Bayang Pilipino: A Study on Liturgical Indigenization* (Manila: Benedictine Abbey, 1975), 18.

> transferred here to the action of the Holy Spirit on the gifts.' Similar language is employed in the communion *epiclesis*, during which 'the priest stretches out his arms towards the people.' *Ipagkaloob* is again invoked, implying that the Holy Spirit is a 'heart' gift. *Lukuban* also again appears here, which Malit translates as the Spirit taking us 'lovingly under his wings.'[29]

Additionally, outside the consecratory words, the other translated words in the ANPSR maintain a more formal sacramental language. For example, the ANPSR uses the more descriptive words: "*Hinawakan ni Hesus ang tinapay sa kanyang banal at kagalang-galang na mga kamay. Tumingala siya sa langit, sa iyo, Diyos Ama niyang makapangyarihan, at nagpasalamat siya sa iyo*" and "*na ito ng pagpapala sa kanyang banal at kagalang-galang na mga kamay*." One illustrative point of dispute was that the word "*Hinawakan*" was deemed less preferable than "*Kinuha*," which local liturgists thought more accurate to the Latin "*accepit*."[30] On the other hand, the ones in the MBP frame the Eucharist more within a context of shared experience, emphasizing communal faith and memory. For example, the MBP uses: "*ipagkaloob mo sa iyong Simbahan ang Espiritu ng kabanalan*" and "*Sapagkat tandang-tanda pa namin*." Interestingly, both the ANPSR and MBP either do not translate some parts of the *Missale Romanum* or they include parts not found there. Both begin with an invocation of the Spirit, which is not in the *Missale Romanum*. Both also omit to translate "*agens benedixit*." The reasons for these are not entirely clear. To better grasp the significance of these translational nuances, they must be evaluated not only linguistically but also in terms of their theoretical underpinnings.

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[29] Edward Foley, "Liturgical Inculturation: Decolonization or Decolonialization? Examining *Misa ng Bayang Pilipino,*" *Asia Journal of Theology* 35, no. 1 (April 2021): 96, citing Jesus Malit, "From *Berakah* to *Misa ng Bayang Pilipino*," (EDMin Thesis-Project, Catholic Theological Union, 2001), 109, 111, 113-114 and *Supplement to the Roman Sacramentary for the Dioceses of the Philippines* (Pasay City: Paulines Publishing House, 1999), 160, 171 and 199.

[30] Timoteo Jose M. Ofrasio, S.J., "The New Translation of the Roman Missal and Liturgical Renewal," *Loyola School of Theology*, February 14, 2012, https://lst.edu/articles/the-new-translation-of-the-roman-missal-and-liturgical-renewal-t-ofrasio-sj/.

Theories of Translation

As was earlier mentioned, the MBP did not receive *recognitio* from the CDWDS in the 1990s. I advance that one of the possible reasons (i.e., not entirely) for such inaction is that the texts found therein did not align as well with the magisterial preference on translation at the time of submission. For clarity, the first translated texts of the MBP and ANPSR drew on the second *editio typica* of the *Missale Romanum*, but the former resorted to dynamic equivalence theory more so than the latter. It will be recalled that the two equivalence theories on translation are formal and dynamic (functional). Both theories of translation have their strengths and weaknesses, and a given context largely influences which of the two is the more appropriate one to use. Eugene Nida introduced the two theories in *Toward a Science of Translating*. There, he described formal equivalence as "focus[ing] attention on the message itself, in both form and content."[31] Meanwhile, Nida viewed dynamic equivalence as emphasizing the meaning of a text in ways that "the relationship between receptor and message should be substantially the same as that which existed between the original receptor and message."[32] These two theories are relevant to scriptural and liturgical translations. In the context of the latter, formal translation emphasizes an accurate or as proximate as possible word-for-word translation of the *editio typica* of the *Missale Romanum*, while dynamic emphasizes more the naturalness of expression, if at the occasional expense of the original wording and/or syntax.

Through the Lenses of Church Documents

The foundational document for liturgical translation is the 1963 Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy of the Second Vatican Council, *Sacrosanctum Concilium*. Therein, active lay participation is highly desired. Some of the more relevant sections regarding translation are:

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[31] Eugene Nida, *Toward a Science of Translating*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1964), 159.

[32] Nida, *Toward a Science of Translating*, 159.

> Paragraph 36.2: But since the use of the mother tongue, whether in the Mass, the administration of the sacraments, or other parts of the liturgy, frequently may be of great advantage to the people, the limits of its employment may be extended. This will apply in the first place to the readings and directives, and to some of the prayers and chants, according to the regulations on this matter to be laid down separately in subsequent chapters.
>
> Paragraph 36.4: Translations from the Latin text into the mother tongue intended for use in the liturgy must be approved by the competent territorial ecclesiastical authority mentioned above.[33]

Six years after the promulgation of *Sacrosanctum Concilium* (and six years prior to the drafting of the MBP), the document *Comme le prévoit* (CLP) was published in 1969.[34] However, CLP was published solely by Consilium, an *ad hoc* commission tasked by Pope Paul VI in 1964 to implement the principles of *Sacrosanctum Concilium*. The commission was headed by Fr. Annibale Bugnini and would soon merge with the CDWDS in 1969. As a matter of approach, CLP is generally concerned with making the translated texts as smooth as possible for the people to understand as per the dynamic equivalence theory.

The Roman Curia (through the Sacred Congregation of Rites, but renamed as the Congregation of Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments from 1969 onwards) issued five instructional documents on how to further apply the principles of *Sacrosanctum Concilium*. These documents were: *Inter Oecumenici* (1964), *Tres abhinc annos* (1967), *Liturgicae instaurationes* (1970), and *Varietates legitimae* (1994). Finally, in 2001, the CDWDS published the fifth instruction, *Liturgiam authenticam* (LA).[35] One other Church document related to translation

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[33] *Sacrosanctum Concilium*, no. 36.

[34] Consilium for Implementing the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, "*Comme le prévoit*: On the Translation of Liturgical Texts for Celebrations with a Congregation," *Liturgy Office England and Wales*, January 25, 1969, https://www.liturgyoffice.org.uk/Missal/Information/Comme-le-Prevoit.pdf.

[35] Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments, *Liturgiam Authenticam*, May 7, 2001, Vatican Archives, https://www.vatican.va/

is the *motu proprio* apostolic letter *Magnum principium* (2017) by Pope Francis. For purposes here, I will focus on the last two instructions in relation to CLP, particularly as the context in which the MBP was resubmitted in 1991 for Roman Curial approval. A presentation of the events and texts of the time will prove to be helpful in discerning Roman Curial inaction.

The *status quo* at the time of the resubmission of the MBP was the following: the prevailing instruction on translation was *Liturgicae instaurationes*, which inclined towards the dynamic equivalence theory. So, the MBP was submitted at a time when the dynamic equivalence theory was still in vogue. However, the MBP was resubmitted three years before the publication of *Varietates legitimae* (VL), which was on inculturation but hinted at a gradual shift from dynamic equivalence towards formal equivalence. Consider the following two paragraphs. VL paragraph 53 states: "Different literary genres are to be respected, and *the content of the texts of the Latin typical edition is to be preserved*; at the same time the translations must be understandable to participants (cf. above No. 39), suitable for proclamation and singing, with appropriate responses and acclamations by the assembly (italics added)."[36] VL paragraph 54 adds:

> For the celebration of the eucharist, the Roman Missal, 'while allowing ... for legitimate differences and adaptations according to the prescriptions of the Second Vatican Council,' *must remain* '*a sign and instrument of unity*' *of the Roman rite in different languages* (italics added).'[37]

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roman_curia/congregations/ccdds/documents/rc_con_ccdds_doc_20010507_liturgiam-authenticam_en.html.

[36] Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Principal Sacraments, "*Varietates Legitimae*: Inculturation and the Roman Liturgy," *Adoremus*, January 25, 1994, https://adoremus.org/1994/03/instruction-inculturation-and-the-roman-liturgy/.

[37] *Varietates Legitimae*, no. 54.

The proximity to the publication of VL suggests that the MBP was resubmitted to a CDWDS moving to formal equivalency.[38] This notion was reinforced when discussions on a new instruction began in 1997. These would culminate four years later with the publication of LA, which put in clearer terms the preference of the CDWDS for fidelity to the Latin texts of the *editio typica* of the *Missale Romanum*.

Reflecting Tensions Between *Comme Le Prévoit* and *Liturgiam Authenticam*

The MBP and ANPSR were drafted when CLP was one of the principle guiding texts for translation. However, only the ANPSR received *recognitio* from the Roman Curia. For that reason, there is a liturgical expectation that it aligns with magisterial norms on translation. The MBP, on the other hand, is still pending in the Roman Curia. Understandably, since the Roman Curia already approved the ANPSR, it cannot allow two official translations to coexist simultaneously in a particular Church. Why the Roman Curia did not give it *recognitio* in the 1970s and 80s is beyond the present scope. After all, as an inculturated expression of the Roman rite, there are many factors to consider, among which translation is only one. By the 1990s, a gradual shift from dynamic equivalence represented by CLP towards formal equivalence theory represented by LA would have placed the MBP at a disadvantage for approval by the CDWDS. Even with their current versions, the differences between the MBP and the ANPSR remain, which arguably warrant continuing caution and examination from the CDWDS. Of course, the translational theories by themselves cannot fully explain the inaction of the CDWDS regarding the MBP. Yet because the MBP was designed to be inculturated, the translated texts retain more of the dynamic equivalence espoused by CLP. Because the ANPSR was designed to be more faithful to the *Missale Romanum*, it was more acceptable to the Roman Curia. In a sense, the tensions in translation between the MBP and ANPSR reflect those of CLP and

[38] Jonathan Y. Tan, "Beyond *Sacrosanctum Concilium*: The Future of Liturgical Renewal in the Asian Catholic Church," *Studia Liturgica* 44 (2014): 295.

LA. For clarity, tensions are not necessarily negative. When handled properly, they reveal the richness of liturgical life.[39]

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[39] I thank Fr. Mario Tomi Subardjo, S.J., S.L.D., an Indonesian theologian who taught liturgical translation studies at the Loyola School of Theology, for his guidance in writing this paper. I greatly appreciate his meticulous reading and constructive comments. Any oversight is entirely my own.

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AUGUSTINE'S ACCOUNT OF HIS PERSONAL CONVERSION TO GOD IN THE *CONFESSIONS* (PART I)[1]

Thomas Sherman, SJ

Abstract. St. Augustine's *Confessions* may be history's most famous autobiographical account of one man's personal conversion to God.[2] In this essay, I shall read St. Augustine's Confessions as a highly personal account of a conversion to God – a personal conversion which included his whole person in its intellectual, moral, and affective dimensions. Once grace leads him to accept the truth of the Catholic faith intellectually, it further leads him to allow God to inspire and guide him in choosing to live the truth of the faith and, in doing so, to experience a joy or delight that gives him the emotional strength to live that truth. As I shall argue, Augustine's *Confessions* can be read as an autobiographical account of one man's personal conversion to

[1] GenAI Disclosure Statement. No GenAI tool was used in any aspect of this paper.

[2] For a thorough study and analysis of the text of the *Confessions*, cf. James J. O'Donnell, *Confessions: Introduction: Text and Commentary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). For a well-regarded biography of St. Augustine, cf. Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). For a contemporary collection of scholarly articles on Augustine's *Confessions*, cf. *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine's Confessions*, edited by Tarmo Toom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

God in his decision to receive baptism and henceforth to live a life of an ordered love for God.[3]

The article will be divided into two installments, the first installment presented here and the following installment in our next edition of *Landas*. This first installment will present what an intellectual, moral, and emotional conversion meant for Augustine by canvassing the complete span of his writings as an introduction to his personal conversion in the *Confessions* as intellectual, moral, and emotional. This installment will then cover a portion of Augustine's intellectual conversion to the Catholic faith to the point where, in studying natural philosophy, he realizes the falsity of the Manichean religion and turns to the skepticism of academic philosophy. The paper will then take up his intellectual search for the truth, his intellectual conversion to the truth of the Catholic faith, and his moral and emotional conversion in living that truth.

Keywords: conversion, intellectual conversion, moral conversion, emotional conversion

Introduction: Personal Conversion as Intellectual, Moral, and Emotional

In the *Confessions*, St. Augustine takes his readers on the journey of his soul by means of conversation between himself and God – a conversation in which Augustine shares with us his readers the state of his mind and heart from the earliest years of his childhood – as far as he could remember - through his adolescence and adult years

[3] As Augustine describes this ordered love of God at *On Christian Doctrine* I, 27: "… so that he neither loves what he ought not to love, nor fails to love what he ought to love, nor loves that more which ought to be loved more…and that every man is to be loved as a man for God's sake; but God is to be loved for his own sake. And if God is to be loved more than any man, each man ought to love God more than himself. Likewise, we ought to love another man better than our own body, because all things are to be loved in reference to God and another man can have fellowship with us in enjoyment of God, whereas our body cannot; for the body only lives through the soul, and it is by the soul that we enjoy God." Also, cf. Augustine, *Of True Religion*, 24.

as these finally lead to his final conversion to God in his decision to be baptized.

As Augustine describes his conversion to God, he wrote these confessions years after the actual event. In fact, it was almost ten years after his religious conversion and after he had become a bishop of the Catholic Church in northern Africa that he was able to set out his conversion experience in his spiritual autobiography. This means that at the time of his writing his *Confessions*, Augustine had come to a faith perspective he did not have at the time of living these events ten years before. His *Confessions*, then, are his *recollection in faith* of God's ways in his life.

The title itself of his *Confessions* was significant for Augustine on several levels.[4] First and above all, "confession" meant for him an act of thankful praise to God for how God had led (and was continuing to lead) him in his life. But second, "confession" meant for Augustine an honest acknowledgment of his sins before God as well as how God had forgiven – and continues to forgive him. Finally, "confession" meant for Augustine the act of witness – the act of confessing as *sharing* with others – friends and foes – what God had done and was continuing to do for him in his life. In writing these confessions, Augustine believed that by confessing his own story of God's ways with him, his readers could come to appreciate their own lives as a story of God's ways with them so that they could join him in confessing their own personal experience of the mercy of God.

Augustine begins his *Confessions* with a prayer that concisely conveys his faith understanding of how God had been (and continues to be) present with him and active in his life:

> You are great, Lord, and highly to be praised: great is your power and your wisdom is immeasurable. Man, a little piece of your creation, desires to praise you, a human being 'bearing his mortality with him' (2 Cor. 4:10), carrying with him the witness of his sin and the witness

[4] Cf. Carolyn Hammond, "Title, Time, and Circumstances of Composition: The Genesis of the *Confessions*," in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine's Confessions*, edited by Tarmo Toom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 17-24.

> that you 'resist the proud' (1 Pet. 5:5). Nevertheless, to praise you is the desire of man, a little piece of your creation. You stir man to take pleasure in praising you, because you have made us for yourself, O Lord, and our heart is restless until it rests in you.[5]

In this opening prayer, Augustine presents his readers with the theme of his *Confessions* – how God gradually revealed Himself to him throughout his life, leading him back to Himself through the very deepest desire of his restless heart. His *Confessions* begin with a prayer and continue as a prayer in the form of a conversation with God the Father, whom Augustine addresses as "Lord" but especially directly as *Thou* (*you*). The *Confessions* is written as a conversation with God in which Augustine acknowledges and thanks God for what he considers the most significant moments in his life, moments in which he recognizes God's mysterious providence guiding him back to God Himself. In an attempt to appreciate Augustine's experience of God's providence, we follow him in his *Confessions* as he describes to God how God spoke to him - most fundamentally in his desire for truth and then in his desire to love and be loved. Reflecting on these desires, he believes that God is inviting him to realize that "You have made us for yourself, O Lord, and our hearts are restless until they rest in you."

What Augustine means by the heart, of course, is the universally recognized human symbol of what is most profound in us – what is at the very center of each one of us. It is the seat of the intellect as well as the emotions and affects, the psychic energy we have to do (or refrain from doing) what we desire. For Augustine, the *restless* heart includes our intellectual desire to know the truth about God but also our appetitive yearning for intimacy with God as our Father and eternal *Thou* (You). The restless heart is our deepest longing to know the truth of who God is and the desire to love and be loved by the God of Love. Augustine's *Confessions* are his personal account conducted in a conversation with God, confessing how God helped him realize through important events of his life how God led him to

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[5] Augustine, *Confessions*, I.1, in Henry Chadwick [trans.], *Saint Augustine Confessions* (Oxford: Oxford Word Classics, 1998). Hereafter, *Conf.*

realize that it was God Himself who converted Augustine intellectually and affectively to come to rest in Him.

The following will be divided into two parts: the first, a description of his personal conversion to God as intellectual, moral, and emotional, as the background. The second part will examine Augustine's account of his personal conversion to God in his *Confessions*, including an intellectual, moral, and emotional conversion in his life.

Intellectual Conversion in the *Confessions*

As Augustine relates in his *Confessions*, his interest in the philosophical life was awakened when, as a university student, he read the *Hortensius*, a dialogue of Cicero which has since been lost. While Augustine's view of philosophy, wisdom, and happiness evolved throughout his life, his early exposure to philosophy prompted his search to understand in what happiness consists of and how to obtain it.[6]

For Augustine, happiness is both the motive and its end, for human beings have no reason to philosophize except with a view to happiness.[7] The search for happiness involves the mind (*mens*) in the activity of reason (*ratio*) in acquiring knowledge as an understanding (*intellectus*) and contemplation of truth.[8] The human mind in reasoning makes use of two kinds of knowledge: knowledge for the sake of knowledge

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[6] Augustine, *Letter* 147, 2, 7.

[7] Augustine, *City of God* XIX, 1, 3.

[8] But knowledge as a contemplation of truth can be of things sensibly perceived or of things imperceptible to the senses but accepted on the reliable testimony of others. In the latter case, knowledge is a belief (*fides*) accompanied by assent to another's testimony, while a knowledge based on what is sensibly perceived differs from the latter only in its source. Knowledge as belief, or faith, can be deemed reasonable provided one has sufficient reason for believing the testimony of those others in its regard. Augustine understood reason as a progressive understanding (*intellectus*) of truth which was naturally prior both to belief and to the understanding of that belief. Cf. Augustine, *Sermon* 43, 2, 3.

or knowledge for the sake of happiness. Corresponding to these two kinds of knowledge, the human mind makes use of a superior and an inferior reason.[9] On the one hand, we have the knowledge of the intellect or superior reason oriented to the divine Ideas, a knowledge in the order of contemplation and based upon an act of submission of intellectual humility to God, a knowledge which ensures happiness: this is wisdom. On the other hand, we know inferior reason, a knowledge of things human oriented to sensible things, a knowledge in the order of action; this is science.[10] It is the knowledge of things divine which is the concern of wisdom as well as the guide to happiness as our final end; while human knowledge is subservient to wisdom.[11] The realization of the truth of this wisdom will require of Augustine an *intellectual* conversion from unbelief to belief in the Catholic faith – a conversion which will require an intellectual humility in accepting the gift of faith. In the *Confessions*, Augustine gives an autobiographical account of a gradual intellectual conversion to this wisdom after his intellectual journey through various forms of unbelief.

As we shall see, Augustine's intellectual conversion to the truth of the Catholic faith involved his answering three fundamental questions as preliminary to his intellectual acceptance of the Catholic faith. The first of these questions had to do with the nature of God, the second with the nature of evil, and finally Augustine had to make sense of and accept the overall *coherence* of the Catholic faith. Answering these questions will require of him an intellectual conversion in humility as the graced submission to God in accepting the truth of the faith. But even after having undergone this intellectual conversion to the truth of the faith, Augustine will face the deeper question of how he can actually *live* the truth of the faith he accepted intellectually. This deeper challenge will require of him a graced *moral* and *affective* conversion which will also require humility: a graced moral conversion in overcoming a pride of the will in trying to save himself by his own

[9] Augustine, *On the Trinity* XII, 3.3, 12, 19, 4.4.

[10] Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIV, 1, 3.

[11] Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIV, 1,3.

efforts and a graced affective conversion in humbly accepting being loved by God in his deepest vulnerability.

Moral Conversion in the Confessions

By use of his superior reason under the influence of grace, Augustine was able to realize the truth of the Catholic faith in overcoming by grace his pride of intellect in his journey through various kinds of unbelief - Manichean, Scientific, Academic, and Neo-Platonic. But once he was able to accept the truth of the Catholic faith, he now had to freely accept baptism and *live* that truth. Living the truth of the faith he intellectually accepted will require a *moral* conversion of the *will* in humbly acknowledging his need for God and allowing God to act in him.

Augustine comes to understand that the human mind is directed to its own end when it submits to wisdom. In doing so, he becomes capable of directing all his actions in accordance with wisdom, conferring upon those actions their moral character. As human beings do not make truth but rather discover it, and as sense objects exist independent of the senses which perceive them,[12] so in the intelligible order the truth seen by different minds at the same time is distinct from those minds.[13] God is the inner master of the intelligible and the source of agreement between minds.[14] In knowing the truth we come to realize that we have but one master, namely the inner truth which presides over our souls, Christ, the unchangeable power and eternal wisdom of God.[15] Every rational soul seeks His counsel, but His truth is revealed to souls according as their will is good or evil. Our inner light or inspiration in recognizing the truth comes from God.[16]

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[12] Augustine, *On Freedom of the Will* II, 7, 13-19.

[13] Augustine, *On Freedom of the Will* II, 12, 33.

[14] Augustine, *The Teacher* 1, 2; 11, 38; 12, 40.

[15] Augustine, *The Teacher* 11, 38; 12, 40.

[16] Augustine, *On Divine Questions,* 83, 54.

This divine illumination is intimately present to the soul in a way that resists adequate representation,[17] for there is nothing in creation as near to God as the soul.[18] This divine illumination is of intelligible rather than sensible realities, which requires the necessary character of judgement.[19] Divine illumination provides the soul with regulative principles, which Augustine calls rules.[20] These rules are the practical principles of the moral life. Fundamental to these rules is the eternal Law of God by which all creation is directed by God. Our human conscience is illumined by this divine Law, so we understand the first principles of morality in the order of action. This we call natural law.[21]

Divine illumination not only prescribes rules of action for us by making our conscience submit to natural law; it also gives us the means of putting these rules into practice. Every man becomes virtuous only by conforming his soul to the immutable rules and lights of the Virtues dwelling within the Truth and Wisdom common to all. The four cardinal virtues of prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice have the divine Wisdom as their source.[22] As God is the very life of the soul, it is by bestowing these virtues on the soul, virtues including wisdom, piety, and charity.[23]

But human beings need to freely accept God and His divine illumination. The power on which that free response depends is the will (*voluntas*). The will as the principle of all our actions is the principle of the moral life. Indeed, not only do all the resolutions and decisions made in the practical order depend on the will, but every operation

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[17] According to the judgment of Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine*, 2nd Edition (Toronto: Vintage Books, 1967), 80.

[18] Augustine, *The Measure of the Soul* 34, 77.

[19] Cf. Augustine, *On the Trinity* IX, 6, 9, 10, 11; cf. *On the True Religion* 30, 54-56.

[20] Augustine, *On Free Will* II, 10, 29; *On the Trinity* XIV, 15, 21.

[21] Augustine, *Expositions on the Psalms* 57, cf. 118, 25. 145, 5; *On Order* II, 8, 25.

[22] Augustine, *On Free Will* II, 19, 52.

[23] Augustine, *Tractates on the Gospel of John* XIX, 5, 12.

of our cognitive powers in the theoretical order as well is under its immediate control.

Augustine thinks of the human being and his will in somewhat the same way. In every soul, as in every body, there is a weight drawing it, as it were, constantly, moving it always to find its natural place of rest; and that weight we call love. "My weight," as Augustine puts it, "is my love."[24] Love is the principle of the will and a crucial and overarching notion in Augustine's understanding of the moral life. Love is closely related to virtue and often used synonymously with will or intention (*intentio*).[25] Love is a force in our souls that attracts us to the true beauty we find nowhere else but in and above ourselves; it impels us to ascend from the sensible to the intelligible world to the contemplation of God.[26] From this follow important consequences for understanding Augustine on voluntary action.

First of all, if love is the inner force which moves the will, and the will denotes the human being himself, the human being is essentially moved by his love.[27] Love is the source of action. The impetus is what is desired, but what can be loved can be morally good or evil. The moral problem, then, is not *whether* one should love but what one should love. Love, but be careful what you love![28] *Virtue* is an inner disposition or motivational habit that enables us to perform every action we perform out of *right* love. Virtue then means to will what we *should* will, i.e., to love what we *should* love. The moral quality (moral *goodness* or evil) of our love will determine the moral quality of the will and ultimately the

[24] Augustine, *Conf* XIII, 9, 10.

[25] Augustine, *On the Trinity* XV, 38, cf. *City of God* XI 7, *Conf* XIII, 12.

[26] Augustine, *Conf* X, 8-38, sp. 38.

[27] Augustine, *On the Trinity* XI, 7, 12.

[28] Augustine, *Sermon* 96 1,1; *On the Good of Widowhood* 21, 26.

moral quality of the act which results.[29] Virtue, then, is ordered love[30] and the criterion of true virtue is its orientation to God.[31]

Since the moral quality of the love determines the moral quality of the will and the will determines the moral quality of the act, the moral quality of the emotions is determined by the moral quality of the love from which they arise.[32]

And as virtue is the only path to happiness, the goal of the moral life, if love is the principle of the will or the will itself, the highest virtue will also be the *highest love*.[33] As for the virtues subordinated to this highest virtue, these may be reduced to this highest virtue, thus highest love. Temperance is love bestowed on the thing loved, fortitude is love which endures anything for the thing it loves, justice is love serving the object loved, and prudence is love wisely discriminating between what helps and what hinders the other virtues, discriminating between what binds the human being to God and what separates him from God.[34] Thus, we reach the heart of morality, charity as the love of God, the highest good.[35]

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[29] Augustine, *On the Trinity* XI, 6, 10.

[30] Augustine, *The City of God* XV, 22.

[31] Even if Augustine occasionally refers to the four cardinal virtues as if they could be added to the Pauline or theological virtues of faith, hope, and love to make a sum of seven, they are best taken as a subdivision of love: Augustine, *Letter 171A* 2, the only one of the Pauline virtues that persist: *Soliloquy* 1, 4. Cf. Christian Tornau, "Augustine of Hippo," in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/augustine/#Virt.

[32] Augustine, *The City of God* XIV, 7, 2.

[33] Augustine, *On the Way of Life of the Catholic Church* I, 15, 25.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Cf. Augustine, *Sermon* 349, 1-3.

Charity is the love whereby we love what we ought to love.[36] Charity moves toward God, as a personal reality. While we can love some things for their own sake, we love persons for themselves. The Lord's great commandment is to love God with all one's heart, soul, mind, and strength and to love one's neighbor as oneself. Loving another with one's whole soul means loving another as oneself on a basis of perfect equality. The one I love is my equal, and I am the equal of the one I love. This is why I love him as myself, as God enjoins. That same justice which in love between human beings demands equality between ourselves and the object of our love, demands that God the Supreme good be the object of an unqualified love, a love without measure.[37] For Augustine, a perfectly realized love of God is a completely actualized moral life expressed in his recommendation to "love and do what you will."[38] As the love of God ought to be the source of acts which give that love expression, all morality may be understood to flow from the love of God.

God is love, and the moral life is love. To live by love, we must move towards God in love even now as a pledge of future happiness in the possession of God, but we already possess God within us through grace, the gift He has made of Himself.[39] Only grace enables us to possess God in love even now in this life as we move toward our full loving possession of God in heaven.[40]

As the moral life is to be ordered to wisdom in the contemplation of God, the moral life requires God's grace and the humble acceptance of that grace in ordering the will and the emotions to the love of God. Augustine experiences that grace as he reads the words of St. Paul under the tree in Milan when he hears God speak to him in his need.

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[36] Augustine, *Letter* 167, 4, 15.

[37] In the words of Augustine's friend Severus, summarizing Augustine's own words: *Letter* 109, 2.

[38] Augustine, *Tractates on the First Letter of John* 7, 4, 8.

[39] Augustine, *Sermon* 158, 9 and 143, 4.

[40] Augustine, *Sermon* 23, 8.

Emotional Conversion in the *Confessions*

In Augustine's theory of action, will (*voluntas*) describes the motivation of a rational being as an impulse (*horme*) toward action. This impulse involves a perception of an object as good and good for oneself. The love that is provoked by this perception is not a feeling but an awareness of the higher reason (*mens*) in relation to some perceived good as answering a need.[41] The perception of such an object includes the cognizing of mental sentences expressing how attaining that object will contribute to one's happiness. This takes place in the discursive part of the mind (*animus*).[42] Psychic delight is experienced at the possession of the object, but the mind now considers whether the object, via the action, will indeed contribute to happiness, and it either assents or dissents by issuing an imperative that commands doing or not doing the action.[43] This theory of motivation underpins Augustine's account of emotion.

For Augustine, all the soul's sensible movements can be reduced to four fundamental emotions: desire (*cupiditas*), joy (*laetitia*), fear (*metus*) and sorrow (*tristia*). Emotions are caused by judgments, passions by assent to false propositions, and affections by assent to true propositions.[44] Every movement of the soul is directed either towards a good to be acquired or attained or away from an evil to be avoided

[41] For Augustine, feelings are psychic pains or pleasures experienced in an "inner sense" though caused by cognitive apprehension while *eros* is mental awareness of itself, cf. *On the Trinity* X, 8, 10-11.

[42] Augustine, *On the Trinity* XI, 8, 12. *Cogitatio* is the discursive use of images and at XII 12 17 where *scientia actionis* is discursive thought (*ratiocinari*) about things in the sensory word. The lower part of the mind has as its focus knowledge of sensible realities by which we may do right actions, XIV, 7, 10 cf. Sarah Catherine Byers, *Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine: A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 52-3.

[43] Byers, *Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine*, 52-53.

[44] Byers, *Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine*, 57.

or removed;[45] but the soul's free movement to acquire or to retain a thing is the will itself.[46]

In his *City of God*, Augustine distinguished two forms of life whose principles are decisions of the will either to live *secundum se ipsum*, that is, in accord with what one determines to be good and right for oneself, or to live *secundum spiritum* according to God's will in embracing His love, truth, and order in imitation of Christ.[47] In these two kinds of lives, emotions such as love, joy, grief, and fear arise in agreement or in disagreement with the good things we desire in the kind of life we will.[48] We feel desire or joy when we obtain what we love, but fear or grief when subjected to things we do not love.[49] As love is the principle of the will, when we possess something we love, we feel joy, whereas we feel fear in facing the prospect of what we do not love. Emotions will be experienced as either positive or negative depending on their arising from what we either love or hate, and their morality will depend on the moral character of what we love or hate.[50] As the moral quality of the love determines the moral quality of the will, so the passions or emotions arising from a will which are in line with God's will are morally good, whereas passions or emotions arising from a life not in accord with God's will are morally evil.[51] Emotions experienced in a rationally ordered way of life, a life in conformity with God's will, will be moral and rational, whereas emotions we feel in living not in accord with God will be immoral and irrational.[52]

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[45] Augustine, *City of God* XIV, 6.

[46] Augustine, *On the Two Souls* X, 14.

[47] Augustine, *On the City of God* XIV, 1, 3, 4.

[48] Augustine, *On the City of God* XIV, 6.

[49] Augustine, *On the City of God* XIV, 6.

[50] Augustine, *On the City of God* XIV, 7.

[51] Augustine, *On the City of God* XIV, 6, 7.

[52] Augustine, *On the City of God* VII, 23; VIII, 17.

Habit (*Consuetudo*) and the Emotions

After having intellectually accepted the truth of the Catholic faith, Augustine faced the personal challenge of living that faith. His challenge, as he describes it in Book VIII of the *Confessions*, was not that of being more *certain* of the truth of the faith but in being more *steadfast* in dedicating himself in service to it.[53] The difficulty he felt in being more steadfast was his being tightly bound by his compulsion to act for sexual satisfaction and his desire to be free of that compulsion. Augustine will describe his inner struggle as a struggle between two wills, the one to live celibately, the other to maintain his longstanding carnal relations. This latter he describes as an older will which had the strength of an old habit.[54] The conflict he experiences between these two wills was that between his will to what he knew was right and a carnal will weighed down by habit (*consuetudo*). He describes his psychological experience of this inner conflict in the theological terms of St. Paul in Paul's letter to the Galatians 5.17 as the flesh lusting against the spirit and the spirit lusting against the flesh, and in Romans 7:22-25 as a conflict between the inner man and the law of his members.

Augustine recognizes that he is responsible for this conflict of wills within him, as the carnal will has arisen from many repeated actions in conflict with God's will. This carnal will he experiences as an aberrant part of himself and a punishment he has brought upon himself.[55]

Augustine's recognition of habit goes back at least as far as his reading of Aristotle's *Categories* when a student in Carthage.[56] In Aristotle he learned that habit was a quality of substance (not a substance itself), a stable disposition like various kinds of knowledge and of the moral virtues like justice and temperance that are gradually

[53] Augustine, *Conf* VIII, 1.

[54] Augustine, *Conf* VIII, 10.

[55] Augustine, *Conf* VIII, 12, 22.

[56] Cf. Augustine, *Conf* IV, 28, 29.

acquired by repeated acts but not easily changed.[57] But he was aware of the notion of habit was a common place in the ancient world as a second nature (*consuetudo secunda natura*), that is, a relatively permanent tendency created by repeated activity and which in turn produces effects in a predictable sort of way.[58]

Habit arises from repetition of a pleasurable activity as this pleasure is lodged in memory.[59] When recalled, the pleasure is intensified, and the desire to repeat the act is strengthened.[60] In unregenerate man, the weight of carnal habit is stronger than the weight of love of God.[61] Only God can rectify such a habit by a grace which provides the person with the pleasure of a love for Himself.[62] With the emotional strength provided by this grace, the evil habit can be undone and an inner unity found in wholeheartedly willing what God wills.[63]

If he is to recover this unity of a wholehearted will in accordance with God's will, evil habit must be transformed through an emotional conversion. This emotional conversion will come about in Augustine's experience of being spoken to by God as he reads the words of St. Paul in his *kairos* moment under the tree in Milan. In that experience

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[57] Augustine, *Categories* 8b, 26.

[58] Cf. John J. Prendeville, "The Development of the Idea of Habit in the Thought of Saint Augustine," *Traditio* 28 (1972): 29, 77. Augustine will insist until the end of his life that habits are freely contracted and can grow into second nature: Augustine, *On the City of God* XII 3.

[59] Augustine, *Against Fortunatus* 22 Augustine explains that before we acquire a habit, we have the free choice to do a certain action or not. When, however, we have done something freely and the pernicious sweetness and pleasure of the action has gripped our soul, then it becomes so involved in its habit that it cannot overcome what it made for itself by sinning in the first place.

[60] Augustine, *Conf* VI, 25; X 41.

[61] Augustine, *Conf* VII, 17.

[62] Cf. Augustine, *Conf* XIII, 10.

[63] Cf. Augustine, *Conf* VIII, *passim.*

of being loved by God, he receives the will and the emotional strength to love God with God's own love for him.

Augustine approached moral and emotional conversion, especially in his dealing with divine inspiration.[64] As human motivation is initiated by motivating impressions which are received, our minds must be touched by an external power which instills in us a delight. In Book VIII of the *Confessions*, Augustine laments that it was his own habitual actions which had forged the chains that now bind him, to make him unable to assent to the impressions of continence, and yet he believes that he retains the power of choice (*liberium arbitrium*), which is the power to give or refuse assent to the sentential content of the impression. And yet he will misuse this power of choice to serve his addiction. What is needed is a divinely motivated impression which, by its delight, will supply the emotional strength to choose what is morally right to do because it is morally good (*kalon/honestum*) as Christ is the source of such goodness.[65] In his *Replies to Simplicianus*, Augustine asks himself, "Who has it in his power that his mind be touched by the kind of impression by which will may be moved…And who can welcome in his mind something which does not give him delight? Who has it in his power to ensure either that something that can delight him will turn up, or that he will be delighted when it turns up?" He answers, "If those things delight us which serve our advancement towards God… that is inspired and bestowed by the grace of God."[66] In his letter on Psalm 67 he writes, "You have prepared in your own sweetness for the needy, O God… so that a good work may be done…from love[67] We need these motivating impressions from God so that, in listening to Him God Himself grants us the will to act according to His will.[68]

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[64] Byers, *Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine*, 172-214.

[65] Augustine, *On the Grace of Christ; Replies to Simplicianus,* 2.24. 28-25.29, citing John 3.8.

[66] Augustine, *Replies to Simplicianus,* 1.2.21.

[67] Augustine, *Exposition of the Psalms,* 67.13.

[68] Augustine, *Replies to Simplicianus,* 1.2.21.

How? In his letter on Psalm 50, Augustine writes, "As I listen, he [the psalmist] says, 'you will give me delight and gladness…when we listen interiorly to him making some suggestion and teaching us we are subject to our teacher."[69] In his commentary on Psalm 114 Augustine writes "Gracious is the Lord…gracious in the first place because he has inclined his ear to me; and I know not that the ear of God has approached my lips, until I was aroused (*excitarer*)…that I might call upon the Lord's name: for who has called upon him, save him whom he first called?[70] And in Letter 57 we read:

> By God's calling they understand to whom they must groan and call upon him in whom they rightly believe, saying 'Have mercy'… when someone stretches out to him, therefore and groans in that way there will happen what follows: where sin abounded, grace was even more abundant …as a result there comes about the fulfilment of the law.[71]

In his later writings, as in his *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians*, Augustine writes, "a human being prepares the heart, but does so only with the help of God who touches the heart in such a way that the human being prepares the heart. But in the answer of the tongue, that is, in that which the divine tongue answers to the prepared heart, the human being does nothing but all comes from God…" As we shall see in Bk VIII of the Confessions, after having cried out to God for mercy and help, "How long, O Lord? Augustine hears the voice "pick up and read" and, in picking up his Bible under the tree in the garden in Milan, reads the passage which his eyes immediately light upon – at that moment he is inspired to listen to God speak to him in the words of the passage he reads and is converted morally and emotionally.[72]

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[69] Augustine, *Exposition of the Psalms* 50.13.

[70] Augustine, *Exposition of the Psalms* 114.5.

[71] Cf. Roland Teske [trans.], *Letters 156-210*, vol. II/3, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century (New York: New City Press, 2004), *letter* 157, 2.16 and 157, 2.22.

[72] Augustine, *Conf* VIII, 28-29. For an examination of Augustine's developing understanding of God's grace and the human response in conversion, again. cf. Byers, *Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine*, 172-214.

In the following, we will follow Augustine himself as he relates his journey to God in the *Confessions* by noting and commenting on key moments of intellectual, moral, and emotional conversion in that journey.

Augustine's Intellectual Conversion to the Truth of the Catholic Faith

Augustine's Early Years

Augustine's *Confessions* begins with his account of his early life with his family – his mother, father, and younger brother in Thagaste, a village in northern Africa. While he grew up in a home in which his mother Monica lived as a devout Catholic, Augustine's father, though a baptized convert at his death, was during Augustine's early life an unbeliever who did not share his wife's concern for Augustine's religious upbringing. Augustine, influenced by his mother's instruction and example, received and practiced the Catholic faith very early in his life, although he did not receive baptism.[73] Despite their differences with respect to the faith, both of Augustine's parents shared a deep concern for their son's future career in the world and, to that end, insisted that the boy Augustine receive the best possible academic formation. While at first resistant to academics, the young Augustine gradually grew to enjoy learning and came to realize that the joy he derived in his experience of learning new things stemmed from a passion for the truth. Despite his early exposure to the faith through his mother, Augustine confesses that his slowly developing passion for the truth in his youth did not move him to seek the truth of God the Creator.[74]

[73] Augustine's baptism was delayed on the assumption that, baptism, being a washing away of all sin, deferring baptism would be better for the baptized, cf. *Conf* XI.17.

[74] Augustine, *Conf* I, 31.

University Life in Carthage

After his father dies, Augustine begins a new chapter in his life as he leaves his mother and his native village and takes up residence in the big city of Carthage to pursue his university studies. He describes that almost immediately upon entering the big city, he got involved in a number of problematic relationships. He describes his motivation in these relationships:

> To me it was sweet to love and be loved, the more so if I could enjoy the body of the beloved… my love was returned, and in secret I attained the joy that enchains. I was glad to be in bondage.[75]

The physical and emotional pleasure he experienced in loving and being loved is described ambiguously as a "joy that enchains." In the midst of this emotional ambiguity, Augustine begins his studies at the university with the career ambition to become a successful orator. With this goal in mind, he decides to devote himself to the study of rhetoric, and he enjoys a considerable amount of success in his studies:

> My studies, which were deemed acceptable, had the objective of leading me to distinction as an advocate in the law courts, where one's reputation is high in proportion to one's success in deceiving people…. I was already top of the class in the rhetor's school, and was pleased with myself for my success and was inflated with conceit…[76]

During his studies, Augustine happens to come upon a book which will open new vistas for him and will mark the first stage of his intellectual conversion to the truth. The book he comes upon was a short treatise of Cicero's entitled *Hortensius* – an exhortation to a life of philosophy as a love for wisdom.77 While Augustine's initial

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[75] Augustine, *Conf,* III,1.

[76] Augustine, *Conf,* III,6.

[77] The *Hortensius*, composed by Cicero in 45 BC toward the end of his life was actually Cicero's adaptation of a short work of Aristotle's entitled the *Protrepticus* which was written as an exhortation to a life of philosophy as a life in pursuit of wisdom which alone offers human beings true happiness, cf. Chadwick [trans.], *Saint Augustine Confessions*, p. 39, footnote 17.

interest in studying the work was motivated by his career interests, the *content* of the book (rather than its literary style) captivates him, as its exhortation to a life of philosophy offers him a conception of a way of living that was new to him.

> The book changed my feelings… it gave me different values and priorities. Suddenly every vain hope became empty to me, and I longed for the immortality of wisdom with an incredible ardour in my heart… I was impressed not by the book's refining effect on my style and literary expression but by the content…love of wisdom is the meaning of the Greek word *philosophia*. This book kindled my love for it… the one thing that delighted me in Cicero's exhortation was the advice 'not to study one particular sect but to love and seek and pursue and hold fast and strongly embrace wisdom itself, wherever found.[78]

Augustine's first steps in what proved to be his intellectual conversion to the Catholic faith were taken in his intellectual conversion from a career-wise secular point of view to an enthusiastic interest in a life of philosophy as a love of wisdom. Yet right at the start of this newfound enthusiasm for philosophy, as this was presented to him by Cicero, Augustine notices something curious.

> One thing alone put a break on my intense enthusiasm – that the name of Christ was not contained in the book. This name … my infant heart had piously drunk in with my mother's milk, and at a deep level I retained in my memory. Any book which lacked this name, however well written or polished or true, could not entirely grip me.[79]

His disappointment in finding no mention of the name of Christ in Cicero's book rather surprises Augustine for at this point of his life he had all but forgotten his childhood faith. Intrigued by this disappointment in not finding the name of Christ in the description of a life of wisdom as this is presented to him by Cicero, Augustine decides to acquire a Bible and begins reading it.

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[78] Augustine, *Conf* III, 7.

[79] Augustine, *Conf* III, 8.

> I therefore decided to give attention to the holy scriptures and to find out what they were like. And this is what met me… a text lowly to the beginner but, on further reading, of mountainous difficulty. I was not in any state to be able to enter into that, or to bow my head to climb its steps … [but] it seemed to me unworthy in comparison with the dignity of Cicero.[80]

Intellectually, he is unimpressed by much of the content of what he finds in the Bible, and its literary crudeness is off-putting for someone like him – an intellectually proud young man successful in his academic studies and an aspiring student of rhetoric educated in the elegant Latin style of the classics.[81] His twofold disappointment in content and style leads Augustine to conclude that the Bible – and along with the Bible, his childhood faith – cannot provide him with the intellectual wisdom he was now seeking. In retrospect, Augustine reckons that his initial negative reaction to the Bible and the faith it expressed was borne of an intellectual pride in not being able to "bow my head to climb its [the Bible's] steps."

As a young man at this point, Augustine is seeking to make sense of his life intellectually, morally, and emotionally in the midst of university life, its academic and social demands, and the ambiguity he was experiencing in his affective desire to love and be loved. In the midst of these life challenges, Augustine comes to hear of a movement and way of life which claimed to provide the kind of meaning he was seeking. The movement and way of life he comes in contact with is Manichaeism – an intellectual and religious movement which was sweeping through the educated classes of the Roman Empire and in particular in North Africa among the educated elite. Like many of his fellow students (and professors) at the university, Augustine is attracted to a movement which appeared to offer the kind of intellectual, moral,

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[80] Augustine, *Conf* III,9.

[81] Before St. Jerome's revision of the Latin Bible, Augustine and African Catholics in North Africa only had access to the Old Latin Bible composed by second-century missionaries in Italy and Africa was colloquial and in places obscure to the point of being barbaric, cf. Chadwick, *Saint Augustine Confessions*, xiv.

and emotional guidance he needed. He soon becomes a follower of this Manichean movement and its proposed way of life.

Manichaeism was a philosophy and a religious way of life based on what was claimed to be a true understanding of God and of reality.[82] Founded by Mani, an enigmatic Persian figure who claimed to be *the* prophet of God who reveals to mankind the truth. According to Mani, originally all was Goodness and Light, which he understood in materialistic terms as a kind of primordial material, or stuff. Due to some primordial fall (never explained in detail), this one Light fragmented into countless individuals who took on bodies but retained within themselves a piece of light from the one original Light. Thanks to this primordial fall, the one Light divided into two opposing principles of good and evil, light and darkness, spirit and flesh. God was identified as the original Light and the ultimate principle of good; Satan, the principle of evil. A cosmic struggle between God (Goodness and Light) and Satan (Evil and darkness) ensued. This cosmic struggle is experienced by each human being as a conflict within the spirit and the flesh. Salvation consists in each individual joining in this cosmic struggle between good and evil by identifying himself with his inner light and engaging in battle against the darkness within oneself in resisting the body and its desires. By identifying with their inner light and denying the fleshly desires of the body, individuals, when they die, would be freed from the body and return to God by having their individual inner light absorbed in the one original Light. But this process required from each Manichee the practice of a rigorously ascetic life which, for the inner circle of believers or "the elect," meant a life free from personal possessions and of adhering to strict dietary laws as well as abstinence from all sexual activity. Those who felt themselves incapable of the rigors of such a life could opt instead for a second-best kind of life in which they could marry and carry on in the secular world - not as "elect" but as associates or "helpers" of the elect. These "helpers" had the special task of supporting the Elect financially and by this service

[82] Cf. Chadwick, *Saint Augustine Confessions*, xiv-xv and Christopher Kirwan, "Manicheism," *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward Craig, doi: 10.4324/9780415249126-K046-1.

hoped to themselves become elect at death and in their next life begin their journey as elect back to reabsorption into the Light.

In the condition Augustine found himself, the Manichean creed seemed to make sense to him as offering a very clear vision of reality and a rigorous ascetic program to overcome the vagaries of human desire. In particular, the dualistic world view of the Manichees with its radical separation between good and evil, light and darkness, spirit and flesh must have made emotional if not intellectually sense to a young man who was personally struggling with his own inner conflict between a desire to live a life of wisdom by forgoing worldly ambition and sex and a life of worldly success and the opportunity to love and be loved as occasion might offer. Thinking that this movement offered him the kind of intellectually coherent worldview he needed as well as an ascetic program to deal with his inner conflicts, Augustine decides to become a Manichee. He receives a thorough indoctrination within the Manichean community of adherents at the university. In his enthusiasm to live a life of wisdom without compromise, Augustine initially wants to join himself to the Manichean "elect" in their rigorous life of celibacy and abstention. But his inner conflicts with uncontrolled sexual desire and personal ambition lead him to the conclusion that he cannot live as one of the "elect" and so, reluctantly, very reluctantly he settles instead for a life as a Manichee "helper," a kind of "second best" option in which he could still live a life in pursuit of wisdom as a Manichee without having to practice strict celibacy nor would he have to renounce his personal ambitions. This second-best option, however, never satisfies Augustine, as his deeper desire was to give himself completely to a life dedicated to wisdom and to live in conformity with that wisdom. Yet despite this deep disappointment in his failure to live the Manichean way of life as he wanted, Augustine will continue in this sect for the next ten years of his life.

Augustine's intellectual journey began with his conversion from a secular concern, as a university student, with worldly success and popularity to a concern for a life dedicated to the pursuit of philosophy and the wisdom it promised. His pursuit of wisdom led him to embrace Manicheeism as a way of life, for Manicheeism seemed to offer him the

wisdom he was seeking as well as a program to live out that wisdom. Yet he is also personally disappointed in not being able to live out the demands of Manicheeism. But he is also becoming dissatisfied with the wisdom the Manichees seemed to be offering him. Despite his personal disappointment and dissatisfaction with Manicheeism, Augustine continued living as a member of this movement for almost the next ten years of his life. In writing his *Confessions*, Augustine looks back and identifies three basic teachings of the Manichees that he initially accepted as consonant with his life as he understood it at the time but which he will discover are false and will prove troublesome to free himself from. The first of these doctrines was that of the fundamental dualism between the spiritual realm of light and the unspiritual realm of darkness. While this dualism seemed to make sense initially as describing his own inner conflict between the spirit and the flesh, he realizes that the radical nature of this dualism will be the basis for radical rejection of fundamental Christian beliefs in God as Creator of all, of the Incarnation of God in Jesus Christ for the salvation of human beings, and that human beings were created in the image of God. As a Manichee, the Christian belief in God as the Creator of heaven and earth meant that the Christian God had to be directly responsible for the existence of the material universe. As the material is the root of evil for the Manichee, the Christian God as the Creator of the material universe must Himself be evil. Secondly, the Christian belief in the Incarnation of God in Jesus could only mean for a Manichee that not only did God create evil but actually united Himself to evil in taking on human flesh in Jesus Christ. Finally, the Christian belief that flesh-and-blood human beings were created in the image of God could only mean for a Manichee that God in Himself must be flesh and blood, that God Himself was evil. These Manichean criticisms of such basic Christian beliefs shocked Augustine even at the beginning of life as a Manichee, but he did not have the capacity to criticize the Manichean world view and so could find no way of resisting these three Manichean criticisms of Christian belief.

While he stayed on in Carthage after finishing his university studies, Augustine continued to live as a Manichee, though he never gave up his interest in philosophy in general. It will be his continued interest

in philosophy and what he learns in his study of philosophy that will eventually enable him to challenge his Manichean beliefs.[83] He writes:

> Since I had done much reading in the philosophers and retained this in my memory, I compared some of their teachings with the lengthy fables of the Manichees.… The philosophers' teaching seemed more probable than that of the Manichees… I used to recall many true observations made by [the philosophers] about the world. I particularly noted the rational, mathematical order of things, the order of seasons, the visible evidence of the stars. I compared these with sayings of Mani who wrote much on these matters very copiously and foolishly. I did not notice any rational account of solstices and equinoxes or eclipses of luminaries resembling what I learnt in the books of secular wisdom. Yet I was ordered to believe Mani. But he was not in agreement with the rational explanations which I had verified by calculation and had observed with my own eyes. His account was very different.[84]

As Augustine continued his study of philosophy, especially that of natural philosophy, which impressed him and when he compared the findings of natural philosophy with many Manichean beliefs about nature, he began to entertain doubts about the veracity of the Manichean system as a whole. At this point he hears that Faustus, one of the Manichee luminaries noted for his wisdom, is to visit Carthage in order to give some lectures; Augustine is eager to attend and listen to see if his growing doubts about the Manichean system could be resolved. Augustine tells us:

> For a long time I had eagerly awaited Faustus. When he came, I was delighted by the force and feeling he brought to his discourse and by the fitting language which flowed with facility to clothe his ideas… but I was disappointed that in the public assembly of his audience I was not allowed to put a question, and to share with him

[83] For an analysis of the influence of philosophy on Augustine and his use of philosophy in the *Confessions*, cf. Giovanni Catapano "Philosophy," in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine's Confessions*, edited by Tarmo Toom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 191-207.

[84] Augustine, *Conf.* V, 3, 4, 6.

> the perplexing questions disturbing me, by informal conference and by the give and take of argument. When this became possible, I, together with my close friends, began to engage his attention… when I put forward some problems which troubled me, I quickly discovered him to be ignorant of the liberal arts other than grammar and literature; and his knowledge was of a very conventional kind … after he had clearly showed his lack of training in liberal arts which I had supposed him to be highly qualified, I began to lose all hope that he would be able to analyze and resolve the difficulties that disturbed me…in consequence the enthusiasm I had for the writing of Mani was diminished, and I felt even greater despair of learning from their other teachers after having consulted on many points which disturbed me the man who was particularly distinguished among them.[85]

As he was becoming disillusioned with the Manichean system, Augustine was growing in his appreciation of natural philosophy and its rational methodology in approaching the world, and it was this philosophy that led him to abandon the Manichean system: "I decided I must leave the Manichees, thinking that I should not remain a member of a sect to which I was now preferring certain philosophers."[86]

While his study of natural philosophy was impressing Augustine as a research program in coming to know the world and its study aids him in appreciating the falseness of Manicheeism, Augustine is disappointed with this philosophy as a *wisdom* for it seems to him to lack any apparent interest in the ultimate religious concerns for God and for a relationship with God.

> About the creation they [the natural philosophers] say many fine things that are true; but the truth, the artificer of creation, they do not seek in a devout spirit, and so they fail to find him. Or if they do find him, although knowing God, they do not honor him as God or give thanks.[87]

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[85] Augustine, *Conf* V, 11, 12, 13.

[86] Augustine, *Conf* V, 25.

[87] Augustine, *Conf* V, 4, 5.

Initially failing to find in natural philosophy the wisdom he was seeking, Augustine turns to another kind of philosophy popularly known at the time as "Academic skepticism."[88]

To be continued in Part II, to appear in the March 2027 issue of Landas.

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[88] Cf. Augustine, *Conf* V, 25.

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THE FIRST COMPANIONS: FINDING GRACE IN DISPERSION, SICKNESS, AND CONFLICT[1]

Christopher M. Staab, SJ

Abstract. In his letter "Confirmed in the Charism," Father General Arturo Sosa invited the Society of Jesus to understand better how "the first companions were able to read the motions of the good Spirit." This presentation responds to Fr. Sosa's call by examining how Ignatius and the first companions found grace in their experiences of dispersion, illness, and conflict. These difficult human experiences fill their extant texts and, as such, provide us with the opportunity to discover how they lived their quotidian apostolic work. Dispersion, illness, and conflict were not experiences to be overcome, but rather experiences to be lived with God. Such an approach to the first companions seeks a less romantic view of the Society's origins and, for that reason, offers consolation to all of us who experience these same difficult realities in our apostolic lives.

Keywords: grace, dispersion, illness, conflict, first companions

[1] This paper was delivered as the keynote address at the International Conference on Ignatian Spirituality organized by Loyola School of Theology and held on April 22, 2026 at the Henry Lee Irwin Theater, Ateneo de Manila University.

Introduction

I want to thank the organizers of this International Conference on Ignatian Spirituality for the invitation to participate in this gathering. I am delighted to be here, and I am grateful for the opportunity to offer a presentation on how Ignatius and the first companions found grace in difficult experiences like those of dispersion, illness, and conflict. I believe that this topic is not only relevant but important. And it is one that we know first-hand. We have experienced conflict, and we know how hard it is. We have felt the effects of being dispersed in mission – separated from our friends and loved ones. We are also not unfamiliar with illness, the limitations of our bodies, and the difficulty of aging. All of these human realities constitute a part of our journey to God. I would like to explore with you this morning how these experiences formed a part of Ignatius' and the first companions' experience with God. Maybe it was in and through these experiences that they found their way to God. Stated in one of the more famous expressions from the Formula of the Institute of the Society of Jesus, perhaps illness, dispersion, and conflict helped them keep their eyes on their Lord.

In addition to being a relevant topic for us to reflect upon, these categories offer a new hermeneutic with which to view their lives. Much historiography of the early Society is tinged with hagiography or colored by a certain romantic, even nostalgic view of its charismatic beginnings. My intention is not to criticize those perspectives, but rather to complement them by filling in the details of the other human experiences that formed part of their lives.[2] By first companions, I refer to Peter Faber, Francis Xavier, Diego Laínez, Alfonso Salmerón,

[2] A similar approach can be found in Markus Friedrich's history of the Society of Jesus in which he discusses "the dissatisfaction and dejection, the turpitude and abject indecency of some its members and their associates." See Markus Friedrich, *The Jesuits: A History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022), 22. See also José García de Castro who argues that "a chapter needs to be written on the conflicts and misunderstandings" amongst and in the early Society. See, Jose García de Castro, "Ignatius of Loyola and His First Companions," in *A Companion to Ignatius of Loyola*, ed. Robert Aleksander Maryks (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 82.

Simon Rodrigues, and Nicolás Bobadilla. I will also refer to important second-generation Jesuits like Juan Alfonso de Polanco and Jerome Nadal. All of them were remarkable human beings; they did the hard work of launching a new apostolic project, and they lived out their faith with uncommon zeal and perseverance. In short, there is much to admire in them. But they were not so different from you and me. They struggled, and some of them struggled a lot.

Their extant texts are voluminous, and for that reason I will limit myself to talking about a few of the companions. I will, however, use their words, attempting to tell how they found grace in the messier moments of their lives. I will begin by speaking of their experience of dispersion, an aspect of their religious lives that was central to them. In the second part, I will move to speak of the way they coped with illness. Finally, I will describe the important place of conflict in Ignatius' spirituality. In each of these three sections, I will try to discern in what ways they found grace, again, using, as much as I can, their own words. My hope is that we will see, following Fr. General Arturo Sosa's letter "Confirmed in the Charism," "how Ignatius and the first companions were able to read the motions of the good Spirit."[3] But primarily I tell the stories of the first companions because they can console us in our Christian journey. Consolation is what they sought to bring people, and I believe that the testimony of their lives – their stories – continues to reveal to us the motions of the good Spirit.

1. Dispersion: "We consider ourselves pilgrims and exiles."

Before their plans to set sail to Jerusalem did not materialize, and before their discernment in 1539, in which they asked themselves how they wanted to maintain their relationships across distances, the evidence of what they did suggests that they understood that following Jesus would mean being separated and sent to different places. For example, in northern Italy, as they awaited passage to Jerusalem, they split up into two groups, five serving in the hospital of St. John and

[3] Arturo Sosa, SJ, "Confirmed in the Charism, Sent on a Mission of Reconciliation and Justice," 3 January 2026.

St. Paul and the other five serving in the hospital of the Incurables.[4] After their trip to Rome in 1537, they came back to Venice and were ordained. Again, they split up, this time into pairs in order to spend time, as Simon Rodrigues put it, in "solitude and reflection on the things of God."[5] In this embryonic stage of their religious life, going to different places was a part of their apostolic identity.

The configuration of their apostolic identity happened in multiple ways – prayer, spiritual conversation, and extended time together as students at the same university. Most importantly, they came to discover their identity in and through the *Spiritual Exercises*. And in that spiritual experience, they met a Jesus who sends apostles into the world. As John O'Malley argued: "the ultimate model for the Jesuits' pastoral engagement was the disciples of Jesus – sent on journey for preaching and healings in body and soul."[6]

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[4] Nicolás Bobadilla, *Autobiographia*, vol. 46, *Bobadillae Monumenta: Nicolai Alphonsi de Bobadilla, Sacerdotis e Societate Iesu – Gesta et Scripta* (hereafter MBob), ed. Daniel Restrepo, SJ (Madrid: Typis Gabrielis Lopez del Horno, 1913), 615.

[5] Two texts, one in Latin and the other in Portuguese, constitute the critical editions of Rodrigues' account of the Society's origins. For the Latin text, see, Simon Rodrigues, *De origine et progressus Societatis Jesu*, vol. 24, *Epistolae PP. Paschasii Broëti, Claudii Jaji, Joannis Codurii et Simonis Rodericii (MBroët)*, ed. Federico Cervós, SJ (Madrid: Typis Gabrielis Lopez del Horno, 1903), 451–517. For the Portuguese text, see Simon Rodrigues, *Monumentum 3* (document three): *Commentarium de origine et progressu Societatis Iesu*, vol. 85, *Fontes Narrativi de Sancto Ignatio de Loyola et de Societatis Iesu Initiis, Tomus III*, ed. Candido de Dalmases, SJ (Rome: Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu, 1960), 5–136. I am following the English translation by Joseph Conwell, (trans.), *A Brief and Exact Account: The Early Recollections of Simão Rodrigues on the Origin and Progress of the Society of Jesus* (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources [IJS], 2004), number 61. Bobadilla and Paschase Bröet went to Verona; Ignatius, Faber, and Laínez went to Vicenza; Claude Jay and Simon Rodrigues were in Bassano; Xavier and Alfonso Salmerón stayed in Monteselice; Jean Codure and Diego Hozes were in Treviso (following Rodrigues, Origins, n. 62).

[6] John O'Malley, *The First Jesuits* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 372. Also Friedrich: "Apostolic ministry, the proactive effort to promote Christianity among men, had long been a prominent feature of classical Western monasticism, but among the Jesuits – even more so than in the mendicant

If we were to look closely at the *Exercises* and what early generations of Jesuits said about it, we would find that they understood their lives *vis-à-vis* the meditation of the Two Standards. In that meditation, Jesus sends many persons "throughout the whole world, to spread his doctrine among people of every state and condition."[7] Speaking to a group of Jesuit scholastics in Coimbra, Portugal, in 1561, Jerome Nadal declared that the meditation is not simply a spiritual exercise that one does in the second week of the Exercises. For Nadal, the meditation described the Jesuit's daily life. In his words, the meditation on the Two Standards "says what really happens" (in our life). Or, in another phrase of his, "this meditation signals our Institute put into practice."[8]

Putting this meditation into practice meant that the Jesuit is sent out by Jesus, and he returns to Jesus every day to learn from him. Jesus is the true life, the one who inhabits a place that is, according to the text, humble, beautiful, and gracious. From that place, Jesus sends us out to bring that humble, beautiful and gracious good news to all peoples. For this reason, to be sent out, separated from one's companions, is a grace. And this special grace of the Jesuit vocation was a point of pride for them.[9] So much so that they likened themselves, as did other religious groups, to the primitive church, experiencing in their dispersion what the disciples felt in being sent out by Jesus.[10] When Polanco wrote,

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Dominican and Franciscan orders – it became the overriding purpose of life," Friedrich, *The Jesuits*, 67.

[7] Ignatius of Loyola, *The Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius of Loyola (Spiritual Exercises)*, ed. George Ganss (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1992), 145.

[8] Jerome Nadal, "*Plática 3ª Meditaciones del Rey y las Banderas,*" in *Las Pláticas del Jerónimo Nadal: La globalización ignaciana*, ed. Miguel Lop (Bilbao-Santander: Mensajero-Sal Terrae, 2011), 170.

[9] In his study of Jerome Nadal, Joseph Conwell points out that Nadal "will increasingly underline the pilgrim nature of the Society, living on the road, in exile." See Joseph Conwell, *Walking in the Spirit: A Reflection on Jerónimo Nadal's Phrase "Contemplative Likewise in Action"* (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 2003), 85.

[10] See, Conwell, *Walking in the Spirit*, 94. Conwell points out that "it is important to be aware that the young Society, like every new religious order, saw itself blessed

"we consider ourselves pilgrims and exiles in this world where we have no permanent city," he was thanking God for the gift of such a call.[11] Union with Christ was to be like him, sent, a pilgrim in the world, the one who had nowhere to lie his head.

Dispersion not only held an important place in their spirituality, but, as all things do in the Ignatian charism, it was structured into their life. In the 4th vow, a vow in which the Jesuit promised obedience to the pope for missions, Jesuits "sought to take part in this universal and global perspective" of the Church's mission.[12] As the historian Markus Friedrich has pointed out, "we should not overestimate the direct influence of obedience to the pope on the everyday workings of the Society."[13] Nevertheless, we should recall that for Ignatius this vow was made so that "His Holiness might arrange our separation and mission."[14] And in a further gloss on this vow, Ignatius underlined its importance: "such a promise is our first principle and main foundation."[15] Their pastoral principle and foundation, the "cornerstone of their following

with the grace to live in its own time the life of the primitive Church." (Ibid., 95).

[11] Juan Alfonso de Polanco, *Polancus Mariae de Salinas matri suae, 31 decembris 1552* (Letter of Juan Alfonso de Polanco to María de Salinas [his mother], 31 December 1552), vol. 52, *Polanci Complementa. Epistolae et commentaria P. Ioannis Alphonsi de Polanco e Societate Iesu ex autographis, Tomus I*, eds. Daniel Restrepo, SJ, Dionysius Fernández Zapico (Madrid: Typis Gabrielis Lopez del Horno, 1916), 76.

[12] Friedrich, *The Jesuits*, 134.

[13] Friedrich, *The Jesuits*, 134.

[14] "Constitutions Regarding Missions," in *The Primitive Constitutions of 1541 and Other Preparatory Documents for the Jesuit Constitutions*, trans. Joseph Munitiz, *Studies in the Spirituality of Jesuits* 53/4 (2021): 39.

[15] "Declaration about the Missions," in *The Primitive Constitutions of 1541 and Other Preparatory Documents for the Jesuit Constitutions*, trans. Joseph Munitiz, *Studies in the Spirituality of Jesuits* 53/4 (2021): 42.

of Jesus as religious" was their desire to be dispersed for mission anywhere in the world.[16]

This rhetoric about the Jesuit pastoral style of being pilgrims and exiles bespeaks hopes and dreams.[17] And these dreams were realized: these were men on the move. Consider, for example Nicolás Bobadilla. Over a 10-week period in the summer of 1538, he and Claude Jay travelled from Rome to the northern Italian city of Ferrara. There they worked, giving as Bobadilla recounts, good example of Christian doctrine by their lives, and then they returned to Rome.[18] They travelled 850 km to work for a month at the bequest of the Duke of Ferrara.[19]

A slightly longer journey for a mission that ended up being about the same amount of time was that undertaken by Alfonso Salmerón and Paschase Broët. Pope Paul III sent them to Ireland, a distance of some 2,463km from Rome.[20] Writing to Ignatius in April of 1542, Salmerón recounted that they spent a mere 34 days in Ireland. Both Jesuits found such hostility in and among the people that staying there was not possible. Salmerón admitted that their presence in Scotland was a bit more fruitful, commenting that "a few people were consoled to see us," but overall, the trip seems to have borne little fruit. Yet, this is not how Salmerón saw it; at the end of his letter, he praised God who brought them there to share "in some way with the cross of Christ." He specified what this sharing in the life of Christ felt like: "we had nothing to eat, nothing to drink, nowhere to sleep, and not even a quiet place to say an Our Father." But he declared: "of all of this and

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[16] Ignacio Iglesias, *"Cuarto voto,"* in *Diccionario de Espiritualidad Ignaciana,* vol. 1, ed. *Grupo de Espiritualidad Ignaciana* (Bilbao-Santander: Mensajero-Sal Terrae, 2007), 517.

[17] Following O'Malley, *The First Jesuits*, 372.

[18] Bobadilla, *Hercules II Extensis, Dux Ferrariae: PP. Nicolao Bobadillae et Claudio Jajo, Ferraria, 29 junii 1538* (Letter of Bobadilla to the Duke of Ferrara [29 June 1538]), MBob, 7-8.

[19] Following letters 3-8, in *Mbob*, 2-11.

[20] According to Google Maps.

the rest we would be happy to stay to do some service to Christ our Lord." Their mission – 2,463km for 34 days – was a grace, and they rejoiced at being able to imitate Christ who came not to be successful or efficient, but to serve and be helpful in small ways.

But the reality of dispersion in the Lord's vineyard was also, unsurprisingly, difficult.[21] Concretely put, it entailed heartache. For example, in the first extant letter we have from Simon Rodrigues, Rodrigues, writing from Lisbon, complained to Ignatius of not receiving letters, letters that in his words he "so desired." In that same letter he recounted the departure of Francis Xavier for the Indies, and he confided that Xavier's absence was hard on him. Similarly poignant is how he interpreted his remaining in Portugal; he reasoned that "I, because of my sins, have been deprived of realizing my great desires, for not being worthy of so much good like Master Francis."[22] He missed his friend, most likely felt alone, and in that emotional state, made what seems like a harsh judgment on himself. In their loneliness, the evil spirit found fertile ground to make the men doubt themselves.

Peter Faber, too, gives ample testimony of both the zeal of being sent out on mission as well as the difficulty of living such an itinerant apostolic life. It is estimated that in six years, from 1540-1546, Faber traveled some 10,000-12,000 miles. His life was, as he himself put it, "wandering and restless to a degree – as I believe God intended it to be, because it was for his sake alone that I have put up in so many lodgings."[23] Faber believed that his peripatetic life made sense in God's vision, but that did not mean that he did not miss the companionship

[21] Important to note too that "many Jesuits at large showed equally great mobility. And yet even shortly after 1540 it was undeniable that an opposite trend had also emerged, becoming more pronounced over time." See, Friedrich, *The Jesuits*, 65.

[22] Rodrigues, *Patribus Ignatio de Loyola et Petro Codacio, 15 maji 1541* (Letter of Simon Rodrigues to Ignatius of Loyola [15 May 1541]), v. 24, *MBroët*, 520 and 523.

[23] See, Pierre Favre, "*Memoriale*," in *The Spiritual Writings of Pierre Favre,* eds. Edmond Murphy & John Padberg (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1996), n. 286, 230.

of his friends. In a poignant letter in which he recounts having missed seeing Francis Xavier, who passed through northern Italy on his way to Lisbon, Faber wrote: "these separations only make sense for Jesus Christ."[24] Faber would never see Xavier again…and he could only turn to Jesus to make sense of, if he could, his feelings. In addition, the geographical dispersion created in him a kind internal dispersion. In his personal journal, he wrote that "I had often been negligent during the course of my numerous and varied journeys."[25] Similarly, he noted that he thought that his lectures to people were incoherent and confusing, [26]and that he was, in his words, "achieving nothing of note…I kept thinking I could not help being by far the least successful of all my contemporaries."[27] Moreover, he lamented what he called his "old defect:" he always took on too many things.[28] And when letters from Rome did not arrive, he concluded: "each week I feel new sorrow that I am not worthy to receive your letters."[29]

In sum, the men understood their separation from their friends in the only way they could: looking at Jesus. Jesus was their principal and foundation, and it was for him that they set off on foot, walked thousands of kilometers, and waited for letters that often never arrived. But their being sent and separated founded the Society of Jesus. That

[24] Pierre Favre, *Patri Ignatio de Loyola, 16 aprilis 1540* (Letter of Peter Faber to Ignatius of Loyola [16 April 1540]), vol. 48, Fabri *Monumenta. Beati Petri Fabri primi sacerdotis e Societate Iesu. Epistolae, Memoriale et Processus ex autographis (MFab)*, ed. Francisco Lirola (Madrid: Typis Gabrielis Lopez del Horno, 1914), 30: *"el Señor por su gracia haga de suerte que, si en este mundo no nos veremos, nos podamos alegrar juntamente en el toro de estas separaciones hechas por solo Jesucristo."*

[25] Favre, "*Memoriale*," n. 433, 309.

[26] Favre, "*Memoriale*," n. 192, 182.

[27] Favre, "*Memoriale*," n. 423, 304.

[28] Favre, *Patribus Ignatio de Loyola et Petro Codacio, 20 aprilis 1541* (Peter Faber to Ignatius of Loyola (20 April 1541), MFab, 88. The phrase is: *"pecando siempre en este mi viejo defecto que es abrazar demaisiado."*

[29] Favre, *Patribus Societatis Jesu Romae degentibus*, 30 novembris 1541 (Letter of Peter Faber to members of the Society of Jesus [30 November 1541]), MFab, 138.

foundation continues to produce fruit: I believe that we are here, sisters and brothers, all of us collaborators in the Church, because of them. This gathering is a fruit of a seed that was sown many years ago. Stated in the language of a psalm: "what they sowed in tears, we are reaping in joy." Moreover, this sowing in tears – experiencing the difficulty of dispersion – has not finished with the first companions. Being sent out for mission is at the heart of our life: our union or community life is lived in and for dispersion. Our present pontiff has reminded all of us of this: "the Church needs you at the frontiers…these are places of risk, where familiar maps are no longer sufficient."[30] This is our charism, which, as Hugo Rahner put it, is a "mystical joy in running toward the world."[31] The lives of the first companions encourage us to go to those frontiers, and to trust that such a mission, lived in dispersion and separation, will be fruitful for generations to come.

2. Sickness or Obtaining "half a doctorate in directing and ordering one's life to God"

Given the amount of travelling the men did, it is not surprising to find illness constantly present in their lives and, as such, finding its way in their correspondence. To return briefly to the companions I mentioned earlier: Faber reported serious health issues in early 1546. He wrote that he had fallen ill and that he had lost use of his hand.[32] Salmerón reports that in their journey from Rome to Ireland, they spent some 20 days in the North Sea in late December sailing to Edinburgh – and if we have difficulty imagining how cold it must have been, he tells us. He wrote that the temperature was so harsh that "I do not

[30] Pope Leo XIV, *Address of Pope Leo XIV to the Major Superiors of the Society of Jesus*, Speeches, 24 October 2025, https://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiv/en/speeches/2025/october/documents/20251024-compagnia-gesu.html.

[31] Hugo Rahner, *The Spirituality of St. Ignatius of Loyola*, trans. Francis John Smith (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1980), 45.

[32] See, Favre, *Patri Jacobo Lainio, 7 martii 1546* (Letter of Peter Faber to Diego Laínez [7 March 1546]), MFab, 400: *"no estoy tan recio de la mano."*

think that we had one good day of health" the whole time.[33] For his part, Bobadilla does not report that he or Claude Jay became ill during their work in Ferrara, Italy, but he certainly did have health issues. For example, in September of 1538, he headed south to Naples, to the island of Ischia on a special mission entrusted to him by Pope Paul III. Upon arriving, he came down with what he called "a malignant fever called *pecoraria*," which in his words "was some kind of pestilence, a deadly fever." He had to leave the island, return to Naples, where he arrived "staggering and worn out from vomiting." He stayed in a hospital, the hospital of the Annunciation, for two months recovering.[34] Recalling this sickness, he wrote that "he heard the doctor say to the infirmarian: 'That man is on his way to the grave.'"[35] He may have been on his way to the grave, but he recovered, went back to Ischia, completed his mission, and then returned to Rome.

Bobadilla is an interesting case study on this topic of illness because he documented so many of his bodily ailments. In an autobiographical text he wrote in 1589, at the age of 80, one year before he died, he recounted in detail the many occasions when he was ill or almost died. In a section of his story that he titled "Just and Legitimate Cause why Master Nicolaus Bobadilla does not easily believe Doctors, nor always Obeys them while he is Sick," he chronologically detailed the "many things he has experienced in his body."[36] For example, he wrote that "he began to get sick when he was thirteen years old, and has often been sick". He was, in his words, "frequently sick because of his studies" and "was often sick unto danger of death." The specific examples of these near-death experiences are vivid: accidentally ingesting poison,

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[33] Alfonso Salmerón, *Patri Ignatio de Loyola, 2 februarii 1542* (Letter of Alfonso Salmerón to Ignatius of Loyola [2 February 1542]), vol. 30, *Epistolae P. Alphonsi Salmeronis Societatis Iesu ex autographis vel originalibus exemplis potissimum depromptae (MSal), Tomus I*, eds. Raimundo Vidaurre, Federico Cervós, SJ (Madrid: Typis Gabrielis Lopez del Horno, 1906), 3.

[34] Bobadilla, *Autobiographia, MBob*, 618, par. 15.

[35] Bobadilla, *Autobiographia, MBob*, 618, par. 15.

[36] Bobadilla, *Autobiographia, MBob*, 630, par. 58.

encountering the plague in Germany, being hit by a kind of spear or javelin while living in an army camp, and suffering for five years from quartan fever, a form of malaria "where an onset of fevers occurs every three to four days."[37] As if this account were not enough, he proceeded to narrate other dangerous incidents he endured. For example, he mentions that he was robbed, menaced by soldiers, and three times thrown off his mule.[38]

For a contemporary reader, Bobadilla's vivid recall of all of his illnesses may make us think he was something of a hypochondriac – obsessed and worried about his health to the very end of his days. Perhaps. But it is worth considering more carefully why he would end his brief autobiography cataloguing the sicknesses, dangers, and accidents he suffered. In other words, what made him enumerate, year by year, all of his illnesses? On a surface level, these experiences constitute his story. They formed him as much as, we might say, apostolic successes achieved in good health. Writing about the spiritual growth that can take place in illness, the author and journalist Liuan Huska asks a compelling question: "What if the vulnerability and the limits we experience in illness tell a truer story about who we are than the invincibility and limit-pushing confidence we feel in good health?"[39] Bobadilla might be inclined to agree with Huska. I am too. After two years of novitiate and another two years of Philosophy studies, I was finally missioned to regency, a period of apostolic work. As I looked towards my regency at a school in northern Perú, I thought: *I am free at last, finally able to do what I wanted. This was why I entered the Society of Jesus.* I spent the first two months of my apostolic life with dengue fever. I learned early on that we have limits. I, we, are not invincible.

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[37] Bobadilla, *Autobiographia, MBob*, 630, par. 58. Also following the Wikipedia article at "Quartan Fever," *Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia*, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quartan_fever (Accessed 23 Feb 2026).

[38] Bobadilla, *Autobiographia, MBob*, 633, par. 60.

[39] Liuan Huska, *Hurting yet Whole: Reconciling Body and Spirit in Chronic Pain and Illness* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2020), 101.

Bobadilla gives two reasons for recounting his ailments. First, he describes his infirmities to show that he knew his body, so much so that he became, in his words, "the greatest passive doctor of his body."[40] This is an important observation: he is indicating that he could read pain and fear as if they were messages or communications. Pain was something he suffered passively, but he became adept at decoding and learning from it. He intimates as much in his story when he wrote that he "made notes" on his illnesses and treatments.[41] This should not strike us as strange. In contemporary Ignatian idiom, we might put it this way: he learned from his experience, maybe even doing an *examen* during his illnesses to discover what benefit, spiritual or otherwise, they might have held for him.

I use the word "benefit" because that is the same language that Diego Laínez used in one of his talks to Jesuit scholastics in Rome. Laínez, the second general of the Society of Jesus, in his capacity as general, talked to Jesuits about how to live in illness. He said that "when one is sick, one can take great profit from the illness."[42] One of those benefits involved learning how to let another take care of you. Similarly, sickness affords the person the possibility to learn patience. Finally, and most importantly for Laínez, one learns about one's self. Disease, fevers, accidentally ingesting poison: these are great teachers in life. This capacity to learn from one's experience points to an essential aspect of Ignatius' spirituality. For example, writing in 1536, he declared: "it is God's way to bestow understanding."[43] For him, God communicates with the human person pedagogically.[44] As such, one is

[40] Bobadilla, *Autobiographia, MBob*, 630, par. 58.

[41] Bobadilla, *Autobiographia, MBob*, 631, par. 58.

[42] Candido de Dalmases, "Le esortazioni del P. Lainez sull' *'Examen constitutionum,'" Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu XXXV, fasciculum* 69 (1966): 173.

[43] Ignatius of Loyola, "To Jaime Cassador (12 Feb 1536)," in *Ignatius of Loyola: Letters and Instructions*, eds. and trans. Martin E. Palmer, SJ, John W. Padberg, SJ and John L. McCarthy, SJ (St. Louis: The Institute of Jesuit Sources, 2006), 17.

[44] Paraphrasing José Francisco Ruiz Pérez who wrote: *"La intervención pedagógica de Dios es uno de los temas preferidos de Ignacio."* See, Ruiz Perez, *Teología de Camino*

always learning from history and from one's experiences, even – and most especially – the most uncomfortable ones. Ignatius himself was a particularly adept reader of sickness. As an example, in a letter to Isabel Roser, he put it this way: "I believe that an illness can leave a servant of God with half a doctorate in directing and ordering his life to God's glory and service."[45]

Returning to Bobadilla and his second reason for his laundry list of illnesses: everything points to God. It was God who brought him out of these dangers and willed that he recover. More specifically, it was God's providence. Bobadilla, like the other companions, believed that "nothing stands outside the guiding hand of God."[46] You will recall that Bobadilla was one of the companions Ignatius had in mind to send with Simon Rodrigues to the mission in Portugal which would eventually take them to the Indies. He never made that trip to Portugal because, well, he fell ill. Writing about that moment in his *Autobiography*, he recalled:

He was ill and … in his place Ignatius of Loyola asked Francis Xavier [to go], who by divine providence had dreamt while in Paris of carrying on his back a young Muslim boy and baptizing him. He (Xavier) had great zeal for the conversion of the infidels, and Christ fulfilled his dream… The judgments of God are a great abyss.[47]

> History has proved that Bobadilla was right: it *was* providence that he was sick, not missioned to the Indies, and that Xavier was sent in his place. The fruits of that providence are evident in the world today, especially in a gathering like this one so near to where Xavier evangelized.

(Bilbao-Santander: Mensajero, Sal Terrae, 2000), 160.

[45] Ignatius of Loyola, "To Isabel Roser (10 November 1532)," in *Letters and Instructions*, 9.

[46] Michael Buckley, *What Do You Seek? The Questions of Jesus as Challenge and Promise* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2016), 112.

[47] Bobadilla, *Autobiographia, MBob*, 618-619, par. 16.

I believe that all of us would agree with Bobadilla that the judgments of God are a great abyss. However, that phrase does not mean that God's providence for him was opaque or confusing, rather it points to his sense that God's care runs so deep that it even governs things like bodily health. It is not too much to state that he and all of the companions believed that God's personal providence guided every moment of their lives. According to Ignacio Iparraguirre, divine providence was one of Ignatius' preferred ways to name God. Moreover, that providence had a style for Ignatius: he consistently described God's divine providence with the word "gentle" (*suave*). For example, he expressed this when he wrote "God gently guides," "the providence of our most friendly God," and "the gentlest providence."[48]

I do not believe that I am exaggerating when it comes to Bobadilla's belief in divine providence. Allow me to add to our conversation one more example from a document he authored in 1570. In my estimation, this rather long letter represents one of the more moving documents from the first companions. Titled "A Small Consoling Book," Bobadilla addressed the particular concerns and frustrations of his Jesuit companion Jerome Doménech.[49]

The context of this letter is not sickness, but rather that of men leaving the Society. In 1570, the province of Sicily was hemorrhaging men, and Doménech found himself dismayed, as any one of us would be, at the fact that so many men – so many of his friends – were leaving the Society. Those feelings were compounded by the fact that Francis Borgia, the general at the time, sent a man from Rome to ascertain the situation. This Jesuit, Juan Montoya, Borgia's special envoy, found the Sicilians hard-headed and therefore in need of what he called "an exemplary punishment."[50] This punishment took the form of his expelling more men from the Society. Seeing the situation unfold and

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[48] Following Ignacio Iparraguirre, *Espíritu de san Ignacio de Loyola: Perspectivas y actitudes ignacianas de espiritualidad* (Bilbao: Mensajero, 1958), 44.

[49] See, *Mario Scaduto, "Il 'Libretto Consolatorio' di Bobadilla a Doménech sulle vocazioni mancate," Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu* (1974): 85-102.

[50] Scaduto, *"Il 'Libretto Consolatorio' di Bobadilla a Doménech,"* 86.

noticing how disconsolate Doménech was, Bobadilla did what a friend does – he sought to console him.

He began his letter with a brief and lucid exposition of the difficulty of discernment. He then turned to console his addressee, arguing that divine providence was at work in bringing men to the Society *as well as* in having them leave.[51] Appealing repeatedly to divine providence, Bobadilla encouraged Doménech to let go of his frustration or indignation. Furthermore, in an astounding vision of vocation and religious life, he wrote: "how many that have left, been dismissed and not received in the Society have gone to paradise and how many in it, both the great and the small, will go to hell."[52] And his concluding words were direct: "a superior ought to embrace in all things divine providence… vesting himself with the grace of God and with love for one's neighbor."[53]

Divine providence was, if you like, the principle and foundation of their lives. Even if they did not feel the motions of the good Spirit, they believed in the Spirit's care.

3. Conflict: "A sign that a greater work of God is at hand"

"It should not surprise anyone," the companions wrote in 1539, "that being some of us French, Spanish, Savoyards, and others Cantabrians, we found ourselves divided in viewpoints and opinions regarding our state."[54] In that foundational deliberation, their

[51] Scaduto, "*Il 'Libretto Consolatorio' di Bobadilla a Doménech*," 95, my emphasis.

[52] Scaduto, "*Il 'Libretto Consolatorio' di Bobadilla a Doménech*," 101.

[53] Scaduto, "*Il 'Libretto Consolatorio' di Bobadilla a Doménech*," 101.

[54] For the Deliberation of the First Fathers, see, Jules Toner, "The Deliberation that Started the Jesuits: A Commentary on the *Deliberatio primorum Patrum*, Newly Translated, with a Historical Introduction," *Studies in the Spirituality of Jesuits* vol. 6, no. 4 (1974): 185-186. The original Latin text can be found at *Monumenta praevia I: Deliberatio primorum patrorum, 1539*, vol. 63, *Monumenta Ignatiana: Sancti Ignatii de Loyola Constitutiones Societatis Jesu, Tomus I*, ed. Arturo Codina, SJ (Rome: Typis Pontificiae Universitatis Gregorianae, 1934), 2, par. 1.

differences did not break up their bonds; rather, the conflicts they experienced seem to have led them into understanding themselves as a group constituted by plurality and diversity. It is intriguing to consider that, along with the results of that foundational deliberation for them and for us, they learned how to exist as a group with ideas and views that were conflictual. It was their experience, borrowing from Hermann Rodríguez, that "the contradiction of opinions and viewpoints need not be an obstacle in the process of searching for God's will."[55] So strong was their sense that God had brought them together that conflict was not an obstacle to arriving at God's will.[56]

The companions' comments about the discernment process of 1539 suggest that they had a strong stomach for conflict. At least Ignatius seemed to. Conflict is an important theme that runs through the *Autobiography*. That text, known well by all of us, indicates that his earliest experiences of finding God's will involved conflict.

Later texts point to his freedom to engage in debates, no matter the conflict and tension that might ensue. For example, one important issue the early Society faced was the conferral of episcopal dignity on its members. According to André Ravier, "between 1543 and 1546, six of the first Fathers were threatened with being made bishops."[57] Perhaps the document that expresses Ignatius' most vehement opposition to this was the letter he wrote in 1546 to Ferdinand, King of the Romans, who had petitioned that Claude Jay be named bishop of Trieste. Ignatius declared that such a nomination would be "the most effective way

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[55] Hermann Rodríguez, *"Aportes de San Ignacio para una espiritualidad del conflicto," Manresa* 75 (2003): 297.

[56] Helpful too is Jean-Luc Enyegue who reasons that "…precisely because there were strong differences between them, because their world was also marked by social and political fractures, and finally, because they were aware of being fragile beings, living as a united body became imperative". See, Enyegue, *The Jesuit Ethos: A Social and Spiritual History* (New York: Paulist Press, 2023), 49.

[57] André Ravier, *Ignatius of Loyola and the Founding of the Society of Jesus*, trans. Maura Daly, Joan Daly, and Carson Daly (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), 223.

to overthrow and wreck the Society of Jesus."[58] No matter the level of hyperbole that he might have been employing, the clarity of his language to an important, high-ranking political figure demonstrates that he was unafraid of the conflict his stance would cause. Several years later, Francis Borgia was high on the list to become a cardinal, and Ignatius again labored strenuously to avoid it. Describing his prayer, he told Borgia: "I held then and now that there would be no contradiction in its being God's will for me to take this course while others take a different one and the dignity be conferred upon you."[59] In other words, Ignatius found no contradiction in the action of the Spirit that might produce different responses. He believed that the Spirit that was moving him to say "no" was the same Spirit that could move another to say "yes."

Unlike previous sections of my paper where I recounted anecdotes or stories of the companions, in this section I would like to explore more deeply Ignatius' spirituality, especially as it emerges in this idea of the Spirit acting in diverse ways. On the one hand, his belief that the Spirit is leading him to say "no" and could lead others to say "yes" bespeaks his freedom and trust in God. Any one of us would love, I imagine, to live with that freedom, trusting that we have been moved by the Spirit even when others may feel differently or when history goes in another direction. But more than revealing his personal freedom, this belief indicates his ecclesiology. In perhaps one of the more well-known rules for thinking or feeling with the Church, he wrote that "what seems to me to be white, I will believe to be black if the hierarchical Church thus determines it."[60] With this rule in the background, we can see him believing a certain way about Borgia becoming a cardinal, and yet he is willing to allow another to see it differently. This is not, I would argue, only an interesting aspect of his

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[58] Ignatius of Loyola, "To Ferdinand of Austria, King of [the] Romans (December 1546)," *Letters and Instructions*, 154.

[59] Ignatius of Loyola, "To Francis Borgia (5 June 1552)," *Letters and Instructions*, 377.

[60] Ignatius of Loyola, *Spiritual Exercises*, 365.

spirituality – it is central. There is a personal dynamic that occurs in our spirituality; for example, we pray and in the process we practice, as much as we can, a docility to the Spirit, feeling and then following movements of the good spirit. And yet, prayer does not reside or remain a strictly personal matter of the individual; it is more than what I feel and determine on my own. Prayer takes its logic from the incarnation, and this means that my personal prayer takes me into history and is specified by the Church.

Ignatius' understanding of how the Spirit acts in him and in others suggests something important about discernment. He trusted that God moved him to this "no," and he was certain about it. As José García de Castro has written, certainty was for him a criterion of the validity of his experience.[61] This certainty was a grace and a grace that he acted upon. But that did not mean in any absolute sense that it was God or God's will. It is as if he could embrace fully what he felt God was communicating to him, *and* he could, in a way, step back from it or not associate it in any facile way with God. There is then in his discernment certainty along with an ongoing surrender or submission to God that is expressed as openness to others. This seems paradoxical: certainty with surrender, conviction with submission. Nevertheless, this is what verifies the motion's origin in God. The motion that moves him makes him humble, and therein lies its Christlike quality and origin.[62]

This element of submission is not absent in that letter to Borgia; he closed it expressing his desire that "he [God] might fulfill his will in all our affairs."[63] God will fulfill his will in all of our affairs, and this can happen in diverse ways. Thus we need, as Philip Endean has written,

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[61] José Garcia de Castro, "La mística de Ignacio: cultura y costumbre," *Manresa* 76 (2004): 333-353, at 350.

[62] Following José Garcías de Castro who argues that "*toda buena moción encierra un componente crístico que antes o después habrá de afectar a la cualidad de la humildad.*" See, Jose García de Castro, "La estructura interna del discernimiento," *Manresa* 80 (2008): 137.

[63] Ignatius of Loyola, "To Francis Borgia (5 June 1552)," in *Letters and Instructions*, 377.

"the willingness to live with the emotional complexity that proceeds from a vision of the Church as a community of diverse forces."[64]

Ignatius' reflection on the same Spirit manifesting itself in diverse ways suggests that he thought theologically and spiritually about conflict. For example, we know that for him, the divine majesty is "so supremely disposed to *communicate* his goods."[65] This was a profound theological belief of his that we all share: God communicates God's self to us. But remember, God is not the only one on the scene: the enemy of our human nature is also at work. This conflict is written into the rules of discernment: two forces oppose each other and that opposition is felt in the most intimate or interior place of the human person. We feel it, daily, in our hearts. This opposing, conflictual action of the good spirit and evil spirit is how Ignatius understood the spiritual life. Depending upon the movement of the person, the spirits use, as Ignatius wrote in the first two rules of the first week, "contrary methods." Both act in opposing ways in the case of one who is progressing or in the situation of one who is "going from one mortal sin to another."[66] One way to think about discernment is as the grace to separate these opposing, conflictual forces. Or, as Pope Francis put it, "discernment is a struggle, and the struggle is to follow the Lord more closely."[67]

This theological and spiritual view of God's communication with the human person informed his view of history. In the words of Michael Buckley, Ignatius viewed human history as "fundamentally

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[64] Philip Endean, "'The Same Spirit in Everything': Towards a Contemporary Theological Reading of Ignatius' Rules for Thinking with the Church," in *Encounters with the Word – Essays to Honour Aloysius Pieris – 2004*, eds. Robert Crusz, Marshal Fernando, Asanga Tilakaratne (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue, 2004), 509-521, at 517.

[65] Ignatius of Loyola, "To the Fathers and Scholastics at Coimbra (Rome, 7 May, 1547)," in *Letters and Instructions*, 166; emphasis mine.

[66] Ignatius of Loyola, *Spiritual Exercises*, 314.

[67] Jorge Mario Bergoglio, "*Dos Banderas*," in *Meditaciones para religiosos* (Bilbao: Mensajero, 2014), 163.

conflictual, continually embodying a radical struggle between the divine influence upon human choice and that of the 'enemy of our human nature,' between the human and diabolical."[68] What one experienced interiorly plays out in the drama of social life. And such a view seems as apropos today as it was in the 16th century: Our history is conflictual; the diabolical presses upon us, all the time, and God too indefatigably works for our salvation.

And if this was his view of history, it also informed his view of the Church. Though of less ecclesiological currency than before, Ignatius employed the image of the Church militant. This was a classic expression, hardly original to him, and with it he expressed how he saw the world. This was one way he expressed his ecclesiology, an ecclesiology which, not surprisingly, maps onto his Christology. To see his Christology, we might turn to the pivotal meditation of the call of the King, where we find Jesus as the one whose "will is to conquer the whole world and all my enemies, and thus to enter into the glory of my Father."[69] Jesus is the one who labors, struggles, and continues to carry his cross for the salvation of all of us. I mention this cognizant of the fact that it is becoming something of a commonplace in Ignatian spirituality to say that the language of the call of the King does not appeal to retreatants today. Our resistance to the language of this meditation is so great that I have even been on retreats where this meditation was passed over. Why? Because no one liked the language. A church militant and a king who wants to conquer do not fit into our religious sensibilities. Our ecclesial moment is much more amenable: we walk, listen, and together follow the lead of the Spirit. And yet, an attentive reading of Ignatius' spirituality (not to mention his ecclesiology, Christology, and history) suggests that it might be important to hold a place, albeit small, for a church called by a King to struggle in the world. Drawing from another image from the *Exercises*, God, as the Contemplation to Obtain Love offers, conducts himself

[68] Michael Buckley, "Ecclesial mysticism in the 'Spiritual Exercises' of Ignatius," *Theological Studies* 56/3 (1995): 445.

[69] Ignatius of Loyola, *Spiritual Exercises*, 95.

as one who works. Let us not romanticize work. Work is, as all of you know, hard. It is a daily struggle with hardship and conflict.

Similar to the presence of diverse movements or "agitations" as that which verified the spiritual experience, social conflict or agitation was a sign of God's action. Another way of stating this is Ignatius saw conflict as a sign disclosing God's presence. Writing in 1554, Ignatius made the following conclusion as he attempted to interpret, what we might anachronistically call, the signs of his times: "As for me, I can say that the more contradictions I see in the world, the more I believe there must be a greater work of God at hand; and the devil, fearing this, does everything in his power to hinder it."[70] Contradictions and tensions alerted him that God was doing some great work in the world and that the evil one, at the level of our humanity, was opposing it. Such is the vision of conflict that comes to us from Ignatius, a vision shared by the first companions. In such a vision, Ignatius invites us to look at the world and interpret it, reading, as it were, God's signs that emerge in the midst of the confusion the evil spirit wants to sow. Similarly, he calls us to be lucid, naming those forces that oppose God's action. A more recent example of how to do this comes from Pope Francis who, for example, warned us that "the temptation in tribulation is to refuse to discern – to ask, *What is the Holy Spirit asking of us? How must we change?*"[71] Following Ignatius, Pope Francis knew that moments of conflict are moments where the Spirit may be most at work.

Conclusion

Pope Francis' questions – "*what is the Holy Spirit asking of us?"* and "*how must we change?"* – are a good place to conclude this presentation

[70] *Benedicto Uguccionio, 28 et 29 septembris 1554* (Letter of Ignatius of Loyola to Benedict Uguccionio [28 and 29 September 1554]), vol. 34, *Monumenta Ignatiana: Sancti Ignatii de Loyola Societatis Jesu fundatoris epistolae et instructiones (Epp. et instruct.), Tomus* VII (Madrid: Typis Gabrielis Lopez del Horno, 1908), 579 (no published English translation).

[71] See, Austen Ivereigh, "Pope Francis: Reform and Resistance," *The Way* 59/4 (2020): 20.

because they bring us back to the Spirit who called us here. The Spirit that called us here is asking something of us. Maybe it is change, openness, newness. Perhaps, on an obvious level, the Spirit has brought us here to listen, to learn, and to form friendships. I hope that this presentation has allowed you to listen and learn from our friends, the first companions. They too were like us, discovering that the Spirit brought them together and that the same Spirit had much to ask of them. And they listened. They listened to the Spirit as they sailed in the frigid waters of the North Sea to Ireland; they listened in hospitals, sick with fevers; they listened too as they struggled to discern the contrary movements that diverse spirits caused in them. And they listened to each other, to their superiors, to the Church, and to the women and men they encountered in historical situations that were both confusing and exhilarating.

If we were to desire to emulate the companions in any way, it might be in this capacity to ask the Spirit to know God's will in all of our human situations. Those situations could include dispersion, both geographical and personal, illness, both in body and mind, and conflict, both internal and external. Hopefully, these days will not be marked by such experiences, but let us turn to the Spirit and listen. And let us ask for the grace to follow those motions that come from the good Spirit.

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THE STATUS OF SOCIETIES OF APOSTOLIC LIFE, A CANONICAL OVERVIEW: FROM THE CODE OF 1917 TO VATICAN II

Arnaud Touré, PIME

Abstract. This article is the second in a series on societies of apostolic life published in *Landas*. While the first article[1] provided a historiographical account of the history of societies of apostolic life, that is, the fundamental circumstances and reasons underlying the creation of such societies, in this second article, the topic is addressed from the canonical aspect. It examines the canonical status of societies of apostolic life, beginning with the drafting process that led to canon 673 of the 1917 Code. It then explores the characteristics of these societies as outlined in that Code and in subsequent magisterial teachings up to the Second Vatican Council.

Keywords: *In communi viventium sine votis*, Second Vatican Council, state of perfection, vows

[1] Arnaud Touré, "The Evolution of Societies of Apostolic Life: From the Early Church to the 19th Century," *Landas* Vol. 38: no. 1 (2026): 229-253.

Introduction[2]

Before the 1917 Code, there was no common norm that could be specifically identified as the law applicable to the group of societies that would later be referred to in that Code as *societies, whether of men or of women, living in common without vows*. Nor do the early efforts to reorganize the sources of canon law, nor the private attempts at codification, seriously address the subject. Notably, in these works, the law governing persons is approached from three perspectives: clerics, religious, and laypersons, without any specific treatment of the subject as a distinct type of ecclesial reality.[3] Not even the apostolic constitution *Conditae a Christo*, by which Leo XIII provided for the recognition of religious institutes with simple vows, as well as for the distinction between institutes of pontifical right and those of diocesan right, established specific norms for this type of institute. Even their very names were the result of their own initiatives or those of the canonists of the time, who wished to distinguish them from religious orders. The names, therefore, differed from one society to another. There were names such as *societas*, *institutum*, *societas vitae communis*, *congregatio saecularis*, *congregatio ecclesiastica*.[4] We must wait until work began on codifying the Pio-Benedictine Code to find any mention of them. One of the earliest manuals to mention them addresses the topic in the section on religious orders, classifying them

[2] This article draws on the author's doctoral dissertation on societies of apostolic life. Readers seeking a more comprehensive and detailed treatment of the issues discussed here are encouraged to consult the dissertation. See Serge Arnaud Touré Pelamifihi, *Società di vita apostolica nella chiesa: storia, natura giuridica e vincoli*, Tesi Gregoriana, Serie Diritto Canonico 123 (Rome: Gregorian & Biblical Press, 2022). GenAI Disclosure Statement: This paper used GenAI for the following components: grammar check, translation from Italian to English. The following GenAI technologies were used: Grammarly, DeepL.

[3] Cf. Albert Pillet, *Jus canonicum generale distributum in articulos: quos collegit et ordinavit* (Paris: *Sumptibus P. Lethielleux, Editoris*, 1900), pp. 442-447.

[4] Cf. Hubert Socha, "*La nature fondamentale e le caratteristiche di una SVA con particolare riferimento ai suoi tre tipi*," *Commentarium pro religiosi et missionariis* 80-81 (1999-2000): 30.

among religious congregations.[5] Examples of such societies included the Oratory of St. Philip Neri, the Oratory of De Berulle in France, the Congregation of the Mission (or Lazarists), and the Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul.

Generally speaking, this lack of specific norms for their particular status was compensated for by the specific laws of each institute. In certain specific cases, ecclesiastical authority had issued a further set of norms for a particular society. It is not incorrect to assume, in the case of clerical societies, that this initial body of norms was supplemented with norms drawn from canon law on secular clerics. Indeed, because the majority of members of institutes of life in common without vows belonged to the secular clergy, such institutes were excluded from the law governing religious orders. This is what some manuals suggest.[6]

It should be noted, however, that several authors classified certain societies such as the Congregation of the Mission and the Oratory of St. Philip Neri as the third type within the category of regulars.[7] This alignment with the regulars, even before the promulgation of the Pio-Benedictine Code, was further evident in the apostolic constitution *Sapienti consilio*, which reorganized the Roman Curia. The *Congregatio Negotiis religiosorum sodalium praeposita*, now separate from the Congregation for Bishops, also had jurisdiction over societies without vows.[8] The criteria chosen by the constitution to identify them were

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[5] "*Societates sive clericorum sive laicorum, quae, ad peculiarem assequendum finem pietatis vel caritatis, accedunt ad Religionum rationem sed ab ea aliquo modo deficiunt, sive quia desideratur aliquod votum substantiale saltem perpetuum, sive qui vota a nullo superiore nomine Ecclesiae acceptantur. Hae nunc presse dicuntur Congregationes ecclesiasticae vel saeculares,"* Arthur Vermeersch, *De religiosis institutis et personis: tractatus canonico-moralis ad recentissimas leges exactus*, vol. I (Brugis: Stumptibus Bayaert, 1907), 42.

[6] Cf. Tommaso Michele Vincenzo Salzano, *Lezioni di diritto canonico pubblico, e privato considerato in se stesso e secondo l'attual polizia del Regno delle Due Sicilie*, vol. II (Naples: Saverio Giordano, 1852[8]), 217.

[7] Salzano, *Lezioni di diritto canonico pubblico*, 219.

[8] Pius X, *Apostolic Constitution Sapienti consilio*, 29 June 1908, *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 1 (1909): p. 11-12, I: *Sacra congregationes*, 5º - *Congregatio Negotiis religiosorum*

the absence of vows and life in common modeled on that of religious, elements that would also be used in can. 673 of the 1917 Code of Canon Law.

Following the promulgation of the Code, further interventions by the Church can be found in certain documents, such as the 1947 encyclical *Provida Mater Ecclesia*. Another key moment from which to discern the Church's thinking on the matter is undoubtedly the Second Vatican Council.

1. The First Codification and the Societies of Men or of Women, Living in Common without Vows

It was with the first codification that the first common and universal norms for this type of institution were established. This development cannot be fully understood without first taking into account the broader, general context of the entire codification process and the even more specific context of Title XVII of the *pars secunda* of Book II.

The idea of a code for the entire Latin Church originated long ago from the realization that the *Corpus Iuris Canonici* and other collections of law then in use within the Church were inadequate. Added to this, in more recent times, was the phenomenon of codification, which, beginning with the Napoleonic Code, which served as a model, exerted a significant influence on the legal system of the nineteenth century. Quite a few states, following France's example, also adopted a code that encompassed all the norms of a specific field. Thus, based on the conviction that the Church is a perfect society, many individuals and institutions within it put forward the idea that the Church, too, should have a code that systematically compiles its legislation. The need for such a code was then expressly articulated during the First Vatican Council, which was cut short by the socio-political events of

sodalium praeposita, n. 1.

the time.[9] With the *motu proprio Arduum sane munus* of March 19, 1904, Pius X announced the drafting of a single code containing the laws of the Church in a reorganized form.[10]

After several years of work, the Church's first *Codex iuris canonici* was promulgated by Benedict XV through the apostolic constitution *Providentissima Mater Ecclesia* on May 27, 1917. Comprising 2,414 canons, its general structure was divided into five books covering the following topics: general norms, persons, things, processes, delicts, and penalties.

Book II, dedicated to persons, was divided into three parts: clerics, religious, and laypersons. Divided into titles like all the other parts, the *pars secunda* contained all the canons governing the life of the religious. At the end of this *pars secunda*, therefore, following the section on religious and preceding that on laypersons, canons 673–681 were placed under Title XVII, entitled: *De societatibus sive virorum sive mulierum in communi viventium sine votis*.

1.1 The Drafting Process of Title XVII: "*De societatibus sive virorum sive mulierum in communi viventium sine votis*"

The development of these canons is fundamentally embedded within the broader context of religious law. This close interconnection requires, in any attempt to understand Title XVII of Book II, that one continually and concurrently refer to the definition of the *status religiosus*.

The preparatory documents trace the first meetings for the preparation of the code back to the spring of 1904. For the initial discussions, the basic document was an outline that, in broad terms, followed the traditional division of the then-current *Corpus iuris canonici*, namely *pars generalis*, *de personis*, *de rebus*, *de iudiciis*, *de delictis et poenis*. Book II, *de personis*, was in turn divided into three parts: *De clericis*, *de religiosis*, and *de laicis*. The section on religious dealt with the status of religious,

[9] Cf. Brigitte Basdevant-Gaudemet, *Histoire du droit canonique et des institutions de l'Église latine: XVe-XXe siècle* (Paris: Economica, 2014), 644.

[10] Cf. Pius X, *motu proprio Arduum sane munus*, 19 March 1904, *Acta Sanctae Sedis* 36 (1903-1904): 549-551.

the establishment of new orders, congregations, and religious institutes, the founding of new monasteries, houses, and provinces, admission, the novitiate, religious profession, constitutions and governance, the obligations and privileges of religious, and leaving orders and congregations. Regarding these topics, a consultant proposed that, after the section on leaving an institute, institutes with simple vows be added.[11]

However, in the very earliest reflections and proposals concerning the future Code of Canon Law, there is no mention of societies without vows. Two trends do emerge, however. On the one hand, there is a gradual broadening of the scope of what is to be considered; that is, the focus is no longer limited to religious orders alone. On the other hand, there is a concern for a rigorous definition of the religious state. This concern is illustrated by the effort to determine its essential elements. Furthermore, those who, while not professing the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, nevertheless imitate the way of life of religious and have been approved in this form were included among the religious.

Starting with the partial and special consultations, an ever-greater awareness began to emerge of the existence of societies that do not take vows like religious orders, and which must certainly be taken into account in the drafting of the *Codex Iuris Canonici*. In this regard, it is interesting to note the proposal by the Jesuit Bucceroni. Under the title *De Congregatione saeculari*, he classified institutes approved by a competent ecclesiastical authority in which no religious vows are taken, or only some are taken, or in which the vows that are taken are private, not public. For him, an institute with this structure is neither a religious order of solemn vows nor a religious congregation of simple vows, but a secular congregation or a pious community.[12]

In the eleventh official draft, a sort of appendix titled *De Congregatione Ecclesiastica* finally appears. First and foremost, a lexical

[11] Cf. *Archivio Apostolico Vaticano, Commissione di codificazione del codice*, scat. 1.

[12] Cf. *Archivio Apostolico Vaticano, Commissione di codificazione del codice*, scat. 28.

change emerges in this text. It is no longer a matter of an "institute" but of a "society;" furthermore, these societies may consist of either men or women. Their approval, as such, by ecclesiastical authority is also affirmed, which thereby sanctions this form of their existence. It is further stated that they lack religious vows or, in any case, public vows, that is, those accepted by the legitimate superior in the name of the Church. Finally, they lead a life in common in the manner of religious under the governance of superiors and in accordance with approved constitutions. The canon thus specifies that they are not religious orders, nor are their members religious, but rather ecclesiastical congregations.

During the drafting of the new code, objections were also raised by various institutes, including the Congregation of the Mission, the White Fathers, the Missionaries of the Most Precious Blood, and the Eudists, for example.

From the meetings of the commission of cardinals for codification emerged the proposal to use the title *De Congregationibus in communi viventium absque votis religiosis*. This proposal, at least in its final part, was indeed adopted by the 1917 Code in Title XVII of Book II.

The modifications that Cardinal Gasparri made to the official draft of 1909, without substantially altering the subject matter, help us better understand their terminology. Notably, it is to him that we owe the use of the word *society*.[13] Finally, it is in the 1914 draft that we find the definitive wording of the first canon on societies;[14] this canon was carried over into the 1916 draft and ultimately into the Code promulgated in 1917.

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[13] Cf. *Archivio Apostolico Vaticano, Commissione di codificazione del codice,* scat. 86.

[14] "*Societas sive virorum sive mulierum, in qua sodales vivendi rationem religiosorum imitantur in communi degentes sub regimine superiorum secundum probatas constitutiones, sed tribus consuetis votis publicis non obstringuntur, non est proprie religio, nec eius sodales nomine religiosorum proprie desigantur." Archivio Apostolico Vaticano, Commissione di codificazione del codice*, scat. 24.

1.2 Nature of Societies Living in Common Without Vows in CIC 17

The 1917 Code addresses the subject of societies of life in common without vows in canons 673-681. Without providing an explicit definition of these societies, the first canon devoted to them sets forth their fundamental characteristics, thereby allowing for an indirect definition. In light of its provisions, those male or female societies in which the members first and foremost imitate the way of life of religious, through life in common under the governance of superiors in accordance with approved constitutions, and secondarily are not bound by the three customary public vows—such societies living in this manner are not strictly speaking religious orders, nor can their members be called religious.

An analysis of the canon allows us to deduce that the nature of these societies is primarily determined by two main criteria. The first consists essentially in imitating the way of life of religious, through two important elements: on the one hand, life in common under the governance of superiors, and on the other, such a life in accordance with approved constitutions. The second criterion, however, is negative and is characterized by the absence of the three customary vows.

1.2.1 The Imitation of Religious

As a positive criterion contributing to the identification of societies, the imitation of religious is evident first and foremost in the very structure of the 1917 Code, which places these societies at the end of, and not outside, the section on religious. Subsequently, the imitation of religious is highlighted by the provisions of canon 673 itself, namely, life in common under the governance of superiors and, above all, the validation of this way of life through the approval of the constitutions. Imitation, therefore, should not be understood as merely *doing a*s they do, taking religious as models and trying to live like them. The imitation of religious is a consequence of the legally established life in common.

By emphasizing this dimension, the Code has identified their organized life in common as the cornerstone of these institutes and has

simultaneously identified life in common as one of the two essential legal criteria through which the imitation of the religious way of life takes shape.

The criterion of life in common is so important that it is even included in Title XVII.[15] Life in common has its roots in the example set by Jesus and his disciples, an example that the first apostolic communities then followed as a way of life conducive to making the apostolate more effective. Just as the Lord sent his disciples out two by two so that the world, seeing the love they had for one another, might know that they were his disciples, the apostolate carried out in community life is an illustration of that community of people already gathered together by the love of Christ.

Indeed, the history of communities of life in common reveals the original desire of every founder to engage in a specific apostolate together with a group of men or women. Although their primary concern was, first and foremost, the fulfillment of a specific apostolate, this original intent was also sustained by the desire to form a body dedicated to that particular apostolate. This original, purely functional aspect of life in common eventually became an indispensable part of these societies. Life in common within these societies, although aimed at the apostolate, is constitutive and therefore determinative of their legal form.

What constitutes the essence of life in common is not simply the fact of being gathered under the same roof. The heart of life in common, its principle and constitutive element, is the fact of having a common rule and observing it. It is the fact of sharing the same spirit, the same interests, and above all, common apostolic goals.

Generally, life in common is understood to involve at least two essential elements: legal membership in the community and the actual

[15] "*De societatibus sive virorum sive mulierum in communi viventium sine votis.*"

living of a life in common; that is, incorporation into the community and actually living under the same roof.[16]

While the code identifies life in common as a distinctive and defining feature of the imitation of religious, it also makes a point of specifying that such life in common is lived under the governance of superiors in accordance with the approved constitutions. Two important elements emerge from this clarification: first of all, the life in common of societies, to be considered an imitation of religious, necessarily requires the presence of superiors. Secondly, this way of life must have received ecclesial approval through the approved constitutions.

The governance of superiors is therefore a further distinctive element of these societies and, above all, a further criterion that allows us to affirm that they imitate religious. Like religious, many of these societies have organized their lives and activities around a centralized government. Within this structure, superiors exercise their governance in accordance with the same provisions of the law governing religious.[17]

A further conclusion that can be drawn from the provisions of canon 673 is the requirement that life in common be under the responsibility of superiors in accordance with the constitutions duly approved by the competent authority. The lives of members, precisely because they are not only lived in community, but above all because they must be concretely directed toward the pursuit of identical goals, sometimes by equally identical means, require common rules. For these rules to fall within the scope defined by the code, that is, to be part of the criteria considered necessary for identifying societies as emulating religious orders, they require a further condition: they must become constitutions, and approved constitutions at that. It is not, therefore, a matter of just any rule for organizing life in common under the governance of superiors, but rather that set of norms enshrined by

[16] Cf. Andrea Caelli, *La vita comune del clero. Storia e spiritualità* (Rome: Citta Nuova, 2000), 85.

[17] Cf. can. 675, CIC 1917.

the Church in the form of that specific legislation called a constitution. By this is meant that body of fundamental norms approved by the Holy See or by the diocesan bishop and distinct from other norms of particular law.

In light of all this, it becomes clearer just how much the lives of these societies actually resemble those of religious communities in terms of their organization. Their imitation of religious orders is not so much a matter of intending to copy what religious do, but rather the fact that the practical organization of their lives, through the community, superiors, and approved constitutions, even without intending to, becomes in some way similar to that already familiar from religious orders. Based on this observed imitation of religious orders, the 1917 Code establishes for them legislation consistent with that of religious orders, legislation applicable to the most diverse areas of their lives. Thus, for example, like religious institutes, societies may be clerical or lay, pontifical or diocesan, exempt or non-exempt.

1.2.2 *Sed tribus consuetis votis publicis non obstringuntur*

According to canon 673 §1 of the 1917 Code of Canon Law (CIC), the absence of the three customary public vows is the primary negative criterion that profoundly distinguishes these societies. Although they are not expressly named, in light of the process that led to canon 673 in its final form, it is nevertheless possible to infer that those three customary vows are certainly those habitually taken in the Church and that they concern obedience, chastity, and poverty.

For them to be truly such, that is, to correspond to the provisions of Title XII, *pars secunda* of Book II, these societies must not be bound by obedience, chastity, and poverty assumed through that particular bond called a vow, which has the additional attribute of being public. According to can. 1307 §1 CIC 17, a vow, that is, a deliberate and free promise made to God about a possible and better good, must be fulfilled in accord with the virtue of religion. The following canon, which outlines the vow in its various aspects, specifies that a vow

is public if it is accepted in the name of the Church by a legitimate ecclesiastical Superior; otherwise, it is private.

Combining these two principles, it follows that what is essentially lacking in societies is primarily that deliberate and free promise made to God to bring about, through the virtue of religion, a possible and greater good, a good here relating to obedience, chastity, and poverty. Such a promise must be accepted by the legitimate superior in the name of the Church. In fact, the vows excluded here share the same characteristics as those made in religious orders, for which public vows are, moreover, indispensable elements. Indeed, *ex iure positivo*, they cannot be absent from such orders. What is lacking, therefore, in the societies referred to in canons 673-681 are precisely the religious vows, that is, the vows of those societies approved by the legitimate ecclesiastical authority, in which the members, according to the laws of the society itself, take public vows, whether perpetual or temporary, which must be renewed upon the expiration of the period for which they were taken and thus strive toward evangelical perfection.

Based on all this, it can be inferred that the concern of canon 673 is that such societies and their members not be bound by the same legal obligations as religious. To fall within the category addressed by Title XVII, that is, societies of men or women living in community without vows, they must necessarily lack the bonds characteristic of religious institutes.

The mandatory nature of the criterion outlined in can. 673 §1 CIC 17, while on the one hand it excludes the three customary public vows from the characteristics of a society, on the other hand, it inevitably leads to the conclusion that there may be societies that have no vows whatsoever; this is the case, for example, with the Oratory of France, the Sulpicians, and the *Missions étrangères de Paris*. This criterion also allows for the existence of any other bonds. It is therefore possible for societies to have bonds with different designations, including even those that might be called vows, provided they are not the ones specifically indicated in can. 673 §1, namely the three customary public vows. In such cases, those vows of the societies are certainly not the same as

the vows found in religious institutes; indeed, they differ substantially. They are not public in the sense indicated by can. 1308.[18] According to the particular law of certain societies and according to well-known canonists, they are to be considered private vows and therefore not made in the name of the Church, even if they were made in public. Whether or not these vows are made with public external form does not in any way alter their intrinsic private nature. Even if, in certain cases, these private vows may have the same effects as public vows, this does not make them public vows. The bull of Alexander VII concerning the Lazarists is quite explicit on this point.[19]

Another conclusion that follows from the mandatory provision of can. 673 §1 of the 1917 Code is that, in addition to societies without bonds or with private vows, there may be societies whose bonds are designated by different terms, such as a promise or an oath.

2. From the Code of 1917 to the Second Vatican Council

After the 1917 Code, which for the first time recognized their distinct nature as separate entities, the issue of communities of life in common without vows was addressed, albeit indirectly, on further occasions. The starting point for these subsequent discussions always remained the framework established by the 1917 Code.

The most significant magisterial interventions following the 1917 Code are undoubtedly the Apostolic Constitution *Provida Mater Ecclesia* and the Second Vatican Council.

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[18] Cf. Anastasio Gutiérrez, *De natura voti publici et voti privati status publici et status privati perfectionis* (Rome: 1959), 39.

[19] "*Cum emissione votorum simplicium castitatis, paupertatis et oboedientiae, necnon stabilitatis in dicta Congregatione ad effectum se toto vitae tempore saluti pauperum rusticanorum applicandi post biennium approbationis faciendae, in quorum tamen votorum emissione nemo intersit qui ea acceptet, sive nomine congregationis, sive nostro et pro tempore existentis pontificis nomine.*" *Alexander VII, Brief Ex commissa nobis*, 22 September 1655.

2.1 The Apostolic Constitution *Provida Mater Ecclesia*

Provida Mater Ecclesia is an apostolic constitution promulgated by Pius XII on February 2, 1947. Through it, the Roman Pontiff intended to recognize the general status of those associations that, from that day forward, would be called secular institutes. Although the apostolic constitution focuses entirely on the secular institutes whose official existence it establishes, it is possible to infer from it, based on the various references it makes, further considerations of the Magisterium regarding societies of life in common.

In this constitution, societies of life in common without vows are equated with the canonical state of perfection. Even though these societies are not formally included within the canonical state of perfection because they lack the legal elements necessary for it, such as public vows, for example, the closeness and similarity between them and religious institutes, which are the paradigm of the canonical state of perfection, are nonetheless recognized. This similarity is based on the fact that despite the aforementioned absence of certain legal elements, these societies nevertheless possess other elements that are considered essential to the life of perfection.[20]

2.2 The Second Vatican Council

At the heart of the Second Vatican Council lay the need to renew the Church, so as to enable it to adapt its salvific mission to the ever-changing demands of the contemporary era. This renewal was not intended to be limited solely to the doctrinal sphere, but was meant to permeate the entire social body of the Church in all its various

[20] "*Ecclesia tamen, magna qua gaudet animi mentisque largitate, tractuque vere materno, brevem titulum legislationi religiosae, veluti peropportuni complementi gratia, adiungendum censuit. In ipso (tit. XVII, Lib. II) ad statum canonicum perfectionis, satis plene Ecclesia aequiparare statuit Societates, de ipsa et frequenter etiam de civili societate optime meritas, quae quamvis aliquibus iuridicis sollemnitatibus ad statum perfectionis canonicum completum necessariis, ut votis publicis (cann. 488, 1° et 7°; 487), carerent, tamen in ceteris quae ad vitam perfectionis substantialia reputantur, veris Religionibus arcta similitudine et veluti necessitate coniunguntur*". Pius XII, *Provida Mater Ecclesia,* 2 February 1947, *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 39 (1947): 117.

structures and components. Such a project certainly could not have been carried out without consideration of the so-called institutes of perfection, whose purpose was, as their name indicates, a resolute commitment to holiness.

As for societies of life in common without vows, a review of the various conciliar documents does not indicate that the conciliar assembly was specifically concerned with them. This absence of specific discussion of societies of life in common in the Council might be explained, first of all, by the fact that, in general, the Council did not, in a certain sense, make a fundamental distinction between orders, congregations, societies of life in common without vows, and secular institutes. A second explanation might be linked to the persistence of a certain mindset inherited from the pre-Pio-Benedictine Code. As is well known, the 1917 Code had essentially established a single form of institute: the religious institute, of which all others were either derivatives or imitations. Thus, on the eve of the Council, the prevailing view regarding communities of men and women living in common without vows was that they were to be considered a subcategory of religious, incorporated into the canonical state of perfection as specified, respectively, by the Pio-Benedictine Code and the Apostolic Constitution *Provida Mater Ecclesia*.

Despite the lack of specific and systematic attention to this topic, it is possible, based on the various statements of the Council, to draw some valuable conclusions regarding these communities. Two documents are of considerable relevance in this regard: the dogmatic constitution *Lumen gentium* and the decree *Perfectae caritatis*.

2.2.1 The Dogmatic Constitution *Lumen gentium*

First and foremost, there is no explicit reference to communities of consecrated life in *Lumen gentium*. It is possible, however, to discern the Council's thinking on these communities within the text, always in relation to the constitution's overarching theme, namely, the Church. *Lumen gentium* brings profound innovations, in that for the first time, the topic of institutes of perfection is addressed in a dogmatic constitution.

The term adopted was not *canonical state of perfection*. Chapter VI of *Lumen gentium* was titled *De religiosis*. This choice seems to have been motivated primarily by the profession of religious vows.[21] One might further consider that it was motivated by the fact that, beginning with the second session, the term *institute of perfection* became increasingly inoperative, both because the state of perfection was reserved for the episcopal order as *perfectores* (cf. LG 41; CD 15), but above all because the Council wished to emphasize that perfection, that is, holiness, was not an exclusive attribute of a narrow category of people within the Church but rather the vocation of all the Christian faithful.[22] Chapter VI was therefore titled *De religiosis*, a term referring to all those who commit themselves to observing the evangelical counsels through vows or other sacred bonds similar to vows, including also communities of life in common without religious vows.[23] However, the paradigm for this way of life is religious life, to which all other forms of life refer. From a theological perspective, therefore, *Lumen gentium* simply continued in the same vein as both the 1917 Code and *Provida Mater Ecclesia*. Nevertheless, the criterion established by the constitution itself remains valid, as it clearly delineated the boundaries of the religious state in the strict sense as a profession with a sacred bond sanctioned by the Church for the purpose of giving oneself totally to God. The fact of strictly limiting the conditions of the religious state simultaneously excludes from it those who do not meet the aforementioned criteria. Therefore, any institute that does not meet these criteria cannot, in and of itself, claim to be part of the religious state. Given that the purpose of societies is not primarily self-offering to God but rather the pursuit of a specific type of apostolate, even though the constitution *Lumen*

[21] "*Quoad questionem de titulo: unanimi consensu conventum fuit, ut in omni casu pars, quae reservatur profitentibus vota religiosa, inscriberetur simpliciter: De religiosis*." Cf. Vatican II, *Acta synodalia sacrosancti concilii oecumenici Vaticani II*, vol. 3, part 1, 325.

[22] Cf. Umberto Betti, "*Histoire chronologique de la Constitution*," in *L'Église de Vatican II. Études autour de la constitution conciliaire sur l'Église*, edited by Yves Marie-Joseph Congar and Guilherme Baraúna (Paris: CERF, 1966), 64-66.

[23] Cf. Gianfranco Ghirlanda, "*La tipologia degli istituti di vita consacrata dal Concilio al nuovo Codice,*" *Vita Consacrata* 21 (1985): 210.

gentium equates societies without vows with religious, one can, above all, infer from it a substantial distinction between societies of life in common and religious institutes.

2.2.2. The Decree *Perfectae caritatis*

As for the decree *Perfectae caritatis*, to better understand its purpose and the place of communities of life in common without vows within it, we must begin with its history. Its drafting dates back to the early days of the Second Vatican Council. Among the commissions established by John XXIII through the *motu proprio Superno Dei nutu* to prepare for the Council was the Commission on Religious, headed by the prefect of what was then the Sacred Congregation for Religious.[24] The tasks entrusted to this commission by the pope himself were to study the renewal of religious life, unions or federations among institutes, exemption, and the religious habit.[25] In the final months of 1962, the first draft, the result of the commission's work, was presented, bearing the title: *Schema de statibus perfectionis acquisendae*. The second chapter of this draft states that there are three types of states of perfection: *religiones*, *societates sine votis*, and *instituta saecularia*. Regarding the second category, that is, societies without vows, paragraph 16 of the draft indicated that, in addition to the qualities of life in common, the pursuit of perfection based on the three evangelical counsels, and the absence of the status of religious, these societies are recognized as observing the state of perfection and sharing the same bond of union with religious orders. Noteworthy in this definition is the use of the verb *accedo* to indicate the relationship between religions and societies.

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[24] Cf. John XXIII, *motu proprio Superno Dei nutu*, 5 June 1960, *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 52 (1960): 433-437.

[25] Cf. Armand Le Bourgeois, "*Historique du décret Perfectae caritatis*," in *L'adaptation et la rénovation de la vie religieuse: Décret Perfectae caritatis*, edited by Jean-Marie Roger Tillard, Gerard Huyghe, Armand Le Bourgeois (Paris: Cerf, 1967), 52.

Although this verb does not appear in the final text of *Perfectae caritatis*, it is nonetheless used in the current Canon 731.[26]

In the following points of the same draft, the difference between the three states was subsequently established. This difference is evident in three aspects: in the manner of pursuing perfection, in the way of life, and in the manner of carrying out their activities. In this regard, the draft indicated that societies pursue perfection through approved vows or certain traditions established by their own constitutions. Regarding their way of life, it was noted that they lead a life similar to that of the religious, applying certain norms of the legislation governing the religious. Finally, regarding their activities, it was noted that societies pursue specific activities in accordance with their own constitutions, both within and outside their houses.[27]

The final draft was finally discussed in November 1964. Among the various interventions by the Council Fathers, what stood out above all was the fear that changes beyond what was necessary might distort the nature and foundation of many institutes, and thus, the concern to safeguard the spirit and distinctiveness of each institute.[28]

In and of itself, the decree introduces, first and foremost, a conceptual and linguistic innovation: the expression *consecrated life*. About a year after the promulgation of *Lumen gentium*, it was stated that the profession of the evangelical counsels constitutes a life consecrated

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[26] "*Religionibus accedunt societates vitae communis, scilicet, illae societates ab ecclesiastica auctoritate erectae, quorum sodales in communi viventes, christianae perfectionis adquirendae causa, tria consilia evangelica, quamvis publica vota emittant, stabiliter profitentur secundum proprias cuiusque societatis constitutiones. Licet enim aliquibus iuridicis sollemnitatibus status religiosi careant, tamen substantiam status perfectionis servant et Religionibus arcta similitudine coniunguntur. Iure igitur meritoque hus Societatibus magna ex parte ius religiosorum applicatur, non tamen absolute sed congura congruis referendo." Archivio Apostolico Vaticano, Conc. Vat. II, busta 1284.*

[27] Cf. Vatican II, *Schemata constitutionum et decretorum*, 194-195.

[28] Cf. Piero Doria, *Storia del Concilio Ecumenico Vaticano II da Giovanni XXIII a Paolo VI (1959-1965)* (Todi: Tau editrice 2016), 243-244.

to God.[29] In doing so, the Fathers coined the expression *vita consecrata per consiliorum professionem* in that decree, which emphasizes religious life as both a consecration and a sign.

Furthermore, unlike *Lumen gentium*, the decree *Perfectae caritatis* was not intended to address the religious state doctrinally and thus define its essential constitutive elements. It was not conceived as a doctrinal treatise on consecrated life; rather, its doctrinal foundation lies in *Lumen gentium*. In this context of updating, the difference between the various institutes subsequently and incidentally emerges. In this sense, it can be said that the decree *Perfectae caritatis* was much bolder than *Lumen gentium*. *Lumen gentium* merely equated the vows and other bonds to establish the criterion for religious life, without formally indicating the difference between the various institutes.

The decree *Perfectae caritatis*, by explicitly providing societies with the conciliar guidelines that are to guide the renewal of religious life, goes beyond this limitation of *Lumen gentium*. By explicitly mentioning societies immediately after religious families and before secular institutes, the decree *Perfectae caritatis* acknowledges from the outset at least a formal difference between these various institutes. It also recognizes their distinct character and nature, thereby expressing a concern to avoid any confusion between them.

However, the recognition of each society's distinct character does not obscure the fact that the decree *Perfectae caritatis* consistently upholds the criterion of the profession of the evangelical counsels: "Now [The sacred synod] intends to treat of the life and discipline of those institutes whose members make profession of chastity, poverty and obedience and to provide for their needs in our time."[30]

In the spirit of the decree, the criterion for these institutes, including societies of life in common without vows, is life according

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[29] Cf. Yuji Sugawara, "*La normativa sulla vita consacrata alla luce dell'aggiornamento postulato dal Vaticano II*," *Periodica* 102 (2013): 549-550.

[30] Vatican II, *Decree on the Adaptation and Renewal of Religious Life Perfectae caritatis*, 28 October 1965, *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 58 (1966): 702, n. 1.

to the evangelical counsels, referred to here as the consecrated life. It is unequivocally affirmed that the state of the consecrated life is attained solely through the profession of the evangelical counsels.

On closer inspection, the systematic effort to distinguish individual institutes does not actually conceal the fact that, once again, they have been equated in some way with religious, who have once more been used as the paradigm of consecrated life.

This conclusion can be drawn not only from the adoption of the evangelical counsels as a necessary criterion, but above all from the consistent use of the term *religious life*, which appears more than ten times in the text to refer to every form of profession of the evangelical counsels. It cannot be denied that this approach also stems from a lack of clarity on the part of the societies themselves. This is the conclusion drawn from the correspondence of the then Superior General of the Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul in her observations. For her, there is primarily a unity and diversity of religious life within the variety of its forms. She wrote that there is a single religious life that is expressed and lived in different forms. Throughout her remarks, moreover, she refers only to religious life and to women religious, without any mention of communities of life in common without vows.[31]

Once again, although this decree does not clearly highlight the distinct nature of societies of apostolic life with respect to consecrated life, nor their specific characteristics from a canonical standpoint, the conditions outlined in the decree nevertheless aid in discernment. According to the criteria derived from *Perfectae caritatis*, the evangelical counsels are constitutive of consecrated life. The essential purpose of consecrated life is the achievement of perfect charity, and this is achieved through the surest path of the evangelical counsels. There is no consecrated life without the profession of the three evangelical counsels. Given this criterion, it can be said that, in light of the criterion of consecrated life, namely, the profession of the evangelical counsels,

[31] Cf. Caterina Ciriello, *Il contributo delle religiose uditrici al Perfectae caritatis. Fare memoria per cambiare il futuro. Saggio storico-teorico* (Todi: Tau editrice, 2015), 103-104.

the decree *Perfectae caritatis* excludes from consecrated life those societies that do not profess these counsels.

Conclusion

At the conclusion of this overview, it can be noted that prior to the 1917 Code, there were generally various types of institutes. Those primarily recognized and regulated by the Church were religious institutes, which were in turn divided into two groups: orders with solemn vows and congregations with simple vows.[32] As for societies without vows, although they were approved on an individual basis, they did not have a common set of rules. One of the merits to be credited to the 1917 Code is that, for the first time, it recognized as a distinct group those societies whose history was discussed in the first part, grouping them under the common designation of *societas sive virorum sive mulierum in communi viventium sine votis*. Such a title was an absolute novelty in the history of canon law. With it, a reality called a *society*, whose members live in community and do not take vows, was formally recognized as part of the Church's heritage.

Despite this formal recognition, the 1917 Code reveals a marked emphasis on aligning the law governing these societies with that of religious orders. The fundamental criterion around which the entire structure of Part Two of Book II of the 1917 Code of Canon Law revolved was religious life with the profession of the three public vows. Thus, all communities that exhibited a certain affinity with religious orders were not only included in that section but were also discussed in close reference to religious orders, of which they were presented as an imperfect form. This applies above all to the societies mentioned in canons 673-681 of the Code of Canon Law.

Despite all this closeness, confirmed by the fact that in many cases they share the same legislation, societies of life in common without vows have not been formally recognized as religious institutes. Although the 1917 Code granted them legislation almost identical to

[32] Cf. Eutimio Sastre Santos, "*Gli Istituti secolari nell'ordinamento dei novelli istituti di voti semplici," Vita consacrata* 33 (1997): 422.

that of religious, it did not go so far as to declare that these societies are religious. Out of respect for their history and the intent of their founders, it recognized them as a formally distinct entity.

As for the Apostolic Constitution *Provida Mater Ecclesia*, it established the concepts of *institute* and *state of perfection* as applicable to these societies as well. However, since the members did not profess public vows, *Provida Mater* considered them an incomplete form of the states of perfection, that is, a state of perfection that retained the life in common of religious, while everything else was left to the discretion of their proper law.

For its part, the Second Vatican Council, although it sought to move beyond the narrow view of religious status outlined in the 1917 Code, which recognized only one form of religious life, established the profession of the evangelical counsels as the criterion for consecrated life, as it broadened the concept through the adoption of this general notion. Thus, in the constitution *Lumen gentium*, the term *religious* was still used, a term that also included societies of life in common without vows. This is particularly true of the decree *Perfectae caritatis*, which is primarily based on the notion of consecrated life. This concept has a dimension that is both inclusive and exclusive. Included in consecrated life are not only religious, but also all institutes that profess the evangelical counsels. At the same time, this criterion excludes those institutes whose way of life is not based on the profession of the evangelical counsels. In this sense, it can be said that the Council first and foremost recognized the formal and autonomous existence of societies of life in common without vows, distinct from both religious and institutes of consecrated life. However, in line with previous legislation, namely, the 1917 Code and the constitution *Provida Mater Ecclesia* in particular, it extended to these societies all the legislation originally intended for religious and institutes of consecrated life.

At the Council, therefore, we once again see a sharing of the same legislative heritage, while nevertheless safeguarding the specific nature of societies. This tension would profoundly shape not only the discussions leading up to the 1983 Code, but also the legislation governing societies within that same 1983 Code.

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MYTH AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE *TIMAEUS*

Earl A. P. Valdez

Abstract. What is the value of myths and mythmaking in the Platonic worldview? I argue in this paper that the retelling and explanation of the creation myth in *Timaeus* shows that myth and mythmaking ultimately bind religion and science, that is, the why and how of reality, together. It gives an analysis of the creation myth together with Plato's view of mythmaking, both present in this particular dialogue, which show how myth legitimizes reality through a cycle of narration and interpretation. Within this cycle, therefore, new knowledge and insight into reality are produced, which in turn bind the Greeks' perspective more seamlessly: their beliefs about themselves and the world are almost inseparable from their explanation of how things work. It concludes by showing us the essential character of myths in the classical worldview as bearers of meaning, which allows us to reflect not merely on our present views on myths, but also the way we interpret the myths that persist until today.

Keywords: Plato, *Timaeus*, myth, religion, science

Introduction

In her exposition of certain "theological sidelights" from Plato's *Timaeus*, Sarah Broadie emphasizes an "integration" between theology and science, which seem to lie on opposite poles in terms of producing knowledge. She says that

> [t]he Timaean story of divine world-making is designed to be a deeply penetrating and detailed account of its composition, structures, and workings of a vast range of physical entities. Far from showing only that divinity is responsible for the things of each kind, the story sets out to explain precisely how they were made and why the distinctly described physical features are as they are.[1]

Broadie not only gives us an appropriate way of reading Plato and his use of myth as an introduction and exposition to his philosophical worldview, but also leads to a critical examination of the relationship between religion (or, more properly, its theological worldview), and the empirical sciences. These two, for quite a long time, have become placed in stark opposition to each other when it comes to their perception of reality. As Harald Haarmann puts it, the modern world has put a stark contrast between myth and reason, something that the ancient world strived to complement.[2]

More specifically, this contrast lies in the way that religion and science are understood as having opposing sources of knowledge and conclusions about the world. On one hand, the scientific worldview, more particularly of the natural sciences, is a product of a specific method of observation, grounded in observable and measurable data from which one derives theories, laws, and principles that enable us to understand and manipulate the physical world.[3] This is, of course, very different from the religious worldview, which comes from varying

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[1] Sarah Broadie, "Theological Sidelights from Plato's 'Timaeus,'" *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes* 82 (2008): 3-4.

[2] Harald Haarmann, *Myth as Source of Knowledge in Early Western Thought: The Quest for Historiography, Science and Philosophy in Greek Antiquity* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2015), 2.

[3] This, of course, is largely related more particularly to the "natural" sciences (that is, *modern* and empirical), and with a particular focus on the method as that which makes it scientific. I am aware that this definition already gives us a certain position on what counts as scientific and non-scientific (in this regard, see David L. Miller. "The Nature of Scientific Statements," *Philosophy of Science* 14, no. 3 [1947]: 221-23); however, I remain with this definition as this is the one that we find relevant in the cosmic worldview of the *Timaeus*.

forms of "divine revelation," and hence holds as true that which goes beyond or remains outside of the observable, calculable, and observable.[4]

Hence, we have what seems to be two perspectives that, on the surface, seems to have few points of contact, and yet both are useful in deriving and making meaning out of the world, with human existence as part of it. And in this regard, I argue that the creation myth within the *Timaeus* seamlessly holds and enriches its scientific elements seamlessly, not running the risk to mix or confuse one with the other. Insofar as this dialogue is concerned, myth comes to bridge the two, which leads us to an insight on how myths become distinct carriers of meaning in his dialogues.

An Overview of the Creation Myth in Plato

The creation myth which makes up more than half of the *Timaeus* is the philosophical core of the whole dialogue. In fact, one cannot speak of the significance of the *Timaeus* without going through this lengthy creation account, a discourse that was prompted by the characters' earlier discourse on the greatness of the city of Athens and its victory over Atlantis, which by itself is another mythical account (cf. *Timaeus* 19d).[5] Thus, the creation myth appears to be the backdrop of

[4] The relationship between science and religion is less complicated than the attempt to define both of them, yet covers various considerations such as object, means of observation, and truth-value of statements, among others, that would spell the difference between these two worldviews and sources of knowledge. For a full treatment, see Helen de Cruz, "Religion and Science," in Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2025), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2025/entries/religion-science/.

[5] See Plato, *Timaeus and Critias*, trans. Robin Waterfield, Oxford World's Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 19d (6). I take all references from the *Timaeus* from this translation, and place them in the main text using title of the dialogue (*Timaeus*) together with the corresponding Stephanus page number.

the Atlantis myth, and gives the whole narrative its context.[6] In fact, it is only in *Timaeus*, hardly appreciated even at present, that one finds a tightly coherent cosmological account that gives a comprehensive view of Plato's understanding and image of the *kosmos* in all its glory.[7]

This lengthy account, found in *Timaeus* 27c onwards, comprises the entire speech of *Timaeus*, and I break this down in several parts for the purpose of seeing not just its scope, but also the meaningful sequence that it meaningfully bares. The schema is as follows:

Stage of the Creation Myth	**Corresponding Section**
The beginning: an invocation of the gods, whose aid Timaeus sought in narrating	27c-27d
The primary question: *What is it that always is, but never comes to be, and what is it that comes to be but never is?*	27e-28a

[6] This is the assumption held by commentators of the *Timaeus*, finding their basis on the narrative found in *Timaeus* 25e-26a, when Critias claims that the Atlantis myth is but part of a larger story that Timaeus clearly recalls. (see also Leonardo Taran, "The Creation Myth in Plato's *Timaeus*," *The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter* [1966]: 2.) There is no clear, single origin of the creation myth in Timaeus, and it was assumed that this particular creation myth in which a divine craftsman is responsible for the emergence of realty is a commonly held and narrated myth. It is possible, however, that Plato himself derives and reworks this myth coming from other mythical accounts that were known in his time. Though this paper does not dwell on this, one can point out that, in line with the research of R. E. Gmirkin, one can see the *Timaeus* as a development of Anaxagoras' notion of the *Nous*, "fitting" it into a myth (see Russell E. Gmirkin, *Plato's Timaeus and the Biblical Creation Accounts: Cosmic Monotheism and Terrestrial Polytheism in the Primordial History* [New York: Routledge, 2022], 259). Various studies reveal close connections with the Genesis myth of creation, but no direct evidence can prove that one is related to another.

[7] Quoting Victor Brochard, Elsa Grasso affirms the fact that the question of the value of myth and hence its importance in the Platonic corpus is raised most often when one encounters the *Timaeus*. See Elsa Grasso, "Myth, Image and Likeness in Plato's Timaeus," in *Plato and Myth*, ed. Catherine Collobert et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 343.

Exposition of the divine craftsman (the *demiurgos*) that created reality after models. The divine maker created the elements, the world's spatial dimensions, and the mixture of the souls and the bodies that make them present	29a-37c
The creation of time	37d-38d
The creation of heavenly bodies and the distinction of the created beings	38e-40a
The divine maker's act of handing over creation, and leaving the rest to the gods.	40b-41d
The creation of souls and implantations into bodies, therefore having male and female forms	42a-42d
The anatomical composition of the human being, together with its motions	42e-47e
Return to the explanation of the universe as the copy of the model that the divine craftsman has conceived	48a-48e
The third element: the "receptacle (or nurse of all creation, *chora*), and its relationship with the four principal elements	49a-50c
The shapes of the world and the mixture of its elements	50d-51c
Causality as the governing principle through which one links creation	68e-69c
The malaise of the body, and its pains and pleasures, its movement and its appetites	86a-92a
Conclusion of account, affirmation of perfection	92b-92c

This proposed structure may not cover all the pertinent details, yet we see here the breadth and depth of this long discourse that reveals an entire worldview, that is, a coherent reality that has an explanation even to the last detail. One can already treat this as an *encyclopedic*—to use an anachronistic term—account of the world. Moreover, it seems to not just come from a singular worldview tackling a singular topic; rather,

it goes through multiple accounts and perspectives which form part of human experience, from which explanations are brought forward in relation to the movement, distance, shape, time, and formation of the whole world as the *kosmos*. At the same time, we see that Timaeus does not back down in its assertion of its divine origin; he treats the truth of the whole matter as warranted by the gods. The narration of the myth lies within the boundaries of the religious, all the while affirming truths that ground common human experience; however, it is embedded within a well-known creation myth that is made more complex and intricate, thus integrating everything within the gamut of human experience.

But while the modern, untrained reader can only reduce this mythological account as purely symbolic or figurative, it is clear that Plato also inserted explanations of nature as experienced by the human person. Crude as myths and myth-making seem to be, it remains meaningful and revelatory of the ancient worldview that Plato largely adopts, though we see that the developed myth carries legitimate answers regarding the composition of all reality. With this, we can ask: *How, then, did Plato use myth as that binding force between the two?*

Myth as Carrier of Wisdom

An important key in understanding Plato's use of myth is his discourse on the very purpose of telling myths. One immediately recalls this discourse in *The Republic*, pointing out that myths are narrated because it becomes easier for the people to understand certain explanations that otherwise can become very complex to remember.[8]

As it seems, the status of the "reality" of such myths are hardly the concern of Plato. In fact, in the creation myth of the *Timaeus*, Plato playfully and creatively uses it in two ways. First, he uses it as a backdrop

[8] See Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, 2nd ed., trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1991), III, 377a-378e (54-56). Allan Bloom used the word "narratives" and "stories," but in the course of the dialogue, eventually, Plato makes use of the very content of myths, not confined to the origin and cause of things, but the very stories that make up the gods and heroes.

of the myth of Atlantis, through which he asserts the significance of Athens, and second, as seen above, he inserts the theories of shapes and the physical account of the world as consisting of four basic elements. Ayreh Finkelberg sees this as a peculiar element in the *Timaeus,* which tells us that Plato asserted that the mythical account can be seamlessly combined with the geometrical view, expressing a synthetic worldview that does not need to separate one from another.[9]

This view of the Platonic myths brings forth two important implications in the analysis of the creation myths. First, as contemporary readers of Plato, we were warned to evaluate the meaning of the myth not by our modern standards of what is "real," that is, equivalent to the systematization of empirical information; rather, we have to look at the nature of the myth's function in classical antiquity, as one which brings forward an explanation to phenomena which otherwise can be unknown yet apparently obvious in one's experience.[10] Put briefly, it tries to contain within itself—within explainable confines—the borderlines between what can be known and what is yet unknown. Corollary to this is the second: it matters little whether the supposed myth must be understood either literally or figuratively.[11] I explain these two points in the analyses below as the principal characteristics of myth-making, which makes myth not only an effective carrier of knowledge but also and more importantly, insofar as it is relevant to the *Timaeus*, one that bridges scientific and religious knowledge altogether.

The Narrative Content of Myth and its Demonstrative Power

Regarding the first point, it is important to see that this particular suspension of the real, in order to give way for the myth to convey a reality that is obvious, leads us to the narrative function of the myth,

[9] As Finkelberg aptly states, "Plato apparently held that the geometrical method can be consistently employed in philosophical discourse and may be a convenient way of philosophical inquiry." cf. Aryeh Finkelberg, "Plato's Method in *Timaeus*," *The American Journal of Philology* 117, no. 3 (1996): 407.

[10] Haarmann, *Myth as Source of Knowledge*, 6-7.

[11] See Finkelberg, "Plato's Method in *Timaeus*," 391-392.

which attests to the reason Plato uses it. To explain the aforementioned first point above, one must see that for Plato and his audiences, it is not so much its literal or figurative meaning. Rather, it is the fact that it presents a coherent, well-thought-out, and sensible story through *and* in which the history of humankind (or, in Plato's case, the Athenians) is appended. While the modern mind dismisses myth and confines it to the corners of ancient literature and the "bedtime story," Harmann says that such is not the case for the people of antiquity, specifically Greeks, emphasizing that

> [t]he organic whole of the Greek world-view where terms referring to narration form a network to express the living experience of people in the cultural surroundings in which they have shaped for themselves in mental constructs.[12]

This means that if one assumes the place of the audience of Plato's dialogues, myth is received not *only* as a story made for entertainment and curiosity. Rather, it provides a link between present and past in all its aspects. It matters little whether what aspect of these myths are true or not, or a mix of real events and well-constructed ones. What matters is that it provides an idea that the present reality is part of a bigger whole that has a source which grounds the reason for reality to exist as such. It is a "grand history," or in the words of Elsa Grasso, a *genesis*[13] with which one finds a source of something to which the audience belongs. In the *Timaeus*, the audience finds themselves opened to this history's specifically divine origin, made possible "by unwinding [history and reality] at once, chronologically, along narratives, and 'visually,' in the mental image which discourse elicits in the reader."[14]

It is not, therefore, disconcerting to think that in the dialogue, Timaeus smoothly places this story to widen and deepen the inquiry regarding the city. Specifically, the creation myth is a presentation

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[12] Haarmann, *Myth as Source of Knowledge*, 39.

[13] Grasso, "Myth, Image and Likeness in Plato's *Timaeus*," 350.

[14] Ibid., 362.

that is both an *eikos logos* and at the same time, an *eikos mythos*.[15] It is a "likely story" that is also, at the same time, told and retold to be a "meaningful story" ripe with philosophical discourse. Significant in this part of the *Timaeus* is a link to the past which the narrative provides to its audience, relating it to the present as thought and constituted. The primary question, therefore, this: *How, then, do we become as such?*

And in this regard, the floodgates of narrative open up and provide a clear picture that carries a plethora of meanings at various levels, *all together at once*. The *why* and the *how* merge together not only as part of the narrative but as elements that make up a whole. There is no contrasting reality that is presented, but only an integrated whole.

Two things, therefore, are reconciled. On one hand, the myth gives space for a distinct and divine origin of the world and its people; it is the genesis of both the divine and the human. However, it is also possible that this narrative leaves space to explain how things happen to be as they are. Plato shows that in this drama between gods and men, one can see that all of reality is carefully thought and formed by a divine craftsman, one that also divides the work in the formation of this coherent whole. It is a reality made up of basic elements and, at the same time, basic forms and figures. It is filled up with bodies that work harmoniously, and from this idea of harmony, one can also see not just the function of parts but also the possible defects in those parts. Within this narrative reworked to bring forth reason, one sees that it taps not just into the sense of a long history, but also into the activity and inherent sense of meaning-making.[16]

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[15] The question on whether the *Timaeus* is *mythos* or *logos*, that is, either as a myth laden with symbols or a narrative that lays down the real structure of the universe is a topic taken by the renowned commentator on Plato, Myles F. Burnyeat, which Grasso brings up once again (see ibid., 350-51). This work does not go into a complete analysis of Burnyeat's work, its critics, and Grasso's reaffirmation in her own argument; however, it is also important to take note of it at this point of the argument.

[16] See Haarmann, *Myth as Source of Knowledge*, 35-36.

All of these happen within the context of a story. It is a narrative which carries the basic truths, and as such, its coherence stands unquestioned because of its integrity and sequence. The whole myth is not merely a poet's play of symbols (which is the reason for Plato to take poets in disdain), but also a vehicle of intelligibility, of origin, of history, and of existential significance. The whole myth-making truly makes sense, as in the words of Ludwig Edelstein, "[r]eason to Plato is supreme; myth is subservient to reason. . . . Plato's philosophical fable is the fable of the philosopher."[17] Thus, one can see how the Platonic myth *constitutes* the understanding of reality. In this point one sees a concoction of what is known to be the knowledge brought by the gods, that is, the religious worldview, and on the other hand, the knowledge of the mind regarding its life, that is, what we know as a physical, scientific worldview.[18]

This whole discussion shows that the narrative of the creation myth effectively bridges what is known as religion and what is known as science for the ancient mind. In a way, the modern mind that searches for a definite divide between the empirical and the fictional, the "scientific" and the "religious," misses the point of the whole myth. The speech of Timaeus carries with it altogether—without confusion or conflation—symbol and reality, origin and explanation. This, however, takes us to another level of interpretation in which this bridge is strengthened, that of the myth's *form*, that is, of myth as such.

Plato's Mythmaking and the Legitimacy of the Myth

To consider the myth as it is and how it functions requires that we take Plato's mythmaking seriously. If the value of the myth is in the meanings that its narrative carries, as demonstrated above, then it follows that whether one reads a myth in its literal sense (the narrative as it is) and in its figurative sense (the meanings that symbols and elements of the story carry), the meaning that the myth transmits does not

[17] Ludwig Edelstein, "The Function of the Myth in Plato's Philosophy," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 10, no. 4 (1949): 467.

[18] See Haarmann, *Myth as Source of Knowledge*, 27-28.

diminish. Rather, both ways of understanding and interpreting them remain valid and supplement each other. This leads us to explore not just these given meanings, but also and more importantly, the very act of producing that myth, through which it was given *as such*.

In *Timaeus*, we see the strange but effective concoction of individual myths together with physical and metaphysical principles. Plato then reminds time and time again that this mythmaking is a "sacred" activity, worthy in the eyes of the gods, and is therefore nothing short of truth and fidelity. It is, in the strictest sense, a bringing forth from ignorance to knowledge, from ambiguity to clarity, from a view that resembles shadows to a view that is outside the cave and under the sun's splendor.[19] Furthermore, Plato is not hesitant to combine myths not merely to integrate them to a whole narrative, but also to preserve what is reasonable in them. Deviating briefly from his master Socrates, who has a slightly more negative view of myths, he recognized the use of myths and made full use of it, with this concoction as a gateway to discourse.[20]

This emphasis leads to another direction in the discussion of myth: the act of mythmaking so as to reorient and even reconstitute discourse. It is not enough for us to say that Plato does the transferring from *mythos* to *logos* (and in some instances, to a notion of *historia*, according to Porphyry and the Middle Platonist schools).[21] More than just merely repetitions of a one-time transfer, it seems that in the act of re-constituting, narrating, and expanding the understanding (not so much as an explanation in the sense of modern, scientific, and technical discourse) of myths, Plato also traverses back and forth from *mythos* to *logos*, always bringing new insights and new questions to deepen the

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[19] See Plato, *The Republic*, VII, 514a-520a (193-98).

[20] Ludwig Edelstein, "The Function of the Myth in Plato's Philosophy," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 10, no. 4 (1949): 466. Note that there is a whole discussion on whether Plato's Socrates really shows a contrasting view of myth, or there are times in which Socrates merely serves as a "foil" to magnify the purpose of myths.

[21] Harold Tarrant, *Literal and Deeper Meanings in Platonic Myths* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 48-49.

subject matter at hand. As readers of *Timaeus*, this is already familiar territory, given that the creation myth is preceded by other myths that are related to it.

Similar to the enriching hermeneutical circle that proceeds as a deepening spiral proposed by Paul Ricoeur in his analysis of biblical texts in relation to Christian faith,[22] we see here an enriching meaning of myths, for Plato keeps coming back to it and expands its meaning, going through a cycle of explanation and narration; in this movement, myth is over and over again legitimized and given greater weight.

As a consequence, myths gain greater weight in philosophical discourse; they carry meaning in a more profound way. They become sacred activities, much like repeated prayers in what can be compared as a "Platonic liturgy" (to use a term that seems to be out of place). But with that, the Platonic discourse also solidifies itself as a description of the movements of heaven and earth, of the parts of the body and its health, of the Forms and the human aspiration to contemplate them. Both the *why* and the *how*, the scientific and the religious, are harmonized and carried together with weight. In this movement, the myth becomes legitimate, and its legitimacy legitimizes all that it carries with it. One sees the unfolding of all these especially in the *Timaeus*, for the simple reason that the telling of the myth is in fact a *reflection* of the myth being told. As Grasso succinctly points out,

> [t]he content of the belief called forth by the myth can only be viewed as the most satisfactory representation for thought, as regards axiologically major issues: the meaning conveyed by [*mythos*] through its images will be similar as possible, on a largely sensible, anthropomorphic mode, to what a divine intelligence's action may be.[23]

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[22] See Paul Ricoeur, "Experience and Language in Religious Discourse," in *Phenomenology and the Theological Turn: The French Debate*, part II, ed. Jean-François Courtine, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky and Thomas A. Carlson (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 127-46.

[23] Grasso, "Myth, Image and Likeness in Plato's *Timaeus*," 364.

In relation to Grasso's point earlier, we see that Plato draws the relationship between the divine craftsman as the father, the maker, and how it relates to the myth-maker as the creator of an image. In drawing this relationship, the myth-maker, like the divine craftsman, is also involved in the work of creation.[24]

Thus, the creation myth in the *Timaeus* is more than just a mythical articulation of the origin of the world. In telling this myth, Plato acts as a "creator" of meaning, drawing from conventional knowledge and weaving them together into a discourse that expresses profound philosophical truth in a particular direction: from the divine entities to the humans who worship and recognize their divinity. We thus see an act of *double legitimacy* that happens at the same time. On one hand, we see Plato as the narrator of myth legitimizing the narrative content in his myth-making in view of the education of the *polis* and in transforming it as a source of rational discourse; on the other hand, in doing so, the myth legitimizes the action of the myth-maker in such a way that as the divine craftsman makes the world in the fashion of his thought, Plato unites himself in this divine activity of creation through his own re-fashioning of myth. There is a reciprocal relationship that enriches both these actions together, which is both and at once a double legitimacy in the content and the form of the myth.

This act of legitimacy spills over and becomes present in the other elements of the myth and its recounting. This implies, therefore, that *mythos* and *logos*, as related elements, give weight to each other. Inasmuch as *logos* legitimizes and justifies the use of myths, *mythos* also justifies *logos*, in such a way that myth demands some form of understanding to bring it to greater light.[25] Alternatively, putting these two terms on the level of the threshold that exists between the graspable ideas and the realm of what cannot be grasped into the unknown, as V. W. Sease notes,

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[24] Grasso, "Myth, Image and Likeness in Plato's *Timaeus*," 361.

[25] Rick Benitez, "Myth, Dialogue and the Allegorical Interpretation of Plato," *Modern Greek Studies* (Australia and New Zealand) 1 (2013): 6.

> [the language of the *Timeaus*] is not the language of one who is proclaiming the priority of a transcendent, supra-rational insight over logical discourse, but rather an admission of inability to articulate adequately his tentative grasp of his problems. Or it is an indication that the subject of discourse is by its very nature *below* the threshold of discursive thought; this is the case of his treatment of the physical world in *Timaeus*.[26]

While *mythos* is considerably an expression of the limits of thought and discourse, we see in Plato the twofold act of recognizing this limit and at the same time articulating it in a discourse that, to a certain extent, leads to further understanding. In the end, this double legitimization affirms not only the necessity of myth, but also the necessity of it being directed toward further understanding through philosophical discourse.

From this, another level can then be implied, which answers the point on the relationship between religion and science, between the recognition of the gods and, in the tradition of ancient science, "saving that which appears." More specifically, it grounds the possibility of making predictions, for in doing so assumes that nature moves in an orderly and intelligible fashion, so much so that one could make models of it through which phenomena could largely be predicted.[27]

Going further, one can say that in recognizing that the creation myth as a narrative is an act of service to the gods, part of its demands

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[26] Victor W. Sease, "The Myth in Plato's Theory of Ideas," *The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* 1, no. 1/2 (1970): 191.

[27] See Benitez, "Myth, Dialogue and the Allegorical Interpretation of Plato," 13. Regarding the description of the physical world as a Platonic rendering of the principle of "saving that which appears" (*sozein ta phainomena*), see G. E. R. Lloyd, "Saving the Appearances," *The Classical Quarterly* 28, no. 1 (1978): 209-210. It is important to note that Lloyd argues that ancient science, limiting himself to astronomy, recognizes its models to be orderly, intelligent, and yet not a total representation of reality itself. Yet, Lloyd claims that there are instances in which "saving the appearances" means also that these mathematical models have something to say on the distinction "between mere 'appearances' and their underlying 'realities.'" (ibid., 221). In this regard, then we see the principle as having a *theoretical* aspect rather than merely an *applied* (i.e., predictive) one.

would be to give account of how things work, which, to a certain extent, obliges Plato to insert the "scientific" elements that he sees are inevitably part of the creation myth.[28] This attempt at discovering the intelligibility and order that is inherently in the world is grounded on a particular belief that the myth upholds, namely the intellect and order of its maker which deserves to be recognized for what it is. This very recognition of the maker, as seen in *Timaeus*, is embedded and included in the very explanation of the products of his work. In other words, the religious activity justifies and even demands the scientific activity.

Consequently, this explanation of *how* things work also gives Plato and his audience the path toward *why* things work. In a way, Plato's extensive explanation of the physical world through the creation myth in the *Timaeus* gives a demand that the ones who caused these movements in harmony ought to be recognized not only as they are, that is, the divine craftsman and his creative activity as supposedly divine, but also worthy of rendering recognition and gratitude. In the assertion of this entire world, there is the credit to "a perceptible god, greatest and best and most perfect." (Timaeus, 92c)[29] The account of the world as crafted, done in the very crafting of the myth itself toward discourse, hearkens back to the divine reality of both myth and myth-maker. The multiplicity of details and the accounts, therefore, leads back to the faithfulness to the gods that Timaeus recognizes at the beginning of the dialogue. The scientific activity, therefore, justifies the religious activity.

All of these varying but interacting layers of legitimacy give myth its greater grounding in Plato. And in the creation myth alone, all these are delivered in an instant that a commentator on Plato would need to unpack even further. Nonetheless, it gives us a clear answer as to

[28] Grasso, "Myth, Image and Likeness in Plato's *Timaeus*," 352.

[29] G. E. R. Lloyd, "Plato as a Natural Scientist," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 88 (1968): 82. The Waterfield translation renders this last section in this manner: "[The universe] was created a visible living being, encompassing within itself those creatures that are visible; it was created a perceptible god, made in the likeness of the intelligible god. This universe of ours is single, the only one of its kind: there is none greater or better, none more beautiful, none more perfect."

how myth stands as a bridge, in fact a firm one for the ancient mind, between religion and science. They justify each other, and by the time Plato delivers these myths, they cannot be inseparable because they each serve a purpose for each other.

Conclusion: The Necessity of Myth

The argument on myths may go inexhaustibly; however, the reasons presented above give us a wider view of Broadie's sidelight on the mix of religion and science in the *Timaeus*. This particular focus on the creation myth gives us a rather clear picture, even if it is just a fragment of the whole, of the purpose of myth as a bridge between religion and science.

In summary, in both its content and form, myth effectively and creatively brings together the religious and the scientific. In terms of narrative content, myth links Plato and his audience to a wider narrative network through which they see the tight connection between their history as a people and the history of the world, as well as a relationship between the way things work and why they work as such. And at the level of form, the myth legitimizes and gives greater grounding to the relationship between religion and science, in turn based on a deeper legitimacy established between the myth's narrator and the narrative content.

Given the richness of the myth, what then can we learn as *contemporary* audiences of Plato? Perhaps we as a people can benefit from this view especially at a time when we are more conscious of the *real*, beyond narrow views that are confined to extremes. This view of myth precisely helps us avoid kinds of fundamentalism which spring from both scientific and religious worldviews espoused by their respective communities. And in a world where we discover that beyond the world of experience there are still more questions than answers, given the discoveries of particle physics on one hand, and the emphasis on the *homo religiosus* on the other hand, we are greatly encouraged (and slightly pushed) toward a healthy integration. Such integration, I believe, can only work on our benefit, living in a world that there is

still a great unknown, and yet there are imminent problems that we need to respond and give answers to.[30] And in this regard, Plato and his narration of myth can indeed be of great help, especially with the myths with which we live at present.

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[30] As a sidelight of my own, it is worthy to mention and continue this research on the possible grounds of the "co-inherence" of religion and science, which transcends dialogue and goes to the level of action toward common questions and common problems that both religion and science, together, can address. See Philip Hefner, "Religion and Science: Separateness or Co-Inherence?" *Zygon* 41, no. 4 (2006): 781–84.

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THE TAGALOG VERB, RICH IN NUANCE: SAMPLES FROM THE *VOCABULARIO DE LENGUA TAGALA* (SB 1613), PART I[1]

Emmanuel C. Marfori

Abstract. Crucial to a missionary's initiation to ministry is learning a people's language well. For this, the *Vocabvlario de Lengva Tagala* (Tomás Pinpin and Domingo Loag, Pila, 1613: hereafter, SB 1613) shows not only the translations, but also the nuances therein. Fray de San Buenaventura, OFM, a missionary to the Laguna province, among other places, after a laborious work, shows the intricacies of the Tagalog language, here sampled in an analysis of thirty verbs in Spanish (*picar, tapar, deçir, haçer, bolver, tener, comer, pafar, quitar, rebolver, tirar, caer, levanter, menearfe, atar, inçitar, eftender, mirar, añadir, hablar, abrir, tomar, poner, hechar, llevar, meter, sacar, cojer, cortar, dar*) with their eight hundred and eighty-four verb (*pandiwa*) equivalents in Tagalog. The analysis includes the active and passive uses of the verbs, their connection to body parts, space, time, use, instruments, involvement of other persons, and purpose. The verbs provide vignettes of different aspects of daily life of Tagalogs (*e.g.*, animal cultivation, food and food production, woodcraft, goldcraft and silvercraft, sewing, health and hygiene, weaponry and security, communication, conflict, good manners or lack

[1] *Editor's Note:* Due to its length and scope, this article is published in two parts. The present installment (Part 1) lays out the historical and linguistic foundations of the study. The continuation (Part 2), to appear in the March 2027 issue, will further develop the analysis and present additional textual samples. GenAI Disclosure Statement: GenAI was not used in any aspect of this paper.

thereof, hospitality, work ethics of lack thereof, house management, communal activities, daily activities, entertainment, commerce and industry, travel, navigation, ecofriendly attitudes, mishaps, presence of a female priestess or healer, folk beliefs, peacemaking, curses, and death) in a southern Luzon region (Laguna, Quezon, Batangas and Manila areas) from the time of the data gathering for the SB 1613 (circa 1590s) which can reflect even the same scenarios existing before the Spanish colonizers came, up to even the start of the fifteenth or the sixteenth century. The present analysis and data classification already show the plurality, richness, and difficulty of data compilation of the SB 1613. Spelling variants of many words hint at groups of data gatherers, translators, and interviewees. The sample Tagalog sentences carried the negative, prohibitive particle *hovag/dovag*, and mentioned *Pa(d)re*, animals, names of some Tagalog-speaking places, and even allusions to love. All in all, these details might have helped the newly arrived missionaries from either Nueva España or España, and definitely embedded their cultural footprints between the lines, across the SB 1613.

Keywords: Vocabulario de Lengua Tagala, *Pedro de San Buenaventura*, *missionary linguistics*, *Tagalog verbs*

Introduction

In this paper,[2] the author tries to find out some of the richness in the Tagalog lexicon, specifically, in some verbs translated into Spanish in Fray Pedro de San Buenaventura's *Vocabulario de Lengua Tagala* (heretofore, SB 1613), authored by Fray Pedro de San Buenaventura, OFM, and published by Tomás Pinpin and Domingo Loag in 1613 in Pila, considered a noble villa by the Spaniards, the first known Spanish-Tagalog *vocabulario* or dictionary to date.

[2] Given at the 2016 Fil-Span Day at the University of the Philippines NISMED. A decade later, in 2026, Pope Leo XIV declares a Franciscan Jubilee open to all, on the oonccasion of the eighth centenary of the *transitus* of St Francis of Assisi. This paper aims to honor this Jubilee, the *Poverello*, and the evangelization carried out by the Franciscans in the Philippine archipelago throughout about six centuries.

Fray Pedro de San Buenaventura, OFM

Who was Fray Pedro? What do we know about Fray Pedro? Fr. Cayetano Sánchez Fuertes, OFM, says:

> Pedro de San Buenaventura, whose birthplace we know not (...) set foot on Philippine soil around 1594, and from then on up to 1627, date of his death while he was going to Mexico, dedicated himself to the evangelization of the *poblaciones* of Nagcarlang, Paete, Mauban, Pasabango, Santa Cruz, Siniloan, Manila, Pila, Mambulao, Longos and Capalongan, all around Laguna de Bay. In 1613, while he was a missionary in the little town of Pila, he asked that the mentioned work be printed. We know, finally, as is written in page 610 of his work, that he started to write it on 20 May 1606 and it was printed on 27 May 1613. Nonetheless, it is fitting to remember that that long time was preceded by another ten years of study of the language in the area where the purest Tagalog in the Philippines is spoken (*en la zona donde se habla el tagalo más puro de Filipinas*). These are the only biographical data we know of this eminent linguist.[3]

The Tagalog Language

As far as the Tagalog language is concerned, Fray Pedro explains an important aspect of its difficulty, which also tells why it is so rich in meaning:

> First, I give notice, to those for whom this *Vocabulario* might seem long and voluminous, that they may know my aim, which is not only to inform of the etymologies of Tagalog words picked at random, but also of the compound etymologies, since as the experts of Tagalog know, it is of little benefit to know the roots, though they may be many, if you to do not know how to join them into compound

[3] This is found in the 1994 facsimile of SB 1613. Cf. P. Cayetano Sánchez Fuertes, OFM, "*Valor histórico y lingüístico de un importante incunable hispanofilipino*," in *Vocabulario de Lengua Tagala. El romance castellano puesto primero: prima y segunda parte*, by Fray Pedro de San Buenaventura (Valencia: Librerías "Paris-Valencia," 1994, c. 1613), "*Valor histórico y lingüístico de un importante incunable hispanofilipino: 4. Fray Pedro de San Buenaventura y su Vocabulario*." Shortened citation of the said facsimile shall be SB 1613 [1994 *facsimile*].

> etymologies, and this is the difficulty of this language. I shall give the most common compound forms, or their imperative forms, or some way to use such and such word, so that beginners may then find material with which they may start to speak. [The *Vocabulario*] is also lengthened because things are placed in a detailed manner, with the greatest clarity which I was able to give.[4]

The SB 1613

The SB 1613, as Sánchez Fuertes affirms, is a gem of Hispano-Filipino literature, for this rare work is one of the very few Filipino *incunabula* printed between 1593 and 1642, where there are copies still available.5 The undersigned author is grateful to Cora Relova of Pila, Laguna. In 2003, she gave me a *facsimile* of the SB 1613. Little did I know that in 2016, I would write a paper about it.

Scope, Limitation and Methodology of the Paper

Of the 351 verbs in Spanish in the infinitive form in the SB 1613 where a given verb appears five or more times, each with a distinct meaning in Tagalog, only thirty verbs in Spanish will be commented on in this paper, where each verb in Spanish has twenty or more Tagalog verbs as equivalents. We shall see the different meanings of the verbs,

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[4] SB 1613, *Notables*. The text is: "*ADVIERTO lo primero alos que feles hiçiefe largo efte Vocabulario y de gran volumen pa q fepan mi intêto q es no solo dar noticia de Rayçes Tagalas fueltas fino tambien de Rayçes atadas, pues como faben los expertos en Tagaloa aprouecha poco fauer Rayçes aunque fean muchas fino fauen atar y efta es la difficultad de efta lengua, dare lasmas atadas y anfi las Rayçes todas como tengan verbos tengan fus imperatibos o fino algun modo de vfar del tal Vocablo, para que los prinçipiantes hallen luego con que empeçara habla. Tambien fe alarga por ir pueftas las cofas muy pormenudo con la mayor claridad que e podido.*"

[5] Cfr. P. Sánchez Fuertes, OFM, SB 1613 [1994 *facsimile*], citing Wenceslao E. Retana, renowned bibliophile and historian of the Philippines: "*Los libros filipinos, en general, escasean mucho más que los de ningún otro país del mundo (...); pueden contarse con los dedos de la mano los impresos filipinos, conocidos de visu, de los siglos XVII y XVIII.*" (Cf. *Catálogo abreviado de la biblioteca filipina de W.E. Retana* (Madrid, 1898), *prólogo*, xv-xvi).

from twenty Tagalog verbs to one verb in Spanish, up to the most numerous, forty-seven Tagalog verbs to one verb in Spanish. They are the following (in alphabetical order, transcribed as they appeared in the SB 1613, modern version in parentheses): *abrir, añadir, atar, bolver (volver), caer, cojer (coger), comer, cortar, dar, deçir (decir), eftender (extender), hechar (echar), hablar, haçer (hacer), inçitar (incitar), leuantar (levantar), lleuar (llevar), menearfe (menearse), meter, mirar, pafar (pasar), picar, poner, quitar, reboluer (revolver), sacar, tapar, tener, tirar, tomar.* All in all, 884 verb entries in Tagalog are equivalent to the 30 verbs in Spanish.

What are the different meanings? The order of appearance of the verbs or verbal prefixes in the SB 1613 is not alphabetical. I have tried to group the meanings whenever possible.[6] The meanings of the verbs will mainly follow the SB 1613, as translated by the author.

Analysis of the process of compounding the simple morphological roots is beyond the scope of this paper. Words which were 15th-century Mexican Spanish, like *poftema, tortillas,* and also Mexican Nahuatl — *e.g., çacatal, petaca, tamales* are mentioned, although a detailed analysis of these words in the SB 1613 is beyond the scope of this paper. Some sample sentences which accompany many of the verbs in the SB 1613 will be mentioned afterwards, and I also tried to group them thematically.

Let us now analyze the thirty verb forms as they are translated from Spanish to Tagalog.

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[6] Fray Pedro, in the *Notables* of the SB 1613, also mentioned having used some abbreviations for words which are - unique, as I see it - to a certain place. I transcribe the abbreviations, whenever these appear in the verbs in Tagalog which are translation of thirty verbs in Spanish in the SB 1613: M., if the word was from Manila, old *Maynilad*, L. if from La Laguna, T. if from Tinguian or Comintang (Kumintang, old name of Batangas), S. if from *Silangan*, east, from Longos to Guylinguylin, and C., if from Castillan Spanish, later Tagalized.

30 *verbos en castellano* and 884 *mga pandiwa sa Tagalog*

Picar (20 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on the animal, astral body, or food or instrument used for the action. In relation to animals, *picar* is: *tuca (tukâ)* if it is a bite from any bird or snake; *sigir* or *cagat* if it is from a mosquito, centipede, ants, etc.; *bogtoc*, T., or *bogtac*, T., if it is from a flying bird or insect; *poloc*, T., if it is from, for example, a wasp (*potacti*); davi or *cqibit* (*kibit*) if a fish bites the bait; *tibo* (*tíbo*) if it is from a stingray (*pagi*). If the sun is affecting the skin, *picar* is *pahang*, the sun is said to be "biting" (*mapahang*), or it is very sunny (*sangit*). If it is from the heat of the chili, it is *hanghang* (*ma-/anghang*) or *halang*. Mincing is *tartar* (also *tadtad*), slicing is *gayat* (for fruits or vegetables). Sausages (*morçillas*) are punctured to let air out; *toroc* (*turók*) or *totloc* (*túsok*?) is done. Freshly-made sausages are to be skewered, *toho* (*túhog*). If the action is done with the tip of a knife, sword, or any small thing, it is *tafac* (*tasác, tarák?)*. If it is with a finger, or cane, it is *sondol* (*sundól*).

Tapar (20 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on what is covered, and with what something is covered. It is *tacqip* (*takip*) if a jar, a pot, an *olla*, a retablo, an image, a door, or a window is covered. *Tapar* is *talob* if a pitcher, *cántaro*, or a bigger jar, *tinaja*, and the like, are covered with leaves or a piece of cloth, *paño*, although *tongtong* is also used when covering an *olla* or a *cántaro*. However, if the *olla* or any similar object is hot, then *tapar* is *goop* with a somewhat larger piece of cloth, *manta*. *Balongcqit* is to cover parts of the cane or to cover the container of the *nga-nga* (betel nut mixture). *Gacot* is to tie a basket, *çefto* (*cesto*), or a jar, *tinaja*, or any other thing with *palápa*, *petate*, or *paño*, and tying it well. If there are holes near or on the roof, *tapar* is *hulip*, but *socfoc* (*suksók*) is to seal any holes, *goteras*, in the roof, especially when the holes drip with rainwater. When something is placed to cover a bottle, *limeta*, or a hole, the action is *sicfic* (*siksík*). If the holes of the canoes of vines, *bejucos*, are sealed, the action is *balibol*. If *betún* is used to seal a break or hole in a container, *vafija*, the action is *capol*. *Soclob* (*suklób, saklób*) is to cover an inkwell, or any similar thing. *Tabon* is to cover a pit, *hocay*, with soil or garbage. *Bonbon* is to cover the *hocay* with soil, garbage, or hay. *Otop* or *opop* is to cover something with the hand, whereas *oop* or

toop is to cover the mouth or something with the entire palm; *oom* is to cover a part of a cane or pipe, *cañuto*, or the mouth, with the palm. *Totop* is to cover the mouth with a finger or with a tube, *caño*.

Deçir (*decir*, 21 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on how something is said, and whether a third person is involved. *Deçir* is *bala* when it is something spoken, *hablado*; *sabi* if it is about providing information; *oo* (*umoo*) if it is saying yes; *toor* if letting someone know through something; *conat* is either flattery, *palabras regaladas*, or a man who speaks softly and with love; *hiya* or *icau* is to tell things that confront or shame someone; *palambang* is to tell something as it is; *sabay* is to say something together with another person, like singing, praying; *tonton* is to tell something (a story?) from the beginning. However, *deçir* is *dagdag* when something is added to what is; *vycangtapat* (*wikang tapat*) or *balangtotoo* when it is to tell the truth on any occasion; *sapol* is to tell it all; *palar* when it is to tell something fortunate; *vycangditotoo* if it is to tell a lie; *afoc*, when it is telling a lie to draw out a truth. When a third party is involved, *deçir* is *opafala* when something bad is said when the person mentioned or alluded to is not around; *pafaring* (*pasaring*) is to tell something in a way that somebody else may not understand; *sangcal*, however, is to tell something that another person may understand; *sablay*, if it is to tell something to a person so that the third person, who did something, might overhear it.

Haçer (*hacer*, 21 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on what was done, or how something was done, or whether a third party is concerned. In- is a particle attached to possessive pronouns change them into verbs — *e.g., inaacqin, hagolo* (*lo hago*), or of both persons, *cqinacanita*, *haçemoslo*. *Haçer* is *gava* (*gawa*) if it is doing anything, *cqimot* if it is manual work, *cqisap* if it is to wink; *tingcar* (*tumingkad*) is to do tiptoeing in a rather deep place, like a river. However, *haçer* is *pangap* (*panggap*) is to do something without knowing or seeing what is happening; *lamoymoy* if something is done haphazardly; *palambang* if done tauntingly; *toytoy* is doing something without finishing it; *lamay* is to do something at nighttime, e.g., writing; *minfan*, if something is done only once; *cofa* (*kusa*) is doing something willingly, *de fumera voluntad*. If a toddler learns how to walk, doing it is *sugapa*. *Dahan* is to do something slowly; *laban*

is to do something with force, as in carrying wood. When a third party is concerned, *haçer* is *hila*, if it entails forcing another person; *sacop* or *sagap* is doing somebody else's work; if this *sacop* entails paying in one's behalf, it is *halang*; *haçer* is *mahal*, is pretending to lord it over somebody, *haçer del señor no siẽdolo*. Interestingly, *haçer* is *mungar* if it is to be the first to do something, like *fembrar*, planting.

Bolver (*volver*, 22 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on what part of the body is moved, or whether it is moving from one place to another, or whether an object is moved. Depending on the body part involved, *bolver* is *lingos*, or *lingap*, or *lingon*, if the head is moving from side to side; *litang*, if the eyes are moved such that the pupils disappear from view, as if to simulate blindness; *tarac*, if referring to the eyes of a dying person; *tumpaling*, when the face moves due to violence or punch; *licor*, when the back is turned; the return of a sickness is *libat*; a recurrence to a sickness when one was about to get well is *baynat*. When one is to move from one place to another, *bolver* is *saoli* (*isauli*), *vli*, L., or *ovi* (*uwi*) to return to where one came from, *magfaoli ca*, *movi ca* (*umuwi ka*) or to return something; when returning from work, *bolver* is *licas*; *orong* (*urong*), if there is a movement backwards; *hatir* (*hatid*) is to return something taken from another place. If it is about an object, *bolver* is *balic* when it is a down-and-up movement, like *banig*; *halocay* (*halukay*) if it is a digging-like movement using a spoon; *balictar* (*baliktad*) turning the shirt or clothes inside out; *buclar* (*buklát*) is to turn something; *taob* is to turn something upside down; *onglac* is to resume what was being done before.

Tener (22 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on what one has. Five particles behaving as verbs begin the list. *May* or *mi*, M., suggest having anything - *maydamit ca?* Do you have clothes? *Mi bait ca mandin*. No doubt you're kind. If the thing possessed is many-much, *ma-* is used — *maginto ca*. You have much gold. If emphasis is to contrast what one did not use to have to what one has, *nagca-* is used - *nagcacaginto*, having much gold, while being poor before. *Nag-* indicated anything possessed; *nagbabagtingan ang Fimbahan*, the Church has a bellfry. *Nag-ari* meant a past possession. *Tanda* is to possess, remember, especially a lesson. *Pigil* is to retain something, or someone (in this case, *taban*)

struggling to be free. To hold something in one's hand is *tangan*, or *camit*, or *havac* (*hawak*), or *hohot*, M., or *taglay*. If a bird holds anything in its beak, it is *tangay*. To hold a sick person on the back so as not to fall is *alalay*, or *alila*; to hold a sick person's head or body on one's back is *salag*. To hold somebody in least esteem is *lifta*. To consider someone for one's worth is *bilâg* (*bilang*). *Imim* is to press crumpled *nga-nga*, *buyo mafcado*, on one's lips for color; to reciprocate, especially a joke, is *hala*.

Comer (23 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on the time of day one eats, or how one eats, or drinks, and what one eats, in particular, or how food is prepared; and, if it is the case, if something, or someone, gets bitten, or eaten. *Caen* (*kain*) is to eat, applied to any kind of food. As to when one eats, *aga* is to eat breakfast, but is also applied to eating a *medio dia o antes o despues*, at midday or before or after; *hapun* is to eat supper. As to how one eats, *namac* (*namamapac?*), or *nopang* (*umuupak?*), is to eat much, *de mogollon*, here and there; *bangal* is to gobble something in giant bites, trying to place everything on one's mouth; *bofog* is to eat up to satiation; *salo* is to eat in company; *tamafa* is to eat for free; *baric* is to eat in a drinking spree; *langot* is to eat with both hands; *samoc* is to eat dessert, *poftre*, by grabbing it, *a rebatiña*, or eating it hurriedly, *apuro*; *aloc* is to give a sick person something to eat. As to what is eaten, *bahao* refers to eating what was kept or was left the night before; *sila* is to eat meat or fish. *Cqilao* is to eat raw meat in a certain way, called *adobado*; *mama* is to eat or chew *nga-nga*, *buyo*; *pangos* is to eat sugar cane, *cañas dulces*; *diim* is to eat clean but uncooked rice; *agar* is to eat what is sought for the day. *Cagat* is when an alligator, cayman, bites someone; *siba* is when the cayman eats a person. If a river "eats" the riverbank, it is *ococ* (*uk-ok*).

Pafar (*pasar*, 23 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on what the path is made of, and how one is passing. As to what the path is, *daan* is to pass through anywhere; *taos* is to pass something to another place with a tip or point. *Tolay*, or *taytay*, or *talay*, is to cross or to pass from one place to another through a bridge or cane; *talaytay* is to pass from one place to another, maybe above ground, suggested by the example — *tinatalaytayan ang mga niyog? An puefto por do pafar de vna palma a otra?* Have they place something to cross from one coconut tree to

another? Possibly a variant of *tolay*, *dolay* is to pass from one place to another through branch, *rrama*, to get nests, *cojer nidos*. As to how one is passing, *langpas* is to pass in front of somebody with little respect; *lalo*, or *laos*, or *lolos*, is to pass by without stopping in a town where one passes because one is carrying a load or is in a hurry; *lagos* is to pass by on foot without stopping or greeting anybody; *lalos* is not to stop but only from a while; *lipas* is to leave something behind, or to move on; abut is to pass on something by hand, or to pass the word in wartime; agar is to pass, e.g., plates. *Sucab* is to pass through something very low. *Silang* is to pass amidst something when entering a property enclosure;[7] *singit* is to pass through a narrow path. *Tiyim* is to let liquids like water and oil pass. *Tavir* (*tawid*) is to pass or to cross a river or sea with or without a ship; *lonoy* is to cross a deep river. Curiously, *higpa* is when locusts (*langofta*) swarm.

Quitar (23 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on what was taken away and how it was taken away. As to what is taken away, *alis* is to take away in a general sense; *orong* (*urong*) is to take back what was placed on the table; *coha* (*kuha*, perhaps from the Spanish *coja?*) is to take away something; *bavy* (*bawi*) is to take what was given; *avat* (*awat*), or *alangay*, or *angay*, is to take away the fire from what is being cooked, if there is too much fire; *ali* (*alis*) is to take away someone's place; agar is to take away something placed somewhere; piling is to take away what is attached to a bunch (*piling*) of bananas; *laying*, L., or *hilaying*, T., is to take away the dry leaves in a banana shrub; *gitas* is to take away the dry leaves from the coconut tree; *sipi*, M., or *singi*, T., is to take away the middle, *los cogollos*, of the tree trunk; *pongol* is to take away shoots from the tree; *dahic* is to take away the detachable ladder and keep it inside the house; if the ladder is placed onto one side, it is *licqir*; *potpot* is to remove the covering of cotton. As to how something is taken away, *bavas* (*bawas*) is to take away what is superfluous; *dahas* is to take away something forcibly, *a puñadas*.; ongot is to cut with the hand, if there is no knife; calos is to handpick rice grains.

[7] SB 1613 says: "*por entre medias de algo como el tiro por entrar la çerca.*"

Reboluer (revolver, 23 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on the type of mixing and the aim of mixing, if any. *Halo*, or *lahoc*, or *gomon*, is to mix anything altogether. *Halongcay* is to mix something into another. However, *halohalo* has the nuance of mixing the good and the bad. *Lanfac* is to mix some things with others. Moreover, *gaogao* (*kawkáw?*) is to mix something with the fingers; *cotcot* is to mix rice in the mortar when it is grounded; *halicvat* is to mix the pot with a spoon; *locay* is something from below upwards, as when mixing a pot; *sahog* is to mix many things in an *olla podrida*; *sacfac* is to mix fish in the basket; when something is in a sack, *arca*, or basket, it is *bocalcal*; *birbir* is either to tie strings together, or to wound something on the arm. As to the aim of mixing, *dimog* is to mix to incorporate something; *ala* (possibly a mistranscription of *lagâ?*) is to mix pieces of sugar cane when they are pressed to let all the juice out; *boclat* is to mix what is in a basket, or bed, to see what is underneath; *dohol*, or *orol*, is to rumormonger, telling each one something negative about the other; *pilis*, L., is to move a post in a pit until it stands still; *biling*, T., is to place the *arigue*, local timber, in the pit to fit it well; *hamoc* is to tell the contrary like in an argument; *lingcqis* is either to wrap something around the body, like a *comot* (*kúmot*) or a snake wrapping itself on a potential victim.

Tirar (24 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on what is thrown or with what one hit, or how something is pulled. *Bofog* (*búsog*), or *alao* is to shoot an arrow; *dolit*, T., is to hit with a stone; *gayang*, or *baca*, T., or *sibat*, is to throw a stone or a lance; *balibat*, or *balibag*, is to hit with a piece of wood, stone or bamboo; *botlong*, or *hambalos*, L., is to hit something with a piece of wood, bamboo or a side of a boat, *bordo*; if the fruit tree is hit in order to get the fruit, the action is *balbat*, T.; *banting* is to play a stringed instrument; *bigvas* (*bigwas*) is to raise the rod in which the fish had bit the bait; *labanog*, T., is to hit a bird with a sling, *honda*; hogos is to pull something using *a cartillo*[8] such as a lamp or *veja*; *batac*, L., or *batag*, T., or *nahot*, is to stretch gold or silver into strings; *torla* is to throw with a portable weapon, *alcabuz*, or with a weapon that ejects arrows, *ballefta*; *sicar* is to kick a child or another

[8] Meaning unknown.

person. As to how something is pulled, *tirar* is *hila* if it is by dragging; *higit*, or *dagandan*, if the pulling is with force.

Caer (24 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on how the fall is, and whether it entails another person, or cause another person to fall. As to how someone falls or makes somebody else fall, the prefix *napa-* can be applied to *caer*, such that *napahalang* is to have fallen flat, and *napafugaba* is to have fallen face down. *Holog* (*hulog*) is to fall in whatever way, be it to let water fall over someone, *hologan...ng tubig*, although *ypaholog mo fiya* is to make somebody fall. *Higa* is to fall flat. *Daqpa*, or *duhong*, is to fall face down. *Sugapang*, or *sugabang*, or *dalapac*, or *duhapang*, is *caer de hoçicos*, to fall face down. *Dolap* is to fall on one's hands. *Sobong* is to fall on one´s nails, like a cat. *Sugaoc* is to fall face down. *Sovac* is to fall from a window or *batalan*. *Gomon* (*gúmon*) is literally to fall into something muddy, *lofac*. *Lagpac* is the fall of persons fighting, when one falls on top of another. *Babuy* is when two fighters fall on their sides. *Sapac*, or *sipi*, is when somebody falls from a branch that breaks off a tree. *Dalosdos* is to fall because someone slipped. *Bolofoc* (*bulusok*) is to fall suddenly like a post into a pit. *Tiric* is when something falls on its tip, being erect upside down. *Labas* is a euphemism for self-impurity, written partly in Latin, en *poluçion proprijs manibus*.

Leuantar (*levantar*, 25 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on the way something is physically carried up, or what part of the body is lifted, or a metaphorical rising. As to the way something is carried up, *leuantar* is *taas* (*taás*) if it is lifting anything from below; *ticvas* (*tikwás*) is to lift the cover, *pauelion*, to enter; *talocas* is to lift something to seek something underneath; *sondong* is to lift something to let something from the inside out; *suval* is to lift with a lever, *palanca*; *taya* is to lift something to test the weight first before carrying; *bangon* is to lift something heavy to lean or leave it in an inclined position somewhere; *buhat* (*buhát*) is to lift something from the floor; *polot* is to pick something that fell on the floor. As to which part of the human body is lifted, *tonhay* is to lift one's head; *tingala* is to lift one's eyes heavenward; *haya* is to lift one's arm; *yaang* is to lift one's hand or arm as a threat; *caang* is to lift one's arm in threat; *cantoy* is to lift one's shoulders; *sanghor* is to lift one's nose (or snout, in animals) *hoçico*, sniffing like a dog or

cat; *daldal* is to lift another person's behind, dar de *nalgas*; *hogos* is to lift something high pulling *con celdel*[9] *por carrillo.* For women, *lilis* is to lift one's own skirt (*faldas*) in order not to get oneself wet; however, *lislis* is when somebody raises a woman's skirt. *Comos* is to lift something like clothes, *rropa (sic)*. *Dahic* is to lift a detachable ladder, *dahicqin mo ang hagdan*; *tovas* is to one side to rise while the other side goes down, like a see-saw; *banglao* is to lift a lamp so that everyone may see. As to a metaphorical rising, *bintang* is to falsely make up a testimony against another.

Menearfe (*menearse*, 25 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on what object/s is/are involved and how something is moved. As to what object/s is/are involved, *menearfe is cqibag* if one moves on a table or chair because of one's poor sitting position; *ogoy* (*ugoy*) is when either a bench or chair moves because of a poor sitting position, or a house moves because of strong winds; *yuga* (*i-uga*), T., is the house moving with the wind; *amboyong* is when a house is moved by an earthquake or a storm/typhoon; *agoy* is when a house moves, or when a sick person moves; *lingac* is when a boat moves with the waves; *cqibang*, or *giboy*, or *iboy*, T., or *gibong*, or *catog*, or *liay*, is to fall off anything because of poor sitting posture; *bogoy* is movement of leaves, when a bird alights from a branch; *ayoc*, or *holay*, is the movement of leaves, branches or trees; *antoc* is either the movement of the tree with the wind, or the movement of someone who's travelling; *gifa* is the movement of fish in boiling water; *cqival* is the movement of a half-dead snake; *oga (uga)* is when a tooth moves; *ngilo* is to move something a bit; *talay* is when something like a lamp is moved; *simpoc* is movement of water or liquor. As to how something or someone moves or is moved, *gulapay* is to move from place to place; *cqifig* is to move with a deathwish; *cqiyao* is hardly to be able to move.

Atar (26 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on how something is tied, or mended. *Tali*, or *bigcqis*, is to tie anything with something, like rattan, *ovay* (*uway*). *Lingcqis* is to wound a string around something with even turns. *Babat* is to tie with sash or belt. *Binda* (from

[9] Meaning unknown.

venda?) is to wrap something. *Gapus* is to tie somebody's hands in front and at the back. *Tobong* is to tie with rope (*soga*) or chain one's animal in the neck, *pezcueço*. *Hafohafo* is to tie a dog with a vine, *bejuco*, that it may not bite. *Bahas* is to tie a jar, in order to use it more. *Baat*, L., is to join together any broken vessel so that it may still be of use. *Baracas* is to tie a dead human person's cadaver with cloth, *vendas* and cotton. *Bitic* is to tie the seats with plant strips, *bejucos*. *Pogong* is to fold a bag with its own strings, tying it after folding. *Bilit*, or *pangcol*, is to apply pressure between wooden rods as is done to the *petacas* made of *bejuco*. *Gaot* is "tying" or attaching a dagger to its sheath; *gacot* is to cover the opening of the basket, or jar, or another vessel. *Baat* is to cover a jar, pot, or something. *Caloas*, L., is to tie something with a vine. *Hicqit* (*higpit*), T., is to tie a bird or animal with a rope or something so it will not escape. *Gilagir* is to tie the bamboo floor with a vine. However, *daling* is to tie the floor loosely. Moreover, *balacqil*, or *balacqir*, or *yacqis*, T., is to tie something badly.

Inçitar (*incitar*, 26 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on what the other person is incited to. Interestingly, though, it starts with *aro*, to incite a rooster on hand *pa q pelee con brio*, for it to fight with aggression, an allusion to cockfighting. *Palicfa* is to incite, to fight, or to argue to test the other's strength. *Cohila* is to provoke somebody. *Aglahi*, or *antig*, is to provoke someone to anger, and if the provocation to anger is to someone meek, it is *cagiot*. *Ingolot* is to provoke somebody to an argument; if the provocation is for the person to be angry and argue, it is *buyo*; if the provocation is to two persons, it is *atig*, or *onyoc*; if it is to two or more persons, it is oloc; olol is to provoke others. However, *lahi*, or *andira*, is to provoke one to do something either good or bad. *Orali*, or *oryoc* (*udyok*), or *oyog* (*uyúk*), or *himoc*, is to sway somebody to one's will. *Tungali* (*tunggalî*) is to force somebody to do evil. *Alectia* is to induce somebody to sin. *Hamon*, or *inging*, is to incite somebody to sin and dishonesty. *Angcqin* (*angkín*) is to invite somebody to live in one's town. *Bangcqit* (*banggít*) is to persuade somebody to something. *Mongcahe* is to incite somebody with one's plan, *traça*. *Arog* is to sow deception, *çiçaña*.

Eftender (*extender*, 27 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on what part of the body or what object is extended, or how one is to extend something. As to body parts, *onat* is to spread one's arm or hand, or *como el q defpereça*, someone who wakes from laziness (slumber?); *tonhac (tunghay)*, or *dunghao (dungaw)*, or *tanga (tánga)*, is to extend the neck to see something; *hindolos* is to extend folded legs; *ducvang*, or *gavar*, is to spread the arm (or hand) to reach what is given; if it is reaching for something above, it is *doclay*. In birds, *cangcang*, or *candang*, is when the bird spreads its wings to fly. As to objects, *latag* is to spread out a *banig*, *petate*, bed, rice or another seedling; if it is spreading rice or any other grain to the sun, it is *buyangyang*; *larlar* (*ladlad*) is to spread out *banig*, *eftera*; *lahar* (*lahad*) is to extend a portion of a rope, lio, or another thing to be seen, or something rotting to be spread under the sun; *lantay* is to extend gold or silver by hammering it; *lamac* is to cultivate (grass) on a patch of ground; *calat*, L., or *carcar*, T., is to stretch out a rope or vine so something may go straight or in front of somebody; *sintac* is to hold a thread, *madeja*, to untangle it. In cooking, *ligis* is to flatten the dough to make tortillas or *ojaldras*; *pipis* (*pipís*) is to extend something with a piece of wood on a wooden board like the dough, in order to make tamales or fruits in a pan. As to how one extends something, banat is to extend something to the limit; biclar is to extend something folded; *pifil* is to extend something with the fingers; *tapil* is to spread something with the palms; *tapi* is to spread with the palms such things as clay, *barro*, or wax, *çera*; *sanghor* is to extend the nose, by a dog or a cat, smelling what is not seen.

Mirar (27 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on what or to whom one looks at, and on how one looks at something or to someone. Generally, *tingin* is to look generally at anything. *Kita* is to look at something. *Noor* (*nuód*) is to look at something that gratifies and recreates. As to what is seen, *tingala* is to look up to the sky; *tongo* is to look at the ground, or to look downward. As to ways of looking at someone, *alimbayao* is to follow somebody with the looks as one goes; *tonhac* is to look with the neck very strained. As to how one looks at something, *sipo* is to seek something among other things; *lingos* is to look by turning one's head in a strange way, *como atronado*; *silip* is to look through a crack or a hole; *tanao* is to look at something from afar;

tanghal, or *banao*, is to look at something from afar or from above; *sabang* is to look at something far from above; *sagila* is to look at something in passing. As to emotions connected and perceived in looking, *mufing* is to look with angry eyes, *ojafos*; *lingig* is to look at one side or another by one who needs to see if anybody agrees with him; *suliyap* is to look sideways like a traitor, *como traydor*, or angry, *quejoso; ilam*, M., or *ilap* (*iláp*), is to look sideways as if angry; *irap* (*írap*), L., or *duyap*, T., is to look as if bearing with something; *liling* is to look sideways and with an evil look; *ifmir*, T., is to look as if in jest, *haçiendo burla*; *imir* is to look emotionally affected; *silay* is to look from the corner of the eye, *de rabo de ojo*, and in passing. And *palar* is palm-reading.

Añadir (29 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on the thing to which something is added, although the verbs can have another connotation. *Dagdag*, *tabag*, is to add another thing. As to adding something to objects, *olog* (*hulog?*) is to add something to a container, like a pot, *olla*. *Olol* is to add something to a book or writing. *Himno* is to add to writing. *Paronron* is to add something more than what is asked for, so that afterwards there may be no lack, as in the case of rice; *sandat* is to add more food, for the guests, *guefpedes*; *lalo*, L., or *holog*, is to add what is lacking in weight. *Tambahe* is to add to have the same as everybody in a group. *Tambal* is to add together two pieces of iron; somag is to insert a cord, *lubir*, into another. If it is merely joining two pieces of cords, it is *cama*. *Solpa* is to add a bamboo stick or short rod, *cavayan*, one into another. Speaking of baskets, *tayictic*, or *talictic*, T., is adding a basket which, after being beaten, is shrunk; *salopil*, or *salifol*, is to enlarge a basket in order for there to be more space, by attaching small pieces of wood around. As to clothing, papa is to add two pieces together, *cofiendo las a lo âcho*, sewing them on the wider side; *dogtong (dugtóng)*, or *dogfong (dugsóng)*, T., or *docpong*, or *dogang*, is to sew two pieces together by adding a smaller piece; *hogpong* is to add many pieces to one another. *Ognay (ugnáy)* is to add something that is not reached. As to other connotations of *añadir*, *dagdag* and *olog*, aforementioned, can also mean adding by telling a lie, *añadir mintiendo*; *lambis* (*lábis*) is to add impertinent words to what one wants to say; *bintang* is to add something more each day to the debt one has, as the *buvis* is in debt, lending more, so that, being unable to pay, one ends

up being enslaved; *arimohan*, L., or *yarimohan*, T., is to add something, even sneakily, to a task or ordinary work.

Hablar (32 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on the volume, speed, style of speech, and how many are speaking. Generally, *hablar* is *ofap* (*usáp*), *vyca* (*wíka*), *bala*, *barya* (*badyâ*), is to speak about anything; *yivo* is to tell someone. As to the volume of speech, *holong*, or *olong* (*bulóng*) is to whisper; *imic* is to speak in a moderate tone, not shouting; *anas* is to speak softly; *cotyatan* is to speak through signs like the deaf; *alacalac* is to speak loudly. As to the speed of speech, *baya* is to speak slowly; *talay* is to speak slowly and well; *talos*, or *dalas* (*dalás*) is to speak fast; As to the style of speech, *tocoy* (*tukóy*) is to speak clearly and directly; *balafbas* is to lisp; *bacqi* is to speak using rough language; *palibhafa* (*palibhása*) is to speak in irony, *balagatac* is to speak in a disorderly manner; *bibig* is to speak much and without order; *damba* is to speak foolishly; *ylambong* is to speak proudly, *hinchado*, hardly considering the others; *bual*, or *moal*, is to speak while the mouth is full; *omalomal* is to speak badly, like someone stuttering or without teeth, *defdentado*; *agingyng* (*tagintíng*?), or *taginyc*, is to speak effeminately and in falsetto, *en tiple*; *cagingcqing* is to speak *en tiple*, like the bell. As to how many are speaking, *balacatac* is to everybody speaking at once; *abat* (*sabát*) is to interrupt the conversation of others. Interestingly, there is a verb, *toco*,[10] which is to speak to somebody's hand, so that what is said or done may not take effect.

Abrir (33 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on what object or place is opened, what is done to a body part, what body part is opened, and the manner of opening something. As to objects, *bucas* (*bukás*) is to open a door, window, or another thing; *buca* (*bukâ*) is to open *a cavan*, *arca*, or anything that has a cover; *able* (from the Spanish *abrir*) is to open something that is locked; *solot* (*sulót*) is to open a door with a key, or a sack. As to actions done to body parts (human or any

[10] Fray Pedro explains a popular belief that people had certain spells that were said to strengthen the body of the rooster, and if one spoke while they applied it, it lost its power ("*Es que tenian çiertos hechiços con que fortificaban el cuerpo de gallo y fi eftandole aplicando le hablaban, deçian perdia toda la virtud*"). Fray Pedro adds in parentheses that that belief was nonsense (*neçedad*).

other animal), *sovit* (*su-ít*) is to open a boil or *pus*, *poftema*, or a swelling, *hinchaçon*, with a small knife, *lanceta*, or any other thing; lili is to open something bloated to pluck out a *fishbone*; *daying* (*dáing*) is to open a fish to salt it; *hochoc*, or *oca*, L., or *hovac*, T., is to open up a deer, or pig's stomach to remove the innards; *hinaya*, L., T., or *hinay*, M., applied to fish, is to open its stomach to remove the innards; *palar* is to open a fish and deboning it; *batibot* is to open a chicken to remove the innards. As to places, *bagtas*, T., or *bactas*, L., is to open a way, or new *eftero*, to supplant an old one; *gatas* is to open a path to place traps for birds; *bagbag*[11] is to prepare a field which has not been cultivated for some time; *tabtab*, T., is to prepare the fertile land, *çacatal*, for sowing; *hapay*,[12] T., is to prepare a field covered with trees; *tabas* is to open up a way by removing the weeds. As to body parts, *mulat*, or *mulaga* (*mulagâ*), is to open eyes wide; *dilar* (*dilat*) is to open eyes in anger; *bifaclat*, or *hitar*, is simply opening one's legs; *hilat* (*hiláta*) is to open one's legs, or eyes (opening the latter with fingers); *caang*, T., L., is to open one's legs so somebody may pass underneath; *bicaca* (*bikakâ*) is to open one's legs while seated; *nganga* is to open one's mouth; *onat* is to open one's hand. As to the way something is opened, *icang* is to open something violently, like a mouth closed, or closed shells; *ingcat* is to open something with a pointed object, like shellfish, oysters.

Tomar (34 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on what is taken, or how it is taken. Depending on what is taken, *tomar* is *coha* (*kuha*, from the Spanish *coja*?), or *hovat*, to take something from somewhere; *gamit* is to take something in behalf of another; *ali*, or ari, is to take as one's own something which is not, like a field, *bucquir*, house, wife; *halon*, or *doong*, is to arrive at a port. As medicine, *sahab* is to inhale sweat (or steam?), *fudor*, as medicine; *langap* (*langháp*) is to inhale

[11] Fray Pedro elucidates on *bagbag* by saying that when lending a field to a third party, the latter uses the field for two years, and on the third year, he shares the harvest with the owner ("*dalla otro q la abra, y feaprouechedos años della por el trabajo, y al tercero parta cô fu dueño el fructo*").

[12] Fray Pedro explains *hapay* by saying that there is a correlative term *paghapay,* when, in May, the fields are tilled or prepared ("*paghapay, llaman pormayo, que es quando andan abriendo las fementeras*").

frankincense, *camangyan*, or another thing as medicine. Depending on how something is taken, *dampot*, or *gitil*, or *putic*, is to pick up something with the fingertips; *logdo* is to take from somebody else's plate, regarded as disrespectful, *poca criança*; *otang* is to take something on loan; *ylit* is to take something as guarantee; *hipno* is to take for oneself what is for three or more (persons), paying them their share; *dampot*, or *camcam*, M., or *salao*, T., is to take something by force; *lofong*, or agar, is to take something against the will of its owner; *halihao* is outright robbery; *gamgam* is to take something in a buy-and-sell mode; *cohantahanan*[13] is to take something (money) in order to deal with it and share the gain, *ganançia*; *gamil*, T., *o boo (búo)*, is to take everything there is; *salava* is to take in many responsibilities and not to start and finish one; *sacop*, or *tingcacal*, is to assume another's responsibility; *sagap*, or *hinagap*, is to take for oneself what is said to another; buhat is to take or carry something in behalf of others; *langcag*, or *talangcas*, is to take the lightest yoke while one leaves the rest of the people behind;

Poner (37 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on what is placed where, and whether it involves body parts. Regarding what is placed where, *poner* is *palagay*, or *lagay*, to place something on the floor or in another non-elevated place; *balay* is to place something on a wooden cane, like feathers, or knife, to cut something off from on high; *sabang* is to hold something on high; *bilar* (*bilád*) is to place something under the sun or to dry so it may dry up; *haba* is to place something lengthwise; *hopa*, or *paroli*[14] is to establish peace among those who argue; *sangcayao* is to place the weight upon something to rest without taking off the weight; *talicor* is to place added weight to what is already carried; *sofon* (*susón*) is to place (clothing) on top of another; *sapao* is placing plates one on top of another; *alay* is to give to somebody something placed on a plate; *patong* is to stack wooden panels, one on top of the other; *tangin* is to place something on top of another to cut it; *salompong*, or *sompong*, is to put together something piece by piece, lengthwise, *haçia la larga*, like roofs, bricks; *agapay* is to place something together as to the

[13] As a noun, it refers to the *principal*.

[14] In the SB 1613, *paroli* involved establishing peace for those who *traen pleyto*, have filed a formal complaint.

width, *ancho con ancho*; *cavyng* (*káwing*) is to place two in one wood, like a chain; *tatag*, *talatag*, is to place persons in order, like a Church procession; *sandig* is to place the detachable ladder. Some very specialized verbs are *cana*, which is to present a request for Baptism, Extreme Unction or Communion; *ngalan*, which is to place a name on the person to be *baptized*. Regarding animals, *itlog* is to lay (poultry) eggs; *sabor* (*sábong?*) is to place two poultry together in place; olot is to incite two roosters; *sangpa* (*sampâ*) is to place something where the cats may not reach; an interesting verb is *balacqi*, which is to take a four-legged black and white (meaning obscure). Regarding rice, *dapog*, L., is placing dirty rice, *arroz fuçio*, with a small shoot; *palan* is to plant rice. Regarding body parts, *dangtay* is to place the leg on top of another person's body; *calao* is to place the arms on one's knees or on the window; *gufilao* is to place the hand in front of the eyes of one who squints because of the light; *tocop* is to place the hands on the forehead to see if one has a fever; samba is to place together one's hands to pray; *ngolo* is to place one's hands above the head.

Hechar (*echar*, 38 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on what, or who, is placed where. *Hingil* is to place something either to good or to evil. For solids, *calos* is to place something (e.g., rice) with the hands into a container; *gatong* is to throw fuel into the fire so that the fire may not stop. For liquids, *salin*, or *liuat*, or *bohos (búhos)*, is to pour (e.g., wine) from one container to another; *tubig* is to pour water onto something; *tigis* is to pour wine or water into a cup; *saboy* is to throw water using one's hands. Using body parts, *lova*, or *loa*, (*luwâ*) is to throw what is in the mouth; *alampay* is to throw a kerchief onto one's shoulders. Regarding who is placed where, *indayon* is to place a baby in the crib; *tali* is to tie something upon a sick person; *subaybay* is to place one's arm over somebody else's shoulder; *cqimis* is to clasp one's hands together. Regarding directions, *holog* is to throw from above; *bolofoc* (*bulúsok*), or *bogfoc*, is to throw something suddenly, like a column into a pit; *valis* is to throw something elsewhere. In navigation, *bognos* is to spread the sail for navigation; *holog* (*húlog*) is to throw things overboard because of a tempest; *bongsor* is to throw the sail into the sea. In playing, *talang* is to use something as a ball. In botany, *halili* is to grow new leaves. In sewing, tobal is to soak a thread in oil, in order to

tinge it afterwards. In cooking, *daloc* is to throw kale, chilis, radish into vinegar (the word *chara* appears; *achara?*); *pamitpit* is to throw in spices into the cooking pot; *sahog* is to throw in vegetables in the pot; *batar* is to marinate (*enrremojo*) meat or fish or something in order to wash it; *boro* (*búro*) is to salt something. In domestic life, *alis* is to fire someone from home. Regarding other nuances of *hechar*, *valay* (*válay*) is to wean oneself from someone; *vala* (*walâ*) is to take anger from oneself; *vacfi* (*waksî*) is to abhor; *daoy* is to watch out for something; *taboy*, or *toro* (*túro*) is to throw the blame to another person.

Lleuar (*llevar*, 38 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on how one is taken to a place, or carried. It may, at first, seem surprising how many words can be translated from the single Spanish verb *lleuar*. It is because *lleuar* is a common element of many verbal phrases in Spanish, which was most probably how the authors/compiler may have translated and classified the Tagalog verbs into Spanish — e.g., *lleuar de braços*, *lleuar a alguno*, etc. As to bringing someone from one place to another, *hatir* is the general word to bring someone; *patnogot* is to bring or accompany the guests, *combidados*, to their homes, if they live in the same town; *days*[15] (*daís*) is to go to another person's home to eat there; *calong* is to carry a child in one's arms, though *calongcalong* is to carry a child in one's arms while crossing a river; *sabi*[16] (later *sábit?*), T., or *sacbibi*,16 T., is to carry the children tied with a piece of cloth; *saclang*, or *salan*, is to carry someone sitting on one's shoulders with both feet in front; *pangco* is to carry something on one's arms, like a dead child or candles of the confraternity. As to carrying or bringing something, *dala*, or *pasan*, or *cqibat*, is to carry something on one's shoulders; *bitbit*, or *bingbing*, is to bring something hanging from the hand, though *biyabit* is to bring something with both hands; *sapola* is to bring something in the palm, *sapo (sapó)* if it is carrying a pot in one's

[15] Fray Pedro explains that *days* implies the custom of the Tagalogs to bring food and money to weddings ("*lleuar de comer para fi a la boda y algun dinero que dar como vfan eftos*").

[16] Fray Pedro clarifies that the verb *sabi* has to do with children according to the custom of Tingues, hanging from a cloth ("*los niños al vfo del tingue colgados ê vn paño*").[16] Similar to *sabi,* Fray Pedro adds: "*como vfan las tinguianes*."

palm but supporting it from under; *balian*, T., or *balayan*, L., is to carry something burning tied to a pole; *alavas* (*alwás*) is to bring something badly placed and which is shameful; *lamang* (*lamáng*) is to bring more than the others; *lacom* is to holding something but holding underneath an arm or cape; *candong* is to carry something on the skirt. In a passive sense, *anor* (*ánod*), or *api*, is to be carried away by the current; *payir*, or *dagifdis*, is to be carried away by the wind or with violence; however, *payirpir* is to be carried by a breeze; *alicalbo*, or *alicabo*, T., or *galbo*, or *cabo*, is to be carried by the breeze, like paper; In navigation, *onda* is to tie to a ship a rod, or wooden beam, *biga*, so it will not sink; *hinacay* (*inákay*) is to take in someone along in one's boat, *tocpa* is to bring something to a boat; *baba* (*babâ*) is to bring someone to a boat. On bringing a message, *hatir* is also a general word; however, *hatirdumapit* is to arrive and spread rumors.

Meter (39 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on what is placed where, whether something is used to place something, and whether body parts are placed somewhere, and other nuances. Regarding what is placed where, [y-]-sa is the prefix used to convey meter, to place — *yfacaban*, place it inside the sack, *yfaabobot mo*, place it on the basket;[17] *soot* (*súot*) is to place/insert something in a hole or some other narrow cavity; *solot* is to insert something in a hole to let it out through another opening; *solobfob* is to insert a prong, or something into the fingernails; *singit* is to insert paper, a letter, in between wooden panels. In cooking, *sobfob* (*subsób*), L., or *loblob*, or *yobyob*, or *loon*, T., is to place something beneath the ashes to broil it. *Longcag*, T., or *lungcas*, is to place something inside the sack in a disorderly manner, *rebuelto*; *sampac* is to place the sword or dagger on its sheath; *bayacqis* is to place the skirt in between the legs; *silir* is to place something inside the chair. On the direction something is placed, *ylalim* is to place something underneath another thing; *lofot* is to insert something inside a hole and to let it fall; *soclob* (*saklób*) is to place something below to hide or keep it. On whether something is used to place something, *dolavit* is to insert a rod or another thing to take something out; *olos* is to insert using a wooden or bamboo rod; *sobo* is to place food on

[17] And so, *abobot* is an old Tagalog term for bag.

the mouth; *palpal* is to two persons giving food to one another; *tinga* is insertion of food in between teeth. Involving the waist, *çinta*, *salocfoc* (*saluksók*), or *socfoc* (*suksók*), is to place skirts, knives, in the waist; *sucbit* is to place the kerchief, whether big or small, in the waist; *salogfog* is to place something near the stomach, *feno*; *solfol* is to place something on someone's hands, like *fabon*. On body parts that are placed somewhere, *daorao* (*dawdaw*), or *saofao* (*sawsaw*) is to dip the fingers or the hand on the water, and if it is also another thing aside from water, dipping is *caocao* (*kawkaw*); *docot* is to place the hand on the water; however, *tigi*[18] is to place the hand in boiling water (trial by ordeal); *sorot* (*sundót*) is placing the fingers in the eyes during a heated argument; *suliyap* (*silip*) is to place the fingers in front of the eyes and to peer through them; *docqit* is to place the finger to pluck something or place in the eyes, o *en mal lugar*, or in a bad place; *silat*, or *bolfot (buslô?)*, T., is to place the foot through a hole in the floor of the house; *balaon* is the foot falling into a pit while walking. Another meaning of meter is *hopa* (*húpa*), to establish peace among those who argue.

Sacar (42 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on what is got. *Hango* is getting something from somewhere. *Docot* (*dúkot*), or *hochoc*, or *hoca*, is to get from the basket, from a hole. *Loval* (*luwál*) is to get something from inside. *Honos* is to get the sword. *Dolarit* is to get something with a stick. *Halicvat* (*halikwát*), or *botbot*, is to get soil from deep into the sack, or basket, or well. *Poyos*, L., or *payas*, T., is to get fire with a stick. *Pingcqi*, L., or *pingcqil*, T., is to make fire with steel, *eflabon*, and flint, *pedrenal* (sic; *pedernal*).[19] *Cahig* is to get coals of fire to take to another place (here, it is synonymous with *caycay*), or to get something with a stick, or to get a foreign object from the eye. *Ylit* is to ignite fire.

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[18] Fray Pedro explains that when a datum was lacking among the natives to know who the thief was, they boiled water and when it boiled, they had submerged the hands of the suspects, and if the hands were left unscathed, they were set free, and whoever was scalded was arrested at once and was said to have stolen ("*Quando faltaua algo entre eftos para fauer quien lo a hurtado calentauan agua y al herbir hacian meter las manos dentro a aqllos en quien fofpechaban y fi no fe quemaban eftaban libres y el que fe quemaua sacando de prefto la mano deçian lo auia hurtado*"). Fray Pedro then judges the said trial as nonsense (*neçedad*).[19] Cfr. "*Pedernal*," *SpanishD!ctionary.com*, http://www.spanishdict.com/translate/pedernal.

Lofong is to get something by force. *Laravan* is to get an image. *Tilos* is to sharpen something. *Batibot* is to get someone else's innards. *Tipo*, or *longas*, is to forcibly remove another person's teeth. *Hofo* (*húgot*) is to get the ring from the finger. *Salacfac*, or *salangfalang*, is to get soil from a pit with a bamboo stick. *Sandoc* is to get rice porridge, *morifqueta*, with a spoon; or *cavot*, to get something with a spoon. *Halachalac* is to pant like a dog out of sheer thirst or heat. *Sagip* is to save someone from drowning. *Sovit* (*su-ít*) is to take out a thorn, *fubi*, with a pointed object. *Dolang* is to get metal from the mines. *Salavay* is to get the phlegm or sputum, *gargajo*, from the mouth through the fingers. *Docqit* is to get with a finger or a stick something from somewhere. *Acay* is when the birds get their offspring to fly. *Pifa* is when the hen sits over her eggs. *Pogos* is to take the stain off the clothes by washing. *Alac* is to get something little by little, *por alquitara*. *Tabo*, or *carlo*, or *tavyng*, is to get something liquid from a jar, or any other container. *Potpot* is to get cotton from the bud. *Gila* is to take water off a boat by moving it here and there.

Cojer (*coger*, 46 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on what is picked or grasped. *Sayog* is to get somebody carelessly (*defcuydado*). *Polot*, or *dacot*, L., or *limot*, T., or *simot*, is to pick something by hand from the ground, like garbage or rice. *Saloc*, or *calos*, L., or *caros*, T., is to get garbage, soil, or any other thing from the ground using a shovel. *Dampot* is to get something with pincers, something hot or otherwise, or with the fingertips; if it is with the entire hand, it is *sacol*. *Ipit* is to get something with two chopsticks, any dirty thing to throw it away. *Sipit* is to pick something with tongs, *tenaças*. *Locot*[19] is to get a bed. *Ticlop* is to fold something, like an alb, a piece of cloth, *manta*, or any other clothing. *Lolon* is to roll the *banig*, a bed. *Icom* is to gather hair together. *Sagap* is to get with the hand something from the water, like shrimps or small fry; *sacqior* is to get *balang*, locusts, with a small net. *Halocaipcaip* is to cross the arms close to the chest, as friars do. *Lubag* is to roll up the sail in navigation. *Langab*, or *binos*, is to collect rainwater. *Baynos* is

[19] Fray Pedro explains that *locot* is to get a bed used by the religious, and only they use this word, although it is Visayan ("*cama de religiofos que ellos folos vfan efte vocablo aunque es Bifaya*").

to collect cotton from the forest (?), *mata*. *Popol* is to collect safflower or fake saffron, *alaçor* (*alazor*), called *cafubha* [*Carthamus tinctorius Linn*.[20]]. *Poti* (*púti*) is to harvest fruits manually; *langot* is to harvest fruits, or get leaves not by cutting, but by hand; *çungcqit* (*sungkít*) is to harvest fruits with an instrument, *horqueta*. *Licao* is to coil the rope. *Pifcal*, or *taon*, is to catch someone in a delict, by day or by night; more specifically, abut is to catch somebody either in adultery or in robbery; *sagip* is to catch a fleeing slave; it is also to save somebody from drowning. *Salo* (*salô*) is to catch something falling. As to animals, *cagat* is when dogs catch the game; *dagit* is to catch a prey in midair; *dacqip* is to catch a pig or anything fleeing; *huli* (*húli*) is to catch something with a net, whether fish or game; *talaba* is to catch oysters. For women, *salocbit*, or *salocfoc* (*saluksók*), is to clip the skirt in the waist in order to do a chore or to cross a river; *bayacqis* is to clip the skirt between the legs. *Coyom* is to hold the handkerchief in the four corners. *Ani* is to harvest rice; *ticqiom* (*tíkom*) is to gather the rice under the sun that had been left to dry and later to be milled; *nolong* is to help get rice for a day's consumption.

Cortar (47 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on what is cut, and how it is cut, although the verbs on what is cut also give an idea of how something is cut. *Potol* is to cut something in any way and with whatever instrument, *herramienta*. As to what is cut, *hiva* is to cut meat or fish; *taga* (*tagâ*) is to cut wood in quantity, or to cut wood on the mountain; *calap* is to cut wood or bamboo to make sticks; *cayas* is to shave something off the wood, or a candle; *taftas* is to untie. As to fruits — bananas: *tiba* is to cut the bunch, *bovyg*, of banana; *layang* is to cut off the leaves on the lower part of the banana shrub, or the branches off a tree, lest it fall; *palas* is to remove the weed and *cogon* from the canals; *gitas* is to cut the (dried) leaves off a coconut tree; *pongol* is to remove by hand the shoots, *renueuos*, of a tree. As to clothing, *talas*, or *tabas*, is to cut textile or clothing; *gunting* is to cut with scissors; *satfat* (*tastás?*) is to cut with the tips of the scissors. *Gapas* is to have a haircut or a shave. Alas is to cut off the end of something to make it the same as another thing. *Pingas* is to cut a part of the ear. *Sumbali* is

[20] Cfr. "*Kasubha*," *StuartXChange*, http://www.stuartxchange.org/Kasubha.html (accessed 23 Sept 2016).

to decapitate someone; if it is with a single blow, as a curse, it is *taba* (later, *tabás?*). As to how something is cut, *hati* is to cut something into two. *Tigpas*, or *tipas*, or *tagpas*, is to cut something with a single blow. To strike something tough, with a machete or big knife, is *tabac*. *Talab*, T., is to cut with a knife or axe. *Carofcaros* is to cut something badly. *Tangab* is to cut something superficially, a *foflayo*. With regards to plants or trees, *sapol*, L., or *sipol*, T., or *otor*, T., or *gargar*, is to cut a tree or plant while leaving the roots on the ground; *cuhit* is to remove the weed in between the on the field with a sharp shovel placed underneath the weed; *popo* is to cut big trees, like the *niyog*; *pocan*,[21] T., is to cut trees in the forest, to make it a field; *giling*, T., is to cut into pieces. With metals, *tatac* is to etch in a golden, silver, or any other metal surface with the use of another instrument; *gupit* is to cut with a silversmith's scissors something, a metal sheet. With food, *gilit* is to slice fish crosswise; *lapa* is to cut meat into four portions; *hilis* is to slice something into portions; *giha*, or *dalipay*, or *dalip*, T., to slice root crops into portions; *tilar* is to slice into somewhat bigger portions; *gayat* is to slice more thinly; *pinlir* is to slice something into equal portions, especially applied to the sugar cane.

Dar (47 entries in Tagalog) is translated depending on what is given and how it is given. It may, at first, seem surprising how many words can be translated from the single Spanish verb *dar*. It is because *dar* is a common element of many verbal phrases in Spanish, which was most probably how the authors/compiler may have translated and classified the Tagalog verbs into Spanish - e.g., *dar de comer*, *dar de beuer*, etc. *Bigay* is the general term. As to what is to be given, *pamago*, from *bago*, is to give the firstfruits. In eating, *cayn* (*káin*) is to give something to eat; *aloc* is to offer a sick person, unable to eat by him/herself, something to eat; *samir* is to choke when eating or drinking hurriedly. In drinking, *inum* is to give somebody something to drink; *tagay* is to offer somebody something to drink by giving a cup with wine; *paling* is when somebody trips, *çancadillas*, when drunk. In clothing, *damit* is to give somebody

[21] Fray Pedro clarifies it *pocan* is to cut trees "in the mountain they call *gubat,* so to prepare that field, as what those in Calaylayan, Tayabas, and other towns do."

clothing. *Hinau* is to give somebody water, for washing. *Laba*[22] is to get involved in usury, a *logro*.[23] In school, *sulit* is to undergo an exam. *Ngalan* is to give somebody, or something, a name. *Sapo* is to give *color* to gold with a certain *colored* earth (here, I find the meaning uncertain). *Salamat* is to give thanks; pa- is a prefix to gift something — *e.g., palupa*, [he] (donated) this land; *yari* (probably pronounced *i-árі*) is when a land gives a good variety of fruit. *Iyac* is to cry. In navigation, *layag*, or *bogmos*, is to spread the sail; *bagbag*, or *bogingbing*, is when a storm hits the coast; *dagfa* is to voluntarily go to the coastline amidst a storm; *sayar* is when a ship or boat hits the shore. *Salang* is when a game is caught in the net. As to how something is to be given, *goray* is to give something for free; *gavar* (*gawâ*) is to give, or gift, *graçiofamente*, something handmade. As to one's body, *dugva*, or *doal*, is to induce oneself to vomit; *tuca* is to move the head downwards out of sleepiness, although *tango* (*tangô*) is to nod; *catab* is to rattle one's teeth, because of cold weather; *alimoom* is to emit either a fragrant or a foul odor; *imbay* is to move one's arm or *cocotoneo*; *alavas* is when a sick person is restless in bed. As to actions toward others, *baoy* is to hit somebody in the face with something; *sicqil* is to hit somebody with the elbow; *calabit* is to make signals to somebody; *tadyac* is to kick somebody; *tolot* (*túlot*), or *alam* (*álam*), is to give permission to who asks for it, to go somewhere; *palo* is to whack somebody with a slim stick or branch, *verdafcaços*; *limbay* is to hit somebody with something one is happening to carry upon the shoulder; yba is to give somebody something else; *balis* (*bális*, from the Latin greeting, *vales* [greetings/farewell]?) is to place a piece of cloth, *paño*, in somebody's aching stomach, while repeating, *"balis, balis..."*. *Libot* is to go back again and again to something; *biling* is to return to something or to go around it again and again.

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[22] It might be surprising for a 21st century Filipino that *laba* is not translated as washing one's clothes (if the pronunciation back in 1613 is *labâ*), but this is partly clarified when we remember that the SB 1613 lists another verb, *pogos*, which is to remove the stains off the clothes by washing them.

[23] For the second possibility, cfr. "*logro*," *Diccionario de la lengua española*, http://dle.rae.es/?id=NZw9HFH. Meanings of some words are from the online *Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Edición Tricentenario*: http://dle.rae.es/?id=3RHTwRF of the Real Academia Española (heretofore, RAE).



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To be continued in Part II, to appear in the March 2027 issue of Landas.

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BOOK REVIEW – INTEGRAL ECOLOGY MINISTRY: DOING ECOLOGICAL THEOLOGY AND ADVOCACY IN LIGHT OF *LAUDATO SI'*

Norlan H. Julia, SJ

Book Title: Integral Ecology Ministry: Doing Ecological Theology and Advocacy in Light of *Laudato Si'*

Publisher: Mindanao Institute of Journalism, Davao City (2025)

Author: Fr. Reynaldo D. Raluto

An old philosophical riddle asks the question, "which came first, the chicken or the egg?" By now, science – particularly evolutionary biology - has settled the question (read: the egg came first!) Nevertheless, this same riddle continues to challenge our thinking. Its value lies not in the answer it proposes; rather, it is the *questioning* that exposes dichotomies and binary distinctions so characteristic of the modern – and Western – mindset, including the theological enterprise.

Fr. Reynaldo (Rey) Raluto's latest *opus* serves as a beacon set against the backdrop of dichotomized and polarizing discourse on climate issues and ecological theology. The book's title is itself already a statement of what the author would like to offer: *Integral Ecology Ministry: Doing Ecological Theology and Advocacy in Light of Laudato Si'* (2025). This collection of Fr. Rey's published journal/academic articles and short

reflections provides a wealth of theological reflections and pastoral insights from one of the country's foremost ecological theologians and environmental advocates.

The book's two parts delineate two facets of the *integral* ecological ministry. Part One is an exposition of the rich ecological theology framework borne through Fr. Rey's dialogue and reflections from the fertile ground of *Laudato Si'*. Part Two proceeds as the logical – and even, providential – consequence of any mature theological reflection: as advocacy and movement towards liberation, so dear and personal to Fr. Rey's priestly ministry and life. In both parts of the book, the operative word is *doing*. Yet "doing" here, as wont in dichotomized and binary thinking, has never been opposed to "being." Reading the articles in this book, one can find how both the *doing* of ecological theology and ecological advocacy express that "sublime communion" (to borrow a key term in the book's opening article) between theory and praxis. With the prevailing discourse on climate issues and ecological theology, this integral vision offers a potent antidote to the all-too-common temptation of reductionism. This work stays true to the spirit of *Laudato Si'*: "everything is interconnected" – especially theological reflection and advocacy!

On a more personal note, I can say that this book has already been written long before it was transcribed and published. The wealth of reflections and insights offered by Fr. Rey were first lived realities nurtured, challenged, and refined from the many years of teaching theology in the seminary, engaging with the marginalized Indigenous Peoples of Malaybalay, and working with and for Basic Ecclesial Communities of Mindanao and the rest of the country. The images included in this book are not just mere aesthetic or pictorial addenda; they speak of the actual history and the faces of engagements and struggles which a true integral ecology ministry entail. Working with Fr. Rey for many years at St. John Vianney Theological Seminary has provided myself – and the whole community of formator-priests, seminarians, co-missionaries, and partners in the apostolates – an integral view of ecological ministry lived reflexively, faithfully, and joyfully.

Let it be clarified: this book is not another intimidating scholarly tome on a subject as complex as ecological theology, climate science, and Christian anthropology. The book may be viewed more properly as a kind of spiritual journal detailing Fr. Rey's heart as a theologian, priest, formator, companion, pastor, crusader, ecological advocate, mountain climber, tree grower, and many more.

I take note of Chapter 21 in Part Two, which stands out among the whole volume – particularly for its language, content, and intended audience (My only contention is that an English translation could have been provided for the benefit of non-Cebuano speakers – so that they can appreciate more Fr. Rey's "pastoral heart" exposed in this book!). Nevertheless, this must have been a deliberate choice. Contextual theology reminds us that the language-culture dynamic serves as another *locus theologicus* so essential in theologizing, including engagement in an Integral Ecology Ministry. Or to speak the language of *Laudato Si'*: "the indigenous communities and their cultural traditions…are not merely one cultural minority among others, but should be the principal dialogue partners" (no. 146). In this regard, the book has much to show and teach us.

In the very last page of the book, we are faced with a question: to move or to remain? This summarizes the whole impetus of this book. The concern is not a matter of resolving a philosophical riddle. There is no priority or mutual exclusivity between doing and being, moving or remaining. Fr. Rey begins by grounding us in the gift of communion and eventually leads us to ecological conversion and transition to integral ecology. This is not a question of what or which comes first. It is only a matter of moving forward as the Church's – and the earth's – synodal march continues. Echoing the continuing appeal *Laudate Deum*: "I ask everyone to accompany this pilgrimage of reconciliation with the world that is our home and to help make it more beautiful, because that commitment has to do with our personal dignity and highest values" (no. 69).

This book challenges us: our ecological commitment to integral ecology cannot remain half-hearted. We can only press onward *doing ecological theology and advocacy in light of Laudato Si'*!